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Introduction 
The international workshop on "Climate Change: Integrating Science, Eco- 
nomics, and Policy" is the third in a series of interdisciplinary meetings or- 
ganized a t  the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
during the past four years. Currently, it is widely recognized in both the 
analytical and policy coinmunities that the complex issues surrounding the 
prospect of climate cha.nge and response measures and policies cannot be ad- 
equately assessed from the perspective of any single discipline in either the 
natural or social sciences, and that these issues cannot be resolved in the 
policy domain alone. This is one of the reasons for the continued research 
activities in this important area at  IIASA and for the decision to organize 
this, the third international workshop to  address these issues. 
The workshop originated because the organizers shared the view that 
small, focused meetings on specific a.spects of the economics of international 
enviroilmental problems would be a, pa.rticularly effective way to  expand the 
frontier of kilowledge in this area. Such illeetiilgs would emphasize the in- 
terdisciplinary and interllatioilal ilature of both the issue and the underlying 
scientific effort. This vision has coiltiilued through all three of the workshops 
held to  date. 
The first workshop, whicll took place a t  IIASA from 28-30 September 
1992, focused on the coillpara,tive a,ssessillellt of mitigation of climate change 
and on its potential impacts ailcl adaptation strategies. One of the key 
findings of this worlisl~op was the need for integrated assessment. IIASA 
held the second workshop a year later from 13-15 October 1993. The secoild 
workshop focused on the review of tlle integrated assessment approaches and 
inlplicatioils for climate cha.nge policies. The proceediilgs of both workshops 
have been published by IIASA.* 
This volume reports on the proceediilgs of tlle third international work- 
shop, held 19-20 March 1996. This workshop focused on three related re- 
search areas in the economics of climate change: market and nonmarket 
impacts of climate change; costs and timing of greenhouse gas emissions 
abatement measures and strategies; and emissions reduction policies. De- 
spite the considerable progress made during the past few years, these three 
- - - - 
* Kaya, Y.,  Nakifenovif, N . ,  Nordhaus, W.D., and Toth, F.L., eds., 1993, Costs, Impacts, 
and Benefits of C 0 2  Mitigation, CP-93-2, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria; and Nakifenovit, 
N . ,  Nordhaus, W.D., Richels, R. ,  and Toth, F.L. ,  eds., 1994, Integrative Assessment of 
Mitigation, Impacts, and Adaptation to Climate Change, CP-94-9, IIASA, Laxenburg, 
Austria. 
research areas are still associated with significant methodological hurdles 
and scientific uncertainties. For example, on the impacts side, estimating 
nonmarket damages and the amenity effects has been very difficult, and on 
the mitigation side it has been very difficult to endogenize the role of tech- 
nology in determining the costs and timing of emission abatement. The third 
research area, policy issues, is of great importance, because measures aimed 
a t  stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations a t  some negotiated 
level, in accordance with Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Conven- 
tion on Climate Change, could require quite high, and in some cases costly, 
reductions of emissions. The proceedings have been divided into three parts 
to reflect these related research areas: the first part deals with the impacts 
of climate change, the secoild with greenhouse gas emissions abatement mea- 
sures, and the third with einissioil reductioil policies. 
Participants in the workshop included some 62 scientists from more than 
17 countries, representing a nuinber of different disciplines. The two-day 
workshop was divided into seven sessions covering research areas such as 
the science of climate change, assessinents of impacts of climate change, the 
role of technology, special topics in integrated assessment, and policy and 
implementation issues. Sessions generally started with the presentation of 
two invited papers and contributioils by invited panel discussants, followed 
by general discussions. This volume iilcludes the revised versions of papers 
presented a t  the workshop. The three parts of these proceedings reflect the 
written contributions and the discussions of the seven workshop sessions. 
The workshop was jointly organized by the four editors of this volume, 
who share the respoilsibility for its scientific content. The editors are listed in 
alphabetical order, because of their joint contributions to  the organization of 
the workshop. The workshop was financially supported by the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI), the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Ailalysis (IIASA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIE;), and Yale University. 
The workshop organizers would like to  extend their thanks to  the par- 
ticipants and contributors who provided the essential intellectual substance 
during the sessions and discussions, in particular to  the authors of papers 
presented in this collaborative volume and to the institutions that provided 
financial support to  bring such a distillguished group of scientists together 
for the third time 011 this ilnportailt research topic. 
The organizers are much indebted to  Nadejda Makarova for research 
assistance and to Ewa Delpos, Ellen Bergschneider, Lilo Roggenland, Angela 
Dowds, and Patricia Wagner for their valuable help in the organization and 
preparation of this volume. 
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Part I 
Impacts and Damages of 
Climate Change 

Climate Amenities and Global Warming* 
William D. Nordhaus 
Yale University, New Haven, CT,  USA 
Abstract 
The most intractable issue in the ecoilomics of climate change has been t o  
estimate the economic impacts. The present study addresses a specific ma- 
jor area of ignorance: the amenity effects of climate. We employ hedonic 
wage techniques to  estimate the impact of an equilibrium carbon dioxide 
( C 0 2 )  doubling on climate amenities. Using data on 3105 US counties along 
with climate change estimates from general circulation climate models, we 
estimate that  an equilibrium C 0 2  doubliilg of s 0 F  (or 4.5OC) would be asso- 
ciated with a disamenity prenliuill of about 0.17% of gross domestic product 
(GDP). Bootstrap techniques indicate that  this estimate is quite fragile and 
subject t o  both sampling error and specification error. Considering all fac- 
tors, we conclude that the most likely effect of an equilibrium C 0 2  doubling 
for the USA would be a disamenity of 0.17% of output with an uncertainty 
of about 2.5% of output. 
1. Summary and Conclusions 
Because this study is long and complicated, I provide a summary for the 
harried scientist a.nd policy inalter. 
1. The present study estimates the impact of greenhouse warming on 
climate amenities. The amenities associated with climate change include the 
effects on the value of directly "consumed" climate as well as the impacts on 
leisure and other noilmarket activities that are complementary with climate. 
Amenity effects may be significant because of the large economic value of 
leisure and because of the high climatic content of many leisure activities. 
2. Valuation of climatic amenities poses deep difficulties because they 
are not directly bought and sold and do not provide the "price, quantity" 
*The author is grateful for the researcli assistance of Kathy Merola. Icris Reynolds assisted 
in preparation of the regional cost of living indexes. This study was supported by the 
National Science Foundation. 
valuations that  attach to most private goods and services. The measure- 
ment issue is addressed using hedoilic wa.ge theory. Under hedonic theory, 
wage differentials associated with different climates represent the amounts 
necessary to  compensate people for the associated amenities: if the climate 
in a region is pleasant, the11 people will accept lower wages to work in that  
region. 
3. The empirical estimates rely on a new county data  set for the USA 
that  provides comprehensive coverage of 310.5 US counties. The major new 
da ta  are nominal wages and cost of living indexes by county. The county 
climate data  are drawn from an earlier study by Mendelsohn et al. (1994), 
and estimates of the impact of C 0 2  doubliilg are drawn from projections 
of 16 general circulation models. We construct three "consensus climates" 
that  are alternative averages of the different models. These models project 
an average warming of 8OF (4.5OC) and an increase of 4% in precipitation. 
4. In the regression estimates, the dependent variable is real average 
hourly earnings, while the exogenous indepeildent variables include climatic, 
demographic, and geophysical variables. The climatic variables are a cubic 
function of temperature, a qua.dratic function of precipitation, and interac- 
tion terms. The geogra,phic variables include latitude, longitude, contiguous 
bodies of water (such as ocean, the Great Lakes, and navigable rivers), and 
interaction terms. The socioecoiloiuic va.riables include the unemployment 
rate, the density of the popula.tion, education, a.nd ethnic variables. Pop- 
ulation density is taken to  be an endogellous variable in the simultaneous- 
equation estimates, and we use a.s instrument for population the employment 
in "export industries." 
5. We estimate the model using different techniques and different speci- 
fications. The central estimates use a uniforln climate change scenario. The 
preferred estimate (two-stage least squares with wage-weighting) indicates 
that  a warming has a small disameility premium for the USA. In the pre- 
ferred equation, an equilibrium C 0 2  doubling causes amenity losses of about 
0.35% of aggregate US wages. This is the equivalent of about 0.17% of US 
gross domestic product (GDP). At 1995 levels of prices and incomes, this 
represents $12 billion per year. 
6. Bootstrap techiliques indicate that this estimate is quite fragile and 
subject to both sampliilg error and specification error. Data bootstrap tech- 
niques indicate that the uncertainty of the hedonic impact is about 3.5% 
of total wages, while specificatioil tests indicate a similar range uncertainty. 
Other wage series tend to indicate that  climate change will lead to a positive 
amenity. Traditional weighting a.pproaches also suggest that  warming will 
lead to  increased amenities. 
7. Weighing all the different specifications and bootstraps, the most 
likely impact of an equilibrium C 0 2  doubling for the USA is a disamenity 
of 0.35% of total wages (or 0.17% of total output) with an uncertainty or 
standard error on this estimate of 5% of wages (or 2.5% of output). 
2. Background 
Climate change involves complex and controversial issues of economics and 
politics, but perhaps the most intractable has been the issue of valuing cli- 
mate change. This issue involves a wide variety of sectors and regions as 
well as the need to forecast impacts in the distant future. In a few areas, 
researchers are reasonably confident that they have identified the principal 
impacts. For agriculture and forestry, estimates of damage are in place for 
a number of countries, although the estimates differ widely depending on 
the technique and time horizon. However, in a number of sectors of great 
potential importance, there a,re no serious scientific estimates of the poten- 
tial impacts. The areas of greatest uilcertainty are nonmarket impacts on 
humans and impacts on natural ecosystems. For these, researchers have to  
date made essentially no progress. 
The present study attempts to  fill the knowledge gap in one particularly 
important area, amenities. More specifically, we estimate the value of climate 
on location-specific, iloilinarketed goods and services. This mouthful of a 
phrase encompasses a wide arra,jr of goods and services. Perhaps the most 
important ones are the effects of cliinate chailge on the value of directly 
"consumed" climate as well as the effects on leisure and other ilonmarket 
activities that  are complementary with climate. 
These effects may be quite significant for two reasons. First, the value 
of leisure and iloilmarket time is a significant fraction of total economic 
income. Estimates of the value of leisure time indicate that  it has approxi- 
mately the same value as all marketed consumption goods and services (see 
Figure 1). A second factor is that climate has major interactions with the 
use of nonmarket time. While work time is often either climate-controlled or 
not significantly affected by climate, leisure time in activities such as skiing, 
swimming, sunning, gardening, hang gliding, and similar activities is highly 
dependent on the weather conditions. The importailce of nonmarket time 
and the dependence of leisure activities on climate raises the potential for a 
major impact of climate change on the value of nonmarket activities. 
The study of amenity values of climate change in the context of global 
warming is still in its infancy. Fankhauser, in his survey of the area, reports 
Figure 1. Leisure, nonmarket activity, and measured output. Nonmar- 
ket activities such as leisure and household activities have economic value 
comparable with that of market output. Source: Nordhaus and Tobin, 1972. 
that tlze "monetary value of a benign climate is still largely unknown . . ." 
(Fankhauser, 1995, p. 43). In his study of climate change, Cline does not 
even hazard a guess on the amenity value (Cline, 1992, pp. 115-116). The 
only serious study of the subject dates back to an analysis by Hoch and Drake 
(1975) on the value of climate amenities associated with global cooling from 
ozone depletion.' Their study used relatively limited data on wages and 
climate. An application of their result would indicate that the greenhouse 
effect as applied to the USA would lead to modest increases in amenity 
values. 
Local climate impacts actually encompass a broad array of factors in 
addition to  climate amenities. For example, if the climate in a region is asso- 
ciated with unpleasant and dangerous pollution, then this would be included 
'This was part of the CIAP study on the effect of a fleet of supersonic aircraft on 
various sectors (see Hoch and Drake, 1975). 
in the climate valuation of that  region. If the climate of the Zauberberg is 
beneficial t o  health, this also would enter into the valuation of the climate. 
More generally, we can distinguish the effect of climate on productivity of 
tradable goods, productivity of non-tradable goods, and consumption activ- 
ities. 
To the extent that  climate increases the productivity of tradable goods, 
there will be no effects on prices of goods across regions, but the rents 
of region-specific factors will rise to reflect the higher productivity. 
r If climate affects the productivity of non-tradable goods, this will affect 
both the rents of region-specific factors and the prices of the non-tradable 
goods. 
r If climate affects the consumptioil or utility in a region, then the rents 
of region-specific factors will change and the returns to labor will adjust. 
The present study focuses primarily on the third factor - the effect of 
climate on utility and the coinpleinentarity of climate with consumption. In 
general, I will interpret this as the aineility effect of climate, including the 
delight in warm and sunily days or crisp powder snow. We should recognize, 
however, that  estimated cliinate impacts include other climate-related public 
goods and non-traded goods such as pollution, health effects, transportation 
effects, and even energy costs to  the extent that these are not included in 
real wages or price indexes. 
The present study extends current research in this area in three ways. 
First, it extends the database to  a conlprehensive set of observations by con- 
structing wages, climates, and other variables at  the county level. Second, it 
identifies certain statistical issues in the estimation of hedonic wage regres- 
sions of environmental va.riables that have been largely ignored in the past 
and finds these t o  be i~nportant  in the interpretation of the data. Finally, it 
presents a new set of estimates of cliinate amenities and their relationship 
to  global warming. 
3. The Theory of Implicit Valuation 
of the Environment 
Valuation of many climatic amenities poses deep difficulties, because they are 
not directly bought and sold and do not provide the "price, quantity" valu- 
ations that  attach to most private goods and services. Economists therefore 
look for "implicit" values, or wha,t is sol~letimes called the theory of "hedo- 
nic prices," in attempting to infer the valuation of nonmarketed goods and 
services. Hedonic valuatioii is used to infer the impact of climate on land 
productivity or agricultural yields; to infer the valuation of different recre- 
ational sites through examinatioil of travel costs; and to understand the 
characteristics of jobs, such as the va.luation of safety, through comparing 
wage rates. 
This issue is particularly important for the issue of climate change, be- 
cause of the extensive interaction between climate and nonmarket activities. 
Earlier studies have tended to find little impact of climate on productive 
activities in most high-income countries (at least outside of agriculture). 
The reason for the minimal influence on nonfarm output is the ability of 
most production processes to be separated from the vagaries of climate. On 
the other hand, climate interacts nlucll more significantly with consumption 
both because climate is consumed directly (in terms of enjoyment of sunny 
days) and because climate is a. colllplelnentary input in many consumption 
activities, particularly those involving leisure time (such as skiing, sitting 
on the beach, or gardening). Because of the strong influence of climate on 
leisure and consumption activities, it is possible that  climate has a major 
impact on living sta.ndards even though its effect on measured national or 
individual income is negligible. 
3.1. A simplified example 
Even though we cannot directly mea.sure the nonmarket impact of climate 
on economic welfare, we call attempt to deduce the value through the use 
of hedonic wage techniques. The basic reasoning in the simplest case is the 
following. Assume tlmt a country is divided into different regions. Each 
region is identical except for its climate. All factors of production except 
climate and land are mobile, so labor, capital, and technology can move freely 
among the different regions. There is a single good (or composite good) that  
is produced in each region, and its price will be equal in all regions. Because 
factors are mobile, factor prices are in equilibrium equalized (net of any 
corrections for climate). 
In this simplified example, we assume that climate affects the economy 
only through its effect on individual preferences and well-being. All indi- 
viduals are identical, and, for simplicity, we suppose that  all individuals 
have identical work and leisure hours. Suppose that the relevant climate 
variable is the percentage of the year that is sunny, called "sunshine." We 
assume that individuals prefer sunnier locations to  cloudy regions; that  is, 
individual preferences include consumption of the composite good, leisure, 
and sunshine. 
Wages 
Sunshine Index 
Figure 2. Wages and the hedonic value of climate. Value of sunshine rises 
with sunshine index. With mobile labor, utility must be equalized across 
climates. Therefore, in equilibrium, wages are lower in more pleasant loca- 
tions. The sum of wages and hedonic value of sunshine equals the constant 
level of utility across regions. 
What is the ecoilonlic equilibrium? By construction, all individuals have 
the same hours of leisure, and a disnlal climate ceteris paribus lowers indi- 
vidual well-being. To induce people to  live in gloomy locations, wages must 
therefore adjust to  allow people who work there to  earn more and consume 
more of the market good. In other words, wages must provide compensating 
differentials to  offset the desirability or lack of desirability of particular lo- 
cations. If the climate in a region is so pleasant that it yields $1000 of extra 
economic well-being, then in equilibrium wages must adjust so that  workers 
can buy $1000 less of marketed goods and services. The change in wages 
then just offsets the nonmarket amenity or disamenity of the environmental 
goods and services. Figure 2 shows the basic idea for the simplest model. 
3.2. Realistic complicatiolls and the identification problem 
The simplest example just presented is the usual approach in most analyses 
of the hedonic valuation of nonmarket goods. There are, however, potent idy 
significant statistical issues that  must be addressed - the issue of statistical 
identification. This is in fact a deep and troubling issue which is usually 
ignored. In this section, I discuss the question and propose a solution. Con- 
sider the  simplest set of equations for supply and demand for labor: 
In these equations, w represents real wages in each county, Ls is labor 
supplied, Ed is the demand for labor, C is climate or a function of climate, 
Z is a set of exogenous variables such as demographics, latitude, and geo- 
physical conditions. The coefficients (a ;  and Pi) are parameters. ( C  and Z 
may be vectors of variables.) 
Equation (1) is usually interpreted as the equation for wage hedonics, 
in which the coefficients are the amenities or disamenities associated with 
particular variables. In the present study, we are interested in estimating the 
hedonic relationship between climate and wages, given by cr2. For purposes 
of discussion, take the coefficients to be scalars, but the generalization to  
vectors is immediate. In equilibrium, LS = Ed = L = actual employment, 
which yields 
The total derivatives of employment and wages with respect to  climate 
and the climate employment relationship are then 
The point that  emerges from this analysis is that  the estimated coeffi- 
cients in an ordinary least squares (OLS) hedonic wage regression will be 
Real wages 
" 1  - - - - - - - 
Employment 
Figure 3. Potential statistical bias in hedonic estimates. County 0 is a 
cold-climate county, whereas the other counties are warm-climate counties. 
(a) If climate differences only affect supply and individuals prefer warmer climates, 
then a warmer climate shifts supply down to  S', leading to  equilibrium a t  2. In this 
case, the negative association of teiuperature and wages indicates the true amenity 
value of climate. 
(b) Suppose individuals are indifferent among climates but climate affects produc- 
tion. By shifting demand from D to  D', with equilibrium a t  1, we see that the 
higher temperatures are associated with higher wages. This association gives the 
incorrect conclusioil that  individuals dislike higher temperatures. 
(c) If both (a) and (b) are a t  worli, the resulting equilibrium a t  3 gives a combina- 
tion of supply and demand effects. The wage-temperature association cannot easily 
be interpreted. 
a tangle of supply and demand coefficients. The implicit identifying as- 
sumption made in most studies of wage hedonics is that  there is no rela- 
tionship between utility and employment in the given area, or that  al = 0. 
That  is, individuals do not care whether they live in a high-employment or 
low-employment region. Under this assumption, it is clear from (5) that  
dw/dC = az, which gives the correct estimate for the hedonic coefficient. 
This is clearly subject to  poteiltial statistical bias. In the case where the 
coefficients on climate are positive (say higher temperatures are good for 
production but disliked by people) the coefficient may be biased if a1 = 0 
( that  is, if people dislike densely popula.ted areas). This is a real worry in 
the data because of the potentia,l that  wa.rmer climates are good for produc- 
tion. Fortunately, t here a.re well-developed statistical techniques for test- 
ing and correcting for simultaneous-equation bias. To correct for potential 
simultaneous-equation bias, we use two-stage least squares (TSLS). Under 
this approach, we use exogenous variables that affect demand but not supply 
as instruments for the right-hand-side endogenous variable in equation (1). 
With TSLS, the estimates of the parameters are consistent, although they 
may be inefficient relative to  other estimators. OLS estimators, by contrast, 
will be biased if the right-hand-side endogenous variables are correlated with 
the disturbances. 
Figure 3 illustrates how estimates of hedonic wage regressions can be 
biased if issues of simultaneous-equation bias are ignored. In this simple case, 
the wage-temperature relationship provides the correct hedonic estimate if 
production is unaffected by clima,te. 
4. Sources of Data 
4.1. General approach 
To estimate the amenity value of climate, we have developed a new data  
set a t  the county level for the USA. Most studies to date have relied on 
larger aggregates, primarily data for cities or large metropolitan areas. The 
advantages of moving to the county level are twofold. First, the number of 
observations increases significantly, with the potential for using 3105 counties 
as opposed to approsilllately one-tenth that  number of cities. Second, many 
of the important attributes of clima.te, particularly those relating to  outdoor 
activities, are likely to be more important in nonurban locations than in 
urban locations. Simply put, the climate is likely to  matter less in the 
Washington subway system or in the New York Squash and Racquet Club 
than on a beach in Southern California or a ski area in Colorado. 
The disadvantages of using the county data are, first, the lack of ob- 
servations on individuals and the consequent requirement of using county 
aggregates. This implies that less information on individual characteristics 
is available. A more important hurdle has been the need to construct a wide 
variety of data  that do not exist at  the county level. This study relies on an 
earlier set of estimates of county climates that were developed in Mendel- 
sohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (MNS; Mendelsohn et al., 1994). To implement 
the present study, it was necessary to develop county wage rates, county 
cost of living estima.tes, a,nd a set of county climate change estimates that  
drew on a wide variety of climate models. The payoff from developing this 
da ta  set is a comprehensive data  set for the USA and a much more detailed 
resolution of the climate-ameni ty relationship. 
4.2. Data 
I begin with a description of the data  used for the study. The most impor- 
tant  are da ta  on wage rates, initial climates, and projected climate change. 
The data  generally pertain to the period 1979-1986, except for the climate 
data,  which are climatic normals for the period 1951-1980. They are all 
the counties of the USA. There are 3105 counties, which include all coun- 
ties, with some minor adjustments for economic reporting areas that do not 
conform with political b ~ u n d a r i e s . ~  
Nominal wage rates. There exists no widely used data  set a t  the county level. 
It  is not possible to use census data on individuals because of sparseness of 
the data  for small counties. There are two largely independent data  sets that  
can be used to  construct county wage data. The first and least satisfactory 
are census estimates of total wages and hours of work in mailufacturing by 
county. These da ta  are the only ones that  contain reliable estimates of llourly 
wages. Their shortcoming is that  the coverage is but a small fraction of the 
work force, particularly so in many smaller rural counties. 
The data  set that forms the primary source for this study is derived 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates of employmeilt and 
wages by industry a t  the county level that  is contained in the Regional 
Economic Information System (REIS; US Department of Commerce, 1995). 
We constructed a number of different indexes to  test for robustness, but the 
preferred wage rate is an index of earnings in those industries which have 
primarily full-time workers (we call this Index # 4). To construct this index, 
we calculated average hourly earnings in each county for the 10 major full- 
time industries. These were calculated by taking average wages per employee 
in the county and dividing this by the national estimate of hours worked in 
that industry. The average hourly earnings were then combined in a fixed 
weighted index using national employment weights. To remove business 
cycles and temporary influences, we then took an average of the county 
wage rates for three years, 1979, 1982, and 1986. 
'The major deviations are in the state of Virginia, for which we have created 25 "su- 
percounties," or reporting areas that are combinations of smaller counties. For these and 
other counties where the political and economic boundaries do not coincide, we either take 
average da ta  for the counties or use the da ta  for the largest county. 
The major external validation of the wage series was a conlparison for 
a series on manufacturing wages based on the BEA manufacturing earnings 
da ta  with estimates on hourly earnings in illanufacturing from the census. 
The correlation was 0.848. It is clear that  there is potential for error in 
measurement of the wage rates given the lack of county-level hours data. 
On the other hand, there is little variation across states or years in the 
hours worked, and the errors are highly unlikely to be correlated with county 
climates, so the errors are likely to  lead to imprecise estimates rather than 
biased ones. 
Regional cost of living indexes. Hedonic estimates clearly should examine 
real wages ( that  is, wages corrected for regional cost of living) rather than 
noininal wages. This is potentially a serious issue because of the clear cor- 
relation of the cost of living with regions, with higher living costs in coastal 
areas, in cities, and in the Northeast and with lower costs of living in t,he 
South. There are no satisfactory cost of living indexes available today, so 
we devised an approach based on existing data. The basic data  came froin a 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) study of regional costs of living conducted 
in 1981-1983 (see BLS, 1982, 1967). This study contained observations for 
25 cities and 4 regional nonmetropolitan areas. We have no further reli- 
a.ble da ta  on general costs of living. Elowever, this study indicated that the 
prima,ry source of regional cost of living differentials is housing costs, a.nd 
there are detailed surveys of housing costs in different regions prepared for 
government housing assistance progra.ms. We therefore combined the BLS 
survey with Department of Housing and Urban Development data  on rentals 
by county to  compute a regional cost of living index. We then calculated 
real wages as the nominal wage rate divided by the regional (county) cost of 
living. 
The regional cost of living calculations are probably the weakest link 
in the entire estimate of the wage hedoilics (aside from missing va,riables). 
This is particularly worrisome beca.use of the clear association of cost of 
living with climate. We have attempted to  ma.ke various corrections for this 
potential bias, but the issue should be flagged. 
County clinzates. Climatic data  pose measurement issues because they are 
available by meteorological station rather than by county, so it was neces- 
sary to estimate county-average climates. As noted above, the data were 
constructed by Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (MNS). MNS sta'rted 
with climate data  that  were available from the National Climatic Data  Cen- 
ter, which gathers information from more than 5000 meteorological stations 
throughout the USA. These stations form a dense set of observations for 
most regions of the continental USA with the exception of some of the desert 
Southwest. The data include information on precipitation and temperature 
for each month from 1951 through 1980. Because the purpose of this study 
is t o  predict the impacts of climate change on amenities, it is appropriate 
to  consider the long-run impacts on wages of precipitation and temperature, 
not of year-to-year variations in weather. We consequently examine the "nor- 
mal" climatological variables - the 30-year average of each climatic variable 
for every station as well as seasonal averages. MNS then used the station 
data  to  create an estimated climate for each county. For this purpose, tlie 
county climate was located in the geographical center of the county. 
For the present study, we conducted a number of validation esercises by 
comparing the county climates estimated in hfNS with climate data on the 
cities in the counties. These comparisons indicated a close correspondence for 
most counties. For a dozen or so counties, mostly in the states of California 
and Washington, there were some significant deviations, generally because 
of unusual local topological conditions, but there were no obvious biases 
that  seemed to  arise from the discrepancies. Finally, we added data for the 
counties in Alaska and Hawaii so as to con~plete the coverage to the entire 
United States. 
Clinznte change estimates. One of the principal issues addressed in this study 
is the estimated impact of climate change in tlie coming decades. To estiinate 
this, we compare the difference between a hypothetical future cliinate and 
the current base climate. The base climate was just discussed. The future 
climate is generated by taking the current level of climate variables and 
adding to them the estimated change in ~ l i m a t e . ~  
The changes are the estimated effects of doubling of C 0 2  taken from runs 
of 16 different general circulation models (GCMs). The numerical estimates 
for the individual models were calculated by Robert Mendelsohn of Yale 
University and Larry Williams of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 
which they provided for this study. These were interpolated from the C:CM 
gridpoints by cubic splines. Alaska and Hawaii were included using data 
from runs on different GCMs. 
We created three "consensus" climate change scenarios for this study. 
One is the simple average for each county across the different models 
- - 
3 T l ~ a t  is, future climate is estimated as the base climate from the meteorological data  
plus the estimated change in climate from the climate models. This approach ensures 
that poor projections of current climate in the climate models will not inflnence the initial 
conditions. 
("average of models"). A second constructs a statistical optimum or port- 
folio in which the models were weighted by their success in predicting the 
initial climate (this is the "portfolio of models"). The final consensus cli- 
mate is a uniform national average climate change. For this, we took the 
wage-weighted average climate change from the portfolio model (which is an  
8.02OF or 4.5OC change in temperature, and a 4.04% change in precipitation) 
and applied this change equally in all counties (this is the "uniform national 
average" ). 
Other datci. The regressions contain a number of other variables that  are 
likely to affect labor markets either through supply or demand. These include 
variables on the supply side (including demographics such as ethnic origin 
and education) or demand side (such as the presence of bodies of water, 
ports, tonnage of ports, and rivers, as well as the presence of state capitals 
in the county). These variables were derived from a wide variety of sources 
including, notably, the US Commerce Department, Couilty and City Data, 
Book (US Department of Commerce, 1994). In addition, we included the 
influence of latitude and longitude, which determine sea,sona.l sunshine, as 
well as intenctions ailloilg the different geographical variables. We include 
certain labor market variables, such as the unemploylneilt ra.te. Finally, 
other local public goods such as density are included. In addition, we have 
a,dded state dummy variables to capture the impact of state ta.s structures 
and public goods. 
Regressions and the loss function. A neglected issue in many studies is to  link 
the statistical procedure to the underlying purpose of the analysis. Often, 
statistical ailalyses are undertaken to estimate or project an  aggregate (such 
as consumption, the value of a stock portfolio, or total population). In such 
cases, it is generally inefficient to use ordinary least squares estimates. In 
this study, because the object of the analysis is to minimize the predicted 
error of the aggregate impact, this implies that  the loss function that  should 
be minimized is not the simple squared errors across counties. Rather, it is 
tlle squared error of the sum of tlle hedonic losses across counties. This loss 
fuilction is equal to the error in each county multiplied by the amount of 
wages in each county, then summed across all counties. We therefore use a 
weighting function for our regressions, which has as weights the total wages 
in the county.4 
4For a discussion of the use of weighted least squares, see Pindyck and Rnbinfeld (1991). 
The  author knows of no studies that  address the issue of weighting when forecasting 
aggregates from microeconomic dat.a. 
Figure 4. Raw data on real wages and temperature by county. 
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Figure 4 shows the raw association between annual mean temperature and 
real wages by county. The wide scatter in the figure indicates that  there is 
more to  life than climate. There is great variability of real wages by mean 
temperature. A visual scan indicates that little of the wide variation in wages 
across climatic zones is determined by the variation in average temperature. 
The raw association of climate and wages proves little, of course, because 
other factors may lie behind the variability and may confound any underly- 
ing relationship. Figures 5(a)-5(i) show a number of simple bivariate scatter 
plots of real wages and other important variables. These show how wages 
vary by precipitation, summer temperature, winter temperature, unemploy- 
ment, latitude, longitude, population density, port tonnage, and migration. 
There is no obvious relationship for most of the variables. The outlier with 
respect t o  high latitude is North Slope, Alaska. The summer temperature 
Precipitation (difference from 
mean, inches per month) 
Figure 5(a). R.eal wa,ge and precipita.tion. 
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Figure 5(b). Real wage and summer temperature. 
Winter temperature (degrees F, 
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Figure 5(c). Real wage aad winter temperature. 
I I I 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Unemployment rate 
Figure 5(d). Real wage and unemployment. 
Figure 5(e). Real wage and latitude. 
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Figure 5(f). Real wage and longitude. 
Figure 5(g). Real wa.ge and density. 
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+ + 
+ 
+++* + 
+ 
I I I 
-5 0 5 10 15 
Log density (difference from mean) 
Migration rate (fraction per six years) 
F i g u r e  5(i). Real wage and migration. 
graph indicates a slight negative relatioilship of wages with summer temper- 
atures, suggesting a positive amenity. The only variable that comes through 
clea.rly is the clear associatioil of wages with population density - a result 
that  has been docunlented for many years. 
The next step is to estiinate the underlying hedonic wage function. The 
principal statistical results iilvolve the OLS and TSLS estimates of the basic 
hedonic wage regression in (1) above. Rewriting this in its general form, we 
have 
The bold letters indicate vectors, and the j subscripts indicate that the 
observations are over the 3105 counties. The 25 are the exogenous variables 
affecting supply, while the c; are the disturbances to  the supply equation. In 
the OLS approach, we simply estimate (1'). In the TSLS approach, we treat 
the density variable, L;, as endogenous and use omitted exogenous variables 
from the demand equation as instruments for the endogenous variable. It 
will be useful to  present simple regressions. These are the log of real wages 
on temperature, temperature and log density, and these variables plus state 
dummy variables. The first set is unweighted; the second group is wage- 
weighted. 
coefficient ( x 100) 
On temp. Std error t-statistic 
Variables: C, TEMP 
(unweighted) 0.1626 0.0290 5.60 
Variables: C, TEMP, LDENS 
(unweighted) 0.0501 0.0278 1.80 
Variables: C,  TEMP, LDENS, 
STATE DUMMIES (unweighted) -0.0456 0.0367 -1.24 
Variables: C, TEMP 
(wage weighted) -0.0368 0.0233 -1.58 
Variables: C,  TEMP, LDENS 
(wage weighted) 0.2417 0.0203 11.89 
Variables: C, TEMP, LDENS, 
STATE DUNINIIES (wa,ge unweighted) -0.3901 0.0301 -13.00 
None of the temperature coefficients is large. Although three are statis- 
tically significant, the signs are inconsistent. The temperature coefficient is 
a semi-elasticity. The first coefficient indicates that a 1°F change in temper- 
ature is associated with a 0.16% increase in wages, or a 0.16% disamenity 
premium. The semi-elasticities ra,ilge from minus 0.39% to  plus 0.24%. 
We now turn to  the full regressiou analysis. Begin with the standard 
version of the hedonic equation (1'). This equation has the real wage rate 
on the left-hand side a,nd a group of climatic, geographic, and socioeconomic 
variables on the right-hand side. The climatic variables are a cubic function 
of temperature, a. quadratic fullction of precipitation, and interaction terms. 
The geographic va,riables include la.titude, longitude, contiguous bodies of 
water (such as ocean, the Great La,l<es, and navigable rivers), and interaction 
terms. The socioecoi~omic variables include the unemployment rate, the 
density of the population, education, and ethllic  variable^.^ 
To deal with simultaneous-equation bias, we treat wages and popula- 
tion density as endogenous and use TSLS. As an instrument for population 
'We originally intended to include other demographic variables such as the crime rate, 
pollution, and data  on other demographic groups. These were, however, not available on a 
comprehensive basis. Tests of t,he relationship with these variables for counties where the 
d a t a  were available did not illdicate ally economically significant difference in the outcome. 
density, we used a variable we call BROADS, which is roughly equal to em- 
ploynlent in exogenous or "esports" industries in a county per unit of area. 
BROADX begins with "broad export employment," which includes employ- 
ment in those industries in a county that  we reckon to  be relatively inde- 
pendent of the climate and other excluded labor-supply variables. Mining is 
a good example. The presence of mining output in a county is determined 
by geological considerations and is unlikely t o  be affected by variables af- 
fecting the supply of labor. (One of the largest observations for BROADX 
is the county containing North Slope, Alaska.) Other industries composing 
the broad instrument are manufacturing, fisheries, water transportation, and 
military. We then take total eillployillent in these industries, divide it by 
the area, and define this to  be BROADX, which is then assumed to be an 
instrument for populatioil density. 
Table 1 shows the definitions of the variables, and Table 2 shows the 
results of the basic OLS regression. It will be useful t o  focus on the coefficient 
of TEMP. Because we have removed the means from the variables, this 
coefficient gives the impact of a 1°F iilcrease in temperature on the log of 
average wages at  the illeail of the sample. The semi-elasticity of 0.0075 
indicates that  a t  the llleail of the sainple, a 1°F iilcrease in temperature 
(other things being equal) is associated with a 0.75% iilcrease in wages. 
The hedonic interpretation of this coefficieilt is that  higher temperatures are 
undesirable and require a compeilsatiilg wage differential of slightly less than 
1% per OF increase. 
The TSLS regressioil in Table 3 shows that  simultaneous-equation bias is 
a significant problem. The semi-elasticity on mean temperature is reduced by 
approximately half, as would be expected if the warm climates are associated 
with higher productivity. Other variables are relatively less affected. 
In both the OLS and the TSLS equations, density is an extremely pow- 
erful variable. This relatioilsllip was interpreted long ago in Nordhaus and 
Tobin as an "urban disameility premium" (Nordhaus and Tobin, 1973). This 
study shows that the premium is also apparent when extended to  all US 
counties and when corrections are made for regional cost of living differ- 
ences and for the simultaneous-equation bias. It is notable that the actual 
size of the urban disamenity premium is reduced by approximately half in 
the TSLS estimates. 
Figure 6 shows a plot of Lbcoilditional wages" against mean county tem- 
perature. Conditional wages are calculated as wages after removing the pre- 
dicted impact of the non-temperature variables on wages. This figure allows 
us t o  get a visual i~llpressioil of the partial relationship between wages and 
Table 1. Variable list in regression analysis. 
TEMP = Temperature by county (degrees F, deviation from national average). 
TEMP2 = TEMP ' = temperature squared 
TEMP2 = TEMP' = temperature cubed 
PREC = Precipitation by county (inches per month, deviation from national average). 
PREC2 = PREC ' = precipitation squared 
TEMPREC = TEMP x PREC = interaction of precipitation and temperature 
XTI, XT4. XT7, XTlO = Temperature by county for January, April, July, October (degrees F, deviation 
from national average annual average). 
XPI. XP4, XP7, XPlO = Precipitation by county for January, April, July, October (inches per month, 
deviation from national average annual average). 
X(s,t)2 = X(s,t) '. where i = P and T, t = 1,4,7, 10 
LDENS = log of density (persons per square mile) 
LDENS ' = square of LDENS 
COLGRAD = Fraction of population with a college degree 
HSGRAD = Fraction of population with a high-school degree 
POPHISP = Fraction of population with Hispanic origin 
LAT = Latitude (deviation from national average) 
LONG = Longitude (deviation from national average) 
LAT2 = LAT1= latitude squared 
LONG2 = LONG ' = longitude squared 
LATLONG = LAT x LONG = interaction of latitude and longitude 
OCEAN = I if county on ocean, 0 otherwise 
OCEANLAT = OCEAN-x LAT = interaction of ocen and latitude 
OCEANLON =OCEAN x LONG = interaction of ocean and longitude 
OCEANLL = OCEAN x LONG x LAT = interaction of ocean, latitude, and longitude 
TEMPOCEA = TEMP x OCEAN = interaction of temperature and ocean 
PRECOCEA = PREC x OCEAN = interaction of precipitation and ocean 
MISRIVER = I if on Mississippi River, 0 otherwise 
TONPORT = Annual tonnage transshipped in port county 
PORT = I if on a navigable waterway, 0 otherwise 
GL = I if on Great Lakes, 0 otherwise 
UR = Unemployment rate in county, 1982 
LBROADX = Logarithm of instrumental variable for density. instrument is equal to total employment in 
"exogenous" sectors per square mile as an instrument for density. Exogenous sectors are mining, 
manufacturing. water transportation,and military. 
LBROADXZ = LBROADX' = squared instrument. 
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Table 2. Ordinary least squares estimates of hedonic regression. 
LS N Dependent Variable is LAVI4 Date: 07/16/96 Time: 15:Ol 
Weighting series: WTWAG Sample: 1 3105 
Included observations: 3 105 
C 
TEMP 
TEMP2 
TEMP3 
PREC 
PREC2 
TEMPREC 
XPI 
XP7 
XPl2 
XP72 
XTI 
XT7 
XTl2 
XT72 
LAT 
LONG 
LAT2 
LONG2 
LATLONG 
LDENS 
LDENS2 
OCEAN 
OCEANLAT 
OCEANLON 
OCEANLL 
TEMPOCEA 
PRECOCEA 
COLGRAD 
HSGRAD 
POPHISP 
UR 
CAPITAL 
GL 
MISRIVER 
TONPORT 
PORT 
1.798495 
0.007549 
-8.86E-06 
- I  .37E-05 
-0.013303 
0.002717 
0.001634 
-0.037747 
-0.021746 
0.001042 
0.004429 
-0.004795 
0.004192 
0.000193 
-9.69E-05 
-0.00605 1 
0.0034 10 
-0.000810 
-2.2OE-05 
0.000328 
0.057761 
-0.001109 
-0.032275 
-0.007299 
0.002024 
1.18E-05 
-0.004292 
0.01 0062 
1.392918 
-0.08 1877 
-0.222265 
2.027405 
0.038138 
0.069676 
-0.033337 
0.000966 
0.013588 
[State dummy 
0.026685 
0.001092 
4.8 1 E-05 
1.51E-06 
0.003814 
0.001042 
0.000285 
0.003492 
0.003439 
0.000889 
0.00074 1 
0.002199 
0.002489 
0.0001 12 
0.000122 
0.00213 1 
0.000394 
0.000 104 
1.14E-05 
4.61E-05 
0.005542 
0.000379 
0.003 129 
0.001922 
0.000204 
3.41E-05 
0.001327 
0.003924 
0.05 1845 
0.046412 
0.017078 
0.077377 
0.002640 
0.003890 
0.005866 
5.87845 
0.002809 
variables included but 
67.39679 
6.912732 
-0.184174 
-9.097270 
-3.487677 
2.606923 
5.737221 
-10.80945 
-6.323522 
1.172198 
5.974525 
-2.179995 
1.684050 
1.731521 
-0.792975 
-2.839522 
8.648773 
-7.777373 
-1.939289 
7.132112 
10.42297 
-2.924014 
-10.3 1390 
-3.798457 
9.92 1202 
0.345934 
-3.234574 
2.564359 
26.86723 
-1.764131 
-13.01497 
26.20161 
14.44480 
17.91220 
-5.683345 
16.44 146 
4.837705 
not listed here.] 
Weighted SIatistla 
R-squad 0.99991 4 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999912 
S.E. of regression 0.106667 
Sum squared m i d  34.64586 
Log likelihood 2573.600 
Rob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Table 3. Two-stage least squares estimates of hedonic regression. 
TSLS I1 Dependent Variable is LAW4 Date: 0711 61% Time: I5:M 
Weighting series: WrWAG Sample: 1 3105 
Included observations: 3 105 
Instrument li: C TEMP TEMP2 TEMP3 PREC PREC2 TEMPREC XPI XP7 XP12 XP72 XTI XT7 XT12 XT72 LAT 
LONG LATZ LONG2 LATLONG LBROADX LBROAD2 OCEAN OCEANLAT OCEANLON OCEANLL TEMPOCEA 
PRECOCEA COLGRAD HSGRAD POPHISP UR CAPITAL GL MISRIVER TONPORT PORT [plus state dummies] 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Rob. 
C 
TEMP 
TEMP2 
TEMP3 
PREC 
PRECZ 
TEMPREC 
XPI 
XP7 
XP12 
XP72 
XTI 
XT7 
XT12 
XT72 
LAT 
LONG 
LATZ 
LONG2 
LATLONG 
LDENS 
LDENS2 
OCEAN 
OCEANLAT 
~CEANLON 
OCEANLL 
TEMPOCEA 
PRECOCEA 
COLGRAD 
HSGRAD 
POPHISP 
UR 
CAPITAL 
GL 
MISRIVER 
TONPORT 
PORT 
1s- 
1.871938 
0.003824 
0.000128 
- 1 .ME45 
-0.013176 
0.005420 
0.001 152 
-0.044105 
-0.023220 
0.0022 19 
0.002588 
-0.014905 
-0.009926 
0.000144 
-0.000607 
-0.009849 
0.0042 15 
-0.000883 
-1.16E-05 
0.000432 
0.03328 1 
0.001469 
-0.033070 
-0.01 1037 
0.001970 
-4.83845 
-0.006266 
0.005 198 
1.138727 
-0.000949 
-0.2583 1 1 
1.684756 
0.03477 1 
0.065392 
-0.030927 
0.001 164 
-0.004305 
dummy variables 
0.030094 
0.001 139 
5.03E-05 
1.57E-06 
0.003927 
0.001082 
0.000295 
0.003621 
0.003553 
0.000917 
0.000769 
0.002395 
0.002776 
0.000115 
0.000131 
0.002201 
0.000109 
0.000107 
1.18E-05 
4.77E-05 
0.006729 
0.000469 
0.003222 
0.002025 
0.000210 
3.528-05 
0.001392 
0.004045 
0.056539 
0.048609 
0.01 7672 
0.083587 
0.002744 
0.004043 
0.006084 
6.278-05 
0.003043 
included but not l i d  
R-squad 0.999909 Mean dependent var 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999907 S.D. dependent var 
S.E. of regression 0.109773 Akaike info criterion 
Sum s q u a d  mid 36.69285 Schwarr criterion 
F-statistic 565933.9 Durbin-Watson stat 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Figure 6. Conditional wages and temperature by county. Conditional wages 
are wages less estimated impact of non-temperature variables on wages. That  
is, if w = f (T)  + g(Z)  + E is the estimated relationship, then stripped wa.ges 
= W* = w - g(Z)  = f ( T )  + E. This shows graphically the conditional 
relationship between wages and mean temperature. 
temperature after allowing for the estimated impact of density, unemploy- 
ment, precipitation, and other variables. (The top and bottom 10 counties 
have been trimmed to  fit the graph.) The overwhelming impression of this 
graph is the loud noise and weak temperature-on-wage signal. 
We next show in Figures 7(a)-7(e) a number of conditional predictions of 
the hedonic value of climate. For each of these, we have taken the coefficients 
from the TSLS equation in Table 3 and changed the sign to  reflect the 
hedonic interpretation that  lower wages are interpreted as higher amenity 
values. These figures indicate that  the preferred climate is slightly below 
the national mean [see Figure 7(a)]. The premium on warmer climates is 
strongly positive for colder regions. Note as well the strong value of warm 
winters and warm summers in Figures 7(c) and 7(d). The density disamenity 
premium is shown in Figure 7(e). 
Figure 7(a). Estimated hedonic value of mean temperature. 
0.05 - 
0.00- z L- 4 u 0 
k el 
0 (0 
0 3 
2 2 
S c -0.05- 
.g .o 
c 3 
0 Q 2 5 
Z 
-0.10- 
-0.15 
Figure 7(b). Estimated hedonic value of mean precipitation. 
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Figure 7(c). Estimated hedonic value of summer temperature. 
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Figure 7(d). Estimated hedonic value of winter temperature. 
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Figure 7(e) .  Estimated hedonic value of density. 
5.2. Impacts of cliillate change 
We next estimate the impact of climate change on climate amenities for 
the USA. The standard technique for making this calculation is the "snap- 
shot" approach. I n  the snapshot apl~roclclz, we impose the estimated climate 
change over the next centrlry or more 012 the existing economic and demo- 
graphic structure assuming no future cltnnge in  the distribution of income or 
population. 
The basic approach is straightforward. We begin with the hedonic es- 
timates of the value of climate shown in Table 3. We then calculate the 
estimated amenity value of current climate and the estimated amenity value 
of the projected future climate. The estimated impact of climate change on 
amenities is simply the difference between the two estimates. The snapshot 
approach assumes that  the distribution of the population is unchanged; that  
the hedonic prices of climate in the future will be the same as today; and 
that  the other exogenous variables are unchanged. Obviously, these are ma- 
jor oversimplifications, but they are useful as a first step in the estimation. 
We begin by showing in Table 4 the impact of climate change for a 
standardized climate change sceizario. The standardized scenario is a 1°F 
increase in temperature and 0.5% increase in precipitation. Table 4 shows 
Table 4. Impact of normalized 1°F climate change on climate amenities* 
(equations are OLS uilless noted). 
Weighted 
STANDARD 
STANDARD (TSLS) 
TEMP 
TEMP PLUS STATE DUMMIES 
TEMP, TEMP2 
TEMP.  TEMP^, TEMP3 
TEMP, TEMP& TEMP3, PREC 
TEMP. TEMP2. LDENS 
TEMP,  TEMP^. LDENS. PREC 
TEMP.  TEMP^. LDENS, PREC, UR 
STANDARD WITHOUT UR 
STANDARD WlTH LAVl2 VSLS) 
STANDARD WlTH L A V I ~  (TSLS) 
STANDARD WlTH CENSUS WAGE (TSLS) 
Hedonic Impact 
(percent Q,C&&I waged . . 
Unweighted 
STANDARD 
STANDARD (TSLS) 
TEMP -0.162 1898.8 
TEMP,  TEMP^ -0.208 1910.5 
TEMP.  TEMP^.  TEMP^ -0.183 1920.4 
TEMP.  TEMP^, LDENS -0.133 2154.9 
TEMP,  TEMP^. LDENS. PREC -0.180 2226.1 
TEMP. TEMP2. LDENS, LPREC -0.266 2308.7 
TEMP.  TEMP^. LDENS, PREC, UR -0.133 2290.8 
*The results here correspond to a uniform I degree F warming along with a '/1 percent increase in 
precipitation. A positive sign indicates a benefit of warming, while a negative sign indicates warming is penalized. 
Note that a log likelihood difference of 3.3 cornsponds to a significant difference at a 1 percent level of confidence 
for normal variables with one variable excluded. With 50 variables excluded, a log likelihood difference of 32 is 
significant at the 1 percent confidence level. 
Table 5. Estimates of impact of global warming on real income in the 
USA.* 
Impact on Average Standard Deviation 
--
Impact of Doubling CO, 
Concentrations** 
As % of wages -0.35 
AS % of GDP -0.17 
This estimate uses the two-stage least squares, with broad income per unit area as 
an instrument for density, with state dummy variables. The underlying equation is 
shown in Table 3. 
** CO, doubling is modeled as a uniform increase of 8.02 degrees F in temperature 
and a uniform increase of 4.04 percent in precipitation. This is the wage-weighted 
uniform climate change. 
the impact as a percentage of wages in the first numerical column along 
with the log likelihood ratio of the regressioil equation in the last column. It 
is clear that  the preferred specification shown in Tables 2 and 3 have much 
higher likelihood than the other specifications; on the other hand, alternative 
approaches give quite different estimates of the hedonic impact of climate 
change. 
We next show the results of the preferred equation in Table 3 with the 
uniform national climate change sceilario discussed above. This result is 
shown in Table 5. For the preferred equation, the central estimate is that an 
equilibrium COz doubling causes amenity losses of about 0.35% of aggregate 
US wages. This is the equivalent of about 0.17% of US GDP. At 1995 levels 
of prices and incomes, this represents US$12 billion per year. 
Figure 8 and the last column of Table 5 shows the distribution of the 
hedonic estimate of climate change amenities by county. The distribution 
is centered about -1.3% of wages and is skewed to the right. The primary 
gainers from global warming in the USA are the very cold regions of Alaska 
Series: HEDOINC 
Sample 31 10 6195 
Observations 3086 
Mean -0.012943 
Median -0.019535 
Maximum 0.103502 
Minimum -0.057635 
Std. Dev. 0.026364 
Skewness 1.060866 
Kurtosis 3.957341 
Jaque-Bera 696.6967 
Probability 0.000000 
Figure 8. Distribution of impacts of C 0 2  doubling on individual counties. 
(The underlying variable is the change in hedonic income in each county 
from a C 0 2  doubling. The highest and lowest 10 have been excluded to  
increase the scale). 
and the northern plains states. The uilweighted mean of the counties in 
Figure 8 is less than the weighted mean shown in Table 5 because colder 
regions are relatively sparsely populated. 
5.3. Results of  alternative specifications 
We have undertaken extensive sensitivity a~.alysis to  test for the robustness 
of the results. The principal results are shown in Tables 4 and 6. As will 
be shown formally below in the bootstrap estimates, the results are quite 
fragile. Climate is never very important as a determinant of wages, so there 
is a risk that  climate will proxy for omitted variables. The central estimates 
indicate that global warming will on balance have a small amenity effect, 
but there is great variation around this central prediction depending on the 
exact specification. 
The results for the different principal specifications are shown in Tables 
4 and 6. 
The results are extremely sensitive to  the choice of climate model, but 
the differences among the three consensus models is quite small. 
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Table 6(c). Alternative estimates of climate amenities for different general circulation models. (Estimates use 
OLS, with wage-weighted regressions except for the last column, with state dummy variables. The average, 
median, and standard deviation are unweighted statis tics on the 16 models.) 
Note: mimain use OLS, with wage-weighted mgmsionr except for the lact column, with a t e  dummy variabln. The avcmge. medim. md siandard deviation 
are unweighted mtistia on the 16 models. 
The results are quite sensitive to  the weighting. This is shown in Tables 4 
and 6 by comparing the results with wage weighting and without weight- 
ing. Estimates that  do not weight by the relative economic importance 
of different counties tend t o  show a gain from climate change. 
There is some inconsistency among the different wage indexes. Looking 
a t  the last row of Table 6(a), which contains the TSLS estimates, the 
preferred LAVI4 index suggests a small impact of global warming on cli- 
mate amenities, while the three other wage indexes indicate a significant 
positive amenity from global warming. The difference between the wage 
series is maintained in the OLS estimates in the top half of Table 6(a). 
Although LAVI4 is conceptually superior to the other wage indexes, it 
is noteworthy that the other indexes all show higher estimates for the 
amenity impacts. 
5.4. Results of bootstrap simulations 
For complicated models like the present one, it is useful t o  apply L i b o ~ t ~ t r a p "  
techniques to  indicate the statistical reliability of the results. Bootstrap pro- 
cedures estimate reliability by replicating the estimates over a subsample of 
the original sample. Under ideal conditions (such as normality), a bootstrap 
estimate can provide an unbiased estimate of the distribution of parameters 
of interest. 
In the case a t  hand, we are interested in estimating the robustness of our 
estimates of the hedonic impact of global warming. The amenity impact, call 
it H, is a function of the set of included variables (0 as well as the sanlple 
da ta  (x) for N observations; that is, H = h ( i ,  s ,  N ) .  We calculate a "da,ta 
bootstrap" distribution of H by taking repeated subsamples of M c N .  
We also consider a "specification bootstrap," which considers a,lternative 
specifications of the hedonic equation. 
Bootstrap Replications for the Data 
We first present a data bootstrap estimate of the hedonic impact of climate 
change, H = h ( i ,  x ,  N ) ,  where we examine only the potential sampling error. 
For this estimate, we hold the specification (0 fixed and subsample from 
the 3105 counties. For this purpose, we use the basic weighted equations 
in Table 3 along with the uniform national climate change scenario. The 
exact procedure is to replicate the estimate with repeated subsamples of the 
Series: SUMNTSLS 
Sample 1 88 
Observations 88 
Mean 0.041 070 
Median 0.034666 
Maximum 0.2241 18 
Minimum -0.090342 
Std. Dev. 0.056233 
Skewness 0.502075 
Kurtosis 3.509577 
Jarque-Bera 4.649285 
Probability 0.097818 
Hedonic porometer (H) 
Figure 9. Distribution of impacts of C 0 2  doubling using data  bootstrap 
estimation. (The parameters are the estimated impact of a C 0 2  doubling as 
a fraction of aggregate wages. These estimates correspond to  the two-stage 
lea,st squares specification in Table 3. The bootstrap sample is determined 
by drawing half of the counties a t  random with replacement.) 
county data. For these, we conduct our subsampling by choosing half of the 
sample randomly and without replacement.6 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of estimates of the hedonic impact of 
climate change. These replications give a mean positive 4.2% amenity im- 
pact, with a standard deviation of 5.6%. This distribution indicates that  
with the present data  set we cannot judge whether the amenity impact is 
positive or negative. Indeed, about 80% of bootstrap samples have a positive 
hedonic value of climate change. Similar results are given by the bootstrap 
replications for the OLS estimates. 
The unsettling result here is that the central tendency of the bootstrap 
estimate is markedly larger than that of the basic result shown in Table 5 
(the mean of the bootstrap sample in Figure 9 is well determined). This 
shows the fragility of the relationship. In principle, the estimated central 
tendency of the bootstrap sample should be the same as the underlying 
regression, but non-normal errors can lead to differences in mean estimates. 
'This procedure was suggested by John Hartigan, who also made a number of helpful 
comments on the bootstrap procedure. The procedure employed is a "delete-half'' jack- 
knife, in which each observation has a probability of one-half of inclusion. For a discussion 
of bootstrap approaches, see Efron and Tibshirani (1993). 
Bootstrap Replications for the Specifications 
We have in addition developed a novel procedure that is called a specification 
bootstrap to  test for the sensitivity of the results to  different specifications. 
The idea here is as follows. As described in the last section, we are inter- 
ested in estimating the hedonic impact of climate change, H = h ( ( ,  x, N). 
In addition to sampling issues, there are clearly uncertainties about the 
specification. Say that  the hedonic function is estimated with variable set 
( = (c l , .  . . , (r,-), where the vector ( represents the Ii possible included 
variables. 
The standard approach to  specification is to  use maximum likelihood 
a,s a method of inclusion. This is useful but fails to give a measure of the 
sensitivity of the out come to  alternative specifications. Instead, we propose 
using a specification bootstrap. The simplest approacli is to assume that  
we are unsure about which variables to  include. We represent inclusion of 
the it11 variable as (; = 1 while exclusion is ci = 0. Assuming that  we 
are uninformed about which variables belong in the relationship and which 
should be excluded, we take samples of M of the Ii' possible variables. (There 
are obvious extensions for nonindepe~ldence and not-equally-likely cases, but 
those are not pursued here.) We then exanline the distribution of H for a 
sample of the potential specifications. 
For this purpose, we set M = 6; that  is, we assume that  6 of the non- 
central 56 included variables are the appropriate ones. The actual specifi- 
cation chosen is a two-stage least squares estimate with a constant, a linear 
temperature term, the two density variables and their instruments for the 
first stage, a,nd 6 randomly chosen included variables from the other 56 vari- 
ables included in the preferred equation shown in Table 3. We randomly 
sample 100 from the 32 million possible specificatio~ls. Figure 10 shows the 
estimates from the specification bootstrap simulation. The central tendency 
for the TSLS specification yields a negative hedonic relatioilship with a,n 
amenity impact of -3.5% and a standard deviation of 3.6%. (The corre- 
sponding preferred estimate for the TSLS is -0.17.) The central tendency of 
the specification bootstrap is the mirror image of the data  bootstrap, being 
less than the preferred estimate. The uncertainty in the specification boot- 
strap is somewhat less than that  in the data  bootstrap in part because three 
variables were included in all specifications. 
Series: SPENTSGA 
Sample 1 100 
Observations 100 
Mean -0.030640 
Median -0.023424 
Maximum 0.041513 
Minimum -0.133293 
Std. Dev. 0.032370 
Skewness -0.933334 
Kurtosis 4.423724 
Jarque-Bera 22.96431 
Probability 0.000010 
Hedonic parameter, H 
Figure 10. Distribution of impacts of COz doubling using specification 
bootstrap estimation. (The parameter is the estimated impact of a C 0 2  
doubling as a fraction of aggregate wages, H. These estimates correspond to 
the two-stage least squares specification in Table 3 and the central estimate 
of the hedonic parameter shown in Table 5. The specification bootstrap is 
generated by drawing G of 56 variables.) 
Conclusion on Uncertainty of Estimate 
Weighing the alternative specifications along with the bootstrap results, we 
conclude that  it is not possible with the available evidence to  determine 
tlie amenity impact of climate change for the USA. The preferred estimated 
impact of an equilibrium C 0 2  doubling, using tlie TSLS regression and uni- 
form climate change, is -0.37% of total wages. For the simplest specifications 
shown above, t l ~ e  impact ranges between -1.9 (f O.lG)% and $3.1 ( f  0.24)% 
of wages. The range of estimates in the specifications in Table 4 is from 
-3.0% to +8.0%. The range of estimates for different wage series shown in 
Table G is from -6.0% to  +4.6%. The estimates for the different climate 
models range from -15.9% to  +26.7% of wages. For the data  bootstrap the 
estimated impact is $4.2 (f 5.6)% while for the specification bootstrap the 
estimated impact is -3.5 (f 3.6)% of total wages. 
Taking all these estimates, the best judgment would seem to be that  we 
are a t  this time unable to  reliably determine the impact of global warming on 
climate amenities. The most liltely value of the amenity impact is -0.35% of 
total wages (or -0.17% of total output). I regard the estiinated varia.tion from 
the bootstrap replications as most reliable and estimate that  the uncerta,inty 
of the estimate is about 5% of wages (or 2.5% of output).' 
5.5. Results of alternative studies 
It is useful to  consider how this research compares with earlier research on 
the subject. The only comparable study is that  of Hoch and Drake (1975). 
They used a technique quite simi1a.r to  that shown in Table 2, estimating 
OLS regressions of wages on climate and other variables for three samples 
of workers, using wages for specific occupations, in 43 to  86 metropolitan 
areas. The climate data were relatively comprehensive, altllough in the end 
only precipitation, temperature, and their interactions were used. 
Their statistical results are difficult to  interpret because of the iluinerous 
uilpooled samples and inconsistent inclusioil of variables. In addition, they 
did not consider the potential for simultaneous-equation bias! nor did they 
allow for the possibility of a systema.tic North-South wage differential. Tlle 
only robust result is the strong negative sign on summer temperature (in 33 
of the 34 subsamples reported in the Appendix), with a snlaller coefficient 
but illconsistent sign on winter temperatures. This result led Hoch and Drake 
t o  conclude that  a. 1°F warming would lead to a gain in living standards of 
a,pproximately USs1.6 billion in 1974. This represents a semi-elasticity of 
0.11% for 1974 GDP. Scaling this to a. ba.seline warming of $OF (or 4.5OC) 
for an equilibrium COz doubling used in this study yields a ga.in of 0.88% of 
US GDP. In the CIAP study, the effect on amenities tllrough wages was the 
single largest impact. All other impacts totaled USS0.67 billion, or about 
40% of the effect on amenities. 
The results of the present study are quite different from the earlier Hoch 
a.nd Drake study. I interpret the inconsistent results a,s an indicatioil of the 
fra.gility of the estimates to  both data and specifica.tion differences. The 
larger sample size in the current study allowed us t,o control for other fac- 
tors, such as the North-South wage differential, which explains much of OLS 
temperature-wage correlation. Other differences are that  the present study 
has a much larger and more comprehensive sample - 3105 counties and com- 
prehensive wage data  - and that it has a correction for regional cost of living 
differentials. 
'These figures are derived by combining the basic estimate in Table 5 with the bootstrap 
replicatiolls in Figures 9 and 10 along with the results of alternative specifications. Each 
of these four sets of estimat,es is equally weighted and assumed to be llormally distributed. 
6. Conclusions 
The present study estimates the impact of greenllouse warilling on cliinate 
amenities. The amenities associated with climate change include the effects 
on the value of directly "consumed" climate as well as those on leisure and 
other nonmarket activities that  are complementary with climate. In the 
first case, climate may affect preferences directly, as in the cases of direct 
enjoyment of beautiful blue skies or cold, crisp nights in the mountains. 
The second case - which is more complex and probably more important - 
comes as climate interacts with other goods and services in the production 
of amenities; this would include the combillation of warm weather, high surf, 
and surfboards in the production of surfing amenities or other consunlptioil 
activities such as hiking, sledding, sunbathing, gardening, or powcler-snow 
skiing. Additional cases of indirect effects would arise througll the impact 
of climate on pollution and health. 
Analytically, measuring the value of clinlate is difficult because climate 
is a public good rather than a private good bought and sold on markets. Be- 
cause there are no market transactions for climate, we must infer its value 
indirectly from individual choices in other areas. The area studied here is in- 
dividual locational choices as they interact with the labor market, using the 
technique of wage hedonics to estimate the impact of climate on econoinic 
well-being. The first step of the estimation is to determine the correlation 
between climate (as an exogenous variable) and wages (as an enclogenous 
variable) for the USA. This estimation addresses the issue of simultaneous- 
equatioil bias, which has generally been overlookecl up to now. Using data  on 
3105 counties, our preferred relationsllip indicates a small positive relation- 
ship of nlean temperature and real wages. The interpretation of this result 
is that  warming would be associated with an decrease in ecollonlic welfare. 
The second step of the process is to  combine estimates of the amenity 
value of cliinate with climate change projections. This is acconlplished by 
using the results of simulations of a number of CiCMs that  calculate the 
impact of greenhouse warming on climate. The GCMs project an  average 
increase of 8OF (4.5OC) along with an increase in precipitation of 4% from an 
equilibrium C 0 2  doubling. Using the uniform climate change scenario, we 
est i~nate that  an equilibrium C 0 2  doubling would be associated with 0.35% 
higher wages averaged across US counties; this is the equivalent of about 
0.17% of GDP. 
Under hedonic theory, wage differentials associated with different cli- 
inates represent the amounts necessary to  compensate people for the asso- 
ciated amenities. Our preferred equation projects that  an equilibrium CO;! 
doubling would produce disamenities amounting to  0.35% of wages or about 
0.17% of GDP. However, alternative specificatioils give marliedly different 
estimates. Weighing all the different specifications and bootstraps, the most 
likely impact is a disamenity of 0.35% of tota,l wages (or 0.17% of total out- 
put)  with an uncertainty or standard error on this estimate of 5% of wages 
(or 2.5% of output). 
How do amenity impacts compare with other estimated economic im- 
pacts of climate change? Up to  now, the only sectors with rigorous esti- 
mates of the impact of climate change a.re a,griculture, energy, and sea-level 
rise. Although different studies have slightly different results, it is fair to  
say that  the sum of the reliable estimates of the impact of global wa.rming 
is very close t o  zero for the USA. This number consists of small losses from 
sea.-level rise (less than 0.1% of GDP),  a small gain in heating and cooling 
(less than 0.1% of GDP),  and no net impact on agriculture. The present re- 
sults suggest that  inclusion of amenities does not change the overall picture 
dramatically, but the uncertainties surrounding amenity impacts swamp the 
impacts identified t o  date. 
We must emphasize that the estimated relatioilship between clima.te 
change and amenity values is extremely fragile. The bootstrap estimates for 
data  and for specification uncertainty indicate that  it is difficult t o  deternliile 
whether the amenity value of climate change will be positive or negative. 
Physicists have grown accustomed to  the Heisenberg uncertainty prin- 
ciple, which concerns the limits to  observability of physical systems. There 
ma,y be a behavioral uncertainty principle operating in the social sciences. 
This principle holds that because of the complexity of human systems and 
the difficulty of establishing cause-effect relationships, it is sometimes impos- 
sible to  accurately forecast the impact of exogenous or policy cha,nges. In the 
case a t  hand, we are blessed with reliable and comprehensive data  covering 
an enormous ra.nge of experience for the variables of interest of tempera,ture, 
wages, and demographics. Yet the underlying complexity of labor markets 
is so great, and the wage-temperature relationship so noisy, tha.t it a.ppears 
that we cannot a.ccurately project the impact of global warming on climate 
amenities over the coming decades. 
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Climate Change, Global Agriculture, and 
Regional Vulnerability* 
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1. Introduction 
The potential impacts of climate chailge on agriculture are highly uncer- 
tain. The large number of studies coilducted over the past few years for 
many different sites across the world show few, if any, robust conclusions 
about either the magnitude or direction of impact for individual countries 
or regions. Where appa,rent coilsensus exists, it frequently appears to occur 
because only one or two studies have been conducted using a single climate 
scenario. Many such studies have focused on 2xCOz general circulation 
model (GCM) equilibrium scenarios. These do not begin to  describe the 
variety of climatic conditioils any particular region is likely to  experience as 
the actual climate changes over time. 
Potential future cliinate chailges are also made more uncertain because 
of the recently recognized role of sulfate aerosols, which may partly offset the 
warming expected from increased concentrations of carbon dioxide (COa), 
methane, nitrous oxide, and other radiative trace gases. The significant 
spatial variation in sulfate aerosol concentrations means that  the regional 
pattern of climate change may be quite different from that  simulated on 
the basis of a C o n  increase alone. The short lifetime of aerosols in the 
atmosphere (a  few days) ineans that if the use of high-sulfur coal in India or 
China increases or efforts to control sulfur emission in the USA or Europe are 
intensified the spatial pattern of climate change could change significantly 
within a relatively short period of time due to  changes in the aerosol cooling 
effect. 
Different impact methodologies also yield widely varying results con- 
cerning the direct impacts of cliina,te change on crop yields and agricultural 
*An earlier version of this paper was originally prepared for the Food and Agriculture 
Organization. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not neces- 
sarily reflect the views of the Department of Agriculture or the United States Government. 
production, even when the sa.ine region aad tlle same climate scenarios are 
esamined. The socioecoilonlic environment, agricultural technology, and 
natural resource base will also necessarily undergo profound changes over 
the next 100 years whether agriculture meets the many challenges of feeding 
the world's growing population or fails to  do so. 
The robust conclusion that does emerge from impact studies is that  
climate change has the potential to  significantly change the productivity of 
agriculture at  most locations. Some currently highly productive areas may 
become much less productive. Some currently marginal areas may benefit 
substantially, while others may become unproductive. Crop yield studies 
show regional variations of +'LO%, 3076, or more in some areas and equal 
size losses in other areas. Most a.reas can espect change and will need to  
adapt , but the direction of clmnge, particularly of precipitation, and required 
adaptations cannot now be predicted; Inoreover, it may never be possible to  
predict them with confidence. Current evidence suggests that regions near 
the poles where agriculture is liinited by short growing seasons are more 
likely to  gain while subtropical a,nd tropical regions may be more likely to  
suffer drought and losses in productivity. However, these broad conclusions 
hardly provide the basis for mapping out a long-term strategy for agricultural 
adaptation. Thus, policy nlust retain flexibility to respond as conditions 
change. 
A further issue is how climate change iinpacts on agricultural production 
fit within the other pressing challenges fa,cing agriculture in different regions 
of the world. Is clinlate chailge a, ininor threat, likely to  be undetected 
anlong the many changes that will reshape the agricultural sectors of the 
world's economies? Or is it another critical challenge t o  an  agricultural sec- 
tor straining to  cope with growing population, resource degradation, tighter 
constraints on available resources, a,nd exhaustion of tecl~nological capabili- 
ties to expand production using existing land and water resources? 
It is useful to  place some of the 2 x C 0 2  agricultural projections in the 
context of other future projections. If we accept long-term demographic pro- 
jections, the largest absolute addition to  the world's population will occur 
during the decade of the 1990s, the growth rate having already slowed from 
that of the 1950s and 1960s. By the time 2 x C 0 2  climate scenarios are ex- 
pected to be realized (some time around 2100 or later), the world population 
will have stabilized according to  these long-term projections and agricultural 
research will no longer face the challenge of improving productivity t o  keep 
up with a growing population. 
The exercise of the previous paragrap11 - to  think a bit about how very 
different the world may l)e 1)y the time the scenarios of changed climate pre- 
sented by standard GCM runs may be realized - emphasizes the need for 
more specific analysis about how climate will change over the next 10, 20, or 
30 years rather than over the nest 100 years. It also provides a caution not 
to consider our response to  climate change apart from our response to the 
more immediate needs of agriculture: feeding a growing population where 
an estimated 740 million people still suffer from hunger and malnutrition 
while maintaining the productivity of basic agricultural resources and meet- 
ing the demands placed on agriculture to  minimize off-site damages to  the 
environment. 
The strategy of this paper will be (1) to  discuss briefly the primary 
methodologies used to estimate impacts of climate change, as different meth- 
ods lead to  substantially different climate change impacts; (2) to  review the 
broad literature reporting results of crop yield studies of climate change con- 
ducted for many different areas - how much (or little) do we know?; (3) to  
review the set of estimates that have been made for global agricultural pro- 
duction and what it lneans for regional agricultural impacts; (4) to  discuss 
the issue of vulnerability, adding a precise definition, while reviewing some 
of the vulnerability concepts that have been used in the literature; and (5) 
to  review specific issues of adaptation - how can the world's agricultural sys- 
tem, or more to  the point, those populations highly dependent on agriculture 
make theinselves less likely to  suffer loss from climate change. 
2. Impact Assessment Methodologies 
Climate change presents a challenge for researchers attempting to  quantify 
its impact due to  the global scale of likely impacts, the diversity of agricul- 
ture systems, and the decades-long time scale. Current climatic, soil, and 
socioeconomic conditions vary widely across the world. Each crop and crop 
variety has specific clinlatic tolerances and optima. It is not possible to  
model world agriculture in a. way that  captures the details of plant response 
in every location. The availability of data with the necessary geographic 
detail currently is the primary limitation, rather than computational capa- 
bility or basic understanding of crop responses to  climate. A specific problem 
has been how to  incorporate the detailed knowledge of plant response into 
aggregate assessments of regional a.ssessments. In general, compromises are 
necessary in developing quantitative a.nalyses a t  regional scales. 
There a.re two basic approa.cl1es to  eva.lua.ting crop and farmer response 
to changing clima.te that l ~ v e  ma.de tlifferent compronlises. These are 
(1) structural modeling of the agronomic response of plants and the eco- 
nomic/management decisions of farmers based on theoretical specifications 
and controlled experimental evidence and (2)  reliance on the observed re- 
sponse of crops and farmers to  varying climate. 
For the first approach, sufficient structure and detail are needed to  repre- 
sent specific crops and crop varieties whose responses to  different conditions 
are known tllrougll detailed experiments. Similar detail on farm manage- 
ment allows direct modeling of the timing of field operations, crop choices, 
and how these decisions affect costs and revenues. These approaches typi- 
cally model a representative crop plant or farm. Both in the case of economic 
models of farm decisions and in the case of crop response models, the origi- 
nal purpose of these models was to  improve understanding of how the crop 
grows or how a farmer manages. In the case of models of a representative 
farm, one might hope to  offer prescriptive advice for the farmer: where farm 
operations differ from the profit ma.xiining (or cost minimizing) model re- 
sults, it provides guidance for how fariners inight improve farm performance. 
In both cases, the idealized representation of the crop and farm operation 
tends to  give results that differ markedly from the actual experience on 
farms operating under real world conditions. This may reflect the fact that  
farmers do not operate a.s profit nla,simizers (they could improve their per- 
formance) or that  the models fail to consider some of the factors that  the 
farmer takes into account, such a.s risk, lack of immediate employment al- 
ternatives, or other considerations. Because of the idealized nature of them 
models, many analysts consider theill to  provide evidence of the potential 
production or potential profitability. Imposiilg climate change on these mod- 
els gives estimates of how potential production may change due to  climate 
change. Using these results as indicative of how climate will actually affect 
agriculture thus rests on the a.ssumption that the change in the potential 
represents the change likely to  be actua.lly experienced. Many approaches of 
this type have used detailed crop response models requiring daily weather 
records. For aggregate analyses iiifereilces concerning large areas and di- 
verse production systems must be made from a relatively few sites and crops 
because of the complexity of the models and the need for detailed data  on 
weather over a decade or more. This is the basic approach of Fischer et al. 
(1994) reported elsewhere in this volume. 
The work of Leemans and Solomon (1993) is in a similar vein, choosing 
much simpler represelltations of crop/cliinate interactions, but is still related 
to  basic agronomic representation of crop growth in response to  temperature 
and precipitation. The adva,nta.ge of t,heir approach is that, because of the 
miiliinal amouilts of clima.tic data (illcan niontllly data  on temperature and 
precipitation), the data exist to apply the crop models a t  a resolution of 0.5' 
latitude x 0.5' longitude grids. 
The second approach, relying on observed responses of crops and farm- 
ers, provided some of the ea.rliest estimates of the potential effects. The 
simplest example of this approach is to observe the current climatic bound- 
aries of crops and to  redraw tliese boundaries for a predicted changed climate 
(e.g., Rosenzweig, 1985). In a similar vein, researchers have applied statisti- 
cal analysis of data across geographic areas to  separate climate from other 
factors (e.g., different soil quality, va,rying economic conditions) that  explain 
regional productioil differences and have used these to  estimate the poten- 
tial agricultural impacts of cliillate change (e.g., Mendelsohn et al., 1994). 
An advantage of using direct evidence froin observed production is that  the 
data  reflect how fa.rmers operating under commercial conditions and crops 
growing under such conditions actually respond to  geographically varying 
climatic conditions. Here, the inost recent work uses extremely reduced 
form models (e.g., Mendelsohn et rrl., 1994) although estimation of more 
detailed structural models is possible. Darwin et al. (1995) use revealed 
evidence from geographic variation in climate in a global model, allocating 
production and input use to cliinatically determined land classes based on 
current production patterns. C!lima.te cllange impacts are then simulated by 
altering the distributioil of land cla,sses a,nd assuming that  when an area's 
land class changes, its uilderlying production level changes to  that  of the new 
land class.' The advantage of these a.pproaches is tliat the response of crops 
and farmers is based on actual respoilse under current operating conditions 
rather than an idealized view of how crops and farmers respond. The basic 
caveat associated with this approa,ch is that one must have faith that  land 
currently producing one set of outputs can change to  the new set of out- 
puts once climate changes. Whether these types of approaches accurately 
'The Darwin et al. (1995) approach links the basic agricultural productivity of land 
classes, described by a production function, with a computable general equilibrium model 
of the world economy. Thus, actual production in a region or land class depends on 
the final market clearing prices. Tlie model also treats interactions with other sectors of 
the economy, most importantly sectors that compete for land and water. My interest in 
this section is in contrasting approaches used to estimate the initial impact of climate on 
agricultural production. As demonstrated by Fischer et al. (1994), Reilly et al. (1994), 
and Adams et al. (1988), given an initial climate sliock on productivity there are a number 
of ways t o  introduce this shock into a variety of different types of economic models t o  
generate estimates of the market impact and realized production under new equilibrium 
prices. 
ca.pture the productivity impact depends on how well they control for other 
factors (such as soil quality) and ~vhet,her farmers can adjust their produc- 
tion as climate changes. This latter coilsideratioll leads to  the interpretation 
that  these approaches capture the long-run equilibrium response to  climate 
change and may not capture adjustmellt costs associated with changing t o  
new crops and productioil practices. 
3. Crop Response Estimates for Different 
Regions of the World 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the large number of studies of the impact 
of climate change on potential crop production. Although the table does 
not provide the detail on the range of specific studies, methods, and climate 
scenarios evaluated, it provides an indicatioil of the wide range of estimates. 
The general conclusion of global studies, that tropical areas may more likely 
suffer negative consequences, is sonlewhat supported by the results in the 
table. For example, Latin America and Africa show primarily negative im- 
pacts. However, very few studies have been conducted in these regions. For 
Europe, the USA and Canada, and for South Asia, China, and other Asia 
and the Pacific Rim, where many more studies have been conducted, the re- 
sults generally range from severe negative effects (-60%, -70%, or complete 
crop failure) to equally large potential yield increases. 
The wide ranges of estimates are due to  several, as yet unresolved, fac- 
tors. Differences among cliinate scenarios are important and can generate 
wide ranges of impacts even when identical methods for the same regions are 
used. For example, a study of the potential impact on rice yields conducted 
for most of the countries of South and Southeast Asia and for China, Japan, 
and Korea using the same crop model fouild yield changes for India to  range 
from -3% to  +28%, for Malaysia from +2% to  +27%, for the Philippines 
from -14% to +14%, and for inailllaild China from -18% to  -4% ((Matthews 
et al., 1994a, 1994b) depending on whether the Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies (GISS), Geophysical Fluid Dyilamics Laboratory (GFDL), or United 
Kingdom Meteorological Office (UIiMO) climate scenario was used. 
The impacts across sites can vary widely within a region. Thus, how 
many and which sites are chosell to  represent a region and how the site- 
specific estimates are aggregated call have important effects on the results. 
Studies for the USA and Canada demonstrate the wide range of impacts 
across sites with total or near total crop failure projected every year for 
wheat and soybeans at  one site in the USA (Rosenzweig et al., 1994) but 
Table 1. Regional crop yield for 2x(':02 GCM equilibrium clima.tes. 
Yield 
Region Crop impact (%) Countries studied/comments 
Latin America Maize -61 to  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico. 
increase Range is across GCM scenarios, 
with and without the CO2 effect. 
Wheat -50 to  -5 Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil. Range is across 
GCM scenarios, with and without the C 0 2  effect. 
Soybeans -10 to $40 Brazil. Range is across GCM scenarios, 
with C 0 2  effect. 
Former USSR Wheat 1 9  to $41 Range is across GCM scenarios and region, 
Grain -14 to $13 with CO2 effect. 
Europe Maize 3 0  to  France, Spain, N. Europe. 
increase LVith adaptation, CO2 effect. Longer growing 
season; irrigation efficiency loss; northward shift. 
Wheat Increase or France, UI<, N. Europe. With adaptation, 
decrease CO? effect. Longer season: northward shift; 
greater pest damage; lower risk of crop failure. 
Vegetables Increase 
North America Maize -55 to $62 USA and Canada. Range across GCM 
Wheat -100 to  scenarios and sites, with and without CO2 effect. 
$234 
Soybeans -96 to  $58 USA. Less severe or increase in yield 
tvhen COz effect and adaptation considered. 
Africa Maize -65 t,o +G Egypt,, Iienya, South Africa, Zimbabwe. 
\Vith COz effect, range across sites 
and climate scenarios. 
Millet -79 to -63 Senegal. Carrying capacity fell 11-38%. 
Biomass Decrease South Africa; agricultural zone shifts. 
South Asia Rice -33 to $28 Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Thailand, 
Maize -65 to -10 Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar. Range over 
Wheat -61 to $67 GCM scenarios and sites; with COz effect; 
some studies also consider adaptation. 
Mainland Rice -78 to $28 Includes rain-fed and irrigated rice. 
China and Positive effects in NE and NW 
Taiwan China, negative in most of the country. 
Genetic variation provides 
scope for adaptation. 
Other Asia Rice -45 to $30 Japan and South Korea. Range is across 
and GCM scenarios. Generally positive in 
Pacific Rim northern Japan; negative in south. 
Pasture -1 to $35 Australia and New Zealand. Regional variation. 
Wheat -41 to $65 Australia and Japan. Wide variation, 
depending on cultivar. 
Source: Summarized from Reilly et  ul., 1996. 
ivlleat yield illcreases of 180-2:30%, for other sites in the USA and Canada 
(Rosenzweig e t  nl., 1994; Brlilacich c t  nl., 1994; Brlilacich and Smit, 1992). 
Whether and how changes in a crop variety are specified in a study 
can have a large impact. Studies conducted of wheat response in Australia 
found impacts ranging from -34% to +65% for the same climate scenario 
and site depending on which known and currently grown wheat cultivar 
was specified in the crop model (Wang et  al., 1992). In a similar vein, 
Matthews e t  al. (1994a, 1994b) concluded that  the severe yield losses in 
South, Southeast, and East Asia for rice in many scenarios was due to a 
threshold temperature effect that  caused spikelet sterility but that genetic 
variation with regard to the threshold likely provided significant opportunity 
to  switch varieties as tenlperatures rose. Thus, an impact analysis that  
narrowly specifies a crop variety is likely to  generate an estimated impact 
that  is much different than that of an analysis that specifies responses on 
the basis of the genetic variation across existing cultivars. Some studies 
have attempted to  evaluate how future crop breeding may change the range 
of genetic variability available in future varieties (Easterling e t  al., 1993). 
Finally, the estimated amount of adaptation likely to be undertaken 
by farmers varies. Fundalnental views about how the farm sector responds 
to  changing conditions (of any lcind) shape the choice of methodological 
approach, and these n~etl~odological pproaches can give apparently widely 
different estimates of impact. Specification of the crop variety in a crop 
response model illustrates this difference. For some analysts, the prospect 
that  farmers will not change the variety of crop grown over the next 100 years 
as climate, tech~lology, prices, and other factors change is so remote that they 
choose to  represent cllange aillong varieties as an essentially autonomous 
response of the farm sector. Other analysts choose more specific crop variety 
characteristics, viewing even crop variety change as neither automatic nor 
without cost. For esample, different varieties of wheat produce flours with 
different characteristics and the cultural practices for growing spring and 
winter wheat differ. Similarly, studies of impacts on Japanese rice production 
estimate negative impacts for the southern parts of the country because 
of the climate tolerances of Japonica rice, which is preferred over Indica 
varieties in Japan (Seino, 1993). 
The differences resulting from simply whether or not one assumes farm- 
ers will adopt the better adapted variety are large, but these differences are 
potentially greatly magnified because the series of potential adaptations are 
broad with some requiring more specific recognition, action, and investment 
by farmers. How do farmers choose a planting date - by planting a t  the 
same time each year regardless of iveather conditions or by planting when 
Table 2. Major cash crops percentage yield change at  two US sites (1 x C 0 2  
to 2xC02) ."  
Iiaiser e l  al.,  1993 
Mount and Li, 1994~ Rosenzweig e l  al.,  1994 
GISS GFDL UICMO GISS GFDL UKMO 
N e b r a s k a  
Dryland maize 18 -22 19 -22 -17 -57 
Dryland soybeans 24 19 14 -12 -18 -3 1 
Dryland winter wheat 11 -3 -4 -18 -36 -33 
I o w a  
Dryland maize 22 -24 3 -21 -27 -42 
Dryland soybeans 15 17 -1 -7 -26 -76 
Drvland winter wheat 0 -6 -5 -4 -12 -15 
Abbreviations: GISS = Goddard 1nst.itute for Space Studies; GFDL = Geophysical Fluid 
Dynamics Laboratory; UIiMO = United Iiingdom Meteorological Office. 
aResults without COz fertilization effect. 
b ~ o  obtain results as comparable as possible to Rosenzweig et al. (1994), a special report 
was generated by Li that  runs t,he same GCPVI results used by Rosenzweig et al. (1994) 
through the models used in Kaiser et al. (1993) and Mount and Li (1994). The  results from 
this special report appear in this column. We are grateful to  Li for generating the report 
and helping us to  isolate the reasons for differences between the results of the studies. 
Source: Schimmelpfennig et al., 1996. 
soil temperatures are sufficient for crop growth, when the rainy season starts, 
or when the fields call be tilled? If the decision is partly keyed to  weather 
conditions then the farin decision-ma.king process will lead to  some amount 
of autonomous adjustment to cliinate change. Similarly, will the changes in 
tillage and irrigation practices, crop rotation schemes, crops, and crop pro- 
cessing and harvesting that are likely to occur over the next 100 years due 
to  many factors also reflect changes in climate that  are occurring simultane- 
ously, or will farmers be unable to detect climate change and therefore fail 
to adapt these systems, beconling and remaining ill-adapted to the climate 
conditions occurring locally? If they ada.pt to  current conditions (but cannot 
confidently look ahead), how maladjusted will their long-lived investments 
be after 3, 5, 10, or 20 years of coiltiiluous changes in climate? 
Table 2 provides estimates based on detailed structural models of the 
impact of climate change on agriculture. Estimates by both sets of authors 
are based on the same family of CERES crop response models and do not 
include the C 0 2  fertilizatioil effect. The difference between these 2 sets of 
estimates are that  Kaiser et al. (1993) link the crop response models to a 
structurally detailed farm-level model of economic decision making. Farmers 
make econonlically optinla1 decisioils about when to pla.nt, till, and barvest 
crops and the anlouilt of drying, fertilizer use, and other inputs used based 
on their expectations about the weather, which are assumed to be based on 
the past decade's climate average. Thus, farmers' expectations regularly lag 
behind the actual climate if climate is gradually changing. These are com- 
pared with the Rosenzweig et  al. (1994) estimates without any adaptation.2 
The estimates reported under Kaiser et  al. (1993) and Mount and Li (1994) 
are actually based on a. response surface model (Mount and Li) estimated 
from multiple scenario runs of the detailed model of Kaiser et al. This fa- 
cilitates comparison of the structurally detailed Kaiser et  al. (1993) report 
beyond the specific sites where tlie detailed data necessary to  run the model 
were available. The striking result in this comparison is that  for most of the 
scenarios, the Ihiser  et  al. (1993) and Mount and Li (1994) analysis sug- 
gests significant increases in production potential compared with significant 
losses in production potential for the Roseilzweig et  al. (1994) site results 
without adaptation. It has not been possible to  conduct a broader regional 
or national analysis with the Kaiser et  al. (1993) model, so it is not possible 
to compare this work with other national estimates for the USA. (For more 
discussion, see Schimlnelpfellnig et  crl., 1996). 
A variety of lnethods lmve now been a.pplied to  estimating the impacts 
for the USA. Table 3 provides the range of estinlates for the USA that  
lmve been genera,ted ba.sed on cluit,e different inethodologies and assuinp- 
tions about the extent to  which ada.pta.tion will occur. While the table 
covers only the USA, it is likely that applying this range of approaches in 
other regions would also generate a siinilar range of estimates. The Mendel- 
sohn et al. (1994) estimates are based 011 an econometric model estimated 
on cross-sectional data and reflect, according t o  the authors, long-run, full 
adjustment of US agriculture to a. climate change shock. The methodology 
does not allow consideration of how crop prices may change and thus may be 
most comparable to  the initial crop yield shock used in other methodologies. 
Except for column 8, ilone of the reported estimates in Table 3 consider 
the direct effect of C 0 2  on plant growth. Unfortunately, the wide ranging 
methodologies do not or have not generally reported results that  are directly 
comparable, thus some iilterpretation is necessary. 
The starkest difference in methodology is between Mendelsohn et  al. 
(1994) and Rosenzweig and Parry (1994). Columns 1 and 2 reflect results 
21n global simulations, Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) include farm-level adaptation, 
but the specific adaptation potential for individual sites has not been separately reported. 
Overall, for the USA, Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) scenarios, even with adaptation, gen- 
erally do not show  improvement,^. 
Table 3. Estimates of the impact of climate change on USA agriculture (% change). 
Mendelsol~n e t  al. ,  1994; Darwin e l  al., 1995: without COr! effect Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; 
without CO? effect Effects on far111 income Effects on cereal prod. average yield effects across crops 
Climate Area Rev. Farm-level Full No Full No Adjustin. 
scenario wgts. wgts. adaptation a d j ~ s t ~ m .  adjustm. adjustm. adjustm. and COz 
GISS -1.8 $2.0 $4.1 -7.8 -24.4 -3.0 -14 to  -21 0 to $17 
GFDL -1.2 $4.2 -16.1 $4.3 -38.0 -2.0 -23 to  -29 $9 to -10 
UI<MO -4.5 $1.1 -4.4 -5.4 -38.4 -5.0 -25 to -58 $1 to -20 
OSU -3.6 -0.7 -10.0 $5.8 -33.3 -5.2 - - 
Abbreviations: GISS = Goddard Iiistitute for Space Studies; GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory; UI<MO = United 
Kingdom Meteorological Office; OSU = Oregon State University. 
Notes: Mendelsohn et al. (1994) figures are annualized impact on land values as a percentage of total value of crop and livest,ock 
production. The values of crop and livestock production are for 1990 from Darwin et al. (1995).  See Mendelsohn et al. (1994) for a 
description of the methodology used in that study. T h e  simulations of the model for the GISS, GFDL, UI<MO, and OSU scenarios 
reported above were provided by personal communication with Mendelsohn, March 29,  1995. Darwin et  al. (1995) results are computed 
from simulations reported in Darwin et al. (1995).  Rosenzweig and Parry summarize the range of crop yield impacts used in their 1994 
study for the USA. The  US average crop yield shocks used by estimated by them were reported in Reilly et al. (1993).  Specific crop 
yield studies, which were, in part,  the basis for these estimates, were reported in Rosenzweig et al. (1994).  
from models estimated with different weights on the individual observations. 
Mendelsohn, et nl. (1994) suggest the column 2 estimates based on revenue 
weights are more appropriate because they reflect the economic value of 
crops. They suggest that the inore negative estimates based on area weights 
(column 1) reflect the type of bias that may be introduced by focusing on 
cereal crops, which generally have a lower value than many other crops such 
as fruits and vegetables. Contrasting the climate impact shock they esti- 
mate (column 2) with the types of yield shocks estimated by Rosenzweig 
and Parry (1994; columil 7) provide a dramatically different picture of the 
impact of climate cha~lge on US agriculture. Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) 
include some adjustnlents but, unfortunately, the yield shocks for the USA 
comparable to  the Mendelsohll et ctl .  (1994) study (climate change and adap- 
tation with no COz effect) have not been reported. However, in their study 
adaptation they did not have a particularly powerful effect on mitigating 
losses as reported by Reilly and Hohnlanil (1993). The relatively benign 
impacts for the USA in tlle Rosenzweig and Parry yield estimates (column 
8,  with the C 0 2  aitd adaptation) are, in a large part,  less severe because 
of the C 0 2  effect. Thus, different methodologies, including adaptation but 
not the C 0 2  effect, apparently produce estimates of impact for four major 
climate scenarios on the order of -1% to +5% using a Mendelsohn et al. 
methodology but on the order of -10% to -25%) using the Rosenzweig and 
Parry methodology. In deriving the -10% to -25% range, I assume that  
adaptation in their study may have reduced losses by 5-lo%, whereas the 
C 0 2  fertilization effect reduced losses by 75-loo%, which is the relative im- 
portance of these two factors on a global basis as in their data as estimated 
by Reilly and Hohmann (1993). 
Tlle Darwin et a / .  (1995) study used an independently derived set of 
climate shocks, representing climate change as a change in land class where 
the productivity of each land class was estimated from current data. Their 
methodology for estimating the direct effect of climate was more akin to  
Mendelsohn et al. (1994), using the observed differences in production across 
geographically varying climate as the basis for the projections. Their results, 
columns 3-6 in Table 3, help explain and confirm some of the differences be- 
tween the other two studies. The initial shock on US cereal production in 
the Darwin et al. (1995) study (column 5) is similar to  and generally more 
severe than, the yield shocks estimated by Rosenzweig and Parry (1994; col- 
umn 7). However, Darwin et al. (1995) estimate that by just considering 
the immediate farm-level adjustment (without price changes and without 
expansion of agricultural production into new areas), farmers could offset 
between 70-120% of the initial losses (i.e., comparing column 5 and column 
3).3 Colunlns 4 a.nd 6 provide the estiiliates after full adjustment, including 
changes in world prices a,iid trade, for cereal productioil and farm income. 
Note that  the farm illcome effects with full adjustment (column 4) are some- 
times worse than the farm illcome effects with only farm-level adaptation 
(column 3), because the Darwin et  al. (1995) study considers worldwide ef- 
fects with international trade. Thus, the impacts that occur in the rest of the 
world under the GISS and UKMO climate scenarios lead the USA to  lose 
international comparative advantage once full adjustment of international 
markets is considered. 
Together these three studies indicate the wide range of estimated impacts 
for the same region and sa,ille climate scenarios depending on the method- 
ology used. Melldelsohil et  (11. (1994) and Darwin et  al. (1995) use method- 
ologies that  they argue more completely consider adaptation, and they find 
impacts after adaptation to be generally less than Rosenzweig and Parry 
(1994). However, even between these two approaches there are significant 
differences in estimated impacts for seine climate scenarios in comparable 
estimates (columns 2 and 3). 
Table 4 provides reports the different types of economic impacts gen- 
erated from these different supply and yield shocks. Adams et  al. (1988) 
have used yield shocks generated by Roseilzweig et  al. (1994). The broader 
ecoilomic implicatioils of the different a.pproaches follow fairly directly from 
the differential yield shocks. I11 particular, the Adams et  al. (1988) scenarios 
without the C 0 2  fertilization effect show illuch larger economic losses than 
the Darwin et  al. (1995) and A4endelsohn et  al. (1994) studies, which do 
not include C 0 2  fertilization. A particular difference for the Mendelsohn et  
(11. (1994) study, however, is the iinplicit assumption that commodity prices 
do not change and that  all changes are reflected in changes in land rents. 
The distributional implications of this assumption is that all effects are felt 
by producers, whereas the structural market models often show that  the 
producer effects are of opposite direction to  the national effects. 
The above discussioil identified four separate factors that contribute to  
widely varying estimates of regional impa.cts of climate change apart from 
how or whether the C 0 2  effect on crops is included in the simulation. These 
factors - varying climate scenarios, wide variation across sites within a re- 
gion, how genetic variability across known crop varieties is addressed within 
3Note that  this comparison is between impacts on cereal production and impacts on 
farm income, which is comparable (given that the simulation in column 3 does not allow 
prices to change) except t,hat farm income includes impacts to  agriculture for livestock 
and non-grain production, as well. 
Table 4. Estimated annual economic impacts of climate change on the US economy (in billion US dollars). 
Adams e t  al., 1988" Darwin e t  al.,  1995~  Mendelsohn e t  al., 1994' 
Climate With COa and No COz or CO? effects hut Land use Land use Cropland Crop revenue 
scenario trade effects trade effects no trade effects restricted unrestricted weights weights 
A. Aggregate  US e c o n o m z c  z m p a c t s  
GISS 10.82 -11.33 10.21 5.9 5.8 -9.2 16.4 
GFDL 4.37 -19.09 4.57 -11.1 -4.8 -35.6 33.1 
UKMO 9.03 -67.01 -17.58 -1.2 1.1 -36.6 8.9 
OSU n.a. 1i.a. 1i.a. -6.6 -3.9 2 8 . 1  -5.8 
B. I m p a c t s  o n  US a g r z c u l f u r n l  p r o d u c e r s  
GISS 12.56 10.79 12.74 2.8 -1.5 -9.2 16.4 
GFDL 6.61 16.84 7.22 8.3 -1.5 3 5 . 6  33.1 
UI<MO 44.44 114.97 41.52 8.2 -1.7 3 6 . 6  8.9 
OSU 1i.a. n.a. n.a. 5.9 0.4 -28.1 -5.8 
For abbreviations see Table 3. 
"Part  A reflects changes in total surplus. Part B reflects changes in producer surplus. In 1990 US dollars, the base scenario total 
(producer) surplus was US$1,124 billion ( U S 2 1  billion). 
*Part A reflects changes in 1990 gross domestic product (GDP). Part B reflects changes in returns t o  agricultural land, capital, labor, 
and water resources. 
'Reflects changes in the annual stream of returns to  farmland due to climate change. 
Note: For comparison purposes, base scenario (Darwin et al., 1995) US G D P  was US$5,497 billion (in 1990 dollars) and the annualized 
1982 implicit return to  agricultural land in 1990 dollars was US$31.1 billion. 
Source: Schimmelpfennig et al., 1996. 
the crop-response inodeliilg approa.ch, a.nd differences across impact method- 
ologies, particularly in ho1v different illethods address the capability of farm- 
ers to adapt - appear to be of roughly equal magnitude in explaining the 
wide range of estimates. 
4. Global Studies and Their Implications 
for Regional Effects 
Accurate consideration of national and local food supply and economic ef- 
fects depends on an appraisal of chailges in global food supply and prices. 
Iilternational markets call moderate or reinforce local and national changes. 
In 1988, for example, drought presented a relatively severe threat because 
it occurred coincidentally in several of the primary grain-growing regions of 
the world. Reilly et u1. (1994) deinoilstrate that  considering country-level 
production impacts of climate change in the absence of consideration of the 
global impacts call generate highly nlisleading results. Agricultural export- 
ing countries, whose productivity is reduced by climate change, may find 
themselves with a fillailcia1 boilailza if world agricultural prices rise because 
of climate change. These same couiltries inay suffer significant economic loss 
if climate change turns out to be generally beneficial to world agriculture, 
even if agricultural productivity in their country benefits. This feature of 
the agricultural ecoilolny is lvell-known and reflects what is, in aggregate, an 
inelastic demand for food. This point, which is a fundamental observation 
of agricultural economists, ineans that absolutely no implications for food 
availability, price, or farm financial success can be drawn from local and 
country-level estimates of production impacts of climate change unless one 
assumes that  production chailges around the world will generally balance to 
leave little impact on global productioil and prices. A country may attempt 
to carry out a set of policies that  lllaintaiils a neutral effect on the country's 
agricultural sector vis-8-vis the rest of the world. However, maintaining such 
policies will generally entail significant ecoilomic cost through subsidization 
of domestic agricultural production and/or consumption, or through import 
or export controls. There are many different ways these costs may be borne 
(higher food prices, governnlent expenditures, lost efficiency in the produc- 
ing sector, lost export opportunities), depending on how the policies are 
structured. 
There are now a number of different attempts to  estimate the impacts 
of climate change on global agriculture, in part to consider the global im- 
pacts, but more importantly to  lnore accurately consider what the regional 
impacts could be, recoglliziilg that what happens to  global agriculture due 
to  climate change will likely be lllore importa.nt for the viability and eco- 
nomic success of local agriculture than what happens to local production 
potential itself. Kane e t  al. (1992) and Tobey e t  al. (1992) examined the 
sensitivity of agriculture to potential yield losses in major temperate grain- 
growing regions based on very stylized climate change impacts. They loosely 
linked the potential for yield losses in temperate regions to  climate projec- 
tions that  showed increasing aridity in the continental mid-latitude areas. 
They made alternative assunlptions about how agriculture might be affected 
in higher latitudes and in the Tropics. They also developed scenarios that  
reflected the estimated yield impacts for different parts of the world that  
were summarized in the 1990 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) assessment (Parry e t  al., 1990). The yield response estimates used 
by R.osenzweig and Parry (1994) also reported in Fischer e t  al. (1994) were 
also the basis of Reilly e t  al. (1994) and in greater detail Reilly e t  al. (1993). 
Many of the general coilclusions are sinlilar between the studies, indicating 
that  given a set of yield shocks, economic modeling of international markets 
in itself is not a major source of difference in results even though there are 
inajor differences in the modeling approa.ches. Rather, these different eco- 
ilomic modeling approaches focus in different aspects and degrees of detail 
of agricultural ecoilonlic interactions a.mong crops, livestocks, land use, and 
the rest of the economy. 
Among the issues tl1a.t give rise to  uncertainty in these studies are the  
following factors: 
1. The timing of expected climate change. For example, Rosenzweig and 
Parry (1994) assume that  the 4.0-5.2OC scenarios occur in 2060, but the 
most recent IPCC work suggests the mean estimate for 2060 is closer to  
1.5OC and that  the range of global temperature impacts by 2100 is likely 
to  be between 1.0-5OC. 
2. Aggregation froin detailed sites. Detailed plant growth models, the basis 
for many studies, require daily teinperature and precipitation records for 
a 10- to  30- year historical clinlate record and detailed soil data,  limiting 
the number of sites for which data are readily available and that  can be 
practicably assessed. A11 alternative approach (Leemans and Solomon, 
1993; Carter e t  al. (1991) inakes use of geographic information system 
databases that  contain more extensive information on current climates 
across the world. These efforts have not been linked t o  an economic 
model. Results confirm the pattern of relative decreased crop potential 
in the tropical areas and iiicl~eased potential in the ilorthern areas but 
are not aggregated to deterilliile the net global effect. 
3. Coverage of agricultural activities. Simulation of crop response models 
has been limited to a few illajor crops for a region, usually important 
grain crops, with yield effects estended to other crops. Left out are the 
indirect impacts of cliinate chailge through impacts on insect, disease, 
and weed pests; on soils; and on livestock production. Mendelsohn et al. 
(1994) argue that their statistical approach accounts for all agricultural 
activities, implicitly accounting for the full effects of climate. 
4. Other resource changes and coinpetitioil for resources from other sec- 
tors. Allocation of land and water resources is a conspicuous limitation 
in global studies. Water dellland for other uses will grow, water use may 
have reached or passed sustainable levels of use in some areas, irrigation 
is responsible for salinizatioil and land degradation, and water pricing 
and water system inanageineilt are far froin efficient under current con- 
ditions (e.g., Umali, 1993; Moore, 1991). Climate change also will affect 
demand for resources from other sectors. 
The Darwin et crl. (1995) study addresses many of these considerations 
in a global model including eight, world regions. In a compatible general 
equilibriuill model, land and cliina.tic resource changes are based on a geo- 
graphic information system; changing cliinate shifts the distribution of land 
across several agro-cliinatic land cla.sses. Other resource-using sectors are in- 
cluded and are also affected by climate change. The model is a static model, 
iillposing climate change on current econoinic and agricultural markets, and 
thus does not address the issue of timing directly. 
The global results (Table 5) are conlparable to  those of Rosenzweig and 
Parry (1994) in terms of direct supply impacts for the world in the "no 
adaptation" case, but the study finds that  adaptation is able to turn global 
losses into small global benefits (unrestricted case). Even when the model is 
constrained to  continue to  produce on esisting amounts of land within each 
region and prices are not allowed to respond, adaptation mitigates a signifi- 
cant share of the losses. These results contrast with those of Rosenzweig and 
Parry (1994) in that  they give generally smaller impacts and possible benefits 
even without the COz effect and show a.daptation to be quite important. 
Again, the global results a.re important because they are the first step 
in considering whether a. local economy's consumers will be able to  purchase 
food if it is unavailable don~estically, how local producers may be affected by 
changes in demand for their crops, or how the cost of a country's agricultural 
policies may change because of changing international market conditions. 
Table 5. Percentage clla.nges in the supply and production of cereals for 
the world by clilna,te chaage scena,rio. 
Climate Supply Production 
scenarios No adaptation Land use fixed Land use fixed No restrictions 
GISS -22.6 -2.4 0.2 0.9 
GFDL -23.5 -4.4 -0.6 0.3 
UKMO -29.3 -6.4 -0.2 1.2 
OSU -18.6 -3.9 -0.5 0.2 
For abbreviations see Table 3. 
Note: Changes ill supply represeut the aclditiol~al quantities firms would be willing to sell 
a t  1990 prices under the alternative climate. Chailges iu production represent changes in 
equilibrium quantities. 
Source: Darwin et  al.. 1995. 
5. Regional Vulnerability 
The previous sections documented the wide range of uncertainty in the po- 
tential direction and magnitude of climate change impact. While many new 
studies have been conducted, most have focused on specific climate scenar- 
ios associated with 2xCOz GChl sceilarios or arbitrary changes in climatic 
conditions to  provide evidence of the general sensitivity of agriculture and 
crop production to cliinate change. The wide range of estimates limits the 
ability to  extend, interpolate, or estra.polate from the specific climate sce- 
narios used in these studies to ''inore" or "less" climate change or to  draw 
implications for impacts beyond the sites where studies were conducted. 
Given these uncertaiilties in both nlagilitude and direction of impact, a 
key issue is vulnerability to possible cliinate change. Vulnerability is used 
here to  mean tlle potential for negative consequences that  are difficult to  
ameliorate through adaptive measures given the range of possible climate 
changes that  might reasoilably occur. Thus, defining an area or population as 
vulnerable is not a prediction of negative consequences of climate change; it is 
an indication that  across the range of possible climate changes there are some 
climatic outcomes that  would lead to  relatively more serious consequences 
for the region than for other regions. 
Vulnerability has been used rather loosely in many discussions. Before 
discussing some of the research that has examined potential vulnerability, 
I introduce a more formal definition. For the sake of simplicity, consider 
that climate can be described as a single variable, C. We are uncertain 
about what value C will take a t  some future point, but we can describe 
the probability, p, that  C will take on a specific value by the probability 
density functioll f ( C ) .  Further, consider that  we are able to  describe the 
sensitivity of agriculture, -4, to  changes in climate by tlie function g(C). 
We can then defil~e the expected loss function, L(C)  as f ( C )  x g(C). A 
population, region, or crop is relatively more vulnerable under this definition 
if the area under L(C) where damages occur is larger than for a comparison 
population, region, or crop. Thus, I use the term vulnerability to  describe 
only that  portion of L(C) where damages occur. For other purposes, it 
useful to consider expected (net) damage (or benefit), that is, the mean 
of the values of loss function wliich is a probability weighted mean of the 
damages. 
Two, purely illustrative, nunlerical exainples are plotted in Figure 1. For 
these examples I have choseli to represent f ( C )  as a gamma distribution. In 
Panel A damages are represented by a quadratic function; in panel B dam- 
ages are represented by a logarithinic function. These choices illustrate just 
two of the ways that  our expectations about the degree of future climate 
change and our understanding of tlie sensitivity of an agricultural system 
t o  climate change may interact. I11 these numerical illustrations, the system 
characterized by quadratic losses (Panel A) is more vulnerable to  loss than 
the system described by logarithnlic losses. Even though the quadratic sen- 
sitivity to  climate leads to potentially larger losses a t  extreme temperature 
change, the system is less vulilerable because climate change is not likely 
to  be that  extreine in tliis example. In fact, the small region of beneficial 
warming (negative damages) in Panel A gives rise to  a substantial possibility 
of beneficial effects of warnling for the system described in this panel. In 
Panel B, in contrast, damages initially rise sharply but the rate of increase 
slows. This characterizatioll of systein sensitivity indicates damages across 
the entire range of expected temperature change. 
Even though damages do not have the potential to  become as severe as 
in Panel A, the system is more vulnerable to  damage because climate is more 
likely t o  be in the relatively higher damage range of the sensitivity function. 
In practice, multiple dimensions of climate affect any agricultural sys- 
tem. The simple characterizatioll in Figure 1 is meant to  make the definition 
of vulnerability mathenlatically precise even though it is not possible a t  this 
time to  formally estimate the multidimensional, joint distribution of impor- 
tant climate variables. Nor do we precisely know the damage function that  
relates changes in these climate variables to  agricultural impacts. The ad- 
vantage is t o  make explicit that we must consider our expectations with 
regard to  climate and damage sensitivity. To make the example concrete, 
a semi-arid area may be extremely sensitive to damage if it becomes more 
arid. However, if our expectation is that  it is highly likely that  the region 
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will become wetter, the region is not vulnerable. Another region in a humid 
agro-climatic zone may be vulnerable if substantial warming and drying are 
likely for the area. 
Up to  this point, I have not been explicit with regard to what I propose 
to measure as a damage. The existing literature suggests several different 
possible measures and therefore several different dimensions of vulnerability. 
Many studies focus on crop yields. Evidence suggests that yields of crops 
grown where temperature could easily exceed threshold values during critical 
crop growth periods are more vulnerable to warming (e.g., rice sterility: 
Matthews et al., 1994a, 1994b). 
Farmer or farm sector vulnerability may be measured in terms of im- 
pact on profitability or viability of the farming system. Farmers with limited 
financial resources and farming systems with few adaptive technological op- 
portunities available to  limit or reverse adverse climate change may suffer 
significant disruption and financial loss for relatively small changes in crop 
yields and productivity, or these farms may be located in areas more likely 
to  suffer yield losses. For example, Parry et al. (1988a, 198813) focused on 
semi-arid and cool temperate and cold agricultural areas as those that  might 
be more clearly affected by climate change and climate variability. 
Regional economic vulnerability reflects the sensitivity of the regional or 
national economy to farm sector and climate change impacts. A regional 
economy that  offers only limited employment alternatives for workers dislo- 
cated by the changing profitability of farming and other climatically sensitive 
sectors may be relatively more vulilerable than those that  are economically 
diverse. For example, Roseilberg (1993) examined the Great Plains area of 
the USA because of its heavy dependence on agriculture. Increasing aridity 
is expected in this region under clinlate change, and thus it was considered 
to  be potentially more economically vulnerable than other regions in the 
USA. 
Hunger vulnerability has been used to mean the "aggregate measure of 
the factors that  influence exposure to  hunger and predisposition to  its con- 
sequences" involving "interactions of climate change, resource constraints, 
population growth, and economic development" (Downing, 1992; Bohl et al., 
1994). Downing (1992) concluded that the semi-extensive farming zone, on 
the margin of more intensive land uses, appears to  be particularly sensitive 
to  small changes in climate. Socioeconomic groups in such areas, already 
vulnerable in terms of self-sufficiency and food security, could be further 
marginalized. In all likelihood we should not look only a t  agriculturally de- 
pendent people. We must coilsider the ineans people have within society and 
the family to  obtain food and how their allocation will change if production 
potential changes. A poor urban household may suffer due to  production 
losses elsewhere in the region while the rural farmer may continue to  eat. Or, 
women and children of rural peasant farms may go hungry, while "excess" 
production from the region is sold. Assessing who has the means and rights 
to  food during shortfalls is thus likely to  be more critical in a climate vul- 
nerability study than assessing how production may change. For hunger and 
famine in general, the relative importance of acquiring (versus producing ) 
food has been denlollstrated by Sen (1981, 1993). 
Given the diverse currently existing conditions, the geographical varia- 
tion likely to  exist in ally climate cllange scenario, and the wide uncertainty 
that  must be associated with local prediction of future climates, some vul- 
nerable agricultural areas and populations are likely in nearly every region, 
even if the expected value for the region is a net benefit. This makes vulner- 
ability a relative concept - while there may be a few areas where even the 
most extreme climate change we can imagine would not generate losses, in 
general, the problem is to  consider whether a particular region or population 
is relatively more vulnerable than others. 
While perhaps most difficult to  evaluate, vulnerability in terms of hunger 
and malnutrition ought to  be the first concern. If so, we can almost certainly 
eliminate the richer countries of the world as vulnerable. For poorer regions, 
it is the poorest members of these areas or those that  could be made poor 
by climate change that  are most a t  risk. The wide uncertainty with regard 
to  local and regional climate change means it is difficult to  rule out negative 
possibilities for any area. Thus, without even considering specific climate 
scenarios we can assert that ,  of the world's populations, those who are cur- 
rently poor, malnourished, and dependent on local production for food are 
the most vulnerable in terms of hunger and malnutrition to  climate change. 
Similarly, severe economic vulnerability is most likely where a large share of 
the population depends on agriculture, leaving few alternative employment 
opportunities. Again, we need not a.ssess climate scenarios or projected yield 
changes t o  establish where these vulnerable populations live. Given these 
considerations, Table 6 presents some of the critical dimensions of areas of 
the world that  might be used to  assess vulnerability. While the table is too 
aggregated to  identify specifica.lly vulnerable populations, it is indicative of 
where many of these people a,re liliely to  be. Because of the wide range of 
uncertainty in precipitation, the only climatic dimension likely t o  enter sig- 
nificantly in an  assessment of vulnerability is temperature. Cool regions are 
more likely to  be limited by low temperatures, and thus warming may prove 
beneficial - these a.reas may still suffer if precipitation changes are adverse. 
However, further wa,rming is unlikely to  benefit already warm regions. Thus, 
global warming appears somewhat stacked against the already warm areas. 
Coincidentally (or not), these regions tend to also be home to  some of the 
world's poorest. 
The focus on hunger and malnutrition as a first priority does not mean 
that  other types of vulnerability are unimportant. Regional economic devel- 
opment, land degradation, or increased environmental stress resulting from 
agricultural production under a changed climate are important concerns as 
well. 
Table 6. Basic regional agricultural indicators and vulnerability. 
Sub-Saharan Middle East/ South Southeast East Former Latin USA, 
Africa North Africa Asia Asia Asia Oceania USSR Europe America Canada 
Agric. land (%)a 41 2 7 5 5 3 6 5 1 57 27 47 3 6 3 7 
Cropland (%) 7 7 44 13 11 6 10 29 7 13 
Irrigated (%) 5 2 1 3 1 21 11 4 9 13 10 8 
Land area ( lo6 ha) 2390 1167 478 615 993 845 2327 473 2052 1839 
Climateb (1) 
Population ( l o 6 )  566 
Agric. pop. (%) 62 
Pop./ha cropland 3.6 
Agric. prod. (106t) 
Cereals 5 7 
Roots aitd tubers 111 
Pulses 5.7 
Sugar cane aitd beet 60 
Meat 6.7 
1991 GNP/cap.' 350 1940 320 930 590 13780 2700 15300 3390 32100 
Annual growth -1.2 -2.4 3.1 3.9 7.1 1.5 N.A. 3.2 -0.3 1.7 
Agric. (% of GDP)' >30% 10-19% >30% 30 to >30% 2 0 ~ 2 9 %  <6% 10-29% <6% 10-19% <6% 
"Agricultural land includes grazing land and cropland, reported as a percentage of total land area. Cropland is reported as a percentage of 
agricultural land. Irrigated area is reported as a percentage of cropland. 
*Climate: (1) tropical; arid, humid. (2)  subtropical, tropical; arid. (3) tropical, subtropical; humid, arid. (4) tropical; humid. (5) subtropical, 
temperate oceanic, continental; humid. (6) tropical, temperate, oceanic subtropical; arid, humid. (7) polar, continental, temperate oceanic; humid, 
arid. (8) temperate oceanic, some subtropical; humid, arid. (9) tropical, subtropical; mostly humid (10) continental, subtropical, polar, temp. 
oceanic; humid, arid. 
'Gross national product (GNP) is in 1991 US dollars; annual growth (percent per annum) is for the period 1980-1991. 
Note: East Asia GNP excludes Japan. Also, regional GNP data generally include only those countries for which data are given in Table 1 in 
World Development Indicators. Countries with a population of more than 4 million for which GNP data are not available include Vietnam, 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Afghanistan, Cuba, Iraq, Myanmar, Cambodia, Zaire, Somalia, Libya, and Angola; land areas are in 
hectares, production is in tonnes. 
Sources: Computed from FA0 Statistics Division, 1992; GNP per capita, GNP growth rates, and agriculture as a share of the economy are from 
World Bank; World Development Indicators 1993 and temperature and climate classes from Rotter e t  al., 1995. a 
6. Adapt at ion Potential and Policies 
The hierarchy of damage coi~siderations a,s above - hunger, regional eco- 
nomic, farmerlfarm sector, a.nd yield vulnerability - helps to  focus on adap- 
tive strategies that  reduce vulnerability. How can we avoid yield failures? If 
yields fail, what other crops can be grown? If farming becomes uneconomic, 
what other opportunities for employment exist? If the people of the region 
can no longer produce food, w11a.t other sources of food are available and 
how will they earn the income necessary to  purchase food, or what other 
means does the society in which they live have to  provide food assistance? 
Historically, farming systems have adapted to  changing economic con- 
ditions, technology, and resource availabilities, and have kept pace with a 
growing population (Rosenberg, 1992; CAST, 1992). Evidence exists that  
a.gricultura.1 in~lovatioil responds t o  economic incentives such as factor prices 
and can relocate geograpllically (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; CAST, 1992). 
A number of studies indicate that  adaptation and adjustment will be im- 
portant t o  limit losses or to  ta,ke a.dvantage of improving climatic conditions 
(e.g., US NAS, 1991; R.osenberg, 1992; Rosenberg and Crosson, 1991; CAST, 
1992; Mendelsohn et ( ~ l . ,  1994). 
Despite the successful historical record, issues of future adaptation t o  
climate change arise with rega,rd to  whether the rate of climate change and 
required adaptation would add significantly t o  the disruption likely due t o  
future changes in economic conditions, technology, and resource availability 
(Gommes, 1993; Harvey, 1993; Lane and Reilly, 1993; Smit, 1993; Norse, 
1994; Pittock, 1993; Reilly, 1994). If climate change is gradual, it may 
be a small factor that  goes unnoticed by most farmers as they adjust t o  
other more profound cllanges in a.griculture stemming from new technology, 
increasing demand for food, a,nd other environmeiltal concerns such as pes- 
ticide use, water quality, aad land preservation. However, some researchers 
see climate change a.s a. significailt addition t o  future stresses, where adapting 
to  yet allother stress such as clinla.te c1la.nge may be beyond the capability 
of the system. Part of the divergence in views may be due to  different in- 
terpretations of adaptation, which include the prevention of loss, tolerating 
loss, or relocating to  avoid loss (Smit, 1993). Moreover, while the techno- 
logical potential to  adapt may exist, the socioeconomic capability t o  adapt 
likely differs for different types of a.gricultura1 systems (Reilly and Hohmann, 
1993). 
6.1. The tecl~i~ological potential to adapt 
Nearly all agricultural impact studies conducted over the past five years 
have considered some tech~~ological options for adapting t o  climate change. 
Among those that  offer promise are 
Seasonal changes and sowing dates. For frost-limited growing areas (i.e., 
temperate and cold areas), warming could extend the season, allowing 
planting of longer maturity annual varieties that  achieve higher yields 
(e.g., Le Houerou, 1990; R,owntree, 1990a, 1990b). For short-season 
crops such as wheat, rice, barley, oats, and many vegetable crops, exten- 
sion of the growing season may allow Inore crops per year, fall planting, 
or, where warming leads to  regular summer highs above critical thresh- 
olds, a split season with a short summer fallow. For subtropical and 
tropical areas where growing season is limited by precipitation or where 
the cropping already occurs throughout the year, the ability to extend 
the growing season may be more limited depending on how precipita- 
tion patterns change. A study for Thailaad found that  yield losses in the 
warmer season were pa.rtially offset by gains in the cooler season (Parry 
et al., 1992). 
Different crop variety or species. For most major crops, varieties exist 
with a wide range of maturities and climatic tolerances. For example, 
Matthews et al. (1994a, 1994b) identified wide genetic variability among 
rice varieties a.s a reasonably easy respoilse to  spikelet sterility in rice 
that  occurred in simula.tions for South and Southeast Asia. Studies in 
Australia showed t11a.t responses to climate change are strongly cultivar 
dependent (Wang et al., 1992). Longer-season cultivars were shown to  
provide a steadier yield under more variable conditions (Connor and 
Wang, 1993). In general, such changes may lead to higher yields or may 
only partly offset losses in yields or profitability. Crop diversification in 
Canada (Cohen et al., 1992) and in China (Hulme et al., 1992) has been 
identified as an adaptive response. 
New crop varieties. The genetic base is broad for most crops but limited 
for some (e.g., kiwi fruit). A study by Easterling et al. (1993) explored 
how hypothetical new varieties would respond to climate change (also 
reported in McKenney et al., 1992). Heat, drought, and pest resistance; 
salt tolerance; and general improvements in crop yield and quality would 
be beneficial (Smit, 1993). Genetic engineering and gene mapping of- 
fer the potential for introducing a wider range of traits. Difficulty in 
assuring traits are efficaciously expressed in the full plant, consumer 
concerns, profitability, and regulatory hurdles have slowed the introduc- 
tion of genetically engineered mrieties compared with early estimates 
(Reilly, 1989; Caswell et al., 1994). 
Water supply and irrigation systems. Across studies, irrigated agricul- 
ture is, in general, less negatively affected than dryland agriculture, but 
adding irrigation is costly and subject to the availability of water sup- 
plies. Climate change will also affect future water supplies. There is 
wide scope for enhancing irrigation efficiency through adoption of drip 
irrigation systeins and other water-conserving technologies (FAO, 1989; 
1991) but successful adoptioil will require substantial changes in how 
irrigation systems are managed and how water resources are priced. Re- 
cause inadequate water systenls a.re responsible for current problems of 
land degradation, and because conlpetition for water is likely to  increase, 
there likely will be a, need for changes in the management and pricing of 
water regardless of whether and how climate changes (Vaux, 1990, 1991; 
World Bank, 1994). Tillage method and incorporation of crop residues 
are other means of increasing the useful water supply for cropping. 
Other inputs and inoizagenzeizt adjustments. Added nitrogen and other 
fertilizers would liliely be necessary to  talie full a.dvantage of the CO;! ef- 
fect. Where high levels of nitrogen are applied, nitrogen not used by the 
crop may leach into the groundwa,ter, run off into surface water, or be 
released froin the soil as nitrous oside. Additional nitrogen in ground- 
water and surface water has been linlied to health effects in humans and 
affects aquatic ecosystems. Studies have also considered a wider range of 
adjustments in tillage, grain drying, and other field operations (Kaiser 
et al., 1993; Smit, 1993). 
Tillage. Minimum and reduced tillage techilologies in combination with 
planting of cover crops a,ild green illallure crops offer substantial possibil- 
ities for reversing existing soil organic matter, soil erosion, and nutrient 
loss and combatiilg potential further losses due to  climate change (Ras- 
mussen and Collins, 1991; Logan, 1991; Edwards et al., 1992; Langdale 
et al., 1992; Peterson et al., 1993; Brinkman and Sombroek, 1996). Re- 
duced and minimum tillage techniques have spread widely in some coun- 
tries but are more limited in other regions. There is considerable current 
interest in transferring these techniques to  other regions (Cameron and 
Oram, 1994). 
Improved short-term cliinate prediction. Linking agricultural manage- 
ment to  seasonal climate predictions (currently largely based on ENSO), 
where such predictions can be ina.de with reliability, can allow manage- 
ment to  a.da.pt iilcreilleiltally to cliinate change. Managementlclimate 
Table 7. Speed of adoption for seine inajor adaptation measures. 
A d j ~ s t ~ m e n t  
Adaptation time (yrs) References 
Variety adoption 3-14 Dalrymple, 1986; Griliches, 1957; 
Plucknett et al., 1987; CIMMYT, 1991. 
Dams and irrigation 50-100 James and Lee, 1971; Howe, 1971. 
Variety development 8-15 Plucknett et al., 1987; Knudson, 1988. 
Tillage systems 10-12 Hill et al., 1994; Dickey et al., 1987; 
Schertz, 1988. 
New crop adoption: Soybeails 15-30 FAO, Agrostat, various years. 
Opening new lands 3-10 Rledvedev, 1987; Plusquellec, 1990. 
Irrigation equipment 20-25 Turner and Anderson, 1980. 
Transportation syst,em 3-5 A. Talvitie, World Bank, 
personal communication, 1994. 
Fertilizer adoption 10 Pieri, 1992; Thompson and Wan, 1992. 
predictor links are a.n importa.nt and growing part of agricultural exten- 
sion in both developed and developing countries (McI<eon et al., 1990, 
1993; Nichols and Wong, 1990). 
6.2. The socioecoi~oinic capability to adapt 
MThile identifying inany specific techi~ological adaptation options, Smit 
(1993) concluded that  necessary research on their cost and ease of adop- 
tion had not yet been conducted. 
One measure of the potential for adaptation is to consider the historical 
record on past speeds of adoption of new technologies (Table 7). Adoption of 
new or different technologies depends on inany factors: economic incentives, 
varying resource and climatic conditions, the existence of other technologies 
(tra.nsportatio11 systems aad ma.rl<ets), the availability of information, and 
the remaining econoillic life of equipillellt and structures (e.g., dams and 
water supply systems). 
Specific technologies can only provide a successful adaptive response if 
they are adopted in appropriate situations. A variety of issues have been 
considered, including land-use planning, watershed management, disaster 
vulnerability assessment, consideration of port and rail adequacy, trade pol- 
icy, and the various programs countries use to  encourage or control produc- 
tion, limit food prices, and manage resource inputs to  agriculture (CAST, 
1992; US OTA, 1993; Smit, 1993; Reilly et al., 1994; Singh, 1994). For 
example, studies suggest that current agricultural iilstitutions and policies 
in the USA may discoura.ge fa,rln lllanageillent a.daptation strategies such as 
altering crop mix by supporting prices of crops not well-suited to  a changing 
cliinate, providing disaster payments wlieii crops fail, or prohibiting imports 
through import quotas (Lewandrowski and Brazee, 1993). 
Existing gaps between best yields and the average farm yields remain un- 
explained, but many are due in part to socioeconomic considerations (Oram 
and Hojjati, 1995; Bumb, 1995); this adds considerable uncertainty t o  esti- 
mates of the potential for adaptation, particularly in developing countries. 
For example, Baethgen (1994) fouild that  a better selection of wheat variety 
combined with improved fertilizer regime could double yields achieved a t  a 
site in Uruguay t o  6 T/ha  under the current climate with current manage- 
ment practices. Under the UI<MO cliinate scenario, yields fell to 5 T/ha ,  
still well above 2.5-3.0 T /ha  curreiltly achieved by farmers in the area. On 
the other hand, Siiigh (1994) concluded that the normal need t o  plan for 
storms and extreme weather events in Pacific island nations creates sig- 
nificant resiliency. Whether techilologies meet the self-described needs of 
peasant farmers is critical in their adaptation (CBceres, 1993). Other stud- 
ies document how individuals cope with environmental disasters, identifying 
how strongly political, econoniic, and ethilic factors interact to  facilitate or 
prevent coping in cases raiigiilg froin the dust bowl disaster in the USA t o  
floods in Bangladesh to  faillines in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique 
(McGregor, 1994). These consideratioiis indicate the need for local capabil- 
ity t o  develop and evaluate potential adaptations that fit changing conditions 
(COSEPUP, 1992). Iillportailt strategies for improving the ability of agricul- 
ture to  respond to  diverse demands and pressures, drawn from past efforts 
t o  transfer technology and provide assistailce for agricultural development, 
include 
Improved tra.ining and general education of populations dependent on 
agriculture, particularly in countries wliere education of rural workers is 
currently limited. Agronomic experts can provide guidance on possible 
strategies and techilologies that may be effective. Farmers must evaluate 
and compare these options to  find those appropriate for their needs and 
the circumstances of their farm. 
Identification of the present vulnerabilities of agricultural systems, 
causes of resource degradation, and existing systems that  are resilient 
and sustainable. Strategies that  are effective in dealing with current 
climate variability and resource degradation are also likely t o  increase 
resilience and adaptability in the face of future climate change. 
Agricultural research centers a.nd experiment stations can examine the 
"robustness" of present farining systeills (i.e., their resilience to  extremes 
of heat, cold, frost, water shortage, pest dama.ge, and other factors) and 
also test the robustiless of new farming strategies as they are developed 
to  meet changes in climate, technology, prices, costs, and other factors. 
Interactive communication that brings research results to  farmers and 
farmers' problems, perspectives, and successes to  researchers is an es- 
sential part of the agricultural research system. 
Agricultural research provides a fouildation for adaptation. Genetic vari- 
ability for most major crops is wide relative to  projected climate change. 
Preservation and effective use of this genetic material would provide the 
basis for new variety development. Coiltinually changing climate is likely 
to  increase the value of networl<s of esperiment stations that  can share 
genetic material and research results. 
Food programs and other social security programs would provide in- 
surance against local supply changes. International famine and hunger 
programs need to  be considered with respect to  their adequacy. 
Transportation, distribution, aad ma.rket integration provide the infras- 
tructure to  supply food during crop sllortfalls that might be induced in 
some regions because of clinlate mriability or worsening of agricultural 
conditions. 
Existing policies may limit efficient response to  climate change. Changes 
in policies such as crop sul~sidp schemes, land tenure systems, water 
pricing and allocation, and iilternational trade barriers could increase 
the adaptive capability of agriculture. 
Many of the above strategies will be beneficial regardless of how or 
whether climate changes. Goals and objectives among countries and farm- 
ers vary considerably. Current climate coilditions and likely future climates 
also vary. Building the capa.bility to  detect change and evaluate possible re- 
sponses is fundamental to  successful a.daptation. Thus, even without having 
clear predictions of clima.te change, is it possible to  identify some strategies 
that  reduce potential vulnerability. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of climate change and altered atmospheric 
concentrations of carboil dioxide ( C o n )  and sulfur dioxide (SOz) on crop 
yields, food supply, and trade. The analysis is part of an integrated as- 
sessment study undertaken a t  the International Institute for Applied Sys- 
tems Analysis (IIASA). For the agricultural study, results from the 11R and 
MESSAGE I11 energy models of IIASA's Environmentally Compatible En- 
ergy Strategies Project and from the regional air pollution model RAINS 
developed by IIASA's Transbounda.ry Air Pollution Project were compiled 
to define economic and eilvironlllental coilditions for simulation experiments 
with the Basic Linked System (BLS) world food trade model. Three dif- 
ferent C 0 2  and SO2 eillission scenarios were tested, representing a range of 
possible energy policy pathways. 
Results from the BLS world food trade model show that  the three emis- 
sion scenarios have only limited impact on global agricultural output, due to 
moderate climate sensitivity to C 0 2  and negative radiative forcing by sulfate 
aerosols. However, the effects of SO2 on agricultural productivity associated 
with the different sceilarios are considerable at  the regional scale. Regional 
impacts on agriculture of a coal-intensive high C o n  and SO2 emissions sce- 
nario are substantial, especially in regions where agricultural production is 
located near industrial areas, as in China and India. Thus, with regard to  
agriculture, the choice of C 0 2  abatement strategy may be more of a regional 
issue than a global one. 
1. Introduction 
Changes in climate and the atmosphere will alter potential and actual 
agricultural production in various regions of the world. Rising levels of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  will likely contribute to  increased agricul- 
tural productivity and enhailced crop water-use efficiency. Global warming 
will tend to  expand the agro-ecological potential poleward and into higher 
altitudes. These positive effects, however, may be constrained by altered 
temperature, precipitation, and evaporation regimes. In addition, other an- 
thropogenic changes in the chemical composition of the atmosphere and 
lithosphere could further alter and possibly reduce regional agricultural pro- 
ductivity. For instance, the a,ir pollutants sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen 
oxides (NO,), and ozone (03)  cause damage to  agricultural crops. 
Our earlier work focused on the coinbilled effects of higher levels of a t -  
mospheric C 0 2  and climate change on world food supplies and trade (Rosen- 
zweig and Parry, 1994; Fischer et crl., 1994). Here we add another anthro- 
pogenic factor to our analysis, examining the impacts of altered atmospheric 
concentrations of C 0 2 ,  climate change, and one air pollutant, SO2, on global 
and regional crop production, agricultural sector gross domestic product 
(GDP),  and food prices. The worli is part of an integrated assessment of the 
consequences of possible energy emission and climate change scenarios car- 
ried out at  the Interna.tiona1 Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
Three different C 0 2  and SO2 emission scenarios derived from this integrated 
assessment are tested, representing a. range of energy policy pathways. 
2. Effects of Increased Atmospheric SO2 
Concent rat ion 
Sulfur dioxide is a prime cause of acid pollution and results primarily from 
the burning of fossil fuels (Fitter and Hay, 1987; Conway and Pretty, 1991; 
and Ashlnore aad Wilson, 1993). This pollutant is prevalent in industrial- 
ized countries, particularly in parts of Europe and northeastern USA. Such 
emissions are currently declining in developed regions due to  regulatory ac- 
tivities; the highest rates of increase of SO2 emissions and other pollutants 
in recent years have occurred in countries that are rapidly industrializing, 
notably in China (Chameides et nl., 1994). 
The nature and amount of damage ca.used to  plants by air pollutants 
depends on three factors: the inherent toxicity of the pollutant gas, the 
proportion that  is taken up by the plants, and their physiological reaction. 
These factors, in turn, are affected by the environment in which the crop is 
growing, including the presence of other pollutants. From the air, SO2 can 
be deposited onto fa.rmers' fields directly as dry deposition or dissolved in 
water in the form of rain or snow as wet deposition, or it can be taken up 
by plants from fog or clouds as occult deposition. Indirect effects of sulfur 
deposition on crops involve changes in the chemical dynamics of the soil and 
surface-water acidification. Apart from these interactions, SO2 aerosols may 
also affect the radiation and temperature environment in which crops grow 
by scattering incoming solar radiation. 
2.1. Dry depositioil 
Early research on SO2 dainage was nlainly concerned with acute injury of 
plants. Conditions under which visible damage of plant foliage occurs have 
been studied for alnlost 100 years. Such visible injury is closely correlated 
with yield losses and can occur when SO2 levels exceed 500 ppbv' for a few 
hours. However, with the adoption of efficient dispersion mechanisms (i.e., 
tall smokestacks for heavy polluters) such conditions are now rare and acute 
injury of agricultural crops from dry deposition is unlikely. 
In recent decades, the research focus has shifted toward the effects of 
sustained low to moderate concentratioils of pollutants on arable crops and 
grasses (Figure 1).  Experinlents ancl field studies have shown that  most 
reductions in yield occur without signs of visible injury. Impacts a t  doses 
comparable t o  levels typically observed in rural areas in Europe and the 
USA have been found to  be highly variable and results have sometimes been 
conflicting. Nevertheless, a few general coi~clusioi~s have been formulated 
(see, e.g., Ashmore and W-ilson, 1993). SO2 -induced chronic injury is en- 
hanced in situations where plants grow slowly, such as in higher altitudes or 
during winter months. Low light intensity, short days, and low temperature 
produce slow growth, which lllalies plants more vulnerable to SO2. 
Evidence from filtration and low-concentration fumigation experiments 
indicates that  critical levels for SO2 inight be lower in the presence of nitrous 
oxide or ozone. On the other hand, a reduction in stomata1 conductance 
due to  enhanced atmospheric C 0 2  could potentially reduce the negative 
effects of SO2 and ozone (Allen, 1990). However, the experimental results 
are complicated and sometimes conflicting, making it difficult t o  predict 
what type of interaction will occur when a crop is subjected t o  a given 
combination of pollutants. Mixtures of toxic gases are most harmful t o  plants 
'Concentrations of gaseous pollutants are usually expressed either on a volume-to- 
volume basis, such as parts per billion volume (ppbv), or on a mass-to-volume basis, 
such as micrograms per cubic meter ( / ~ ~ m - ~ ) .  Coilversion between measures depends on 
pressure, temperature, and molecular weight of the gas. At a temperature of 20°C and a 
pressure of 1 atmospllere, the lespective conveision factor for SO2 1s 1 ppbv ~ 2 . 6 7  l~gm-3.  
Figure 1. Effects of long-term exposure (20-200 days) to  SO2 on the grass 
Lolium perenne. Source: Roberts, 1984. 
under stress and may reduce their ability to  withstand such environmental 
stress, for instance, their ability to tolerate freezing. Plants with the Cg 
photosynthetic pathway2 tend to  be more susceptible to  air pollution than 
C4 plants. There is some evidence to  suggest that  soil type does not have a 
major influence on the response of crops to  pollutants when crops are grown 
in adequately fertilized soils (Sanders, 1993). 
'In the process of photosynthesis, COz and water are combined in plant leaves using 
sunlight to  produce carbohydrates and oxygen. Plants differ in the intermediate steps and 
compounds produced in the photosynthetic process. One major group of plants are referred 
to  a s  C3 plants, because one of the first intermediate compounds has three carbon atoms 
(phosphoglyceric acid). Most agricultural crops, notably, wheat, rice, barley, soybeans, 
and potatoes, belong to the C3 group. Similarly, a second group of plants, termed C4 
plants, produce a compound with four carbon atoms (oxaloacetic acid). C4 plants of 
economic importance include maize, sorghum, millet, and sugarcane. 
I11 studies of critical 1oa.d~ of pollutants in Europe (see Bell, 1993), it has 
been noted that  in the case of a.gricultura1 and horticultural crops adverse 
effects are not observed for annual mean SOz concentratio~l evels below 30 
pgm-3. The overall dose or average concentration of pollutant gases, rather 
than intermittent peaks in exposure levels, appears to be the primary factor 
controlling these effects. 
2.2. Wet depositioll 
Most investigations illto the effects of wet deposition, commonly termed acid 
rain, have focused on damage to forests and water bodies. Studies on an- 
nual crops indicate that  the usual aillbient concentrations of acids in rainfall 
are insufficient to  produce acute injury, except in the immediate vicinity of 
sources of intense emissions. Plant damage has been reported for pH values 
below 3.5, a concentration of acids in rainfall that  is rarely achieved, even 
in highly polluted areas. Some general findings are that  broadleaf plants 
are more susceptible than grasses, and root and leafy vegetables are more 
susceptible than forage, grain, and fruit crops. Overall, the effects of wet 
deposition of pollutants on plants are even less uilderstood than those of 
gaseous pollutants (Fitter and Hay, 1987). 
Much attention has also been given to  studying the indirect effects of 
sulfur deposition, for instance, on the chemical dynamics of soil and surface- 
water acidification. A reduction in pH below a level of 4.2 eventually leads 
t o  an increase in toxic aluminuin coilcentration in the soil, enhancing the 
potential for damage to vegetation and reduction in soil fertility. This pos- 
sibility has been a major concern with regard t o  less intensively managed 
ecosystems such as forests, but seeills of less importance for agro-ecosystems 
where mitigating mailagement practices (e.g., liming of agricultural land) 
can neutralize even high rates of acidic deposition, albeit a t  increased costs 
of agricultural production. 
3. Study Methods 
This integrated assessillent study iilvolves several models developed by dif- 
ferent IIASA projects. To achieve consistency among the various research 
groups, the assessment models have been harmonized through an approach 
that  we term soft-linking. The first step in this process is linking the eco- 
nomic growth rate and regional investment results of the macroeconomic en- 
ergy model 11R (Ma.nne and Richels, 1992) and IIASA's model of the world 
food and agriculture system, the Basic Linlced System of National Agricul- 
t,ural Policy Models (BLS) (Fischer et 01.. 1988). Second, the climate change 
yield component of the BLS is parameterized according to C 0 2  emissions 
projected by the energy model MESSAGE I11 (Messner and Strubegger, 
1995) and global temperature changes derived from MAGICC (a  Model for 
the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Impacts and Climate Change; Hulme et 
al., 1995; Wigley and Raper, 1992). Third, results from RAINS (Regional 
Acidification INforination and Simulation model; Amann, 1993; Amann et 
al., 1995; Cofala and Dorfiler, 199.5) are used to  derive regional yield damage 
functions in the BLS to account for the effects of increasing SO2 emissions 
and deposition in the high C 0 2  and SO2 emission energy scenario used in 
this study. 
3.1. The world agriculture iiiodel system 
The BLS is a global general equilibrium model system developed by the 
Food and Agriculture Project at  IIASA. It consists of some 35 national and 
regional models: 1s natiolla,l models, 2 lnodels of regions with close economic 
cooperation (EC-9 a.nd Eastern Europe and former Soviet union3), 14 ag- 
gregate models of country groupings, a,nd a small component that accounts 
for statistical discrepancies a,nd ilnba,lances during the historical period (see 
Appendis). The individual illodels a.re linked by means of a world market 
module. A detailed description of the entire system is provided in Fischer et 
al. (1988). Earlier results obtained with the system are discussed in Parikh 
et al. (19SS) and in Fischer et cr.1. (1991, 1994, 1996). 
The country models are linked through trade, world market prices, and 
financial flows. The system is solved in annual increments simultaneously 
for all countries in a recursive dynainic simulation. Although the BLS con- 
tains different types of models, all a,dhere to some common specifica.tions. 
The models contain two main sectors: a,griculture and nonagriculture. Agri- 
culture produces nine aggregated commodities; all nonagricultural activities 
are combined into a single a,ggregate sector. Agricultural production is de- 
pendent on the availability of the modeled primary production factors, that  
is, land, labor, and capital. 
For agricultural commodities, yield is determined separately from 
acreage or numbers of animals, and is represented as a function of fertilizer 
3The political changes and changes in national boundaries of the recent past are not 
captured in the BLS, although the model formulation has been adjusted away from cen- 
trally planned economies t,oward more rnarket-orient,ed behavior. 
application (crops) or feeding intensity (livestock). Technological develop- 
ment is assumed to  be largely determined by exogeilous factors. Technical 
progress is included in the models as biological technical progress in the 
yield functions of both crops and livestock. Rates of technical progress are 
estimated from historical data and, in general, show a decline over time. 
Mechanical technical progress is part of the function determining the level 
of harvested crop area and livestock husbandry. 
Several factors in the BLS cause consumers and producers to  adjust their 
behavior over time t o  political changes and altered economic and technolog- 
ical conditions. For consumers, respoilses are altered by the formation of 
taste and habit, and by changing prices and incomes. Producers are most 
affected by their past investnleilt decisions, by technological innovations, or - 
as in this study - by changes in productivity due to  climate change, increased 
atmospheric concentrations of COz, and sulfur deposition. 
Information generated in BLS simulations contains a variety of variables. 
At the world market level these include prices, net exports, global produc- 
tion, and consunlp tion. At the couiltry level the illformation generated varies 
in the different models, but generally iilcludes the following variables: pro- 
ducer and retail prices; level of production; use of primary production factors 
(la.nd, labor, and capital); iilternlediate input use (feed, fertilizer, and other 
chemicals); level of human consumption; stocks and net trade; GDP and 
investment by sector, populatioil number, and labor force; welfare measures 
such as equivalent income; a.nd the level of policy measures as determined 
by the government (e.g., taxes, tariffs). Here we focus on cereal production 
and demand, agricultural GDP, and world food commodity prices. 
3.2. Linking BLS with 11R and MESSAGE I11 
11R is an  11-region adaptation of the Global 2100 model (Manne and Richels, 
1992). This model, in several variants, has been widely used for economic 
studies of the global in1plica.tions of C 0 2  reductions. 11R is a dynamic non- 
linear macroeconomic optimizatioil model. Its objective function is the total 
discounted utility of a single representative producer-consumer. The maxi- 
mization of this utility fuilctioil determines trajectories of optimal savings, 
investment, and consumption decisions. Savings and investment drive the 
accumulation of capital stocks. Available labor (dependent on demographic 
change) and energy inputs determine the total output of the economy accord- 
ing to  a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. 
11R generates internally coilsistent projectioils of global and regional GDP, 
as well as trajectories of regional investment, labor, and primary energy con- 
sumption. A high degree of correspondence with the BLS in key variables for 
modeling the economy inakes it fea,sible to harmonize the scenario analyses 
undertaken with the 11R and BLS models. One possible approach would 
have been to  directly impose projections of GDP, labor, investment, and 
technological progress as exogenous inputs to the BLS. This alternative was 
dropped, however, as it would have constrained the BLS in an extremely 
rigid manner, in effect bypassing its representation of the interdependencies 
between the agriculture and nonagriculture sectors. 
To keep these interdependencies intact, the approach chosen for link- 
ing the models was to harmonize the rates of economic growth generated 
in the BLS with those projected by 11R by adjusting production factors 
and assumed technical progress. Growth rates in the national models of the 
BLS are endogenously determined based on three elements: capital accu- 
mulation through investment and depreciation, related to a savings function 
that  depends on lagged GDP levels as well as balance of trade and financial 
aid flows; dynamics of the labor force as a result of demographic changes; 
and (exogenous) technical progress. The 34 model components of the BLS 
were aggregated into 11 world regions nlatching the regionalization of 11R 
as closely as possible. The harn~onization of production factors and GDP 
for the period 1990 to 2050 was then carried out on a region-by-region ba- 
sis. Regional GDP a.nd investment generated by 11R for the high C 0 2  and 
SO2 emissions scenario (HER) are showil in Table 1. Economic growth is 
highest (over 4%) in the developing regions. Developed regions grow by a 
little less thail 2%. This lnodel cali11ra.tion resulted in a BLS reference sce- 
nario (BLS/REF3) specifically designed to derive projections of the world 
food system that  are consistent with the basic economic assumptions used in 
11R. As a benchmark run for comparing alternative energy policy scenarios, 
reference scenario BLS/REF3 a.ssumes current climate and current levels of 
atmospheric C 0 2  and SOz concentra.tions. 
Another cornerstone of the integrated assessment exercise is MESSAGE 
111, a dynamic systems engineering optimization model used for medium- to  
long-term energy system planning a.nd energy policy analysis. MESSAGE 
I11 uses a bottom-up approach to describe the full range of technological 
aspects of energy use, from resource extraction, conversion, transport, and 
distribution to the provisioil of energy end-use services. The model keeps a 
detailed account of pollutant emissions of C 0 2  and SOz. 
The emission projectioils arrived at  by iteration over the 11R and MES- 
SAGE I11 scenario runs are illput to MAGICC (Hulme et al., 1995), which 
Table 1. Economic growth and investineilt in the 11R high C 0 2  and SO2 
emissions energy scenario (HER). 
Growth rate Growth rate 
G D P  (5% p.a.) Investment (% p.a.) 
(billion 1990 US$) 1990 1990 (billion 1990 US$) 1990 1990 
1990 2030 2050 -2030 -2050 1990 2030 2050 -2030 -2050 
World 20,870 59,346 97,532 2.65 2.60 4,020 11,570 18,810 2.68 2.61 
Developed 18,390 41,121 58,210 2.03 1.94 3,230 7,360 10,550 2.08 1.99 
Developing 3,420 19,848 41,451 4.49 4.25 800 4,220 8,260 4.25 3.97 
has been widely used for assessillents reported by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (see IPCC, 1990, 1992, 1996). MAGICC 
accounts for the cliillate feedback due to  C 0 2  fertilization and for negative 
radiative forcing due to  sulfate aerosols and stratospheric ozone depletion. 
Emissions are converted to  atinospheric coilceiltrations by gas models, and 
the concentrations are converted to  radiative forcing potentials for each gas. 
The net radiative forciilg is then coillputed a.nd input into a simple upwelling- 
diffusion energy-balance climate model. This produces estimates of mean 
annual temperature for the Northern and Southern Hemispheres useful for 
impact studies (see Carter et al., 1994). This study compares the results 
of a high C 0 2  and SO2 emissions scenario (HER) with the outputs from 
two alternative C 0 2  and SO2 elnission abatement scenarios. These are the 
MIS (Mitigation Including Single-purpose options) and the MOM (Mitiga- 
tion Oilly with Multi-purpose stra.tegies) a,batement scenarios. The global 
climate and emission characteristics of the three scenarios used in this study 
are shown in Table 2. 
The HER scenario is purposely high in both C 0 2  and sulfur emissions. 
The goal was to  better understa,nd possible interactions among strategies 
dealing with various a.spects of energy development, and the HER scenario 
makes interactions between C 0 2  a.batement strategies and sulfur abatement 
strategies more visible than they might be in a low-emission scenario. 
The two low-emission scenarios take advantage of MESSAGE 111's ability 
to  optimize the energy structure in response to  sulfur emission limits. The 
first abatement scenario, MIS, uses all opportunities to  reduce sulfur, from 
the addition of specific mitigation tecllnologies to the redesigning of some 
parts of the energy system. The second abatement scenario, MOM, relies 
exclusively on emission reductions from the redesigning of the energy system. 
Technologies whose single purpose is sulfur abatement are not used. 
Table 2. Climate a,nd enlissioll cha~racteristics of three energy scenarios. 
Scenario 1990 2010 2030 2050 2100 
HER 
Temperature change ( O  C) 
North 
South 
Global 
COz concentration (ppmv) 
SOa emissions (Mty-l) 
MOM 
Temperature change (OC) 
North 
South 
Global 
COz concentration (ppmv) 
SO2 emissioils ( ~ t ~ - ' )  
MIS 
Temperature change (O C) 
North 
South 
Global 
COz concentratiou (ppmv) 
SO2 emissions (Mty-' ) 
3.3. Temperature and COz effects on crop yields 
A projection of global temperature change only, as calculated by MAG- 
ICC, provides insufficient inforlnation to assess the impact of climate change 
on agriculture. Therefore, we einployed geographically detailed information 
generated within earlier climate iinpact studies to  estimate regional crop 
yield changes for the three scenarios (see Rosenzweig a.nd Parry, 1994; Rosen- 
zweig and Iglesias, 1994; Fischer et al., 1994, 1996; Rosenzweig et al., 1995; 
Strzepek and Smith, 1995; IBSNAT, 1989). 
The original yield change estimates referred to  well-defined conditions 
of climate and C 0 2  conceiltratiolls according to the results of doubled-C02 
simulations of three general circulation models (GCMs) (Table 3): GISS, 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies (Hansen et al., 1983); GFDL, Geophysi- 
cal Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (Manabe and Wetherald, 1987); and UKMO, 
United Kingdom Meteorological Office (Wilson and Mitchell, 1987). 
The simulated temperature cllailges of these GChiI scenarios (+4OC to  
+5.2OC) are a t  or above the upper end of the range (+1.5OC to  +4.5OC) 
Table 3. GCM cliillate change scenarios. 
Resolution COa level Change in average global 
GCM Yeara (lat. x long.) (ppmv) temp.(OC) precip.(%) 
GISS 1982 7 . 8 3 ' ~  10' 630 4.2 11  
GFDL 1988 4.4' x7.5' 600 4.0 8 
UICMO 1986 5.0' x7.5' 640 5.2 15 
"Year GCM result was calculated. 
projected for doubled-C02 warilling by the 1pCC4 (IPCC, 1996). Due to the 
lack of negative radiative forcing by sulfate a.erosols, the temperature changes 
generated in the GCM esperiments are well above the temperature changes 
projected by MAGICC using the emission scenarios of the current study. 
For the crop modeling part of the original study (Rosenzweig and Parry, 
1994)) climate changes from doubled-C02 GCM simulations are utilized with 
an associated level of 555 ppnlv C 0 2 ,  slightly higher than the C 0 2  levels 
occurring in the HER energy scenario (i.e., 538 ppmv in year 2050). 
For the regional specificatioil of crop yield impacts for the three energy 
scenarios, we scale our previous results calculated for the different GCM 
climate scenarios in the followi~lg manner. Let ATGCM denote the tempera- 
ture change associated with any pa.rticular GCM experiment. The levels of 
atmospheric C 0 2  for the control run (i.e., approximately the current levels) 
and for an effective doubling of greenhouse gases are indicated by CzCM 
and c,$ZM, respectively. Furthermore, let aY2iM denote the yield changes 
in region j of the BLS, a.nd Ay;Lnd be a, vector of respective yield cha.nges 
from C 0 2  fertilization at  C 0 2  level C,$zlvI. These vectors of yield impacts 
can be derived from the agro~loinic results produced in the previous crop 
modeling study (Rosenzweig and Iglesias, 1994): (i) the vectors ay2iM of
climate-change-induced yield effects are ca.ptured in the climate change only 
experiments, and (ii) vectors Ay;Lnf can be calculated as the difference 
between climate impacts with plzysiological eflects of elevated C02 and cli- 
mate change only scenarios. For global climate conditions resulting from 
any particular energy scenario s ,  that is, a combination of projected tem- 
perature change and increase of C 0 2  concentration (At,, Ac,), the effective 
yield impact is calculated by linear interpolation: 
4Taking into account the range in the estimate of climate sensitivity (1.5-4.5OC) and 
the full set of IS92 emission scenarios, the climate models used in the IPCC assessment 
project an increase in global mean temperature of between O.g°C and 3.5OC by 2100. 
The respective chailges in global temperature and the level of COz con- 
centrations for the high C 0 2  and SOz emissions scenario (HER) and the two 
alternative abatement scenarios (MOM a,nd MIS) are taken from Table 2. 
Temperature changes were applied separately for the Northern and Southern 
Hemispheres as calculated in MAGICC. This approach, which mixes equi- 
librium climate and transient COz projections, is the best available given 
the lack of GCM transient cliinate change simulations consistent with the 
assumed emission scenarios. 
3.4. Effects of SOa on crop yields 
Quantificatioll of the effects of SOz on crop yields requires the estimation 
of regional SO2 deposition and crop damage. RAINS is a modular sim- 
ulation system originally designetl for integrated assessment of alternative 
strategies to  reduce acid deposition in Europe (Alcamo et al., 1990). The 
model quantifies sulfur emissions from given activity levels in the energy 
sector, both production and end uses; traces the fate of these emissions us- 
ing atmospheric transport and chemical transformation models; calculates 
the amount of sulfur deposition; and estimates the impacts of the emissions 
on soils and ecosystems. RAINS generates results in a geographically ex- 
plicit manner on a grid of lo latitude x lo longitude. To parameterize the 
crop yield damage caused by dry deposition of SO2, the gridded estimates 
of sulfur deposition a,nd SO2 concelltrations for South and Southeast Asia 
projected by RAINS-Asia5 were evaluated using a linear damage function: 
where x is the geographic location (i.e., pixel of lo latitude x lo longitude); 
e(x) is the mean ailllual SOz concentration in pgm-3 a t  location x;  and 
nys:(x) is the yield change caused by SO2 at  mean annual concentration of 
e(x>. 
From Section 2 we kllow that quantifying SO2 impacts on crops is diffi- 
cult and controversial. Nevertheless, it was decided to  a t  tempt to quantify 
'Results of RAINS are available for Europe and for South and Southeast Asia. Spatially 
disaggregated estimates of sulfur deposition were not available for other regions. 
possible crop damage from dry deposition in the BLS runs, because omit- 
ting these effects would have created an uilacceptable bias in the assessment. 
However, there is great uncertainty as to  the magnitude of the possible SO2 
damage to  crops. 
We use an SO2 concentration threshold of 30 pgm-3, as established for 
Europe (see Ashmore and Wilson, 1993). In accordance with experiments 
cited in Fitter and Hay (1987) and Conway and Pretty (1991), we have 
adopted the assumption that  crop yield damage increases linearly when SO2 
concentration levels exceed the threshold such that  yield is reduced by 10% 
for each 10 ppbv (i.e., each 10 ppbv 2 26.7 pgm-3) increase of mean annual 
S O2 concentrations beyond the critical level. 
The estimates of crop damage by grid-cell were then aggregated for the 
main agricultural areas of major countries in the study region of RAINS- 
Asia (e.g., China, India, Pakistan, etc.). In addition to  South and Southeast 
Asia (CPA, PAS, and SAS regions6), estimates of crop damage from SO2 
deposition were also included for the former Soviet Union (FSU) and North 
America (NAM) using the regional tra,jectories of sulfur emissions calculated 
by MESSAGE I11 in the HER energy scemrio. Consequently, the yield im- 
pact equation (1) discussed above wa,s ainended to include a term accounting 
for SO2 damage: 
3.5. Scenario analysis with the BLS 
The evaluation of the poteilt,ial impa.cts of alternative future C 0 2  and SO2 
emissions on production and trade of agricultural commodities is carried out 
by comparing the results of corresponding climate change scenarios with a 
reference projection, scenario BLS/REF3. The reference scenario represents 
a future with current clinlate and atmospheric conditions and the contin- 
uation of current economic, population, and technology growth rates. The 
basic assumptions of the reference and three C 0 2  emission abatement sce- 
narios are described in Table 4. 
Data on crop yield changes were estimated for different scenarios of 
climate change and increases of a.tmospheric C 0 2  and SO2 concentrations, 
'The mapping from BLS co~nponents to aggregate world regions is given in the 
Appendix. 
Table 4. BLS scenarios analyzed in the study. 
Scenario Scenario characteristics 
BLS/REF3 Reference scenario: UN 1992 medium-growth population 
scenario; economic growth by region calibrated through 
adjustment of production factor dynamics to approximately 
inatch growth characteristics of 11R results in high-emission 
energy scenario; agricultural protection is reduced by 50% 
between 1990 and 2020; cliinate and levels of COz and SO2 
concentrations remain a t  base-year level. 
HER High-emission scenario: same basic assumptions as in 
BLS/REF3; yield changes parameterized according to  
temperature changes and increases in C 0 2  and SO2 levels (see 
Table 10) derived from emissions in high-emission energy 
scenario using MAGICC and RAINS-Asia and scaling yield 
iinpacts calculated in EPA climate impact study; spatial pattern 
of climate change derived from doubled-C02 GCM experiments 
using results published for GISS, GFDL, and UICMO general 
circulation models. 
MOM Abat,enlent variant 1: saine basic assumptions as in BLS/REF3; 
yield clianges paraineterized according to  temperature changes 
and increases in C103 levels (see Table 10) derived from emissions 
in an energy sceilario that implements mitigation through 
abatement measures according to  multipurpose strategies using 
MAGICC and scaling yield impacts calculated in EPA climate 
impact study; spatial pattern of climate change derived from 
doubled-C02 GCbI experiments using results published for 
GISS, GFDL, and UII;hIO general circulation models. 
Abatenlent variant 2: same basic assumptions as in BLS/REF3; 
yield changes parameterized according to temperature changes 
and increases in COa levels (see Table 10) derived from 
emissions in an energy sceilario that implements mitigation 
through abatement measures according to  single-purpose (i.e., 
SO2 mitigation) optioils using MAGICC and scaling yield 
impacts calculated in EPA climate impact study; spatial pattern 
of climate change derived from doubled-C02 GCM experiments 
MIS 
using results publislied for GISS, GFDL, and UKMO general 
circulation models. 
based on the emissions resulting from three alternative emission scenarios. 
Data were compiled for each of the 34 regional or national components repre- 
senting the world in the BLS. Yield variations caused by climate change, C o n  
fertilization, and sulfur deposition were introduced into the yield response 
functions of the BLS country models by means of a multiplicative factor 
[see equation (3)] inlpactiilg on the relevant parameters in the mathemati- 
cal representation. This approach inlplies that both average and marginal 
fertilizer productivity are affected by the imposed yield changes. Therefore, 
changes in yield obtained in sin~ulatiolls with the BLS that include economic 
adaptation will deviate solnewhat from productivity changes derived from 
crop modeling results, because input levels adjust accordingly. 
It is uncertain to what extent the positive physiological effects of C 0 2  
observed in crop experiments will materialize in farmers' fields (e.g., see 
FAO, 1994), and to what extent negative impacts from climate change can 
be mitigated by farmers' adaptation to  changing conditions. Thus, we tested 
two variants of our BLS sceilarios in order to examine the robustness of our 
results given our optilnistic specificatioil of C 0 2  fertilization effects based on 
agronomic experiments (Rosenzweig and Iglesias, 1994) and the potential for 
farmer adaptation to yield changes. In sceilario variant V1, we assume that 
the effect on farmers' fields will be only two-thirds of the beneficial impacts 
of increased C 0 2  levels derived fro111 crop experiments. Scenario variant V2 
assumes that  only two-thirds of both climate and C 0 2  effects materialize 
under open field conditions, assunling that farmers act to minimize yield 
damage. 
Finally, we include the cost of abatement's potential to affect capital ac- 
cumulation for agricultural and other sectoral investment (scenarios V l b  and 
V2b). Additional investillent required for enlissio~l abatement is determined 
by MESSAGE 111. The results, calculated by world region, were input to  the 
BLS as percentages of GDP used for additional energy investment (and thus 
not available for other purposes). The underlying idea is that additional in- 
vestment requirements for C 0 2  and SO2 emissions abatement will also affect 
capital accumulation in other sectors, including agriculture. Averaged over 
decades, the global investment required in scenarios MOM and MIS is about 
0.5% of GDP. The investment requirements differ significantly between de- 
veloped and developing regions. The following invest ment coefficients, that  
is, the percentages of GDP required for investing in abatement, were used in 
the V l b  and V2b BLS simulation runs: 0.1% North America (NAM), 0.05% 
Western Europe and other developed countries (WEU&ODE), 0.10% Pacific 
OECD countries (PAO), 1.2% Africa (AFR), 0.6% Latin America (LAM), 
Table 5. Global agriculture production in BLS/REF3 reference scenario." 
Growth (% p.a.) 
Production level 1990 1990 
1990 2030 2050 -2030 -2050 
Wheat 560 897 1037 1.2 1 .O 
Rice, milled 345 605 706 1.4 1.2 
Coarse grains 912 1476 1685 1.2 1 .O 
Agriculture 377 659 784 1.4 1.2 
Duni t s  of measurement: wheat, rice (milled equivalent), coarse grains in million tons; 
agriculture production in billion 1970 US dollars. In addition, the BLS also includes 
the following corllrl~odity groups: bovine and ovine meat, dairy products, other animal 
products, protein feed, other food products, and nonfood products. 
0.6% Western Asia (WAS), 0.8% South Asia (SAS), 1.0% centrally planned 
Asia (CPA), and 0.85% Pacific Asia., developing countries (PAS). 
4. The Agriculture Sector in the BLS/REF3 
Reference Scenario 
The reference scenario BLS/REF3 is a long-term projection of agricultural 
supply, demand, and trade that serves as a neutral point of departure for 
studying potential impacts of alternative emissions scenarios on productivity 
changes in agriculture. The reference scenario adopts the economic growth 
patterns calculated by the energy model 11R according t o  the assumptions 
in the high-emissions (unabated) energy scenario (HER). We discuss here 
the characteristics of the reference scenario BLS/REF3 for comparison with 
the impacts of the C 0 2  and SO2 elllissions abatement scenarios. BLS/REF3 
represents a future in which currellt clima.te conditions prevail. 
Effective demand for food grows substantially, because of higher incomes 
and larger populations. This increase in demand is met at  somewhat decreas- 
ing world market prices for agricultural products, consistent with historical 
trends. Table 5 shows global production of agricultural commodities in the 
BLS/REF3 scenario. Average annual growth rates of production during the 
period 1990 t o  2050 (and hence effective demand) for agricultural commodi- 
ties range between 1.0% and 1.2% per annum, implying a 1.8- to  2.2-fold 
increase compared with 1990 levels. Gross agricultural production7 increases 
on average 1.2% per annunl, that is, by the year 2050 it reaches about 2.1 
' ~ r o s s  agricultural prodnction, labeled Agriculture in Table 5, is calculated a t  constant 
1970 world market prices. 
Table 6. Population in BLS/REF3 reference scenario. 
Populatioll (bln. people) Growth rate (% p.a.) 
1990 2030 2050 1990-2030 1990-2050 
World 5.2 8.7 9.9 1.3 1 .O 
Developed 1.3 1.5 1.5 0.4 0.2 
Developing 3.9 7.2 6.4 1.5 1.1 
Table 7. Cereal production in BLS/REF3 reference scenario. 
Total production (mln. tons) Production per capita (kg) 
1990 2030 2050 1990 2030 2050 
World 1,818 2,977 3,428 350 344 348 
Developeda 962 1,327 1,448 759 899 984 
Developing 855 1,650 1,979 218 230 236 
aBecause the Rest of the world region (containing both developed and developing countries) 
is included here with the developed region t,he figures for cereal production and demand 
- - 
are somewhat higher than shown in the statistics and values for the developing region are 
somewhat lower (see Appendix). Rice is included in milled equivalent, that  is, a conversion 
factor of 0.667 is applied to paddy rice. 
times the 1990 level. This colllpa,res favorably with the projected average 
population increase of ambout 1.0% allllually during the 60-year period from 
1990 to  2050 (Table 6). 
Global cereal production in 1939-1991 is estimated in the BLS to  amount 
t o  1.8 billion tons (note that rice is included in milled form). Production is 
projected to  increase to  about 3.0 billioil tons by the year 2030 and to  some 
3.4 billion toils by the year 2050, ilnplying an average annual increase of 
1.1% over a period of 60 years (Table 7). This increase slightly exceeds the 
projected population growth. The share of developed countries (plus "Rest 
of the world") in global productioil of cereals is projected to  decline steadily 
between 1990 and 2050, from 53% to  42% by the end of the simulation 
period. Over the same period the share of developed countries in the global 
demand of cereals declines from 49% in 1990 to  33% in 2050, resulting in an  
increased net flow of cereals into developing countries (Table 8). 
5. Static Yield Impacts 
The individual yield impact compollellts of climate, C 0 2  fertilization, and 
SO2 damage, and the resulting net impa.ct for each energy scenario a t  global 
and broad regional levels are listed in Table 9. The net yield change is a 
measure of distortion kilowil as the st.a.tic yield impact, because it describes 
Table 8. Cereal demand in RLS/REF3 reference scenario. 
Total demand (mla. toils) Deinaiid per capita (kg) 
World 1,818 2,977 3,428 350 344 348 
Developed 866 1079 1129 683 731 767 
Developing 952 1899 2296 242 264 274 
Table 9. Static impact on crop productivity in 2050 under GISS climate 
assumptions (% change). 
Cerea,ls 
Impact of World Developed Developing 
HER Climate 
( 3 0 2  
SO2 
Net total 
MOM Climat,e 
co2 
so2 
Net total 
Climate 
c o s  
SO2 
Net tota.1 
MIS 
a hypothetical effect of climate change without taking into account adjust- 
ments of the ecoi~omic system. To obta.in an estimate of the static climate 
change yield impact for any particular year r,  say, A,(r) for scenario s ,  we ap- 
ply the estimated crop-wise yield cha,nges, Xj(s, r )  = AyhCM[Ats (~) ,  c (T)], 
to  the yield and production levels a.s observed in a BLS reference projection 
in year r. For cereals these impacts can be added up without weighting. 
To arrive a t  static impact estiinates for other groups of crops and the entire 
sector, world market prices for year r as simulated in the respective reference 
projection are used. In mathematical notation, 
where A;(r) is the static climate change yield impact of scenario s on region 
R in year r ;  X:(s, r )  is the climate cha,nge yield impact of scenario s for 
Table 10. Dynamic impact on cereal production under alternative GCM 
variants in 20.50 (% change). 
GISS GFDL 
HER MOM h1IS HER MOM MIS 
World 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Developed 5.2 4.9 5.5 3.5 2.5 2.9 
Developing -2.3 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.4 -1.3 
UI<MO AVERAGE 
HER MOM MIS HER MOM MIS 
World 1.2 1.5 1.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 
Developed 4.9 4.8 5.4 4.5 4.1 4.6 
Developing -1.5 -1 .O -1 .O -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 
i in country j in year r ;  P): is the world market price of commodity i in 
year r of BLS/REF3 projection; and Q!, is the production of commodity i 
in country j in year r of BLS/REF3 projection. 
Climate effects on crop yields are uiliforlllly negative, whereas C 0 2  fer- 
tilization effects are positive. SO2 effects are negative in the high-emissions 
scenario, but are mitigated in the abatement scenarios. Net static impacts 
of the emissions scenarios on world cereal yields are small, less than 3%, but 
tend to  be more positive in developed countries. 
6. Scenario Results 
The dynamic impacts of the three elllissioll scenarios on cereal production 
under alternative GCM regional distributions of temperature are shown in 
Ta.ble 10. The results take into a.ccount econolllic adjustments triggered by 
the changes in crop productivity. Although the C 0 2  concentration is highest 
in the HER scenario, the projected temperature increase is less than in the 
abatement runs, MOM aad MIS, because of lower radiative forcing caused by 
the high amount of aerosols. This combination of factors causes the smallest 
impacts on world cereal production. Because increased temperature, a t  least 
a t  an aggregate regional level, leads to negative yield impacts, and increased 
C 0 2  leads t o  sizable positive yield impacts, the HER scenario would clearly 
be the best option for agriculture if one were to  ignore possible damage 
from SO2. Even when taking SO2 damage to  crops into account, estimates 
of aggregate global crop productivity in the HER scenario are comparable 
with the estimates for the abatement cases. Overall, the global results are 
Table 11. Regional impacts on agriculture sector GDP and cereal pro- 
duction in 2050 (% cha.nge relative to BLS/REF3) under GISS climate 
a s ~ u m p t i o n . ~  
Agricultural GDP Cereals 
HER R40M IvIIS HER MOM MIS 
World 
Developed 
Developing 
NAM 
WEU+ODE 
EEU+FSU 
P A 0  
AFR 
LAM 
WAS 
SAS 
CPA 
PAS 
Osee Table 4 for an explanatioi~ of acronyms and scenario variants. 
similar across the climate impa,cts derived from GISS, GFDL, and UKMO 
doubled-C02 GCM runs.s 
However, although ~vorld impacts are small, abatement to  avoid dam- 
age from SO2 pollution clearly matters to  regional agricultural production 
and GDP (Table 11). Outconles are Inore beneficial for developed regions 
than for developing countries. For both groups, however, the magnitude 
of the impacts falls into a fa.irly broad range, with the most positive re- 
sults for the regions illcludillg the fornler Soviet Union (EEU&FSU), Pacific 
OECD countries (PAO), and Western Europe (WEU&ODE). The highest 
cereal production losses occur in Latin America (LAM) and Africa (AFR). 
Compared with the a,baten~ellt scenarios, the HER scenario with high coal 
output has the potential for a downturn in the agricultural sectors of North 
America, the former Soviet Union, and China and other nations in Far East 
Asia. 
The impact on world prices, on the other hand, is fairly moderate (Table 
12). As a consequence of a modest increase in crop productivity relative to  
the reference scenario BLS/REF3, mainly due to  the physiological effects of 
'Although regional results according to different doubled-COz GCM scenarios are in 
most cases compatible with regard to directioi~ of change, there are some striking differ- 
ences in the magnitude of the changes. 
Table 12. Dyilaillic impact 011 world market prices in 2050 (% change 
compared wit11 BLSlREF3). 
Price change 
HER MOM MIS 
Cereals 
Other crops 
All crops 
Agriculture -15 -9 -1 1 
Table 13. Regional impa.ct on cereal production under GISS climate as- 
sumptions in runs V1 (lower C 0 2  fertilization) and V2 (lower COz fertiliza- 
tion and farmer adaptation) in 2050 (% change). 
HER MOM RlIS HER MOM MIS 
World 
Developed 
Developing 
NAM 
WEUSODE 
EEU+FSU 
PA0 
AFR 
LAM 
WAS 
S AS 
CPA 
PAS 
C 0 2  on plants, prices of a,gricultural coillmodities are generally lower when 
considering chailges in climate and the a.tmosphere. When assuming that  
the beneficial physiological effects of COz in the open fields will on average 
be only two-thirds of the magnitude determined in crop experiments, the 
abatement scenarios become superior for agriculture (scenario variant V1; 
Table 13). In this variant, the global impact on cereal production is slightly 
negative, between -1% and 0%, and the regional impacts still vary widely, 
between -1 0% and + 18%. These conclusioi~s are further strengthened in 
scenario variant V2, where we a.ssume that  the climate effect will also be 
limited to  two-thirds of the level determined in the crop experiments ( a  
rough estimate of adapta.tion measures by farmers). In this case, the global 
Table 14. Regional inlpact on cerea.1 production under GISS climate as- 
sumptions in runs V l b  and V211, iilcludillg the costs of COz and SOz abate- 
ment in 2050 (% change). 
V l b  V2b 
HER MOM MIS HER MOM MIS 
World 
Developed 
Developing 
NAM 
WEU+ODE 
EEU+FSU 
PA0 
AFR 
LAM 
WAS 
SAS 
CPA 
PAS 
results tend t o  be positive, producing a net benefit in the order of less than 
+1% (see Table 13). 
Finally, the dynamic in~pa,cts on crops taking the cost of abatement mea- 
sures into account are sho\vn in Table 14, referring to  scenario variants V l b  
and V2b. There is, of course, no difference in results for the coal-intensive 
energy scenario HER between Ta,ble 13 and Table 14, as no additional invest- 
ment is required. Earmarliing additional energy investment requirements for 
abatement causes a small reduction of crop output and GDP of agriculture 
of about 0.3-0.4%. 
7. Summary 
The simulation experiments with the BLS, computed to  analyze the impacts 
of alternative energy futures on agriculture, suggest a few general conclu- 
sions: 
The overall effects are limited due to moderate climate sensitivity and 
negative radiation forcing by sulfate aerosols. 
Productivity in agriculture a t  the aggregate global level increases in sim- 
ulations for all three energy scenarios compared with present climate and 
C 0 2  concentration levels, maiilly beca.use of the positive physiological 
effects of increased C 0 2  levels on crop performance. 
The aggregate impact for the group of developed countries is clearly 
positive in all simulated cases. The a,ggregate impact on developing 
countries is likely to  be negative. 
Although there is relatively little difference between outcomes a t  the 
global level, regional results vary greatly between scenarios. 
In particular, regional impacts on agriculture of a coal-intensive high 
C 0 2  and SO2 einissions scenario could be substantial, especially in re- 
gions where agricultural productioil is located near industrial areas, as 
in China and India. 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
World population is espected to alillost double between 1990 and 2050 from 
5 to  about 10 billion people, which in turn will necessitate major increases in 
the level of economic activities, in energy consumption, and in food produc- 
tion. The analysis presented starts from economic projections that  stipulate 
a more than 10-fold increase of GDP in developing regions between 1990 and 
the middle of the nest century. Undoubtedly, such dramatic demographic 
and economic changes will put heavy demands on resources and will require 
the application of more efficient and environmentally benign technologies. 
The costs of such enviroilmentally benign technologies, however, are con- 
siderable. The projected differences in energy investments between abate- 
ment scenarios (both MOM and MIS) and the coal-intensive HER scenario 
amount to  about 0.5% of global C:DP (US$ value), and more than 1% of 
GDP in East Asia (CPA region). It is justified, therefore, to carefully ana- 
lyze the regional and global consequences of a failure to  implement emission 
abatement in the energy sector. 
Wheil looking only at  the projected climate and C 0 2  effects of the three 
alternative energy and emission scenarios, conditions in the high-emissions 
scenario are more beneficial to  agriculture than those in the abatement sce- 
narios. This perhaps counterintuitive finding derives from the projected 
conditions, namely, that  the high-emissions scenario produces the highest 
C 0 2  level ( a  positive effect) and causes the least warming (a  negative im- 
pact) of the three cases analyzed. Thus, global impacts on agriculture alone, 
and on the basis of the single pollutant taken into account here (i.e., SOz),  
do not seem to  provide sufficient economic justification for abatement. 
However, unlike the deba.te on cli~llate change impacts where the regions 
mainly responsible for the increa.se in atmosplleric C 0 2  concentration may 
be different from those most affected by it,  the damage caused by air pollu- 
tion stays more closely withill the region of origin, a t  least when analyzing 
the effects in terms of broa.der world regions. Hence, from a regional per- 
spective, abatement appears to be foremost in the interest of the polluters 
themselves. Thus, emissioil a,batenlent in terms of agricultural impacts is a 
regional issue much more than a globa,l one. Furthermore, high levels of SO2 
emissions pose a llumber of enviroilmelltal risks not included in this anal- 
ysis. The detrimental inlpacts of a,irborile chemicals include human health 
effects, acidification of soils and wa.ter bodies, forest dieback, and damage 
t o  buildings and infrastructure. Whereas the cost of abatement measures 
is determined by rather well-specified investment requirements, the damage 
caused by SO2 and related polluta.nts is complex, of multiple forms, and 
widespread. 
Appendix. Aggrega.tion of BLS couiltsy modules into world regions. 
Economic 
group Region BLS component." 
Developed NAM Canada, USA 
WEUSODE Austria, EC-9, Rest of the worldb 
EEUSFSU Eastern Europe & USSR 
PA0 Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
Developing AFR Kenya, Nigeria, 
Africa Oil Exporters, 
Africa medium income/calorie exporters, 
Africa medium income/calorie importers, 
Africa low income/calorie exporters, 
Africa low income/calorie importers 
LAM Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Latin Ainerica high income/calorie exporters, 
Latin America high income/calorie importers, 
Latin America inediuin income 
WAS Egypt, Turkey, 
Near East Asia oil exporters, 
Near East Asia medium-low income 
SAS India, Paltistan, 
Asia low income 
CPA China, 
Far East Asia high-medium income/calorie importers 
PAS Indonesia, Thailand, 
Far East Asia high-medium income/calorie exporters 
"For details of country grouping in t,he BLS, see Fischer et nl. (1988). 
b ~ h e  main characteristics of the Rest of the world region derive from developed countries 
mainly in Europe; the region also inclndes some developed and developing countries in 
other parts of the world. 
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Abstract 
A vital measure for global warming policy is the marginal impact of a tonne 
of carbon emitted to the atmosphere. In economic terms, this value cor- 
responds to  the carbon tax level needed to  internalize the externalities as- 
sociated with climate change. This study re-evaluates the marginal impact 
of carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  emissioils in light of new scientific and economic 
understanding of the cooliilg effects of sulfate aerosols and ozone depletion, 
the regional distributioil of global wa.rmiag damage, ilonlinearity in damage 
as a function of temperature rise, and the appropriate discount rate. 
1. Introduction 
Global warming policy must balance the cost of reducing greenhouse gas 
einissioils now against poteiltial dama.ge from future climatic change. A vi- 
tal and ongoing debate iilvolves valuing the impacts of carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  
einissioils t o  the atillosphere (Nordhaus, 1991; Cline, 1992; Fankhauser, 
1993; Fankhauser, 1994b; Azar, 1994). One common measure is the marginal 
impact of a tonne of carbon emitted to  the atmosphere. In economic terms, 
this value corresponds to  the carboil tax level needed to  internalize the ex- 
ternalities associated with climate change. However, the complexity of the 
global warming pheilomenoil and difficulties in representing the impacts of 
climatic change using a single monetary value make the marginal impact per 
tonne carbon ( tC)  a highly uncertain value. The range of estimates is large; 
most values lie between US$5-25/tC (Fankhauser and Pearce, 1993). 
Hope and Maul (1996) deinoilstrated that  much of this disparity is ex- 
plained by different assumptioils about the effectiveness of adaptation to  
climate change, the backgrouild level of C 0 2  emissions, economic growth 
rates, and the discouilt rate. Ailother key factor is the treatment of uncer- 
tainty. 
One of the two rllodels used by Hope and Maul, the Policy Analysis for 
the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) izzodel, was developed for use by European 
Union (EU) decision inakers in 1991. Since then, scientific knowledge of the 
global warming problem and methods for impact valuation have developed 
greatly. For example, the sulfate aerosols produced by the burning of fossil 
fuel have been found t o  have a sigilificant cooling effect. Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), once thought to  be the ~llost potent greenhouse gases, are now be- 
lieved t o  have only a slight effect because they destroy ozone, itself a strong 
greenhouse gas. Case studies in various regions of the world have improved 
our ability to  measure damage froin global warming, and suggest that  dam- 
age is likely to be a nonlinear function of temperature. The PAGE model 
was recently updated to  reflect this iilfor~nation (Plambeck et al., 1995). In 
this paper we use the updated PAGE model, PAGE95, to  examine the effect 
of new scientific and ecoilomic kilowledge on the predicted marginal impact 
per tonne of carbon, and talie another look at the role of assumptions about 
the discount rate, ecoiloillic growth rate, and the effectiveness of adaptation 
t o  climate change. 
2. The PAGE95 Model 
The PAGE integrated a.ssessment model was developed in 1991 for use by EU 
decision makers (Hope et al . ,  1993). An updated model version, PAGE95, 
accounts for recent developnleilts in the science and economics of global 
warming (Plambeck et nl., 199.5). Global warming policy decision variables 
are the level of greeilhouse gas eillissioils over time and the degree of adap- 
tation to  climate change. For a. specified global warming policy, PAGE95 
estimates the cost of eila,ctiilg t,lia.t policy as well as the resulting climate 
change impacts, the focus of this pa,per. 
PAGE95 contains equations tlmt model 
a Emissions of the priinary greenhouse gases, C 0 2  and methane. Chlo- 
rofluorocarboils (CFCs) and l~ydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), deci- 
sion variables in the original PAGE model, have a reduced role in 
PAGE95. Although future emissions are limited by international agree- 
ments to  protect the ozone layer, existing atmospheric concentrations 
are not expected to  decline significa.ntly in the next century. Therefore, 
PAGE95 models (H)CFCs a.s a small addition to  background radiative 
forcing (small due to the cooliilg effect of ozone depletion). 
a The greenhouse effect. Ailthropogeilic emissions of greenhouse gases 
exceed the rate of reilloval by chemical a.nd biological processes and 
accumulate in the atmosphere. The greenhouse gases trap heat in the 
atmosphere so that less of the illcoming solar radiation is re-radiated 
to  space. This increases radiative forcing, the net flux of energy to  
the earth. The earth's temperature rises very slowly as excess heat is 
transferred from the atmosphere to  land and ocean. 
Cooling from sulfate aerosols. Sulfate aerosols result from fossil fuel 
combustion and are commonly known as the cause of acid rain. They 
also backscatter incoming solar radiation and interfere with cloud for- 
mation, producing a reduction in radiative forcing. This counteracts the 
greenhouse effect. 
Regional temperature effects. Unlike greenhouse gases, which remain in 
the atmosphere for decades and are globally mixed, sulfate aerosols have 
a very short atmospheric lifetime (about six days) and so tend to  remain 
in the source region. Therefore, sulfate aerosol cooling is a regional phe- 
nomenon. For the eight world regions in PAGE95,' temperature rise 
is computed from the difference between global warming and regional 
sulfate aerosol cooling. Sulfate cooling is greatest in the more industri- 
alized regions, and tends to  decrease over time due to  sulfur controls to  
prevent acid rain and negative health effects. 
Noillillearity in the damage caused by global warming. Climatic change 
impacts are a polynomial function of regional temperature increase above 
some tolerable level of temperature change, ( T  - Ttol)n, where n is an 
uncertain input parameter. 
Regional economic growth. Impacts are evaluated in terms of an annual 
percentage loss of gross donlestic product (GDP) in each region, for 
a maximum of two sectors - in this application defined as economic 
impacts and lloneconolnic (environmental and social) impacts. 
Adaptation to climate change. Illvestment in adaptive measures (e.g., 
the building of sea walls; development of drought-resistant crops) can 
increase the tolerable level of temperature change (TtOl) before economic 
losses occur and also reduce the intensity of both noneconomic and eco- 
nomic impacts. 
All aspects of the global warming problem are subject to profound un- 
certainty. To express the model results in terms of a single "best guess" 
could be dangerously misleading. Instead, policy should be informed by a 
range of possible outcomes. Therefore, PAGE95 represents more than 70 key 
'The eight regions are Chiua and Centrally Planned Asia, India and Southeast Asia, 
Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
USA, EU, and Other OECD Nat,ions. 
input para.meters by proba,bility distributions. Random sampling is used to 
build up an approxiillate probability distribution for the model results. The 
comprehensive scope and proba.bilistic formulation of the model necessitate 
the simplest credible equa.tions. These equations and the probability dis- 
tributions for key input parameters are described in Plambeck et al. (1995) 
and Plambeck and Hope (1995). 
3. Calculating Marginal Impacts 
The marginal impact of a tonile of ca,rbon emitted as C 0 2  is computed by 
comparing the impacts of two policies that  differ only by a "pulse" of carbon 
emissions. The impact of one tonne of carbon is too small t o  be detected. 
Human emissions of C 0 2  are siuall compared with natural cycles, so the 
pulse must be large in hunlan terms to  produce a measurable effect. Even 
1 billion tonnes (1 GtC, a.bout 15% of annual world emissions), cannot be 
detected, and 10 GtC is a t  the limit of resolution of the PAGE95 model. 
For this study the policies a.re made to  differ by a pulse of 100 GtC. The 
incremental impact of this pulse is then divided by 10" to  give the valuation 
of ilnpacts per tC.  This procedure is ta.1ien from Hope and Maul (1996). 
The structure of the PAGE95 model, designed to  look a t  long-term poli- 
cies, does not allow for an instantaneous pulse. Therefore the 100 Gt  C pulse 
is emitted over the 30-year period fro111 1990-2020, peaking in 2000. Hope 
and Maul (1996) observe that ,  for a. positive discount rate, this will produce 
a smaller impact va.luation than a.n insta,ntaneous pulse in the year 2000. For 
example, given an effective discount rate of 2%, the approximate levelizing 
factor is 0.77. However, the results in this paper are not modified by any 
levelizing factor. Spreading the pulse is reasonable given the long time scale 
required for policy to affect C 0 2  enlissions (e.g., a carbon tax  leading to the 
replacement of inefficient fuel-burning equipment). 
Hope and Maul (1996) used the original PAGE model to  estimate the 
marginal impact per tonne of carbon emissions at  US$5, with a 90% range 
from US$2-7/tC, based on the following assumptions: 
A horizon of 2200 for calculating impacts to  allow for the long time lags in 
the natural systems. The impacts were aggregated and discounted back 
to  the base year, 1990, at  5% per year; this rate reflects the opportunity 
cost of capital. 
Business-as-usual (BAU) emissio~ls of C 0 2 ,  methane, CFCs, and HCFCs 
ba.sed on Intergovernmental Pa,nel on Climate Change (IPCC) Scenario 
Figure 1. Carbon enlissions by policy and year. 
IS92a up to 2100. The second policy (BAUtPULSE) added the pulse of 
100 GtC of COz einissioils to these BAU emissions, as shown in Figure 1. 
Economic impacts were taken to  be in the range of 0.25-1.6% of GDP 
per OC per year, with a most likely value of 0.6% for all world regions. 
Noneconomic inlpa,cts were taken to  be slightly lower than economic 
impacts to  coilforill with the results found by Nordhaus in a poll of 
experts (Nordhaus, 1994). Both economic and noneconomic impacts 
grew as a linear functioil of temperature. 
Large amounts of adaptation in the developed world, such as the build- 
ing of sea walls and the prevention of development in vulnerable areas, 
that  eliminated economic impacts altogether for the first 2OC temper- 
ature rise, and reduced the remaining impacts by 90% after 50 years; 
in the developing world, adaptation reduced impacts by 50% after 50 
years (CRUIERL, 1992). In all regions, adaptation was less effective a t  
reducing noneconomic impacts, bringing only a 25% reduction. 
A worldwide economic growth rate of 2% per year, implying that  both 
the economic and noneconomic impacts of a 1°C temperature rise also 
grew a t  2% per year before adaptation. 
In a series of experiments in this paper, we examine the effect of suc- 
cessive updates t o  the PAGE model on the estimated marginal impact per 
tonne of carbon einissions. This process culminates in the PAGE95 current 
best assesslnent of marginal impa,ct. Subsequent experiments with PAGE95 
explore the sensitivity of that result to assumptions about the discount rate 
and the degree of adaptation to  clinlatic change. 
3.1. The PAGE95 updated climate model 
Ozone Depletion 
The first experiment, CLIMATE, involves the PAGE95 updated climate 
model with cooling from ozone depletion and sulfate aerosols. All other 
aspects of the PAGE illode1 remain as in Hope and Maul (1996). For more 
than 15 years it was thought that  CFCs were the most potent greenhouse 
gases (Ramanathan, 1975). However, recent studies show that  the radiative 
forcing effect of CFCs is counterbalanced by their destruction of stratospheric 
ozone, itself a greenhouse ga,s. For this reason CFCs have only a small net 
warming effect (Wigley and Ra.per, 1992). In PAGE95 net radiative forcing 
from all llalocarbons, iilcluding CFCs, is taken to  be 0.2 \i\'/m2 for the period 
1990-2080 and zero thereafter based on the latest scientific data (Daniel et 
al., 1995). This change reduces the predicted level of global warming by as 
much as 10% by the year 2200. 
Sulfate Aerosols 
The more dramatic update is regional cooling from sulfate aerosols. Current 
research indicates that  anthropogenic aerosols in the troposphere, notably, 
sulfate, have a significant cooling effect (Wigley, 1994; Charlson et al., 1992; 
Taylor and Peiuner, 1994). Aerosols a,re produced primarily by metal smelt- 
ing and the combustion of bioma,ss and fossil fuels. These activities pro- 
duce gases containing sulfur, carbon, a,nd nitrogen, which are converted into 
aerosols (small, solid particles from to  lo2  pm in radius) by chemical 
reactions in the atmosphere. The primary actor is sulfur dioxide (SO2) gas, 
which is oxidized to produce sulfate (SO:+) aerosol, commonly known as a 
contributor t o  acid rain. Aerosols have been found t o  have a direct effect 
on climate by reflecting incoming sunlight, and an indirect effect involving 
cloud formation. 
Aerosols absorb and backscatter solar radiation. This is commonly re- 
ferred to  as the direct cooling effect. In the absence of clouds, radiative 
forcing decreases as a linear functioll of tropospheric aerosol concentration. 
In this paper, we take the magnitude of the direct cooling effect to  be in 
the range from -0.3 to  -0.9 w / m 2  in a,nnual global mean forcing for present 
concentrations, based on Jones ct 01. (1994), Charlson e t  al. (19921, Kiehl 
and Briegleb (1993), and Ta,ylor a,nd Penner (1994). This is not insignifi- 
cant compared with the radiative forcing effect of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases, estimated a t  2 to  2.5 W/m2 (IPCC, 1990). 
Aerosols also impact climate indirectly through cloud formation. 
Aerosols act as cloud condensing nuclei (CCN), increasing the overall vol- 
ume of clouds. Clouds augment the albedo (reflectivity) of the atmosphere 
so that  more incoming sunlight is reflected back into space (Langner and 
Rohde, 1991). Second, by increasing the concentration of CCN, aerosols re- 
duce mean cloud droplet size. This interferes with rainfall and changes the 
distribution of clouds and water vapor. As water vapor is the primary green- 
house gas, this phenonlenon will play a major role in climate change. The 
indirect effect of aerosols on radiative forcing is more difficult to  quantify 
than the direct effect, because the complex interactions between aerosols, 
CCN, and cloud properties are poorly understood. The indirect effect might 
even constitute a net increa,se in radia,tive forcing (Charlson e t  al., 1992). 
Using a version of the Hadley Centre GCM, Jones et  al. (1994) estimate 
that  the global annual mea,n of indirect ra.diative forcing is -1.3 w / m 2  for 
present concentrations. Based on these results, we take the indirect effect to 
be in the range from +0.2 to -2.4 W/m2 of annual global mean forcing for 
present concentrations 
Climate modelers are moving quickly to  incorporate aerosols, "the miss- 
ing forcing factor," so that model results will reflect observed temperatures 
over the past century (Matthews, 1994). Aerosols can explain past overesti- 
mates of heating by GCMs (Hadley, 1995). Aerosols can also account for the 
previously inexplicable decrease of tenlperature in the Northern Hemisphere 
(in which Inore than 90% of industria.1 SO2 is emitted) that  has not occurred 
in the Southern Hemisphere (M'igley, 1989). 
Unlike greenhouse gases such as C 0 2 ,  which remains in the atmosphere 
for centuries, aerosols are rapidly renloved from the atmosphere through pre- 
cipitation or dry deposition. The average lifetime is only six days (Charlson 
e t  al., 1992). As a result, the cooling effect of sulfate aerosols is concentrated 
in the source region. Greenhouse gases, which are uniformly mixed through- 
out the atmosphere, can be modeled as a simple additive component in mean 
global forcing, whereas modeling the effect of aerosols requires regional speci- 
ficity. Therefore, PAGE95 computes regional temperature rise based on the 
change in radiative forcing from regional sulfur emissions.' Figure 2 shows 
'The direct cooling effect is modeled as a linear reduction in radiative forcing as a 
function of anthropogenic sulfar flux for each region. The  indirect effect on radiative 
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Figure 2. Annual emissiolls of sulfur for developing and developed coun- 
tries, 1990-2200, in Tg of sulfur. Developed countries include the follow- 
ing PAGE95 regions: European Union, USA, other OECD Countries, East- 
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Developing countries include the 
following PAGE95 regions: China and Centrally Planned Asia, India and 
Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and Latin America. Sources: 
Spiro et al., 1992; WEC, 1992; Ball and Dowlatabadi, 1994. 
the projected sulfur en~issiolls over time used in this paper. These are derived 
from Spiro et al. (1992); WEC (1992); Ball and Dowlatabadi (1994). 
Figure 3 contrasts the temperature rise predicted by PAGE95 with the 
results from PAGE (Hope and Maul, 1996): for both policy scenarios the 
mean temperature rise predicted by PAGE95 is significantly lower than in 
PAGE. The difference is most important in the early years, when the sulfate 
cooling effect is greatest in proportion to greenhouse warming. Due to  their 
short atmospheric lifetime, sulfate aerosols do not accumulate in the atmo- 
sphere over time as does COz; sulfate aerosol cooling is roughly proportional 
to the rate of emission. Therefore the greenhouse effect will dominate in the 
long term unless sulfate aerosol emissions increase dramatically relative to 
the greenhouse gases, which is very unlikely. Fossil fuel combustion is the 
forcing is modeled as a logarithmic function of the ratio of anthropogenic sulfur to the 
natural sulfur flux. Regional temperature rise is calculated from the difference between 
positive radiative forcing from the greenhouse effect and negative radiative forcing from 
aerosols, allowing for thermal lag. 
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Figure 3. Mean temperature rise (OC) in the CLIMATE experiment, by 
policy and year, 2000-2200. Pulse of 100 GtC emitted from 1990-2020. 
Source: Hope and Maul, 1996; a.nd PAGE95 runs. 
primary source of both sulfate aerosols and C 0 2  emissions, so the two are 
closely linked. However, unlike C 0 2 ,  sulfates can be removed from the ex- 
haust stream. Particularly in wealthy countries, concerns about acid rain 
and health effects have prompted investment in sulfur control technologies. 
Decision makers are very ullliliely to  choose to  increase sulfate emissions in 
order t o  combat global warming. As Figure 2 shows, we assume that  aggre- 
gate world sulfate a.eroso1 einissioils decrease after 2040, causing the level of 
net radiative forcing in the two models to  converge. However, as a result of 
the earth's thermal lag, teinperatures in PAGE95 are still significantly lower 
through the year 2200. 
The CLIMATE experiment coinputes the marginal impact per tonne of 
carbon emissions using the PAGE95 updated climate model with cooling 
from ozone depletion and sulfate aerosols. All other aspects of the PAGE 
model remain as in Hope and Maul (199G). Marginal impact results for the 
CLIMATE experiment appear in Table 1. Net present value of impacts refers 
to  the sum of economic and noneconomic impacts through the year 2200, 
discounted and aggregated back to  1990. The columns "min" and "max" 
refer to  the 5% and 95% poiilts on the probability distribution of results. 
Recall that  Hope and Maul (1996) estimated the marginal impact per tonne 
Table 1. Total and nla.rgina1 inlpacts in the CLIMATE experiment, 1990- 
2200. 
Milla Mean m ax* 
Net present value of impacts 
BAU + lOOGtC emissiolls (US$ trillion) 0.9 2.5 5 . 5  
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 0.8 2.2 4.6 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 1.0 3.0 6.0 
aMin = 5% point on distribution of results. 
  ax = 95% point on distribution of results. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
of carbon emissions a t  US$5, with a 90% range from US$2-7/tC. The CLI- 
MATE experiment suggests that the cooling effects of ozone depletion and 
sulfate aerosols decrease the estiinated marginal impact per tonne of carbon 
by US$1-2. This result is unsurprising. Natural and economic systems are 
thought to  be robust; tlmt is, iinpa,cts will not occur for sufficiently small 
or gradual increases in t'einpera,ture. By depressing temperature, ozone de- 
pletion and sulfate aerosols are expected to reduce and delay the onset of 
impacts from the COz pulse. 
Climate Sensitivity to Cc~rboiz Dioxide Concentration 
Nevertheless, the true ilnplicatioils of the scientific findings on aerosol cooling 
may be counterintuitive. Climate sensitivity to  increased atmospheric C 0 2  
concentration is usually estimated from global circulation models (GCMs) 
calibrated to  reproduce observed tempera.ture trends over the past century. 
However, by leaving out a. substantial cooliilg factor (sulfate aerosols) GCMs 
have probably underestimated climate sensitivity to  C 0 2 .  Therefore, green- 
house warming is likely to  be greater than was previously expected. As 
discussed previously, sulfate aerosol cooliilg will not significantly counteract 
greenhouse warming in the long term. Hence recent scientific findings on 
cooling from sulfate aerosols may actually increase the estimate of marginal 
impact per tonne carboil emissions. 
The second experiment, CLIMATE2, investigates this possibility by also 
varying a key input parameter in PAGE: the equilibrium warming caused 
by a doubling of atmospheric COz coilcentration (ATzco,). Previous ex- 
periments in Hope and Ma.ul (1996) and CLIMATE used the IPCC 1992 
estimate of ATzCo2 ill the range 1.5-4.0°C, with most likely value being 
2.5OC. This figure was derived froin GCMs without sulfate aerosol cooling; 
an  increased value is appropriate for use in the PAGE95 climate model with 
95% point: BAU+PULSE 
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Figure 4. The 90% ra.nge and mea.n temperature rise (OC) above the 1990 
level in the EU in the CLIMATE2 experiment, by policy and year, 2000- 
2200. Pulse of 100 GtC einitted from 1990-2020. Source: PAGE95 runs. 
sulfate aerosols. I11 the CLIMATE2 experiment, ATzcoz ranges between 
1.5 and G.O°C, with most likely value being 3.0°C. This increase in ATzcoz 
is conservative. From the estimates of aerosol cooling in the forthcoming 
IPCC report, Raper et  al. (1995) conclude that  the value of ATzcoz must 
be a t  least 4.5OC to  explain the observed temperature rise of 0.5OC over the 
past century. West et  cil. (199.5) recommend a range of 2.0-5.5OC, with a 
best estimate of 3.5OC for ATzcoz. Figure 4 shows the 90% range and mean 
temperature rise predicted by PAGE95 with increased climate sensitivity for 
each policy. Note that  the level of temperature increase is highly uncertain, 
and that  the range of possible values is large compared with the difference 
between policies. 
The marginal impact results for the CLIMATE2 experiment appear in 
Table 2. Increased climate sensitivity t o  atmospheric C 0 2  yields an  es- 
timated marginal impact of US$5/tC, in agreement with Hope and Maul 
(1996) and 25% higher than in the previous experiment, CLIMATE. We 
observe that  cooling from ozone depletion and sulfate aerosols reduces the 
estimated marginal impact per tonne carbon, but only if the temperature 
sensitivity t o  atmospheric C 0 2  is not adjusted. Clearly, the marginal impact 
valuation per tonne carbon may rise if, as suggested by Raper et  al. (1995), 
climate sensitivity is even greater than assumed in CLIMATE2. 
Table 2. Total and marginal impact,~ in the CLIMATE2 experiment, 1990- 
2200. 
Mina Mean Maxb 
Net present value of iinpacts 
BAU + 100GtC enlissioils (US$ trillion) 1.1 3.7 8.4 
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 0.9 3.2 7.2 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 2.0 5.0 12.0 
"Min = 5% point on distribution of results. 
bMax = 95% point on distribution of results. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
Expansion of the 90% range for the marginal impact per tonne carbon, 
from US$2-7/tC in Hope and Maul (1996) to  US$2-12/tC, illustrates a very 
important point about recent scientific findings on aerosol cooling. The cli- 
mate system is even illore complex than was previously thought. Modelers 
must assess the strength of two coinpeting phenomena, greenhouse warming 
and aerosol cooling, from the historical temperature record. Therefore, al- 
though the mean results have not changed, we can be far less certain of our 
calculations. The marginal impacts caused by a tonne of carbon emissions 
may be significantly larger than previous predictions. 
Regional Differences in the Inzl~acts of Climate Change 
In the third experiment, IhJPACTS, PAGE95 is run as in CLIMATE2 with 
the addition of an updated valua.tion of the regional impacts of global warm- 
ing. Much of the resea.rcl1 on valuing the inlpacts of climate change has 
focused on the USA and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Developmeilt (OECD) couiitries (e.g., EPA, 1989; CRU/ERL, 1992). How- 
ever, the level of da.mage from global warnling is expected to vary widely 
among geographical regions. Different areas may be more or less vulnera- 
ble to climatic change. For example, heat stress and drought are expected 
to be most extreme in the interior of continents, while island nations and 
low lying coastal areas such as Bangladesh will suffer most from sea level 
rise. Impacts are expected to be relatively large in the less developed coun- 
tries due to the relative importance of climate-dependent sectors such as 
agriculture. Furthermore, loss of life is likely to be proportionally greater 
in developing countries because of poor ilutrition and health infrastructure. 
With limited financial reserves, developing countries have less capacity for 
adaptation. According to  Failkhauser (1994~) )  damage to developing coun- 
tries will be 50% higher than the OECD average. However, not all agree. 
Table 3. Regional impact factors (compared with the EU) for the IM- 
PACTS experiment. 
Regional impact factors 
Region hliilimum Most likely Maximum 
USA 0.75 1.20 1.40 
OECD except USA and EU 0.75 2.20 2.60 
Former USSR and Eastern Europe -0.30 0.00 0.30 
China and Centrally Plaililed Asia 1.00 4.00 4.80 
India and Southeast Asia 1 .OO 6.60 7.90 
Africa and the Middle East 1 .OO 4.50 5.40 
Latin America 1.00 3.30 4.00 
Sources: Tol, 1995; Fankhauser, 1994b; CRU/ERL, 1992, 
Manne et al. (1995) observe that willingiless to pay t o  avoid noneconomic 
(ecological and social) damages from global warming increases with income. 
Therefore the valuatioil of iloilecollonlic damages should be higher in the 
developed countries. 
Most attempts to  quantify damage have focused on the benchmark of a 
doubliilg of atmospheric COz collcentration and the associated temperature 
rise of 2.5OC (IPCC, 1990). PAGE95 ha,s two uncertain input parameters 
representing the percentage of GDP loss per 2.5OC in the economic and 
noneconomic sectors. These values are estimated for the focus region, the 
EU. In terms of the percentage of C:DP lost per 2.5OC, noneconomic impacts 
will range between 0.3 a.nd 3.5, with the most likely value being 0.7; economic 
impacts will range between 0.3 and 1..5, with the nlost likely value being 0.6. 
Economic and i~oneconoi~~ic impa.cts in the other regions are computed as 
a multiple of the EU values. For esample, percentage of GDP lost per 
2.5OC in India and Southeast Asia is between 1 and 7.9 times the value for 
the EU, with the most likely value being 6.6. In some cases, benefits are 
expected to  occur as a result of warming (e.g., agriculture in the former 
Soviet Union). This is represented by a negative value for GDP loss (see 
Table 3). This valuation of impacts derives from To1 (1995), Fankhauser 
(1994b), and CRUIERL (1992). 
The results of the IMPACTS experiment appear in Table 4. Updat- 
ing the regional damage estimates yields a slight reduction in the estimated 
range of marginal impacts. However, the mean marginal impact increases t o  
US$8/tC in IMPACTS, conlpared with US$5/tC in the CLIMATE2 experi- 
ment, primarily due t o  significant damage in the less developed countries. 
Table 4. Total a.nd l~la,rgiilal iinpa,cts in the IMPACTS experiment, 1990- 
2200. 
Milla Mean  ax^ 
Net present value of impacts 
BAU + lOOGtC ernissioils (US$ trillion) 2.8 6.8 14.2 
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 2.5 6.0 13.0 
Marginal inlpacts (US$/tC) 3.0 8.0 12.0 
aMin = 5% point on distributioil of  result,^. 
b ~ a x  = 95% point on distribution of results. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
Table 5. Total and inarginal ilnpacts in the NONLINEAR experiment, 
1990-2200. 
Mina Mean Maxb 
Net present value of impacts 
BAU + lOOGtC eillissioils (ITS% t8rillion) 1.8 6.7 16.7 
BAU eillissions (US$ trillion) 1.2 5.9 14.9 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 6.0 8.0 18.0 
"Min = 5% point on distrubtion of results. 
b b ~ a x  = 95% point on clistribution of resnlts. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
Nonlinearity i n  Climatic Inzl~acts 
We observed previously that lllost a.ttempts to quantify the impacts of cli- 
mate change focus on a benchma.rk wa.rming of 2.5OC, yet this benchmark 
is likely to  be surpassed within the nest century. A current issue in pol- 
icy analysis is how to extrapolate in order to predict damage before and 
after the benchmark of '2.5OC. Iinpacts a.re usually assumed to be a polyno- 
mial function of temperature rise with power between 1 and 3 (Nordhaus, 
1993a, 1993b; Peck and Teisberg? 1993a, 1993b). A poll of experts suggests 
a power of 1.3 as the most likely value (Failkhauser, 1994b). In the fourth 
experiment, NONLINEAR, both economic and noneconomic impacts grow 
nonlinearly with temperature rise (recall that a linear model was used in 
the previous experiments). The impact function is a polynomial function of 
temperature rise above the tolerable level, ( T  - Tt,[)n, where n is an  uncer- 
tain input parameter with iniililnuln of 1, illaximum of 3, and most likely 
value of 1.3. The impact function is calibra.ted to  give the same results as a 
linear function for a. 2.5OC tempemture rise. 
The results for the NONLINEAR esperiment appear in Table 5. For 
the range of emissions we esamine, iloillinearity in the impact function does 
cubic function 
linear function 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Deg C 
F i g u r e  5. Impacts by temperature rise a,ild form of damage function (warm- 
ing above the preiildustrial level). Tolerable temperature rise before impacts 
occur is 2°C. 
not challge the estimated meall nlarginal impact of a tonne of carbon emis- 
sions. As show11 in Figure 5, for a temperature rise above the tolerable level 
that  is smaller than 2.5OC, the nonlinear damage function falls below the 
linear function. However, for a large temperature rise the nonlinear damage 
function dominates. In short, ilonliilearity in the damage function decreases 
damage in the early years, but increases damage later. In the NONLIN- 
EAR experiment the net effect is slight. However, the introduction of an 
additional ullcertaill parameter to  represent the curvature of the damage 
function yields an increase in the range of estimated marginal impacts. 
Regional Economic Growth and Time- l'uriable Discounting 
Previous experiments assumed a uniform, worldwide economic growth rate 
of 2% per year and a discount rate of 5%. The fifth experiment, REGIONAL, 
is distinguished from NONLINEAR by the use of time- and region-specific 
values for the economic growth rate taken from the Energy Modelling Forum 
(EMF, 1994). These values appear in Table 6. Furthermore, the discount 
rate is time variable and linked to  economic growth (see Table 7) .  
In economic growth theory the discount rate, ~ ( t ) ,  is given by Ramsey's 
rule: 
Table 6. Regiona.1 a.nnual economic growth rates (in percent). 
EU, Otlier Foriner USSR, China, Centrally India, Southeast 
Years USA OECD Eastern Europe Planned Asia Asia, Africa 
1990-2000 2.5 2.7 -1.5 4.0 3.8 
1990-2020 2.3 2.3 4.3 3.5 4.2 
1990-2040 1.5 1.5 3.6 3.3 3.6 
1990-2060 1.7 1.7 2.7 3.1 3.1 
1990-2080 1.2 1.2 2.0 3.0 2.8 
1990-2100 1.1 1.1 2.0 3.0 2.8 
1990-2125 1.1 1.1 1.0 2.0 2.0 
1990-2150 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.0 
1990-2200 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1 .O 
Source: EMF, 1994. 
Table 7. Time-va.riable discount ra.te, r ( t ) .  
1990- 2000- 2020- 2040- 2060- 2080- 2150- 
Years 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2150 2200 
14t ') 3.93 4.59 4.56 4.58 4.70 4.94 3.90 
Source: World per capita ecollomic growt,l~ rate + 3% time preference (EMF, 1994). 
where y is the negative of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, 
p is the pure rate of time preference, and y(t) is the per capita relative 
growth rate of consumption. The term y -y ( t )  is positive under the standard 
coltditions that the economy grows, a.nd that marginal utility is positive, but 
its derivative is negative (Azar, 1994, p. 1256). The value y is usua.lly set to  
one, correspondillg to  a logarithmic utility function. The per capita relative 
growth rate of consulllptioll may be computed as 
where C( t )  is the global consumption, and P( t )  the world population a t  time 
t. For experimental purposes in this study, g(t)  is assumed to  be equivalent to  
the worldwide per capita economic growth rate (i.e., consumption accounts 
for a fixed percentage of total production). 
A time-variable discount rate should be used in climate change analysis 
because economic and population growth rates, and hence the value g ( t ) ,  are 
highly variable in the long term. I11 particular, economic growth rates will 
be affected by abatement policies and warming impacts. Nevertheless, t o  
date most global warming allalyses have used a fixed discount rate, the level 
Table 8. Total a,nd ina.rgina1 impa.cts in the REGIONAL experiment, 1990- 
2200. 
h l  i 11 a Mean  ax^ 
Net present value of inlpacts 
BAU + lOOGtC emissions (US$ trillion) 5.0 19.8 45.5 
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 4.0 17.7 40.7 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 10.0 21.0 48.0 
aMin = 5% point on distribution of results. 
bMax = 95% point on dist,ribut,ion of resultas. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
Table 9. Total and nlargiilal impacts in the PTP2  experiment, 1990-2200. 
RiIina Mean  ax^ 
Net present value of iinpacts 
BAU + lOOGtC eillissions (US$ trillion) 19.0 58.1 103.5 
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 17.0 53.5 94.1 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 20.0 46.0 94.0 
aMin = 5% point on distribution of results. 
b ~ a x  = 95% point on dist,ribut,ion of result,s. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
of which strongly conditions the results (see Haraden, 1993; Fankhauser, 
1994a) 
The use of variable discouiltiilg based on economic and population 
growth rates still requires a difficult decision on the pure rate of time pref- 
erence, p. The appropriate pure time preference for the study of global 
warming is hotly disputed. Accordiilg to  Azar (1994) and Cline (1992) the 
use of a positive pure time preference, p,  is unethical because it implies that  
the utility of the current generation is worth more than that  of future gener- 
ations. However, oilly a positive rate is c,onsistent with savings and interest 
rate data  (Fankhauser, 1994b). Many global warming optimization mod- 
els (Nordhaus, 1991, 1993a., 1993b; Peck and Teisberg, 1992, 1993a, 1993b; 
Manne et al., 1993) use a 3% rate of pure time preference, and that  value is 
also assumed in the REGIONAL experiment. 
The results of the REGIONAL experiment appear in Table 8. These 
figures represent the PAGE95 current best estimate for marginal impacts. 
The extremely large increase in the valuation of marginal impacts, from a 
mean value of US$8/tC in NONLINEAR to  a mean value of US$2l/tC in 
REGIONAL, occurs because both economic growth and damage tend to  be 
concentrated in the developing countries. 
Table 10. Total and marginal impacts in the PTPO experiment, 1990-2200. 
Mina Mean Maxb 
Net present value of impacts 
BAU + 100GtC emissioils (US$ trillion) 237.0 965.0 2156.0 
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 198.0 921.0 2058.0 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 390.0 440.0 980.0 
"Min = 5% point on distribution of results. 
b ~ a x  = 95% point on distribution of results. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
Table 11. Total and marginal impacts in the NO-ADAPT experiment, 
1990-2200. 
Mina Mean Maxb 
Net present value of impacts 
BAU + lOOGtC emissions (US$ trillion) 10.0 31.1 69.6 
BAU emissions (US$ trillion) 7.8 27.9 64.0 
Marginal impacts (US$/tC) 22.0 32.0 56.0 
"Min = 5% point on distribution of results. 
b ~ a x  = 95% point on distribution of results. 
Source: PAGE95 runs. 
The next two experiments, PTP2  and PTPO, are equivalent to  RE- 
GIONAL except for the use of a pure rate of time preference p=2% and 
p=O%, respectively. The results of the experiments P T P 2  and PTPO appear 
in Tables 9 and 10. The mean value of impacts rises to  US$46 and US$440, 
respectively. Clearly, the marginal impact per tonne of carbon emissions is 
highly sensitive to  the choice of a pure rate of time preference. This is due 
to  the long-term nature of the global warming problem. A pulse of COa 
emissions affects the climate for many decades, if not centuries. 
Adaptation to Climatic Change 
The final experiment, NO-ADAPT, is the same as REGIONAL except that  
no adaptation is used to  reduce the impacts of climate change. Results for 
the NO-ADAPT experiment appear in Table 11. Without adaptation the 
estimated marginal impact per tonne of carbon is US$32/tC, an  increase of 
US$l l /  tC compared with the REGIONAL experiment, which assumed ag- 
gressive adaptation. In the literature, impact valuations are frequently made 
without stating assumptions on the degree of adaptation to climate change. 
The NO-ADAPT experiment demonstrates the need to  clarify assumptions 
about adaptation in future work. Note that  marginal impact estimates in 
this study do not consider the cost of adaptive measures. This is justified 
because aggressive adaptation has been shown to  be optimal for both policy 
scenarios considered in the study (Hope et al., 1993). The cost of adaptation 
is slight compared with potential impacts from climate change. Furthermore, 
different policy levers are needed to  influence adaptation and greenhouse gas 
abatement, so the incremental costs of adaptation and greenhouse gas emis- 
sions should be considered separately. 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our current best estimate of marginal impacts from PAGE95 is US$2l/tC, 
with a 90% uncertainty range of US$10-48/tC. To put this measure into 
context, $21/tC corresponds roughly to a petroleum tax of US$2 per barrel, 
or a petrol tax  of 1.2 cents per liter. Our estimate of the marginal impact 
of a tonne of carbon is based on the following key assumptions and inputs: 
An updated climate model with cooling from sulfate aerosols and ozone 
depletion, and increased climate sensitivity to  atmospheric C 0 2  concen- 
tration. Impacts grow as a nonlinear function of temperature. 
Noneconomic impacts are slightly greater than economic impacts and 
are also more uncertain. Expressed as a percentage GDP loss, both eco- 
nomic and noneconomic damages are largest in the developing countries. 
Economic growth is region and time specific. Since both climatic change 
impacts and ecoilomic growth tend to  be concentrated in the developing 
countries, this increases the estiina.ted marginal impact per tC.  
Large amounts of adaptatioil to climate change, such as the building of 
sea walls and the preventioil of development in vulnerable areas, partic- 
ularly in the developed world. 
A time-variable discount rate conlputed as the sum of world per capita 
economic growth and a pure rate of time preference of 3%. 
This "best" marginal impact estimate is most sensitive t o  assumptions 
about adaptation, nonlinearity, and the discount rate. In the case of zero 
adaptation to climate change, margiilal impacts rise by 50% to  US$32/tC. 
An important interaction effect was observed between the degree of adap- 
tation and nonlinearity in damages as a function of temperature rise above 
some tolerable level. Recall that the net effect of nonlinearity in the dam- 
age function is slight under aggressive adaptation, because the decrease in 
predicted damage early in the time horizon is balanced by the increase in 
predicted damage later on. This trade-off is highly sensitive to  the tolerable 
level of ten1pera.ture inc.rea,se before dama.ge occurs, which in turn depends 
on the degree of a'dapta.tion. For exanlple, in the absence of adaptation, 
the tolerable level of temperature increase is assumed to  be zero, as com- 
pared with 2OC for the developing countries under aggressive adaptation. 
Nonlinearity in the damage function makes a substantial contribution t o  the 
difference in marginal impacts under aggressive and zero adaptation. In a 
similar manner, nonlinearity in the damage function increases the impor- 
tance of the discount rate. 
The most influential assumption examined in this study is the discount 
rate. Reducing the pure rate of time preference component of the discount 
rate from 3% to  2% doubles the mean marginal impact to  US$46/tC. If a zero 
rate of pure time preference is chosen to  sa.tisfy intergenerational equity, then 
the mean marginal impa.ct increa.ses by an order of magnitude to  $440/tC. 
In addition to  the issue of iiltergenerational equity, the existence of sec- 
oizdary benefits to GO2 nbntenaent suggests that  our best marginal impact 
estimate of US$2l/tC may be conservative, even though it is a t  the upper 
end of the range of estimates in the literature (US$5-25/tC; Fankhauser 
and Pearce, 1993). Fossil fuels are the primary source, not only of COa, but 
of other air pollutants - CO, SO,, NO,, particulates, and volatile organic 
compounds. Therefore, a. carbon tax t o  reduce fossil fuel use will incur sec- 
ondary benefits in improved air quality and reduced acid rain. Furthermore, 
recycling the carbon tax revenues t o  reduce other distortional taxes such 
as value-added taxes (VAT) or pa,yroll taxes will stimulate employment and 
generally increase the social welfa.re (Barker et al., 1993). 
Finally, the 90% range for the ma.rgina1 impact per tonne of carbon 
emissions found in this study, US$lO-48/tC, is very large in comparison to 
the uncertain range of US$2-7 estinla,ted in Hope and Maul (1996) or the 
accepted range of values in the literature, US$5-25/tC. New scientific and 
economic knowledge, in particular about sulfate aerosols and nonlinearity 
in damage as a function of temperature rise, suggests that climate-human 
interactions are even more complex and difficult to  predict than was previ- 
ously thought. This increase in uncertainty is reflected in the results of our 
study. 
In conclusion, in reading any study on the valuation of global warm- 
ing impacts, policy makers are advised to  carefully consider the treatment 
of uncertainty as well as assumptions about adaptation to  climate change, 
nonlinearity in damage as a function of temperature rise, secondary bene- 
fits t o  C 0 2  abatement, and the discount rate. We have shown that  these 
assumptions, often hidden in the sillall print or not reported a t  all, have a 
profound effect upon the marginal impact calculations. 
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Abstract 
This paper considers the case of Bayesian learning about the relationship 
between the greenhouse-gas level and temperature rise. Learning takes time 
because of a stochastic shock to the realized global niean temperature. The 
paper illustrates the difficulty of quickly learning about the underlying re- 
lationship in the presence of a shock. The paper then goes on to present 
an integrated assessment model with endogenous learning. The model is a 
stochastic growth model with learning. It is solved as a dynamic program 
and then simulated for particular realizations of the shock. 
1. Introduction 
One of the doniinant issues in the ecoiloluics of climate change is the role of 
uncertainty. Malllle and Richels (1992), in their important book on control- 
ling precursors of climate change, focus almost entirely on hedging against 
uncertainty. Nordhaus (1994), in his important book on the economics of 
climate change, devotes coilsiderable space to  the uncertainty in forming 
control policies.f The policy debate worldwide is dominated by the ques- 
tion, "Do we know enough t o  coiltrol the problem now, or should we wait 
until more is known about climate change?" Although uncertainty is always 
present in problems of environmeiltal policy, the uncertainty is much greater 
in the case of climate change if for no other reason than that  the problem 
and its solution span deca.des or even centuries. 
*Research supported by US Department of Energy grant numbers DE-FG03-94ER61944 
and DE-FC03-90ER61010, the latter through the Midwestern Regional Center of the Na- 
tional Institute for Global Environmental Change. Research assistance from Aran Ratcliffe 
is gratefully acknowledged. Also appreciated are comments from Michael Schlesinger, Steve 
Salant, John Laitner, and seminar participants at  the University of Michigan. 
'Other papers that  have considered these issues include Peck et  al. (1989), Hammitt et 
al. (1992), and Kolstad (1993). 
There are two dinleilsioiis to the uncertainty problem, as it is normally 
perceived: paranletsic uncertainty ai~cl stochasticity. There are clearly as- 
pects of climate change that are not ~vell understood, although presumably 
over time the problem will be better understood. Simply stated, we are 
uncertain about particular parameters of the problem, but we expect that  
uncertainty to diminish with time or effort [e.g., research and development 
(R&D)]. This is what we term parametric uncertainty. A close relative of 
parametric uncertainty is stochasticity. Climate change is subject to stochas- 
tic shocks that  affect climate, technology, and costs, but the future value of 
these shocks will always renlain uncertain. No amount of information ac- 
quisition will allow us to predict whether a coin toss will come up heads 
or tails. These two eleinents - parailletsic uncertainty and stochasticity - 
generate significant uncertainty in trying to  forinulate policy for controlling 
greenhouse gases. 
To make things nlore complex, there is a third aspect of uncertainty - 
learning. Over time, parametric uncertainty can be reduced. By investing 
in R&D or observing climate behavior, we can learn about uncertain pa- 
rameters. However, ex crntc, we do not linow how this uncertainty will be 
resolved or what the results of learning will be. 
Learning has inany dimensions. Learning can take place at  various levels 
of a policy problem, ranging from agents in the economy who are learning 
in order to  adapt to chailges in their ellviro~lment to policy makers who 
are trying to  fornlulate the best policy in an uncertain and changing world. 
When agents withill the economy react to changed circumstances, it is usu- 
ally termed adaptation. If these agents perceive uncertainty but learn over 
time, then adaptation may also talie time. While learning is taking place, 
suboptimal decisions (relative to  perfect information) are made with result- 
ing welfare losses. To offer an overly simplistic example, suppose the climate 
has changed in the mid\vestern USA, resulting in a higher frequency of flood- 
ing and more rainfall. It may take decades before farmers realize the change 
is permanent and change their crops to take advantage of this (perhaps by 
planting flood-resistant strains). In the meantime, significant crop losses oc- 
cur. Even though farmers can adapt perfectly to the changed climate, the  
delay in realizing a change has occurred results in significant losses. 
Policy makers also base their decisions on some body of knowledge. 
When that knowledge base evolves over time, regulatory decisions may evolve 
over time. More subtly, current regulatory decisions must take into account 
the fact that  more will be known tomorrow. This process takes time and 
the decisions made in the interim influence the rate a t  which information is 
acquired. 
In addition to who learns. learning call be characterized by how it 
occurs.' Active learning involves the agent's having some influence over the 
rate a t  which information arrives. For instance, investment in R&D yields 
information. If a monopolist is ullcertaill about her demand curve, she can 
experiment by varying price and observing sales, learning over time about 
demand (Balvers and Cosimano, 1990). Greenhouse gas emissions may be 
varied in a grand experiment to determine how emissions influence climate. 
Passive learning involves the exogenous arrival of information. This may 
occur all a t  once, as in Manne and Richels (1992), or more gradually as a 
function of time, as in Iiolstad (1993). Obviously, there has to be some 
process whereby information is generated and arrives; however, with passive 
learning, that  process is exogenous to  the system being examined. 
R&D is an obvious way in which information is acquired and a clear 
example of active learning. It is also a major factor in learning about climate 
change. However, learning from experience is also very important in climate 
change. In the example of the farmer's learning from realizations of the 
climate, learning occurs without R&D, simply by observation. Furthermore, 
much effort has been expended by the research community in trying to  detect 
a climate change footprint/fingerprint in the temperature record of the last 
century. The implication is that  if a footprint is clearly evident, a much 
stronger case can be made for controlling the problem. 
The purpose of this paper is to understand the interplay between learn- 
ing about the climate change problem and decisions to control the problem. 
Although there are many characterizations of learning, we are considering 
the case of endogenous learning, where agents learn from observing the cli- 
mate record and base their actions on their state of knowledge a t  the point 
where action is taken. Using the farmer example again, after 10 years of 
drought, a farmer will view the probability of being in a drier climate as 
higher than it was prior to  the drought and will make planting decisions 
accordingly (reducing the potential damage from drought). 
From the policy maker's point of view, even if the climate has changed, 
she may not realize it. But she nlay know that  in 50 years parametric un- 
certainty will be resolved. In contrast to  the agent within the economy, the 
policy maker can adjust emissions. At least conceptually, emissions can be 
varied in order to  coax more information from the resulting climate real- 
izations. What emission control decisions will the policy maker undertake? 
'See Cunha-e-sa (1994) and I<olstad (1996) for further discussion of different types of 
learning. 
How are those decisioils influenced b. the fact that  parametric uncerta.inty 
will be resolved at  sonle point in the fubure? 
In the next section of the paper, we consider this problem of learning 
about the climate, using a simple statistical model of temperature change. 
In particular, we show how hard it is to quickly detect a climate change 
footprint when there are stochastic shocks to  the climate system. Was this 
year's frigid winter in the USA just a stochastic event or evidence of climate 
change? 
In the subsequent section we expand this analysis t o  a simple integrated 
assessment model with endogenous learning embedded in the model. We are 
interested in the difference between levels of greenhouse gas emission control 
with perfect knowledge versus the case of slow learning based on climate 
realizations. 
2. Learning About a Stochastic Process 
Most climatic processes are stocllastic. In particular, the average annual 
global temperature is well recognized t o  be stochastic, with some determin- 
istic elements, such as radiative forcing from increased levels of greenhouse 
gases. Consider the simplest representation of this process: 
where Tt and A l t  are telnperature and greeilhouse gas concentratioils (rel- 
ative t o  some base) a t  time t ;  /3 is a constant; and ut is a random shock, 
assumed to  have a zero mean but perhaps exhibiting serial correlation. 
How might such a process evolve over time? Schlesinger and Ra- 
mankutty (1995) and Bassett (1992) have estimated several different stochas- 
tic processes for temperature of the form of equation ( l a ) ,  though without 
the dependence on greenhouse gases. All of these authors consider the case 
of first-order autocorrelation. In such a case, equation ( l a )  can be rewritten 
as 
where a is a constant and E~ exhibits no serial correlation. 
Bassett (1992) estimates values of a = 0.808 and V a r ( ~ )  = 0.0185, where 
temperature is in deviations from the sample (1880-1991) average, in degrees 
Celsius. Figure 1 shows a 50-year silnulation of temperatures for this model 
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Figure 1. Atmospheric tempera,ture deviations, with and without COz 
effect. 
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(broken line), assumiilg E is ilorillally distributed and starting with To = 0 
and h.lt - 1, Vt so there is no climate effect. Note that  these temperatures 
call exhibit medium-tenn tempera.ture trends ("transitory shocks"), even 
though the long- term steady state level of temperature should be zero. 
Now suppose we introduce some radiative forcing due to  an increase in 
carbon dioxide (COz). Assume for the time being that  a doubling of green- 
house gases leads to  a 2.5OC increase in the steady-state temperature. This 
is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) best estimate 
(Lempert et al., 1996). This implies a value for P of 3.6. The solid line in 
Figure 1 shows a simulation of an instantaneous 10% increase in greenhouse 
gas levels (To = 0, Mt E 1.1, Vt), though not necessarily with exactly the 
same realizations of the random shocks as in the case of no greenhouse gas ef- 
fect. Note two things. First, as with the broken line, there are medium-term 
trends that  do not necessarily persist. Second, it is not a t  all obvious from 
casual inspection of the two lines which figure involves a climate effect. This 
illustrates the problem of depending on a noisy signal for deducing whether 
climate change is a "real" phenomenon. 
Let us now consider a Balyesian a.pproacl1 to the problem. We will make 
this as simple a,s possible. Suppose we are uncertain about the true value 
of p,  but know it must be one of two values: p E {PL,PH) = {2.16,6.48). 
These two values of ,8 correspond to the IPCC low and high values (green- 
house gas doubling leads to 1.5OC or 4.5OC temperature change, respectively) 
reported in Lempert et al. (1996). Let n be the probability that  ,f3 takes on 
the high value, pH. Thus, a yriori, n = 0.33, so that  the expected value of 
p is 3.6, corresponding to climate sensitivity of 2.5OC from a greenhouse gas 
doubling. As we move through time, we observe realizations at  temperature 
T ,  which gives us information about ,f3, and thus n evolves. Let nt be the 
value of n at  time t .  At time t ,  our prior is nt; we observe a temperature 
realization, Tt+1, and update n to obtain a posterior, nt+l. This updating 
follows Bayes rule: 
where f is the conditional density on the continuous random variable Tt+l. 
Focus on the right-hand side of equa,tion (2). In the numerator, the first 
term can be obtained directly from equation ( I ) ,  provided we know the 
distribution of E .  Assuming E il(0, a:), then for ,f3 = Pi, where i = L or H,  
The second term in the nuinerator of equation (2) is simply the prior on 
,f3, r t .  The second term in the denominator is similarly either nt or (1 - r t ) .  
Figure 2 shows how a prior of 0.33 might evolve over time, assuming the 
true value of ,f3 is at  its high value ( p H ) .  This figure shows how equation (2) 
evolves when temperature in equation (1) is simulated for a 0%, lo%,  25% 
and 50% increase in greenhouse gases with ,f3 = ,OH. Remember, uncertainty 
is resolved only when the probability rea.ches one (or zero if the true ,f3 is DL). 
The figure shows the evolution of the probability as a function of M .  For 
small M ,  learning occurs slowly, because the stochastic shocks overwhelm 
differences between and pH a,nd make learning difficult. For larger values 
of M ,  the noise is relatively smaller and it is thus easier to  distinguish the 
true value of p. 
Figure 2 illustrates how learning is endogenously affected by decision 
making. For example, more restrictive policy scenarios such as limiting 
greenhouse ga,s enlissions to  1990 levels or limiting total C 0 2  
Figure 2. Evolution of learning over time for a prior of 0.33. 
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to  a low level slows learning. Conr.ersely, the absence of controls results in 
faster learning, though of course illore rapid increases in greenhouse gases. 
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3. Controlling Greenhouse Gases with Learning 
tirne(years) 
We now turn our attention to  the problem of incorporating learning within 
a model of the costs and benefits of controlling greenhouse gases. The model 
we present here is similar to  that found in Kolstad (1994) and is in the spirit 
of the Ramsey growth models a.pplied to  climate change, particularly the 
DICE model of Nordhaus (1994). 
3.1. A stochastic, learning integrated climate 
economy model 
We now turn to  a specific description of our model of climate change. We 
maximize the net present value of utility subject to  a capital accumulation 
constraint as well as an embedded model of climate change: 
Capital I i t + l = ( l - G I , - ) I i t + I t  , 
GHG Mt+i = (1  - p t )  a ( t ) ~ ( t ) l i : ~ ( t ) ' - ~  
Emissions 
~Jncontrolled 
Atmospheric temp. Tttl = aTt  + '31n [$&I + $Ot + E~ , ( 5 4  
Ocean temp. Ot+l = Ot + w[Tt - Ot]  , ( 5 4  
where the variables p t ,  It, Tt, Ot , l i t ,  and AJt are, respectively, the emission 
control rate (E[O, I]), the investinent level (LO), the atmospheric tempera- 
ture, the deep-ocean temperature, capital, and the concentration of green- 
house gases. The parameters p. bl, b 2 ,  dl ,  02, y, bIi, d M ,  a ,  4, and w are con- 
stants. A(t), L(t), and a ( t )  are time-varying exogenous parameters. A(t) 
and L(t)  gradually rise over time; a ( t )  gradually falls (Nordhaus, 1994). All 
three of these variables cease to  change much after a few centuries. 
Equation (5a) is simply a consumption identity, with the two brack- 
eted terms representing the reduction in gross domestic product (GDP) 
[A(t)IizL(t)'-Y] associated with the cost of emission control (numerator) 
and pollution damage (denominator). Equation (5b) is the capital accumu- 
lation equation; equation (5c) is the greenhouse gas accumulation equation; 
equation (5d) is the equation of evolution of the atmospheric temperature; 
and equation (5e) is the evolution of the deep-ocean temperature. The last 
term ( E ~ )  in equation (5d) is the stochastic shock, assumed distributed as 
q(0 ,  a:). Uncertainty is eillbodied in uncertainty in the parameter P.  
The model presented in equations (4) and (5), without the uncertainty 
or stochasticity, is very similar to  Nordhaus' DICE model, though the pa- 
rameter values may differ soillewllat from the current version of DICE. A 
relatively inodest difference between this model and DICE is that  we have an 
infinite horizon, whereas DICE and nearly all other similar models deal with 
a finite horizon. Anotller difference is that  our objective involves the utility 
of a representative consumer. I11 DICE, per capita utility is multiplied by 
the size of the labor force, L ( t ) .  A11 else being equal, our model places less 
weight on the future, compared with DICE. 
The primary difference between our model and DICE is that  here the 
parameter ,D is not known with certainty. The expectation operator in the 
objective function [equation (4)] is over the possible values of ,D as well as 
the possible values of E~ [the stochastic shock in equation (5d)l . Uncertainty 
in p a t  any given point in time is represented as a prior distribution a t  that 
point in time. A decision is made on the optimal values of p and I, the 
economy evolves, is observed, the prior on ,D is updated and a posterior is 
formed, which becomes the prior for the next time period. 
In earlier work on learniilg in the context of climate change (Kolstad, 
1993, 1994), knowledge of the distribution on an uncertain parameter was 
assumed to  evolve in an exogenous fashion, following a "star-shaped spread- 
ing of beliefs." Tllat approacll has the advantage of involving a parametric 
and well-defined movement from less knowledge to  more knowledge, and 
eventually certainty. That  approach has the disadvantage of saying nothing 
about the process underlying informatioil acquisition. Information just ar- 
rives like manila from heaven. Tlle approach presented here is much more 
explicit about how inforinatioil is acquired. The entire process of information 
acquisition is endogenous to the model. 
Assume the prior that  p is distributed 11(r, V ) ;  i.e., normally with a 
(finite) mean of r and variance of 1.. \\:it11 this prior, all we actually observe 
are T and 0 ,  not the realizations of 5. From this, the distribution on ,D must 
be updated. Rewrite equation (5d) as 
All that  is observed are Ti, Ot ,  and Mt,  or, equivalently, H t  and Xt. 
We must infer the value of p, or rather update our prior on p ,  based on 
these observations. Let p, be the precision of E; i.e., p, = l / V a r ( ~ ) .  After 
some mathematical wrangling with Bayes rule, we find the well-known result 
(e.g., Cyert and Degroot, 1974) that the posterior distribution on ,D is also 
normal with 
Note from equation ( i l l )  that the variance estiiilate on /3 is monotonically 
iloniilcreasiilg with time. Thus. except for trivial examples, no matter what 
the realization of the shock, the variance shrinks. Recall that  perfect infor- 
mation is associated with a variance of zero. 
It is straightforward to  interpret the updating rules in equation (7). 
First, the current estimate of the mean of ,L3 is a sufficient statistic for all 
information up to  period t.  Hence the new estimate of the mean will be a 
weighted average of the old estimate and the new information, Ht+ l /Xt :  
A high prior variance (TIt) ca.uses the updating process t o  put more weight 
on the new information; similarly, a low prior variance results in very little 
weight being placed on new information. 
The model is now complete. It consists of equations (4, 5, and 7). The 
net present value of utility is maximized, using as controls p (the emis- 
sion coiltrol rate) and I (investment). The system is characterized by state 
variables that  evolve over time: t (time), T (atmospheric temperature), 0 
(ocean temperature), I{ (capital stock), 44 (greenhouse gas stock), r (esti- 
mated mean of /3), a,nd T/ (estima.ted va.riance of p). The reason t (time) is 
considered a state variable is t11a.t some of the parameters ( A ,  L,  a )  depend 
on time. Parameter values a.re presentecl in Table 1. In our implementation, 
a time period is a decade. The time-dependent parameters ( A ,  L, a )  take on 
exactly the same va,lues as in Nordhaus (1994). 
3.2. Solutioil approach 
Nearly all models of climate and the econolny involve optimization over 
a finite horizon as a solutioil technique. This has the advantage of being 
computationally efficient. However, direct optimization is very difficult t o  
use when there is a stocllastic element. All variables depend on the possible 
realizations of the shock ( E ) .  A more elegant, though not easy to  implement, 
approach involves rewriting the model using the Bellman equation and then 
solving that  system nunierically (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989). 
To describe the approach concisely, without getting bogged down in 
notation, suppose we have a vector of controls (Ct)  - variables that  are 
adjusted to maximize the objective - and a vector of state variables (St), 
which evolve over time, based on what controls are chosen. Assume there is 
Table 1. Parameter values. 
Parameter \ra.lue 
P 0.7441" 
b l  0.0686 
b2 2.887 
el 0.01478 
0 2  2 
Y 0.25 
6~ 0.6513 
6~ 0.083 
a 0.5819 
4 0.0944 
W 0.02 
\'ar ( E )  0.11 
"Equivalent t o  3% annually. 
Note: O n e  unit  of t ime = 10 years. 
some stochastic shoclc every period, e, and a parameter that  is imperfectly 
known, p. We can write this problem as 
The Bellman principle of optimality states that  the net present value of the 
objective [equation (9a)l must obey a dynamic consistency condition, known 
as the Bellman equa.tion. Let F(,S) be the value of the objective in equation 
(9), starting a t  any sta,te S .  The Bellman equation in this case is 
The Bellman equation [equation (lo)]  states that the maximum attainable 
net present value of the objective sta.rting a t  5' must be equal to today's one- 
period objective ( f )  plus tomorrow's maximum attainable net present value 
of the objective, assuming the optimal control is chosen today. Because p 
and E are random variables ex ante, one must take the expectation of F on 
the right-hand side with respect to  the distributions of ,O and E .  In our case, 
the distribution of P is defined by two state variables ( the prior mean and 
variance). 
Note that  if one kllows F ,  tllell it is easy to calculate the optimal action 
to take a t  any point in time: simply solve the right-hand side of equation (10) 
for C*. However, the real problem is finding an F ( )  that satisfies equation 
(10). Equation (10) is really a fullctional equation with, as an unknown, the 
function F. 
So the problem is how to find an F ( )  that satisfies equation (10). This 
is a problem of some concern in macroeconomics and a number of numerical 
techniques have been developed.3 The basic idea is to  define a family of 
functions of which F is a member. The family must be parameterized by 
some parameter vector, X. Thus the family is defined by the function @(S; x)  
where the solution to equation ( lo) ,  F (S) ,  corresponds to  some particular 
value of the parameter, x*. We can rewrite equation (10) as 
We may not be able to  have equation (10) hold exactly because we are using a 
restricted set of value functions, parameterized by X,  instead of the universe 
of real-valued functions. That  is the reason for the error term, 7,  appended 
to equation ( l l b ) .  The task is to  find the x* for which 7 in equation (1:Lb) 
is as close t o  zero as possible over relevant values of the state variable, 5'. 
An obvious nor111 is least squares: i.e., find the x that  minimizes the sum of 
squared 7 over a finite set of va.lues of S ,  which span that  portion of the state 
space that  is of interest. This defines a, recursive algorithm for finding X'S 
given some xj, evaluate equation ( l l a ) .  Then find yj+l that  solves equation 
(1 1 b), minimizes some norm of 11 over S .  
There are a number of alternative pa.ra.metric families that  can be used 
to define the appropriake set of value fuilctions for c~ns ide ra t ion .~  The 
primary requirements are that  any real-valued function can be approximated 
to  any degree of precision and that  the parameterization be computational 
3The January 1990 issue of the Journnl of Btrsiness and Economic Statistics was de- 
voted to  such techniques. In particular, see the review article by Taylor and Uhlig (1990) 
in that  issue. 
Judd and Guu (1993) describe the familiar Taylor approximation (a series of polyno- 
mials) and the Pad6 approximation (quotient of polynomials). Judd (1991) argues for the 
use of a series of Chebysher polynomials as more computationally efficient. Hornik et  al. 
(1989) s l~ow that  neural networks, approximations involving transcendental functions, can 
approximate any Bore1 measurable mapping arbitrarily well. 
e f f i ~ i e n t . ~  We choose to use neura.1 network approximations to  the value 
function. As we have implemented this, it is a close relative of the Fourier 
network. Our approximation is 
where Xze is a vector and other xs  are scaler components of the parameter 
vector X, and S is the state vector. 
The next step is to  define a compact region of the state space where 
equation (11) will be required to hold. For instance, if the capital stock is 
one of the state variables, a lower limit would be zero and an upper limit 
would be any stock for which it is optimal for investment to  be less than 
depreciation, thus causing tlle stock t o  shrink over time. Having defined 
the relevant compa.ct region of the state space, choose a finite set of points 
in that region, S;, i = 1, . . . , I. The finer the mesh covering the region of 
interest, the more accurate the approximation, although the computations 
will also be more intensive. We then recursively generate a sequence of 
xj, {xo, XI, . . . , x J } ,  starting from some initial guess xo. If one knows xj, 
then xj+l is the error-minimizing solution to  equation ( l l b )  where the rhs 
in equation ( l l b )  is evaluated at  ,xi: 
These x, converge to an x*, which defines the approximate solution, 
@(S; x*), to  the Bellman equation (10). Convergence criteria are discussed 
in the next section. 
This approach is essentially the same as the contraction mapping con- 
structive proofs of existence of solution to dynamic program (see, for exam- 
ple, Stokey and Lucas, 1989). These proofs define an operator (T)  from the 
space of continuous functions to  the space of continuous functions. Choosing 
an arbitrary continuous function (v) on the value function on the right-hand 
side of equation (lo) ,  the left-hand sets of the equation define T(v). If T is 
51n other words, for X. of sufficiently large dimension, @ spans the space of continuous 
functions. To be more precise, define @(S, x.) : Rn x Rm -r R where n is the dimension 
of the s tate  space and rn is the dimension of the parameter vector X. For any C' function 
G: A -+ R where A is a compact subset of Rn and any X > 0, 3m,, x E Rn, 3 IIG(S) - 
@(S, x) I l .  < A. 
Table 2. Region of interest, in st,atci space and 198.5 values of state variables. 
Nuinber of Grid 1985 
State Units grid point,s values value 
11' (10' 1987 US$) 5 10,40,100,190,310 51.26 
M (10' tonnes) 4 600,1000,1400,1800 730 
T (OC from 1950) 4 0.2,1.7,3.2,4.7 0.45 
0 (OC from 1950) 3 0.1,0.75,2 0.11 
r 3.07 w/m2 3 0.72,1.1,1.4 0.81a 
v - 3 0.1,0.5,1 0.75 
t (Decades from 1905) 6 1,3,7,12,20,50 3 
"Equivalent to  2.S°C temperature rise from doubling of greenhouse gas stock. 
a contraction mapping, then multiple applications of T t o  v eventually con- 
verge to  a fixed point, a solution to  equation (10). In our case, we are dealing 
with a restricted set of functions, @ ( S ,  x). Iteration on x as described above 
is essentially the same as multiple applications of T. 
This defines the solution t o  model (9). While this is much more com- 
putationally intensive thail solving a deterministic finite horizon version of 
equation (9) using standard optilnization software, two clear advantages of 
this approach are: a)  stochasticity is represented; and b) once solved, the 
solution (optimal actions) for all values of the state vector is also known 
- no further coinputatioils are necessary for other values of the state vec- 
tor. This is a very inlportant advantage of dynamic programming. It allows 
straightforward comparative statics analysis as well as great flexibility in 
policy analysis. 
3.3. T h e  solutioil 
We now turn to  the specific solution of the model defined in equations (4) and 
(5). Recall that  there are seven state variables: t (time), T (atmospheric 
temperature), 0 (ocean temperature), Ii (capital stock), M (greenhouse 
gas stock), r (estima.ted meail of IS), and V (estimated variance of p). The 
range of interesting values for these states is shown in Table 2, along with the 
discrete values of each state that are used to make up the points that  span 
the state space for approsinlation purposes. The state variable t (time) was 
truncated a t  the point where exogenous labor and technical change virtually 
stop changing. 
Finding a good grid over the state space requires considerable trial and 
error. The idea is to  put grid points in the regions where the value function 
has significant curva.ture, to  improve the fit. Also, the grid must have the 
stationary state in the interior. Tlle grid we used contained 12,960 points. 
The neural network approximation [equation (12)] is assumed to  have 16 
terms in the summation, resulting in 129 elements in X.6 The maximization 
in equation ( l l a )  is solved using sequential quadratic programming.7 The 
expectations in equation ( l l a )  are evaluated using numerical integration 
based on 12-24 point Gaussian quadrature (Tauchen, 1990). 
Equation (13) is solved using a quasi-Newton method with analytic first 
derivatives of 71 with respect to x. The nonlinear least squares is assumed to  
converge when the objective is less than As indicated in the previous 
section, we iterate on x until convergence of x appears to be ~ b t a i n e d . ~  Our 
convergence criterion is that the difference in value function approximations 
[equation ( l lb ) ] ,  between one iteration and the next is less than or equal to 
a t  all grid points. 
The problem was implemented using Matlab on a Sun Sparc 20 (75 
mHz). Solution time was about 72 
4. Results 
The solution of the dynainic progra,nl is a va.lue function F(t,T,O,K,&l,r,V), 
and the corresponding policy functions giving optimal pollution control 
and investnlent as functions of the state variables: p*(t,T,O,Iir,M,r,V) and 
I*(t,T,O,lc,M,r,l/). Today's values of the state variables are sufficient to 
6An important issue in the st.at,istics literature is the optimal choice for the number of 
parameters in the neural net ( . m ) .  When observations are subject to  iid noise, one often 
gets the result to  set m such that  the number of parameters equals the square root of the 
number of observations. So given 13,000 observations, we might set m = d m ,  - 114. 
This results in the number of terms [the Cs in equation (12)] being approximately 13. Given 
tha t  the actual value function is deterministic, we can use a few more terms to increase 
the fit without concern that  the da ta  are noisy. We let m = 16 in the derivation of the 
value function. 
'The maximand in equation ( l l a )  is not guaranteed to be globally concave. I t  is easy 
to  show tha t  the set of feasible solutions to the maximization is convex. Provided the 
climate shock is not too great (lei less than - 5'), we can show concavity of the objective 
function over the region of the state space shown in Table 2. 
'Provided utility is bounded, given our assumptions, a solution to equation (10) exists 
(Stokey and Lucas, 1989). Given the range of values for states given in Table 2, and tha t  
controls are chosen so that Ii7 is bounded away from zero and T remains below some upper 
bound, utility will be bounded. 
'Solution time can presumably be significantly reduced by compiling some of the 
computationally intensive parts of t,he process rather than using the Matlab interpreter 
exclusively. 
determine today's optiinal a,ction. In order to  simulate the path of invest- 
ment, pollution control, or a.ny of the states over time, one must simulate 
the transition equations (5) and optimal control functions, using particular 
realizations of the random shock, E .  It is important to  realize that, while in 
the model there is uncertainty over the climate response parameter, /3, the 
dynamic system requires a specific value of /3 in order to evolve. Thus, when 
we simulate the model, we must simulate it for a specific /3, even though 
learning is occurring about beliefs on /3. Starting in 1985 from initial values 
of the state variables given in Table 2 and assuming the shock is distributed 
rl(O,O.ll),10 we examine the evolutioil of the system for two different values 
of /3, a high value and a low value. These high and low values correspond 
respectively to  the IPCC high and low climate sensitivities of a 4.5OC and 
1.5OC temperature change from greenhouse gas doubling (Lempert et  al., 
1995). 
Figure 3 shows how the estimate of the mean of the distribution on the 
true /3 evolves over time for each of the two actual values of /3. (Actually, 
for clarity, climate sensitivity is shown, equal t o  3.07/3.) The curves are 
jagged because they involve the realizatioil of the random shock. A different 
set of realizations could very well have resulted in somewhat different paths. 
Although the variance is not shown, it is virtually identical for the two values 
of /3. This is because the updating formula for the variance [equation (7b)l 
only involves AIt, the stock of greenhouse gases - a variable that  changes 
very slowly and is very insensitive to  a teinporary lack of knowledge about 
/3. Note that  it ta.kes 50-100 years for the ineail of the distribution of /3 
to  "converge" to  the true value (and the variance to  be reduced to  a small 
number). 
We can be a little more precise about how long it takes to  converge. The 
prior distribution on /3 is that it is normal with a mean of 0.86. Over time the 
distribution changes. At a.ny point in time the agent can test the hypothesis 
that  /3 = 0.86. We have run severa,l hundred Monte Carlo simulations ( the 
realization of the shocl; varies from one siillulatioil to  another) and for each 
determined the time period where we first reject that  null hypothesis. Table 
3 shows the mean time to  rejection of the null under different assumptions 
about the true /3 and different levels of confidence. Note that  rejection a t  
the 95% level takes less than 100 years if the true /3 is high, but over 160 
''The variance of the shock is computed from an analysis of the global annual tempera- 
ture data. We found the standard error to  be approximately 0.105, equivalent to  a variance 
of 0.011. Bassett (1992) and Nordhaus (1994) report standard errors for the interannual 
variation in the range of 0.1 to  0.15. Although it is not strictly statistically correct t o  do 
so, we multiply our 0.111 variance by 10 to yield a decadal variance of 0.11. 
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 
year 
Figure 3. Evolutioil of the estimate of the mean of the distribution on the 
true ,kl over time for two actual values of p. 
Table 3. Decades to reach confideilce levels on P. 
True 
beta 
Coilfide~lce level 
95% 99% 
H 9.3 12.5 
L 16.3 22.9 
Note: Figures shown are in decades. Represents mean over Monte Carlo simulations of 
time to reach indicated confidence level for rejecting the null hypothesis that = 0.86. 
years if it is low. This is son~ewhat surprising since most analyses of learning 
hypothesize that  uncertainty is resolved in 20-60 years. Also note that  the 
learning time is not symmetric. 
The implication of this slow learning can be seen in the level of pollution 
control. Figure 4 shows the pollution control rate (p) as a function of time for 
both the low value of ,kl and the high value (solid lines). Also shown are the 
values of p tha t  would be obtained if ,kl were perfectly known (broken lines). 
For low ,kl, where greenhouse gases have a smaller effect on temperature, 
pollution control starts low a,nd rises as uncertainty is reduced. This is a 
year 
Figure 4. Pollution control rate as a function of time for both the low and 
the high values of P. 
somewhat unusual result. Growth in control implicit in the underlying model 
donlinates learning which would tend to  reduce control t o  the no-uncertainty 
case. Another esplanation is that learning causes the deferment of control 
until some of that  uncertainty is eliminated. This is not as obvious when 
the true value of p is high. Pollution control still starts low but gradually 
builds t o  8-9% as the true value of /3 is learned. 
We can provide additional insight as to  why control rises t o  its peak 
around 2100 and then falls (when the true P is low).ll Much is changing 
over the next century; what is most important in driving emission control? 
Assuming the true value of P is low, the control rate increases by 148% 
([p2Og5 - p1985]/p1985 = 1.48). We know the values of each state variable in 
1985 and 2095. We can set all state variables a t  their 1985 value except one, 
which we set a t  its 2095 value and see how much pollution control changes. 
Let that  value be p;, where S; is the state that  has been changed t o  its 
We are unable to offer an unambiguous explanation for why control levels drop after 
2100. 
Table 4. Proportion of change in control due to each state variable. 
Variable I< M T 0 r V t 
Pro~ortion 26% 70% 6% 1 % -40% -21% 57% 
Note: Shown is p , " d 9 ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ 8 s ,  assuming the true /3 is low. pi is the control level when all 
states take their 1985 vatue except state i ,  which takes its 2095 value. 
Figure 5. Evolution of atmospheric and deep ocean temperatures over the 
very long run for the high value of P.  
2095 value. Table 4 shows the ratio of 11; - p1985 to  p2095 - p1985. Roughly 
speaking, these figures should sum to  loo%, though because of nonlinearities 
and other factors, they will not do so precisely. 
Note in the table that  Ii, M, and t have the biggest positive impact on 
p, whereas learning has the opposite effect. The change in T and V, which 
is due to  learning, tends to work in the opposite direction. On net, learning 
is dominated by the other variables and the control rates rise. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of atmospheric and deep ocean temperature 
over the very long run for the high value of P .  Note the very long lags built 
into the temperature response of the deep ocean. It is clear that  while the 
deep ocean temperature is not significant now, it will be eventually. 
01 ' 0 9 I 4 I I 
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Figure 6. Decadal emissioils for the high value of /3 and a scaled plot of the 
product of three variables: technology, labor force, and emissions per unit 
GDP. 
It should be pointed out tl1a.t 1llucl1 of the growth in emissions and 
greenhouse gas stock levels is due to growth in the labor force and growth in 
output-enhancing technology. Figure 6 shows a plot of decadal emissions (for 
the high value of /3 - a sinlilar result holds for the low value) and a scaled 
plot of the product of three variables: technology (A*), labor force (Lt), 
and emissions per unit of GDP (at) .  Higher A's and L's yield higher GDP; 
a is the greenhouse gas emissions-GDP ratio. Thus the product of these 
three variables is proportional to ullcontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. The 
relationship between this product and emissions is striking. Since there 
is very little control (< lo%),  emissions and this triple product track each 
other well. Why is this significant? It is significant because the A, L, and a 
variables are all exogenous. An interpretation of Figure 6 is that  exogenous 
variables determine how much is emitted and thus how serious the warming 
problem is. This is explored further in Kelly and Kolstad (1996). 
This leads to the obvious question of how the optimal policy is affected 
by the various state variables. The optimal policy function is nonlinear, 
Table  5. Sensitivity of enlission control to 1% increase in value of states. 
Ii' M T 0 T V t 
0.4  3.8 0.1 0.02 1.7 0.2 1.2 
Note: States evaluated at 1985 values; sho~vn is percent change in p. 
which makes generalization difficult. However, we can ask specific questions. 
Suppose we start with the value of the state variable in 1985 (see Table 2). 
We can then investigate how a 1% increase in each of the states would affect 
the optimal C 0 2  control rate, assuming the true value of P is at  its high 
value. Table 5 shows the change in p from its base value of just under 3% 
control of greenhouse gases. 
We see that  the most significailt states are M ,  r ,  and t .  The optimal 
policy puts little weight on T, because T is subject to  stochastic shocks and 
is not a very good predictor of future temperature. However, M and r are 
excellent predictors of future T values, and hf has much less stochastic fluc- 
tuation than T. Also i~llportant a.re the levels of the exogenous variables, 
represented by t (as mentioned earlier). So we see that learning is an impor- 
tant  component of the optinla1 policy, although most analyses focus on A4 
or T. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper is one of the first papers to  deal esplicitly with learning about 
the climate within a.n integrated-assessmlent framework. We have explored 
1ea.rniag about the exa.ct relationship between elevated greenhouse gas levels 
and temperature rise. We lmve shown that  it can take a very long time to  
resolve that  uncertainty, time during which significant suboptimal control 
can take place (relative to perfect information). 
It should be noted that  in this model, learning is from the point of view 
of the policy maker. We lmve assumed the agents within the model are 
perfectly informed. If agents also were learning then adaptation would be 
slower and the effect of learning more pronounced. 
There are several drawbacks to our approach, not the least of which is 
the computational complexity. A related problem is that  other parameters 
are also uncertain but the problem becomes too complex if learning about 
more parameters is included in the model. Finally, Bayesian leaning is not 
the only kind of learning that takes place. Clearly research and development 
also generates information; tha,t process is not represented here. 
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Abstract 
This paper discusses a new systematic set of studies measuring the economic 
impacts of climate change on the USA. These studies develop new method- 
ologies that  emphasize adaptation. Wit 11 fas t-moving sectors that  adapt 
quickly, the methods focus on cross-sectional natural experiments to  mea- 
sure climate sensitivity. LVith capital-intensive sectors that  adapt slowly, 
the methods focus on dynamic adjustments which take decades to  complete. 
The set of studies also elllphasizes coinprehensive analyses of entire sectors. 
Many components of sectors that were previously ignored are now included. 
The result of including these new elements is that climate impacts on the 
market economy of the USA are likely to  be beneficial. Several nonmarket 
impacts have yet to be measured. 
Although a great deal is now understood about the science of climate 
change, very little has yet been learned about the impacts of changing cli- 
mate. As scientists become more co~lviilced that  anthropogenic emissiolls of 
greenhouse gases are disturbing the planet's climate, it is increasingly im- 
portant t o  uilderstand what the consequences of this change may be. All the 
existing compreheilsive estimates of aggregate ecoilomic impacts are expert 
judgements (Nordhaus, 1991; Cline, 1992; Fankhauser, 1995; Tol, 1995). 
These in turn are based largely on a single set of empirical studies for the 
USA (Smith and Tirpak, 1989), which did not estimate aggregate welfare 
effects. 
This article reviews a new set of impact studies and empirical results 
for the USA. These new studies (Adams et al., 1996; Hurd et al., 1996; 
Mendelsohn and Markowski, 1996; Mendelsohn et al., 1996; Morrison and 
Mendelsohn, 1996; Segerson and Dixon, 1996; Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 
1996; Yohe et al., 1996) were coordiilated to  develop improved comprehen- 
sive measures of the impacts of global warming. For example, the studies 
examine the same climate scenarios (except timber) with the identical eco- 
ilomic assumptions. Consisteilt assumptioils were made about joint resources 
such as la.nd, water, capital, and labor. The studies were also designed to  
cover all impacted sectors and provide a more thorough analysis of each sec- 
tor. Two types of nonlllarket effects are also examined, outdoor recreation 
and nonmarket water impacts. 
1. Methodology 
The economic approaches employed in these parallel sector studies reflect 
several improven~ents in measuriilg climate sensitivity. All of these studies 
carefully capture adaptation. Each of the sector studies assesses the extent 
to  which economic actors could adapt to  climate change given current tech- 
nology. Farmers adjust crops in response to  changes in yields. Forest owners 
harvest vulnerable timber early and plant more in anticipation of new op- 
portunities. The owners of coastal structures make economically rational 
decisions about whether t o  protect coastal structures from rising sea levels 
or gradually abandoil them over time. Homeowners and stores adjust energy 
needs for space conditioning as clilnate changes outside. 
Several of the studies rely on natural climate experiments. Nature con- 
tains many examples where actors adapt t o  different climates over the land- 
scape. By comparing behavior in one location with one climate to  that  in 
another location with a different cliinate, we can see how people would adapt 
t o  climate change in the long run. For example, by comparing the farming 
net revenue of town A (which experiences 25°C temperatures) with the net 
revenue of town B (wllicll experiences 30°C temperatures), one can see how 
a 5OC temperature increase may affect farming in town A. These are long- 
run comparisons that  presume that  people have adapted to  the local climate 
they experience. The models do not assume infinite foresight on the part 
of actors, but merely that  they adapt to what they experience. The models 
do not assume new technology will save everyone. The models assume that  
people will use existing technology. but perhaps not techniques currently 
employed locally. For sectors that are laown to adapt quickly, this long-run 
approach can provide accurate inlpact estimates. 
Some sectors, notably coastal structures and timber, are characterized 
by large capital stocks that  are difficult t o  adjust over time. These sectors 
cannot immediately adjust froill one ecluilibrium t o  another, because it can 
take decades to  change the capital stock. Because the period of adjustment 
can last for decades or, in the case of climate change, for centuries, it is 
important to  model these sectors dynamically. Comparing the equilibrium 
outcome today versus several centuries away provides little insight into what 
will happen during the period of adjustinent. Because the period of adjust- 
ment is everything in these sectors, it is crucial to  capture it carefully. The 
dynamic model must explicitly treat how quickly climate changes and how 
quickly the sector can respond. The dynamic forestry and coastal models 
find that  these sectors are sensitive to  the rate of climate change, confirming 
the importance of using a dynamic approach. 
The new studies are more comprehensive than earlier research. For 
example, the agriculture study extends previous analyses of grains to  include 
effects on livestock, fruits, and vegetables. Not only does this capture a 
larger fraction of the agricultural sector, but it explicitly includes farming 
acti\.ities that predominate in warmer environments. The energy analysis 
extends earlier research in electricity to include all fuels. Because electricity 
is used primarily for cooling, extending the analysis t o  all fuels provides 
a more balanced treatment of both heating and cooling. The recreation 
study extends earlier work on skiing to  include summer outdoor recreation 
activities. Although warining should shortell the winter season, it should 
also tend t o  lengthen the summer season, when most outdoor recreation 
occurs. These changes alter the results. Whereas earlier research focused on 
measuring phenomena that were damaged by warming, the parts of these 
sectors that  they omitted often benefit from warming. 
The set of new studies was carefully designed to  be consistent across sec- 
tors so that  the results could be aggregated into a single index. For example, 
each study explored the same temperature and precipitation scenarios. Ef- 
fects across studies could then be aggregated for each scenario. Care was 
taken to  make consistelit assuinptiolis across shared resources. For example, 
as temperature rises, agriculture t.urns to Inore irrigation and so requires a 
bigger share of wa.ter consumption. The projected increase in irrigation in 
the agricultural sector model was included in the water sector model. As 
forests become more productive, the forestry nlodel projects that  forest land 
will increase slightly in some marginal agricultural areas. Care was taken to 
protect highly valued agricultural lands, which were needed in the farming 
sector. Similar economic assumptions were also used across scenarios, where 
possible. For example, each study assumed that  US gross national product 
would grow to  $20.8 trillion by 2060 and the US population would grow to 
294 million (Houghton et  cd., 1990). 
The scenarios examined a broad range of climatological projections. Cli- 
mate scenarios were chosen across the range of plausible values suggested by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; Houghton et  al., 
1990). Temperature increases of 1.5, 2.5, and 5.0°C were included, whereas 
previous studies focused more closely in the ileighborhood of 4.5OC temper- 
ature increases. As forecasts of future cliillate challge have been moderated 
in recent years, these other impact studies have become obsolete. However, 
by providing a range of responses, these new studies can adapt to  many dif- 
ferent forecasts. For each temperature increase, precipitation was assumed 
t o  increase by 0%, 7%, and 15%, for a total of nine climate scenarios. For 
most of the studies, temperature and precipitation changes were assumed t o  
be uniform across the continental USA and across seasons. With the timber 
study, the climate predictions come from global circulation models (GCMs) 
that  predict regional and seasonal patterns of change. 
Many climate scientists do not believe that a uniform temperature in- 
crease is likely. consequently, they argue for using GCM predictions instead. 
However, recent analyses of multiple GCM runs indicated that the expected 
impact from using a large set of GCMs was identical to  using a uniform 
climate chailge illode1 for the USA (Williams et  ul., 1996). The study also 
indicated that  a large set of GC:hls produce a wide variance in predicted 
impacts. Consequently, we explored using GCMs for the agriculture, energy, 
and recreation studies. Both of the dyilamic studies (timber and sea level 
rise) also specified a path of climate chailge from current t o  future condi- 
tions. Carbon dioxide was assulned t o  increase to  530 ppm [710 ppm in 
the timber study, whicll was determined by assumptions in the ecological 
modeling (VEMAP Pvlembers, 1996)], which is consisteilt with a doubling of 
all greenhouse gases from preiildustrial times. The coastal study tested the 
impacts from rising sea levels of 0.33, 0.66, and 1.0 meter by 2100. 
2. Results 
Table 1 summarizes the impacts predicted for an  economy in 2060 with a cli- 
mate sceilario of a 2.5OC temperature increase, a 7% precipitation increase, 
a carbon dioxide level of 530 ppmv, and a 33-cm sea level rise. This scenario 
reflects the IPCC's central estimates of temperature, precipitation, and at-  
mospheric carbon dioxide increases (Houghton et ul., 1990). There are two 
important policy conclusioils to  be drawn from the results in Table 1: ( I )  
the effects that will occur will be small relative to  the size of the economy, 
and (2) the new models and methods predict that warming will result in a 
net benefit to  the economy, rather than the net loss suggested by previous 
research. 
There are several explanations for the more optimistic results of the cur- 
rent study in comparisoil with previous work. The new, more comprehensive 
Table 1. The econonlic iillpacts of clima.te change in 2060a 
(in billion US dollars). 
Market sectors 
Farming 
~ i m b e r ~  
Coastal structuresC 
Residential energy 
Commercial energy 
Water 
Total market 
% of GNP 
Nonmarket sectors 
Recreation 3.5 
Water -5.7 
"Positive numbers represent benefits and 11egative numbers represent 
damage. Estimates based on 530 ppinv of COz and uniform expected 
climate change. 
* ~ i m b e r  uses GCM, not. ~uliform climate scenarios, and 710 ppmv of 
COz. 
'Sea level scenario assumes 33 cm rise by 2100. 
measures of these sectors generally benefit from warming (e.g., citrus and 
vegetable crops in a.griculture, hea,ting in energy, summer activities in recre- 
ation). The new studies do a illore complete job of including adaptation. 
Adaptation increa.ses benefits a,ild reduces da,nlage. The sectors dependent 
on the ecosystem benefitted from carbon fertilization and were not seriously 
damaged by warming. Agroilomic studies suggest that carbon fertilization 
is likely to  offset some, if not all, of the damage from warming. Forest 
ecology models suggest that  the ilortheri~ expansion of productive south- 
ern pines more than offsets reductioi~s in productivity per hectare (VEMAP 
Members, 1996). Dynamic micro-a.nalyses of the coastal and timber sectors 
predict damage would be smaller than earlier static analyses. Finally, es- 
timates of climate change have moderated over the past decade. Whereas 
earlier impact studies examined the implications of climate changes of a 
4.5OC or more temperature increase with sea levels rising one meter, dou- 
bling projections now center on a ' 2 . 5 O C  temperature increase with sea levels 
rising 33 cm (Houghton et  al., 1990). 
It is worth noting that this study focuses on impacts in 2060 instead 
of 1990. Earlier studies used the 1990 economy as a point of comparison, 
because it is an  easy benchinark to  agree on. Warming, if it is to  occur, 
however, will take many deca.des. The 1990 economy will have transformed 
to the 2060 economy (or a. la,ter economy) by the time a 2.5OC temperature 
change materializes. Because some sectors grow and others do not, the 
impacts in 2060 could be quite different than those in 1990. Furthermore, the 
plausibility that  the economy will have adjusted in 2060 to  a small climate 
change is far more credible than if the change were to  occur spontaneously. 
The warming scenario benefits the US market economy by about $37 
billion. The farming, timber, and commercial energy sectors all benefit from 
warming. In contrast, the coastal structures, residential energy, and water 
sectors are all damaged. The largest effect by far occurs with respect to  
farming, which enjoys a vast increase in supply from carbon fertilization. 
Overall, however, the effect is small compared with the projected US econ- 
only in 2060. The total benefit from warming to  the economy is only 0.2% 
of the economy. 
Warming has different effects on the two studied nonmarket sectors: 
water quality and outdoor recreation. Water quality is harmed by warming 
because of predicted reductions in mean runoff. Recreation largely bene- 
fits from warming because of the rela.tively large increases in fishing and 
boating benefits associated with prolonged summer seasons. These two sec- 
tors largely offset each other. Little call be concluded about the effect of 
warming on quality of life from these water and recreation analyses, because 
several other important llonlnarket inlpacts (health, species loss, and human 
amenities) have yet t o  be q~a~ntif ied.  
The results reported in Table 1 are conditional on the selected climate 
and economic scenario tested. Alterna.tive climate scenarios and economic 
projections lead to  a wide range of impacts. With more severe climate 
scenarios, damage increases and benefits shrink. The slower the economic 
growth, the smaller the impa.ct. All the climate sensitivity estimates are 
empirical and thus uncertain. Policy responses by the government call inhibit 
efficient responses, which would increase damage. New technologies may be 
better able t o  adapt to  changing conditions, which would decrease damage 
and increase benefits. The impact of climate change on other countries 
may be different from the effects on the USA. Foreign impact can affect US 
welfare through trade. If other countries increase their productivity, prices 
could fall, resulting in gains for domestic consumers and losses for domestic 
producers. If other countries have lower productivity because of warming, 
prices would rise, which would hurt doinestic consumers and help domestic 
producers. 
The improvemeilts described a,bove in the economic modeling of climate 
change impacts suggest that inodest warming would result in small but ben- 
eficial impacts to  the American economy. These results are more optimistic 
than previous analyses and should be incorporated into ongoing efforts to  
determine the optimal policy respoilse to greenhouse warming. The results 
strongly suggest that  aggregate market impacts in the USA are not a moti- 
vating factor for near-term action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
These market studies, however, do not address all potential impacts from 
climate change, including some potentially large impacts from human health, 
species loss, and aesthetic changes. The optimal response to greenhouse 
warming will depend on the magnitude of these effects, as well. The study 
also does not address the climate sensitivity of the economies of other coun- 
tries, especially developing countries. Given the worldwide consequences of 
greenhouse gases, it is importailt to measure impacts beyond US bound- 
aries. Many of the methods demonstrated in this US study, particularly the 
less data-intensive "natural experiments," could be applied directly in other 
developed countries and, with careful adjustment, to developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic assessment of the impa.cts of climate change has advanced consid- 
erably, but many improvemeilts are conceivable. Experience gained during 
the preparatioil of the chapter on social cost in the Second Assessment Re- 
port (SAR) of the Iiltergovernmeiltal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
Working Group I11 (Pearce et al., 1996), suggests that equity aspects of 
impact valuation, comparison, a.nd aggregation should be high on the list 
of research priorities. This pa,per focuses on aggregation, showing one way 
damage estimates call be corrected for illequalities in income distribution. 
In the proposed model, regional da.mage estimates are weighted with an  eq- 
uity factor derived from the social welfa.re functions of world regions and the 
entire world. Equity weightiilg ca,il sigilificantly increase global damage fig- 
ures, although some specificatioils of weighting functions also imply reduced 
estimates. The use of equity weights requires value judgements by decision 
makers or analysts. It is also shown that  equal valuation - despite empir- 
ical evidence - iinplies a global welfare function, possibly with undesirable 
properties. 
Section 2 of this paper contains a brief account of the state of the art  
as reflected in the SAR of the IPCC, correcting a somewhat unfortunate 
way of expressiilg damage in poorer countries. In Section 3, various ways 
'Most of the work for this paper was done during Sam Fankhauser's association with the 
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE). The  
opinions put forward here are tliose the authors and cannot be attributed to  the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) or its associated agencies. 
of aggregating estinlates over couiltries with different levels of economic de- 
velopnlent are discussed. The implications of equal valuation are treated in 
Section 4, and some conclusions a.re presented in Section 5 .  
2. Background 
Scientific research on global warming impacts has focused predominantly 
on the (arbitrarily chosen) 2 x C 0 2  scenario, in other words, the impacts 
of an atmospheric carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  concentration that  is twice the 
preindustrial level. I11 addition, lllost research focuses on the impact climate 
change would have on the present situation. Although counterfactual (the 
long-term vulnerability profile could change as a consequence of economic 
development and population growth), the advantages of this approach are 
that  only one variable (climate) is altered and that  projections of future 
worlds are avoided. 
Climate change inlpacts call be classified as being either market related 
(affecting tradable goods and services) or nonmarket related (affecting "in- 
tangibles" such as ecosysteills or human health). Table 1 categorizes the 
expected impacts of global warming. Climate change will affect a broad 
range of economic sectors and activities, as well as natural systems. Impacts 
on coastal zones, human health, water supply, and agricultural production 
are likely t o  be among the most serious effects. Table 1 also assesses how 
carefully these impacts have been estimated in the literature so far. It  is 
clear that ,  despite a growing body of literature, much remains t o  be done. It 
should be noted that estimates include both adaptation costs and residual 
damage. The former include the costs of coastal protection and migration, 
and the change in energy demand due to  alterations in space heating and 
cooling requirements. The underlying adaptation assumptions, however, are 
not explicitly stated for most impact categories. 
Monetary estimates of both market and nonmarket damage are ide- 
ally expressed in the form of willillgness to  pay to  obtain a good or service 
(WTP) ,  or willingness to  accept compellsation to forego a good or service 
(WTA). W T P  measures the amount of income a person is willing t o  forego in 
exchange for improvemellts in the state of the world; WTA is an  estimate of 
the compensation required to  accept a deterioration in the state of the world. 
With regard t o  climate change, W T P  values improvements over business-as- 
usual scenarios, whereas WTA values deterioration of present conditions. 
Both measures are used in welfare economics as a way t o  determine individ- 
uals' preferences in monetary terms. They are often used interchangeably, 
Table 1. Overview of climate change impacts. 
Market impacts Nonmarket impacts 
Primary Other Damage Damage 
economic economic from from 
sector sector Property extreme Ecosystenl Human extreme 
Damage damage damage loss events damage impacts events 
Fully estimated Agriculture Dryland loss, Weteland loss 
based on coastal 
willingness protection 
to Pay 
Fully estimated Forestry Water 
using S U P P ~ Y  
approximatioris 
Hurricane Forest loss 
danmge 
Hurricane 
daina.ge 
Partially Fisheriesa Energy Urhan Dainage Species loss Human life, Damage 
estimated demand, infra- froin air pollution, from 
leisure st,ructure droughtsb water pollution, droughts" 
activity migration 
Not estimated Insurance Nontropical Other Morbidity, Nontropical 
costs, storms, ecosystenls physical storms, 
construction, river floods, loss comfort, river floods, 
transport, hot/cold political hot/cold 
energy spells, stability, spells, 
supply other human other 
catastrophes hardship catastrophes 
aOften included in wetland loss. 
bPrimarily agricultural damage. 
Source: Pearce e t  al., 1996. 
Table 2. Aggregate monetary damage for 2 x C 0 2  levels (annual damage). 
Region Percent of GDP Percent of real GDPa 
Developed countries (OECD) 1.0 to 3.0 1.0 to 4.0 
Developing countries and 
countries with econoinies 
in transition -0.5 to 9.0 -0.5 to 7.0 
World 1.5 to 2.0 1.0 to 2.0 
"GDP corrected for differences in  purchasing power parity. 
Source: Fankhauser and Tol, 1995. 
although WTA estimates are generally (and sometimes substantially) higher 
than W T P  estimates. Studies on clinlate change damage costs predomi- 
nantly focus on WTP, although WTA has also been used for some damage 
categories. There has been discussion about which concept is appropriate 
for the enhanced greenhouse effect. This discussion relates to  issues of re- 
sponsibility and equity and is not elaborated here (for more information, see 
Fankhauser et al., 1996b). Unfortunately, W T P  and WTA estimates are not 
available for all global warnling impacts. Reductions in revenues, the return 
on input factors (such as capital or land), and other indicators are frequently 
used t o  approximate the welfare iinpacts of climate change (see Table 1). Of- 
ten, W T P  ancl WTA estinlates are 1)ased on study results transferred from 
issues other than cliinate change, or froiu one region to  another. 
Available estilnates on the costs of clinlate change are therefore neither 
accurate nor complete, and there is a considerable range of error. Figures 
on developing countries, in particular, are usually based on approximations 
and extrapolations, and are clearly less reliable than those for developed 
regions. Nevertheless, the available estimates can serve as an indication of 
the relative vulnerability of different regions. 
Table 2, which is based on the extensive literature survey of IPCC Work- 
ing Group 111, sllows the aggregate damage often associated with 2 x C 0 2  
levels. Figures range between -0.5% a,nd 9.0% of gross domestic prod- 
uct ( GDP),  with danlage in developing countries typically accounting for 
a greater percentage of GDP than that in Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) countries. The damage estimates re- 
ported by the IPCC, while in most cases corrected for differences in purchas- 
ing power parity (PPP) ,  are expressed as a percentage of uncorrected GDP. 
In addition to  the IPCCl figures, Table 2 also shows calculations that  express 
damage as a percentage of real (PPP-corrected) GDP, with P P P  corrections 
Table 3. Danlage resulting from 2xC:02 levels in nlonetaay terms, by world 
regions. 
Fankhauser To1 
Region Bln.US$ % of GDPa Bln.US$ % of GDPa 
European Union 63.6 1.4 - - 
USA 61.0 1.3 - - 
Other OECD 55.9 1.2 - - 
OECD America - - 
OECD Europe - - 
OECD Pacific - - 
Total OECD 180.5 1.3 192.7 1.9 
E. Europe/Forrner USSR 29.gb 0 . 4 ~  -14.8 -0.4 
Centrally Planned Asia 50.7' 2.9' -4.0 -0.1 
South and Southeast Asia - - 92.2 5.3 
Africa - - 46.4 6.9 
Latin America - - 40.3 3.1 
Middle East - - 11.5 5.5 
Total Non-OECD 141.6 0.9 171.7 1.7 
World 322.0 1.1 364.4 1.8 
a G D P  corrected for differences in p~~rchasing power parity; GDP base may differ between 
the studies. 
*Former USSR only. 
'China only. 
Source: Fankhauser and Tol, 1995. The figures in t,his table differ from those in Pearce et 
ul., 1996; these fignres are fully corrected for purchasing power parity. 
where this had not been done initially. The differences between the two sets 
of estimates are small compared with the likely range of error. 
The figures in Table 2 are best guess estimates. They do not reflect 
uncertainties and they neglect the possibility of impact surprises and low- 
probabilitylhigh-impact events (such as a drastic change in ocean currents). 
Considerable regional differences are likely, with the potential for rela- 
tively high impacts for some individual countries, such as small island states. 
Table 3 shows some of the estimates that  underlie the figures in Table 2, 
highlighting the substa,ntial differences between regions. The estimates are 
again corrected for differences in P P P .  For the former USSR, for example, 
damage could be as low as 0.4% of real (PPP-corrected) GDP, or might even 
be negative (climate change is potentially beneficial). Asia and Africa, on 
the other hand, could face estremely high levels of damage, mainly due to  
the severe life/morbidity impacts. Mortality estima,tes are extremely volatile 
and controversial, however, and should be interpreted with caution. Devel- 
oping countries generally tend to  be more vulnerable to  climate change than 
developed countries, beca.use of the greater importance of agriculture, the 
lower health standards, and the stricter financial, institutional, and knowl- 
edge constraints on adaptation. 
The wide range of results shows that ,  although a rough picture of re- 
gional vulnerability to  climate change is starting to  emerge, much additional 
research is still necessary to  iinprove the currently limited understanding of 
the issue. 
3. Aggregation 
The damage estimate for the world listed in Tables 2 and 3 results from 
simply totaling the regional dama.ge estimates. The implicit assumption is 
that  the current income distribution is fair, or that  distributional impacts are 
of secondary importance. This a.ssumption can be criticized. Alternatively, 
worldwide damage can be expressed as 
where the terms in brackets denote "equity weights." D denotes climate 
change damage; i=1,2, . . . , n denotes the region; W, denotes the first-order 
derivative of global welfare with respect to uZ;  U; denotes the marginal 
welfare of income of region i; and TIT.li denotes marginal value of income, 
that  is, the maximum global welfare increase that can be achieved with 
an additional unit of income. Equity weights are thus built up from three 
elements: the change in regional welfare due to climate change damage, 
the change in global welfare due to  the change in regional welfare, and the 
optimal way to  change global welfare. Note that if the income distribution 
is considered just, equity weights all equal one. [For a detailed derivation 
of equation ( I ) ,  see Fankhauser et nl. (1996a).] Equation (1) rests on four 
crucial assumptions: that  nleaningful welfare functions exist; that  valuable 
goods and services are approximately substitutable; that  climate change 
damage is small in each region - equation (1) is a linear approximation; and 
that  climate change does not change the relative welfare of regions. 
A number of additional assumptions are needed before equation (1) can 
be used. We employ a conventional CRRA (constant relative rate of risk 
Table 4. Globa.1 2xC02  tlama.ge, corrected for illcome inequality 
(bln.US$/year). 
Fankhauser, 1995 Tol, 1995 
Uncorrected damage 322.0 364.4 
Utilitarian welfare fuilctioil 
e = 0.5 315.6 
e = 1.0 405.2 
e = 1.5 621.9 
Bernoulli-Nash welfare functioila 405.2 614.3 
Maximin welfare function 
e = 0.5 95.8 89.4 
e = 1.0 181.0 172.2 
e = 1.5 342.7 331.8 
aBernoulli-Nash weights are independent of e ,  and correspond to the case e = l  of the 
utilitarian welfare function. 
Source: Fankhauser et  al., 1996a. 
a.version) utility functioil that  depends solely on income (superscripts are 
suppressed for simplicity) for regional welfare: 
Different values for parameter e ( the iilcoine elasticity of marginal welfare) 
will be used below. Values between 1.0 and 1.5 are commonly used in the 
literature (see, for example, the discussioil in Cline, 1992), although Pearce 
and Ulph (1994) note that l~ousehold behavior models support lower values 
of about 0.8. Each region is assumed to  have the same welfare function. 
A useful specificatioil for the global welfare function that encompasses 
a number of concepts is 
where y is a parameter of inequality aversion: the larger y is, the greater 
the coilcern about equality. For y=O, equatioil (3) reduces to  a utilitarian 
welfare function. Letting y approach 1 leads to  a Bernoulli-Nash function, 
while y + oo represents the illaximiil (Rawlsian) paradigm (see Boadway 
and Bruce, 1984). 
Table 4 preseilts the global aggregate damage for different values of e 
and y. For y =O (i.e., utilitarian welfare), Tol's equity-weighted global dam- 
age is considerably higher thail non-equity-weighted damage and increases 
as inequality aversioll e increases. Fankhauser's equity-weighted damage is 
lower than non-weighted damage for e=0.5, but increases rapidly for higher 
values of the inequality aversion parameter. The explanation for this result 
is tha t ,  in general, Fankhauser estimates the poorer regions t o  be slightly 
less vulnerable than the richer regions to  climate change (hence an initial 
drop in damage), but the weight assigned to  China - which is highly vulner- 
able - increases rapidly with e. Note that  for e=O (a  linear regional welfare 
function), weighted and uilweighted damages coincide. With a linear re- 
gional welfare function, inargiilal welfare is identical across individuals and 
income levels. Because the same is true for marginal global welfare, changes 
in income have a constant effect on global welfare, independent of where the 
changes occur. If y approaches unity (i.e., Bernouilli-Nash welfare), equity 
weights become iildepeildent of risk aversion. The resulting weights equal 
the case y =O and e= l .  For y i ca (i.e., maximin welfare), Fankhauser's 
equity-weighted figures are much lower than the simple aggregate for low 
values of e, but exceed the non-equity-weighted aggregate for higher values. 
Tol's figures are somewhat lower: the region with the lowest per capita in- 
come (PPP-corrected) is Africa. Obviously, damage increases as parameter 
e increases. 
4. The Implicit Assumption behind 
Uniform Values 
Some papers on estimating cliinate chailge damage have advocated the use 
of uiliform unit values for damage (e.g., Ayres and Walter, 1991; Hohmeyer 
and Gartner, 1992; Ekins, 1995; Meyer a.nd Cooper, 1995). Note the differ- 
ence between a global assessmellt without regional distinctions and a global 
assessment with regional distinctions. In the former case, the common way 
to  proceed is t o  value everything at  a global average, in the same way that  
Fankhauser and To1 (1995) valued a t  regional averages. It is the latter case 
that  we are interested in, where regions are distinguished and damage is 
regionally assessed and subsequently compared and aggregated. It is im- 
portant to  note that  the case in favor of uniform damage valuation in all 
these papers is made on the basis of ad hoc decisions, not welfare theoretic 
reasoning. This sectioil analyzes these value judgements in the framework 
of the model of Section 3, a.nd calculates the type of global welfare function 
implicitly assumed when using uniform unit damage values. 
For the sake of simplicity, iildividuals are divided into only two groups, 
inhabitants of OECD couiltries (clenoted by superscript r)  and inhabitants 
of non-OECD countries (including middle-income countries such as those 
with economies in transition; denoted by superscript p). We are interested 
in the ratio of per unit damage values (e.g., the relative W T P  per km2 of 
wetlands). Suppose the ratio actually observed, based on the current income 
distribution, is VT/TfP. The goal the11 is to  choose the parameters of the 
regional and global welfare functions such that the ratio of equity-weighted 
per unit values is unity. Using equatioil ( I ) ,  this requirement can be written 
as 
Using equation (3)  for global welfare and equation (2) to specify regional 
welfare, after some mailipulation equatioil (4) becomes 
with R = [ln(T/'P) -ln(T/")]/[ln(YT) -111(I,'")]. R.eca,ll that y is the parameter 
for illequality aversion in the global welfare function, and e is the income 
elasticity of the ma.rgina1 regional welfare. That  is, for any given values 
for R and e (which are both deterilliiled empirically), the presumption that 
climate change impacts a,re to be valued equally implies a certain value for 
y ,  and thus a certain degree of inequality aversion.' 
Table 5 presents y as a functioil of e and VT/Vp. As before, we assume 
values for e between 0 and 2, with values of 0.8-1.5 being the most likely 
specification according to  empirical evidence (see Cline, 1992; Pearce and 
Ulph, 1994). The ratio VT/VP is more difficult to  determine, because empir- 
ical evidence is scarce. An often used starting point is to  assume an income 
elasticity of W T P  of one (Pearce, 1980). In this case, WTPs as proportions 
of income are identical for all individuals. That  is, VT/YT = VP/Yp, which 
in turn implies a value of T f T / T f G  Iv/T'P, or a ratio of about four (recall 
that  Y is purchasing-power-corrected per capita income and that the group 
of poorer countries includes middle-income as well as low-income countries). 
The estimates quoted in Pearce et al. (1996) took the same starting point; 
however, rounding and extrapolation inaccuracies, as well as deviations from 
'Note t h a t  we only require equal values between regions, not equal values a t  a particular 
level. T h e  la t ter  would imply an additional rest,riction on (5). 
Table 5. Implied illequality aversion (y)  as a fuilction of risk aversion (e) 
and empirical value ratio (T,"'/lfl'). 
V' /VP 1.36 2 8 10 
Elasticity of WTP 0.35 0.66 1 .OO 1.16 1.20 
7 ,  for 
e = 0.0 0.22 0.50 1.00 1.49 1.65 
e = 0.5 -0.56 -0.01 1 .OO 1.98 2.31 
e = 1.0 z!cmb *mb 1 .OO =tooc =tooc 
e = 1.5 2.56 2.01 1.00 0.02 -0.31 
e = 2.0 1.78 1.50 1 .OO 0.51 0.35 
aCorresponds to  the case Vr/Vp = YP/Y".  
by T oo for e 1 1, and y  1 -a for e 1' 1. 
'y 1 -oo for e T 1, and y  '1 oofor  e l  1. 
Source: Fankhauser et  ul.,  1996a. 
this rule for some damage categories, led to  a slightly higher average income 
elasticity of WTP, in the order of 1.15-1.20. This result implies a Vr/VP ra- 
tio of about 8-10.~ Flores and Carson (1995) and Kristrom and Riera (1996) 
argue that elasticities generally tend t o  be less than one, and Krupnick et 
al. (1995), for example, have a.ssumed a value of 0.35-1.0 for statistical life 
estimates in Eastern Europe. This secoild set of studies would imply a much 
lower VT/VP ratio, perhaps in the order of 1.3-4.0. Table 5 presents esti- 
inates of y for both sets of a.ssumptions. 
As Table 5 shows, the postulate of uniform per unit values is compatible 
with many sets of "reasonable" parameter assumptions, but by no means 
with all of them. For several parameter specifications, common values im- 
ply degrees of inequality aversion in the utilitarian (y=O) or Bernoulli-Nash 
range (y = I ) . ~  In the case of a unitary illcome elasticity of WTP, for exam- 
ple, uniform per unit values imply a Bernoulli-Nash welfare function. Other 
parameter sets imply higher degrees of inequality aversion, and in the case 
of a logarithmic regional welfare fuilctioll ( e= l ) ,  equal values are only com- 
patible with a inaximin welfare coilcept (y = m). 
There are also cases where the notion of common per unit values would 
seem untenable. As Table 5 shows, there are parameter combinations for 
which common per unit values imply negative values for y ,  that  is, "in- 
equality attraction," which could in the limit go to  a maximax (Nietzchean) 
'This figure is an average value between middle-income and low-income country ratios, 
which are all subsumed in the "poor" group. The middle-income country ratio assumed 
by Fankhauser (1995) is about 4:1, and the low-income country ratio is in the order of 10:l 
to  15:l.  
3Al t l~ougl~  y = l  is only approached for c 1 oo and e 1. oo. 
welfare concept (y = -m). With certain parameter combinations, weighted 
per unit damage estimates for the LLpoor" region can be higher than those 
for the "rich" region. The restriction of equal values then favors the rich. 
Clearly, this would be an indefensible welfare concept, and it would therefore 
be hard t o  make a case for common per unit values should these particular 
parameter values prevail. As noted, the question of the appropriate regional 
welfare and W T P  parameters is an  empirical one, about which precious little 
is known to  date. 
5. Conclusions 
It is arguable that  climate change is such a large and pervasive issue that it 
is right for equity arguments to  be integrated into a benefit-cost comparison, 
even though equity weighting is no longer common in benefit-cost analysis. 
This paper shows one approach to equity weighting in the aggregation of 
damage estimates for world regions into a global damage estimate. 
In our approach, equity weights depend on regional and global wel- 
fare functions, notably, the degrees of risk aversion and inequality aversion. 
Equity-weighted global damage estimates can be substantially higher than 
the damage estimates presented by the IPCC SAR (Pearce et al., 1996), 
although reduced damage cannot be excluded. The simple aggregation un- 
derlying the figures reported in the IPCC SAR implies unacceptable welfare 
functions. 
The degree of inequality aversion required for per unit damage values 
to  be the same in rich and in poor countries - a notion frequently called 
for in the debate on the chapter on social costs of the IPCC SAR - is 
compatible with a wide range of "reasonable" welfare functions, but can 
also be incongruous with defensible welfare concepts. 
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Abstract 
This paper argues that using simple extrapolations of aggregate gross domes- 
tic product (GDP) growth as a basis for projecting energy use and carbon 
emissions in the medium term is potelltially misleading. In fact, we argue 
that  simple extrapolatioils derived by projectiilg GDP and assuming all vari- 
ables grow in proportion would do a particularly poor job of explaining the 
historical record (and there is no rea.son to  expect this approach t o  do better 
in the future). In this paper we present medium-term projections for the 
world economy, starting with projections of future population growth and 
industry-level technical chailge based on a wide range of empirical studies. 
We use these projections in an empirically based multisector general equi- 
librium model of the world ecoilomy to  calculate aggregate GDP and the 
sectoral composition of GDP endogenously. We then explore the sensitiv- 
ity of the aggregate outcomes across ecolloinies to the assumptions about 
sectoral productivity growth. I11 particular, we use as a metric the emis- 
sions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel use in the global economy. Under 
each set of assuinptioils we calculate the size of a carbon tax sufficient to  
stabilize emissions in 2010 at  1990 levels. We show that  this tax varies sig- 
nificantly depending on the assumptions made about productivity growth a t  
the sectoral level. 
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1. Introduction 
Projecting the course of the world ecollollly over the next few decades is a 
daunting task. To see precisely how difficult it is, one need only look a t  
the history of the last half century. How accurately, for example, would we 
have been able to  predict the 1995 world economy in 1965? Would anyone 
have imagined the sharp decline of the US steel industry, the rapid increase 
in market share by Japanese automobile manufacturers, the rapid growth 
of Japan, the rapid growth in world trade, the explosion of the computer 
industry, the decline in manufacturing employment and the expansion in 
services, the sharp decrease in energy use per capita and per unit of gross 
domestic product (GDP) brought about by the oil price shocks, and the 
transition of the US from international creditor to  net debtor? 
History holds a t  least three lessons that  are important to  remember. The 
most obvious is simply that today's projections are unlikely to  be correct. 
Projections of the world econolny should be used more to  discover which 
variables are important than to  develop point estimates of future GDP or 
other variables. The second lesson is that  the most interesting and important 
events are likely to  lie in the details of individual industries and countries. 
The third lesson, demonstrated vividly by the oil shocks of the 1970s, is 
that  people respond to  challges in prices. Together these lessons mean that  
projecting aggregate GDP is unlikely t o  be useful: it will almost certainly 
be wrong, and it will fail to  capture the most important events. To put this 
another way, the 1995 world economy is clearly not a simple scaling of the 
1965 economy. [1] 
This paper draws on sollle results presented in Bagnoli et al. (1996) 
to  argue that  simple extrapola.tion of future GDP as a basis for projecting 
energy use and carbon emissiolls without taking into account the changing 
future structure of economies is problematic. 
The third lesson is clearly illustrated in the effect of the 1973 and 1979 oil 
price shocks on the economies of the USA and Japan. Figure 1 shows GDP, 
energy use, and carbon dioxide (COa)  emissions for the USA from 1965 to  
1990 (each series has been normalized to  one in 1965).[2] Figure 2 shows 
the same series for Japan.[3] Before the 1973 increase, oil prices were low 
and energy use per unit of GDP was relatively constant. When prices rose, 
however, energy use per unit of GDP began to  fall significantly. During that  
period, in other words, energy use was growing much more slowly than GDP. 
In economic terminology, Anlerican and Japanese energy users substituted 
away from energy when oil prices were high; in ordinary language, they 
- Energy Use - GDP - C02 Emissions 
Figure 1. GDP, energy use, and C 0 2  emissions in the USA. 
- Energy Use - GDP - C02 Emissions 
Figure 2. GDP, energy use, and C 0 2  emissions in Japan. 
conserved energy. From this exainple it is clear that  economies can be highly 
responsive to  changes in relative prices, even over fairly short periods of time. 
The evidence in these graphs has been analyzed more formally in a num- 
ber of papers using econonletric techlliques to  quantify the responsiveness 
of energy demand to  changes in relative prices. For exa~nple, using a model 
with moderate disaggregation, Ban (199 1) estimates that  the responsiveness 
of the Japanese economy to  changes in energy prices has been high and 
much of the change in the energy-gross national product (GNP) ratio from 
the early 1970s to  the late 1980s has been due to  the response of households 
and firms to  changes in relative prices of energy. A recent Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Developnlent (OECD) study covering a range of 
countries also comes to  the same conclusion. Hoeller and Coppel (1992) esti- 
mate price and income elasticities for carbon emissions using a cross section 
of 20 OECD countries. After accounting for energy taxes in each economy, 
the authors found that  for 1988 the incolne elasticity of carbon emissions was 
0.95 and the price elasticity was -0.75. In other words, these results imply 
that  a 10% rise in the price of carbon emissions would potentially reduce 
carbon emissions by 7..5%. (Because this figure is based on a cross-sectional 
study, it should be considered a long-run result.) Both the income elastic- 
ity and the price elasticity are somewhat larger than would be consistent 
with the results we present below. Conlparing this with the historical record 
suggests that  a 1960 projection of current carbon emissions based on out- 
put growth alone would miss nearly half of the actual movements in carbon 
emissions for OECD countries! 
Thus, future projections for carbon emissions depend, not just on GDP 
growth projections, but also importantly on changes in relative energy prices, 
as well as a range of other ecoilomic factors. This suggests that  an exercise of 
this kind requires the use of a global general equilibrium model that  embodies 
the empirical relationships we have observed during the recent decades. 
In this paper we use a multisector, nlultiregion world economic growth 
model called G-Cubed to  explore the roles of population growth and differen- 
tial rates of productivity growth across countries and sectors in determining 
the future course of the world economy. G-Cubed is a neoclassical growth 
model in the spirit of Cass-Iioopn~ans and Ramsey. The behavior of house- 
holds and firms in the model is based on econometric evidence from the 
postwar period. As a result, G-Cubed will be able to capture the demon- 
strated ability of economies to  respond to changes in relative prices. In ad- 
dition, the model also accounts for physicaa capital accumulation, perhaps 
the single most important determinant of economic growth. We base our 
forecasts of future population on projections produced by the World Bank; 
our productivity figures are talcen from various papers in the productivity 
literature. 
In addition to presenting projections of the world economy through the 
year 2020, we also consider how the composition of GDP growth contributes 
to  industrial emissions of C 0 2 ,  an important greenhouse gas that  has re- 
ceived the attention of policy makers concerned about global warming.[4] 
In particular, we calculate how large a carbon tax  would have to be to hold 
year 2010 emissions to 1990 levels.[5] 
In the following section we present a general discussion of the sources of 
economic growth, drawing on the approach in Bagnoli et al. (1996). We then 
give a brief overview of the G-Cubed model in Section 3. Two projections are 
presented in Section 4 under the assunlption of equal sectoral productivity 
growth and under the assumption of differential productivity growth that  is 
more consistent with the recent historical record. 
2. The Sources of Economic Growth 
At an abstract level there a.re four sources of growth within an individual 
economy: (1) increases in the supply of labor, capital, and other inputs; (2) 
increases in the quality of these inputs; (3) inlprovements in the way inputs 
are used (technical change); and (4) inlprovements in the way that inputs 
are allocated across industries. For the world economy as a whole, a fifth 
source of growth is reallocation of inputs a.nlong countries. The first three 
effects can be illustrated with a simple model. Suppose an industry can be 
represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
where Yt is output at  time t ;  I C t ,  Lt, and A& are inputs of capital, labor and 
materials, respectively; P and y are parameters; At is a coefficient reflecting 
the overall level of productivity; and Ft, Gt, and Ht are coefficients capturing 
the quality of each input.[G] This expression can be transformed into a 
relationship between growth rates by differentiating with respect to  time and 
dividing through by Yt. The result is shown below, where lower-case variables 
represent the rates of growth of the corresponding upper-case variables: 
Output growth will thus be a, weighted sum of overall productivity growth 
(a) ,  increases in the qua,ntity of fa.ctors (k ,  1, and m), and increases in factor 
quality (f ,  g, and h) .  The weights in tlie sum are parameters of the produc- 
tion function.[7] A more geiieral expression can be obtained by relaxing the 
assumption that  the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Suppose the pro- 
duction process may be represented by a constant-returns-to-scale function, 
Q ,  that  depends on the level of technology, A, and quality-adjusted inputs 
of capital, labor, and materials: 
If firms minimize costs taking prices as given, it is straightforward t o  show 
that  the rate of output growth will be given by 
where the first term on the right-hand side is called the rate of total factor 
productivity (TFP)  growth, and SIC, SL, and SM are respectively the shares 
of capital, labor, and materials in total costs. This expression is similar 
t o  the Cobb-Douglas case, except that  the weights in the sum are now cost 
shares instead of productioii function parameters. In fact, the Cobb-Douglas 
function is a special case in which tlie cost share of each input can be shown 
to  be equal t o  the correspondiiig parameter. The main difference between 
the two expressions is that the geiieral case is nonparametric: decomposition 
of the growth rate does not depend on estimates of production function 
parameters. Moreover, observations of the rates of growth of inputs and 
outputs cannot be used to estimate parameters of the production function as 
no parameters are identified. For the purposes of analyzing growth, however, 
this is not a liability.[8] 
As an empirical matter, decomposiiig output growth into its constituent 
pieces is a difficult task. For many industries measuring the rate of output 
growth y is fairly straightforward: the quantity produced in one year is com- 
pared with the quantity produced tlie previous year. However, determining 
the source of the growth requires very careful accounting t o  measure the  
quality-adjusted rates of growth of factor inputs. Any errors in measuring 
inputs will cause the rate of total factor productivity growth to  be misstated. 
It is worth emphasizing the last point: studies of the sources of growth 
use the equation above to determine T F P  growth (tfp) as a residual after 
accounting for other factors: 
Ally error in the illeasureinent of input growth rates will cause tfp to  be 
measured incorrectly. Denison (1962), Christensen and Jorgenson (1969), 
and others have enlphasized that careful accounting for quality-adjusted 
growth of inputs leaves little residual growth to  be attributed to  improve- 
ments in TFP. 
Jorgenson (1988) has shown that for the economy as a whole there is 
also another potential source of growth: reallocation of resources between 
industries. To see this, consider an economy with two sectors, X and Y. If 
the overall productivity of labor in sector X is higher than it is in sector 
Y (say because of prior technical change), a shift in final demand from Y 
to X shifts primary factors from Y to  X and will result in growth of total 
output. This occurs even if there is no concurrent productivity growth in the 
individual sectors. The effect is even more pronounced if the composition of 
demand shifts toward sectors that  have productivity growth rates that are 
higher than average. 
Thus, in order to project the world economy over the next few decades 
we would need underlying projections of each country's labor force, capital 
stock, materials inputs, cllailges in factor quality, and changes in product 
demand patterns. Many of these will lead to  changes in relative prices and 
thus change the structure of each region's economy. Moreover, the evolution 
of each country's capital stock will be an endogenous result of domestic and 
foreign investment decisions. I11 order to  combine all of these projections, 
capture the effects of relative price cha,nges, and project the future path of 
the capital stock we have developed a disaggregated intertemporal general 
equilibrium model called G-Cubed. In the next section we describe the key 
features of G-Cubed. 
3. An Overview of The G-Cubed Model 
We now present a brief overview of the features of our model, G-Cubed, that  
are important for this study. A Inore complete description is contained in 
McIGbbin and Wilcoxen (1995) or McIGbbin and Wilcoxen (1994). 
G-Cubed has several features that  together distinguish it from other 
models in the literature. It uses econometric estimates of parameters de- 
scribing preferences and production technology; it integrates macroeconomic 
adjustment with the sectoral adjustment to  changes in exogenous variables; 
it captures the link between flows of goods and flows of assets between 
Table 1. List of regions. 
USA 
Japan 
Australia 
Other OECD (ROECD) 
China 
LDCs 
Eastern Europe and the Former USSR (EEB) 
Oil Exporting Developing Countries (OPEC) 
Table 2. Industries in each region. 
1 Electric utilities 
2 Gas utilities 
3 Petroleum refining 
4 Coal mining 
5 Crude oil and gas extraction 
6 Other mining 
7 Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 
8 Forestry and wood products 
9 Durable manufacturing 
10 Nondurable illanufact,uring 
11 Transportation 
12 Services 
economies; and it endogenously determines financial prices such as inter- 
est rates and exchange rates which play a crucial role in the adjustment of 
the global economy to  alternative projections and policies. 
G-Cubed disaggregates the world economy into the eight economic re- 
gions listed in Table 1. Each region is further decomposed into a household 
sector, a government sector, a financial sector, the 12 industries shown in 
Table 2, and a capital-goods-produciilg sector. This disaggregation enables 
us t o  capture regional and sectoral differences in the impact of alternative 
environmental policies. 
We model the behavior of firms, households and governments. Each 
producing sector is represented by a single firm that chooses its inputs and 
its level of investment in order to maximize its stock market value subject 
to  a multiple-input productioil function (using capital, labor, energy, and 
materials) and a cost of adjustment model for the capital stock (see Lucas, 
1967; Treadway, 1967) and a vector of prices it takes t o  be exogenous. The 
parameters of the production techilology are estimated using a time series of 
input-output tables and price series for the USA [see McKibbin and MTilcoxen 
(1995) for more details]. 
To parameterize the other regions, we impose the restriction that substi- 
tution elasticities are equal tl~rougllout he world. In other words, we assume 
that  each industry has the same energy, materials, and substitution elastic- 
ities no matter where it is located. This is consistent with the econometric 
evidence of Kim and Lau in a number of papers (see, for example, Kim and 
Lau, 1994). However, the share parameters for other regions correspond- 
ing to  individual countries (Japan, Australia, China, and approximately the 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union region) are derived from input- 
output data  for those regions and are not set equal to  their US counterparts. 
The share parameters for the remaining regions, which are aggregates of indi- 
vidual countries, are calculated by adjusting US share parameters to  account 
for actual final demand coinponents froin the aggregate national accounts 
data  for each of the regions. In effect, we are assuming that  all regions share 
production methods that differ in first-order properties but have identical 
second-order characteristics. This is intermediate between the extremes of 
assuming that  the regions share common technologies and allowing the tech- 
nologies to  differ across regions in arbitrary ways. Finally, the regions also 
differ in their endowments of primary factors and patterns of final demands. 
The main limitation of this approach is that there are very few benchmark 
input-output tables, so our data set coiltaiils few observations. The problem 
is severe outside OECD countries. 
In addition to  the 12 industries discussed above, the model also includes 
a special sector that produces capit.a,l goods. This sector supplies the new 
investment goods demanded by other industries. Like other industries, the 
investment sector demands labor and capital services as well as intermediate 
inputs. We represent its behavior using a nested CES production function 
with the same structure as that used for the other sectors. However, we 
estimate the parameters of this fuilctioil from price and quantity data  for 
the final demand column for investment. 
Households consume goods and services in every period and also demand 
labor and capital services. Household capital services consist of the service 
flows of consumer durables plus residential housing. Households receive in- 
come by providing labor services to  firms and the government, and from 
holding financial assets. I11 addition, they also may receive transfers from 
their region's government. Within each region we assume household behav- 
ior can be modeled by a representative agent maximizing an intertemporal 
utility function of consumption over time subject to  an  intertemporal bud- 
get constraint that  the present value of future consumption is constrained 
by the present value of future income. 
We take each region's real governillent spending on goods and services t o  
be exogeilous and assume that it is allocated among final goods, services, and 
labor in fixed proportions, which we set to  1987 values. Total government 
spending includes purchases of goods and services plus interest payments on 
government debt, investment tax credits, and transfers to  households. Gov- 
ernment revenue comes from sales taxes, corporate taxes, personal income 
taxes, and from issuing government debt. In addition, there can be taxes on 
externalities such as COz emissions. 
We assume that agents will not hold government bonds unless they ex- 
pect the bonds to  be serviced, and accordingly impose a transversality con- 
dition on the accumulation of public debt that  has the effect of causing 
the stock of debt a t  each point in time to  be equal to  the present value of 
all future budget surpluses from that time forward. This condition alone, 
however, is insufficient to  determine the time path of future surpluses: the 
government could pay off the debt by briefly raising taxes a lot; it could 
permanently raise taxes a small amount; or it could use some other policy. 
We assume that the government levies a lump sum tax equal to  the value 
of interest payments on the outstanding debt. In effect, therefore, any in- 
crease in government debt is financed by consols and future taxes are raised 
enough to  accommodate the increased interest costs. Thus, any increase in 
the debt will be matched by an equal present value increase in future budget 
surpluses. 
The eight regions in the lllodel are linked by flows of goods and assets. 
Flows of goods are determined by the bilateral import demands of house- 
holds, firms, and governments. These demands are summarized in a set of 
bilateral trade matrices which give the flows of each good between exporting 
and importing countries. There is one S x 8 trade matrix for each of the 12 
sectors for each country. 
Trade imbalances are financed by flows of assets between countries. We 
assume asset markets are perfectly integrated across the OECD regions. 
With free mobility of capital, expected returns on loans denominated in 
the currencies of the various regions must be equalized period t o  period 
according to a set of interest arbitrage relations. In generating the baseline 
of the model, we allow for risk premia on the assets of alternative currencies, 
although during simulations we assume these risk premia are constant and 
unaffected by the shocks under study. For the non-OECD countries we 
also make the assumption that exchange rates are free to  float a t  an annual 
frequency. We also assume that  capital is freely mobile within the regions and 
between the regions and the rest of the world. This may seem simplistic since 
many developiilg countries have restrictioils on short-term flows of financial 
capital. Many of these countries nolletheless have significant flows of direct 
foreign investment responding to changes in espected rates of return. In the 
model, capital flows capture both of these effects because they include foreign 
direct investment as well as short-term financial capital. Future work will 
focus more on modeling financial markets in the developing regions of the 
model. Finally, we assume that the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) chooses its foreign lending in order to  maintain a desired 
ratio of income to  wealth subject to  a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar. 
We assume that labor is perfectly mobile among sectors within each 
region but is immobile between regions. Thus, within each region wages 
will be equal across sectors. The nominal wage is assumed to  adjust slowly 
according to  an  overlapping contracts model where nominal wages are set 
based on current and espected inflation and on labor demand relative to  
labor supply. In the long run labor supply is given by the exogenous rate 
of population growth, but in the short run the hours worked can fluctuate 
depending on the demand for la,bor. For a given nominal wage, the demand 
for labor will determine short-run unemployment. 
Finally, we assunle that  lllolley enters the model via a constraint on 
transactions. We use a money demand function in which the demand for 
real money balances is a functioll of gross output and short-term nominal 
interest rates. The supply of money is determined by the balance sheet of 
the central bank and is exogenous. 
4. Projecting Labor Supply and 
Productivity Growth 
The first step in using G-Cubed to project the future path of the world 
economy is to  obtain appropriate estimates of the rates of labor force growth, 
total factor productivity growth, and factor augmentation for each country 
and industry in the model. For each of these we relied on the extensive 
literature of empirical studies of the postwar historical record. More details 
on these studies can be found in Bagnoli et al. (1996). 
4.1. Labor supply 
To compute long-run labor supply growth, we began by assuming that  labor 
force participation rates remain constant. As a result, labor force growth 
will be exactly equal to  populatioil growth. To project population, we used 
figures from the World Bank. 
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Figure 3. G-cubed regional population, historical data 1970-1990. 
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Figure 4. G-cubed population projections. 
Figure 3 shows popula,tion levels for G-Cubed regions for five periods 
beginning in 1970. As one would expect, the largest increases have been in 
China and the LDC region. Figure 3 provides an uncomfortable reminder of 
the scale of the population problem -excluding China, the LDC region added 
more than a quarter of a billion people between 1985 and 1990. Figure 4 
shows the World Bank's populatioil projections under its "standard fertility 
decline" scenario. This figure sllows population growth rates are projected 
to decline. If population growth co~ltiilues to slow, global population will 
eventually stabilize, albeit at  a level coilsiderably higher than today's. 
4.2. Productivity growth 
The empirical literature on productivity growth is enormous. However, many 
of the studies reach contradictory conclusions and none has been done with 
exactly the right specification for use with G-Cubed. An extensive survey 
of the literature on estimating productivity growth by sector can be found 
in Bagnoli et al. (1996). A key result from the empirical studies is that  
productivity growth not only varies considerably across sectors but also that 
for most sectors improvements in the use of intermediate goods have been a 
significant source of growth. 
5.  The Importance of Structural Change 
in Future Scenarios 
I11 this section we describe the results of using the model to  project a range 
of variables from 1990 to 2020. Because a.gents in the model have foresight, 
in order to  predict future endogenous variables such as industry output and 
C4DP we must first project the model's esogenous variables far into the fu- 
ture. The most important of these variables are shown in Table 3. To create 
these projections we begin with the \4'orld Bank population projections dis- 
cussed above. 
We then use two alternative sets of projections for changes in labor 
quality. These two alterna.tives are referred to as Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. 
In Scenario 1 we project aggregate techllical change based on the studies of 
aggregate productivity growth discussed above and then apply the aggregate 
projection equally to each sector within an economy. Thus, for example 
referring to  Table 4, we assume the aggregate growth in labor quality in the 
United States is 1.4% per year and this aggregate growth is applied equally 
to  all sectors within the US economy. 
Table 3. Share of each region in global ca.rbon emissions, Scenario 1. 
USA 23.0 20.2 17.5 15.3 
Japan 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.4 
Australia 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Other OECD 17.6 16.4 15.2 14.5 
China 10.5 14.3 14.9 15.0 
LDCs 17.5 25.7 28.8 30.3 
Eastern Europe and former USSR (EEB) 17.4 11.8 13.8 16.6 
Table 4. Regional assumptioils used in generating Scenario 1. 
USA .Jai)an Aust ROECD China LDCs EEB 
Population growtha 
Non-energy labor 
productivity growth (%) 1.4 2.5 1.8 2.0 
Energy sector labor 
productivity growt,h ('3%) 1.4 2.5 1.8 2.0 
Energy efficiency growth (%) 0 0 0 0 
Tax ratesb 
Fiscal spendingC 
Monetary policy (%) 
(fixed money growt,h rate) 2.9 1.25 1.64 3.98 12.84 6.48 23.81 
aSee Figure 4. 
b1990 levels. 
'1990 shares. 
Table 5. Annual labor productivity growth 
used in generating Scenario 2. 
1 Electric utilities 0.0 
2 Gas utilities 0.0 
3 Petroleum refilling 0.0 
4 Coal mining 0.0 
5 Crude oil and gas extraction 0.0 
6 Other mining 0.0 
7 Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 3.9 
8 Forestry and wood products 0.0 
9 Durable manufacturing 0.0 
10 Nondurable manufacturing 5.3 
11 Transportation 0.7 
12 Services 0.6 
Scenario 2 is ba.sed on projections of differential la,bor quality change by 
sector within each economy. The purpose of Sceilario 2 is not to ilecessarily 
make the most likely projection of labor quality change, but to  show how sen- 
sitive future projections of energy use, carbon emissions, and aggregate GDP 
are to  assumptions of differential labor quality changes (or labor-augmenting 
technical change) across sectors of an economy. The growth rates of each 
sector are based on the studies of sectoral growth outlined above. The pro- 
jections of labor quality change or labor-augmenting technical change are 
contained in Table 5. We assume that  there is no labor quality change 
in the energy sectors and several of tlle non-energy sectors. Positive la- 
bor quality change is projected in agriculture, noildurable manufacturing, 
transportation, and services. For comparability with Scenario 1, we scale up 
the sectoral productivity numbers in Table 5 for each country individually 
so that  aggregate labor quality change, calculated as the output-weighted 
shares of labor quality change in each sector (using 1990 weights), is equal 
t o  aggregate labor quality chailge for each country from Scenario 1. By 
ilormalizing to  the same aggregate 1a.bor quality change in each country, we 
have a clear comparisoil of the iinportailce of differential productivity growth 
across sectors for the projections. 
The other main assumptions for Scenario 1 are also shown in Table 4. 
These include assunlptions about energy efficiency improvements, tax  rates, 
fiscal spending, moneta,ry policy assumptions, and the real price of oil. The 
real price of oil is assumed to  be deterillilled by the OPEC region in the 
model. This last assumptioil is fa,irly important: Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 
(1992) have argued, and we have illustrated above, that  the oil price shocks 
of the 1970s reduced US energy demand enough to  hold COz emissions es- 
sentially constant from 1972 througll 1985. Several comments should also 
be made about the assumptions above in relation to other studies. Biases 
in technical change have been a significant source of controversy in the lit- 
erature. Engineering studies soilletiines suggest that  there have been sub- 
stantial improvements in energy efficiency over the last few decades beyond 
what would arise from price-induced substitution. Manne and Richels (1990) 
included this effect in their model "Global 2100" and referred to  it as the 
rate of "autonomous energy efficiency improvements" or AEEI. Their value 
for AEEI ranges from 0-1% aanually and varies over time and across re- 
gions. An AEEI of 1 iinplies that annual energy requirements per unit of 
output drop by 1% per year. The true value for AEEI is still a subject of 
debate. Econometric analysis by Hogan and Jorgenson (1991) suggests that  
the biases of technical change vary across industries and that  for many in- 
dustries technical chailgc is actua.11~ energy-using, which would imply t11a.t 
AEEI should really be negative. In any case, AEEI plays a very important 
role: Manile and Richels (1990) have shown that  high values of AEEI lead 
to  very slow growth of baseline carbon emissions, and hence to low carbon 
taxes for any given target, while low values of AEEI lead to  rapid growth 
in baseline emissions and high carbon taxes. By the year 2100, according to  
Manne and Richels, the level of baseline enlissions under a pessimistic view of 
AEEI is several hundred percent higher than under a more optimistic view. 
In our study we assume a zero value for AEEI and let the model determine 
endogenously the relationship between GDP and energy use. 
Given these assumptions, we solve for the model's perfect-foresight equi- 
librium growth path over the period 1990-2050 using software developed by 
McKibbin (1994) for solving large models with rational expectations on a 
personal computer. 
5.1. Scenario 1: Sectoral productivity growth the same 
across sectors 
For the purposes of this paper, the most important results for Scenario 1 
are the future paths of GDP (showl~ in Figure 5),  the energy intensity of 
each economy (Figure 6), aad future paths of COz emissions (shown in 
Figure 7). Figure .5 illustl.ates that the different population growth rates 
and labor productivity growth rate as well as different rates of private capital 
accumulation lead to  different paths for real C;DP in each economy. Figure 6 
shows an index of the energy use per unit of GDP. A fall in this index 
indicates that  energy use is falling per unit of GDP produced. For China 
and other developing countries, the energy intensity rises initially before 
gradually falling over time. For industrial economies the index falls over 
time, although after 2000 there is sonle gradual rise in the energy intensity 
because falling energy intensity in developing economies reduces the relative 
price of energy for industrial econoluies. Energy intensity in the Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet Unioll region moves around far more, reflecting the 
large structural changes taking place in these economies. Frankly, however, 
this part of the model is largely based on speculation. Few reliable data  
exist. 
Figure 7 shows the emission of carbon in million tonnes from 1990 to  2020 
by country or region. In Scenario 1, global emissions rise from 5,388 million 
tonnes of carbon in 1990 to  15,378 million tonnes in 2020. The changes in 
carbon emissions in individual countries and regions between 1990 and 2020 
(in million tonnes) are USA, 1,339 to  2,251; Japan, 316 to  680; Australia, 76 
to  176; Rest of the OEC'D, 1.025 to  2,228; China, 608 to  2,310; other non-oil 
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Figure 5. Real GDP in US$1990, Scenario 1. 
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Figure 6. Energy use per unit of GDP, Scenario 1. 
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Figure 7. Carbon emissions, Scenario 1. 
developing countries, 1,015 to 4,663; and Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union, 1,010 to  2,544. Eillissioils growth in China and the other developing 
couiltry region is particularly high because economic growth is projected to  
be highest in those regions. 
Regional sha,res in total einissioils and their projected evolution are 
shown in Table 5. The share of elllissions from China and other devel- 
oping countries rises over the next 30 years. At the same time, the share of 
carbon emissions from currently industrialized economies in the OECD falls 
(although in absolute terms emissions continue to increase). This clearly il- 
lustrates the policy dilenlilla with greenhouse gas emission reduction: a large 
part of future emissions are likely to be produced by developing economies 
who can least afford to  bear the burden of future emissions reductions. 
5.2. Sceilario 2: Differential sectoral productivity growth 
The same calculations as for Scenario 1 a.re undertaken for Scenario 2 with 
differential rates of sectoral productivity growth. The path of GDP for each 
country is shown in Figure 8. These results are similar to  those for Figure 5, 
except the growth rates are lower. Given that  average labor productivity and 
population growth are the same, the difference in trends is due to  differential 
capital accumulatioil across sectors in the two scenarios. Strong growth in 
the non-energy sectors lea,ds to  a, rise i11 the demaild for energy. This raises 
the relative price of energy, which draws resources into the energy sectors 
and leads to  substitution away from energy inputs, in production. With this 
reallocation of inputs, the aggregate GDP growth path is reduced. 
Energy intensity in each region is shown in Figure 9. Here we see a 
difference in the results compared with Figure 6. Differential productivity 
growth across sectors has led to  large changes in energy intensity despite 
similar paths for overall GDP in ea,ch economy. If one were t o  look only at  
GDP and energy use, this would appear to  be "autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement," because energy iilteilsity is declining even though prices are 
constant. These results show tha,t even if energy efficiency appears to  im- 
prove a t  the aggregate level it should not be interpreted, as it commonly 
is, as resulting from technical change in energy production. In this case, 
differential productivity growth across sectors changes relative prices and 
thus the pattern of energy demand. The results look more like the historical 
experience than Scenario 1, because we have imposed differential sectoral 
growth more similar to  historical experience than the assumptioils behind 
Scenario 1. 
The path of carbon einissioils are showil in Figure 10. It is clear compar- 
ing this with Figure 7 that the eillissioil paths for carbon are quite different, 
as one might expect given the different energy iiltensities under the two sce- 
narios. Even over a 30-yea,r period, we see a significant difference between the 
two scenarios despite similar a,ggregate a,ssuinptions. In Scenario 2, global 
emissions rise from 5,388 millioil tolliles of carbon in 1990 to  9,818 million 
tonnes in 2020. That is allnost 5,500 millioil toniles less than under Sce- 
nario l! The change in carbon emissions in individual countries and regions 
between 1990 and 2020 (in millioil tonnes) are USA, 1,339 to  1,738; Japan, 
316 to  488; Australia, 7G to 146; R.est of the OECD, 1,025 to  1,648; China, 
608 to  1,020; other non-oil developing countries, 1,015 t o  2,523; and Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet Union, 1,010 to 1,831. 
The shares of each region in global carbon emissions are shown in Ta- 
ble 6. A broadly simi1a.r story to  Scenario 1 holds for the pattern of emission 
shares over the next 30 years for Sceilario 2. The share of emissions from 
developing countries is expected to  rise, and the share for industrialized 
economies is expected to  decline. However, the size of the shift is quite 
different under the two scenarios. In Sceilario 2 the rise in emissions is pro- 
jected to  be much less, and therefore the change in shares is less dramatic. 
This is clearly seen in Figure 10. The faster rise in emissions when overall 
productivity growth is the sa.me is not surprising. In Scenario 2 the relative 
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Figure 8. Real GDP in USS1990, Scenario 2. 
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Figure 9. Energy use per unit of GDP, Scenario 2. 
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Figure 10. Carbon emissions, Scenario 2. 
Table 6. Share of each region in global carbon emissions, Scenario 2. 
1990 2000 2010 2020 
USA 23.0 22.4 20.1 17.7 
Japan 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.0 
Australia 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Other OECD 17.6 17.6 17.1 16.8 
China 10.5 12.2 11.7 10.4 
LDCs 17.5 23.1 25.0 25.7 
Eastern Europe and former USSR (EEB) 17.4 11.7 14.3 18.7 
prices of non-energy goods fall faster than the prices of energy goods. This 
raises the relative price of energy, causing consumers and firms to substitute 
away from it. (Another way to  think of this is that ,  without rising labor 
productivity in the energy sectors, energy becomes relatively scarce, which 
reduces the growth of downstream industries.) The growth in energy supply 
in Scenario 1 is dominated by the assumed growth in productivity, whereas 
in Scenario 2 the growth in energy supply is dominated by capital accumu- 
lation in the energy sectors in response t o  market forces changing relative 
prices. Hence emissions of C 0 2  rise with growth in GDP, but at  a slower 
rate in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1. 
5.3. The inlplicatioils for eillissioil stabilization 
The UN Frameworli Collventioll on Climate Change requires countries to  
take action to  limit rising emissioils of C 0 2 .  To show the effect on this 
policy of assumptions about baseline conditions, we calculate the carbon 
taxes needed to  stabilize emissions in each region by the year 2010 a t  the 
level of 1990, given that the revenue is used to  reduce fiscal deficits in each 
country by the amount of revenue raised by that  country. We have shown 
elsewhere (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1994) that the assumption about how 
the revenue is recycled has important macroeconomic and sectoral impacts 
on the results. Here we will stay ~zrith a deficit reduction assumption for 
both scenarios. 
Several importailt assumptions make the results we report here differ- 
ent from those of other studies of this issue, and from our own previous 
work using G-Cubed. First, we begin the simulation in 1990, but since 
1990 has actually passed, we phase the carbon tax  in gradually starting in 
1995. In other words, the sinlulations are conducted as though the tax were 
anllounced in 1990 to  start in 199.5. (As a result, asset prices adjust some- 
what before 1995.) The tax is set so that emissions gradually fall to  the 
1990 target by the year 2010 rather than stabilizing emission in every year 
up to  2010. This is done to nlinimize the output loss over the adjustment 
path since, in this model, announciilg credible tax changes in advance leads 
to  changes in capital accunlulatioil in advance of the policy. Investment is 
channeled away from sectors hurt by the shocli (in this case the coal industry 
in each country) and toward other sectors of production. The resuits would 
be quantitatively different had we stabilized each year at  1990 levels. 
With the tax in place in both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, emissions are 
gradually reduced t o  1990 levels by the year 2010 (in all regions) but begin 
rising after that  because the tax is held constant. This is an important as- 
pect of the problem of taxing carbon emissions. Because the future path of 
emissions is projected to  rise continually in both scenarios, targeting emis- 
sions a t  1990 levels after the year 2010 will require a continually rising tax. 
In the experiments reported here, we assume that the tax is held constant 
after the year 2010 so emissions coiltinue to  rise after 2010 but from a lower 
level. 
The taxes required to  stabilize eillissions are shown in Table 7. For 
clarity, three representative years are shown, although the model is actually 
solved on an annual basis. By 2010 the stabilizing tax  in the USA is $44.80 
(1990 US$) per tonne of carbon in Scenario 1 and $22.40 per tonne of carbon 
under Scenario 2. It is clear from this table that  the different assumptions 
Table 7. Enlission stabilization t'a,xes bv the yea.r 2010 (US$1990 per tonne 
of ca.rbon). 
1995 2000 2010 
USA 
Scenario 1 2.80 16.80 44.80 
Scenario 2 1.40 8.40 22.40 
Japan 
Scenario 1 10.50 63.00 168.00 
Scenario 2 5.50 33.00 88.00 
Australia 
Scenario 1 3.80 22.80 60.80 
Scenario 2 2.60 15.60 41.60 
Other OECD 
Scenario 1 6.80 40.80 108.80 
Scenario 2 3.70 22.20 59.20 
China 
Scenario 1 1.15 6.90 18.40 
Scenario 2 0.24 1.44 3.84 
Developing countries 
Scenario 1 2.60 15.60 41.60 
Scenario 2 1.15 6.90 18.40 
Eastern Europe and former USSR 
Scenario 1 1.15 6.90 18.40 
Sceilario 2 0.35 2.10 5.60 
a.bout the sectoral colnposition of growth have a dramatic effect on the size 
of the taxes necessary to stabilize carbon emissions in each region. This is 
not surprising, because we saw above that the path of carbon emissions is 
quite different under the two scenarios given the change in energy intensity 
caused by changes in relative prices in the global economy. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have focused on the importance of the sectoral composition 
of economic growth for calculating future paths of the world economy. The 
common practice of using aggregate projections of trend GDP growth in 
different countries to derive projectioils of energy use, carbon emissions, 
and other variables can be misleading. Using a global economic model that  
accounts for (1) general equilibrium interactions and (2) expectations of 
future events, and (3)  that  is based on historically estimated substitution 
possibilities, we 11a.ve illustra,ted t11a.t t he  coinposition of future growth is 
crucial for t he  rela.tions11ip between a ra,nge of wriables of importance. 
We found tha t  t he  energy composition of GDP can change significantly 
over a 30-year period, because of changes in the  composition of ou tput  as well 
as  a changes in t he  use of inputs in production. These changes occur through 
changes in relative prices reflecting substitution decisions by households and  
firms. These have been observed historically and  the  model suggests t ha t  
under plausible assumptions they may be important  in t he  future. 
Notes 
[l] In spite of this, simple projections of GDP growth have been widely used. For 
example, such projections forin the basis of much of the material used in the 
scenarios prepared for the Iiltergoverilineiltal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Moreover, almost all studies of global warnling have very simple stories about 
GDP growth and the relationship between growth and a range of variables. 
[2] This point has been emphasized by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1991), who point 
out that over tlie period 1973-85, US energy consumption and carbon emissions 
remained essentially constant. 
[3] Similar graphs for Japan call be found in Ban (1991) and Yamazawa et al. 
(1995). 
[4] Gases that contribute to tlie greenhouse effect include carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, cl~lorofluorocarhoi~s, and others. For an overview of the econoinics 
of global warming see Cline (1992). Nordhaus (1991a), or Schelling (1992). See 
Hoeller et al. (1990), Nordhaus (1991h), or Energy Modeling Forum (1992) for 
surveys of estimates of the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
[5] A carbon tax would be applied to fossil fuels in proportion to the COa they 
produce when burned. Nordhaus (1979) proposed this as a means of taxing the 
externality (global warming) produced by users of fossil fuels. 
[6] Coefficients F,  G ,  and H could also be interpreted as biases in the pattern of 
technical change. A illore general specification would allow for both improve- 
ments in factor quality and biases in technical change. Empirically, it would be 
difficult to distinguish the two effects. One approach would be to form a panel 
data set from time series data for a large number of industries and then esti- 
mate productivity growth rates imposiiig tlie restriction that biases be industry 
specific and improvements in factor quality be the same across industries. 
[7] This is a generalization of Solow (1957). For a survey of recent papers that 
use less restrictive production or cost functions, see Diewert (1992). Maddison 
(1987) presents a broad survey of the productivity literature. 
[8] This approach is due to the pioneering work of Denison and is sometimes called 
"growth accounting." See Denisoil (1974, 1979, 1985) for much more refined 
examples of this style of analysis. 
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Abstract 
This report describes the concept of hedging strategies for global car- 
bon emissions and climate change. It conlpares the application of these 
ideas within seven of the models participating in Energy Modeling Forum 
Study 14. 
1. Introduction: Hedging Strategies 
The global warming problem resembles the dilemma faced by a driver on 
a foggy road. It is desira,ble to  move ra,pidly toward one's destination, but 
one's speed lllust be governed by the distance that one can see ahead and 
by the ability to mal<e ra,pid changes. Reasonable people will differ in their 
estimates of these fa,ctors. A driver does not autolnatically determine his 
speed on the basis of worst-ca.se scenarios such as brake failure. A prudent 
decision maker allows for the possible costs of rapid mid-course corrections, 
and hedges his bets against both upside and downside risks. Any of the 
current projections ca.n be wrong. The extremely pessimistic outcomes grab 
headlines, but they are not a sure thing. Their probabilities need to  be 
considered in the design of global emissions strategies. 
This report compares the application of these ideas within seven of the 
models participating in Energy Modeling Forum Study 14, Integrated As- 
sessment of Climate Change (EMF, 1995). The acronyms of these models 
*This report summarizes a collective effort. William Nordhaus was the principal architect 
of the guidelines for scenarios. Other active participants included Minh Ha Duong, James 
Hammitt,  Charles Kolstad, Stephen Peck, Thomas Teisberg, and Gary Yohe. Helpful 
comments were received from John Rowse, Richard Richels, and John Weyant. The  author 
is much indebted to Fellmi Ashaboglu and Joel Singer for research assistance. Financial 
support was provided by the Center for Economic Policy Research of Stanford University. 
Table 1. References to the seven pa.rticipating models. 
CETA 
DI AM 
DICE 
HCRS 
MERGE 
SLICE 
YOHE 
Peck and Teisberg (1992) 
Chapuis et al. (1995) 
Nordhaus (1994a) 
Hammitt (1996) 
Manne and Richels (1995) 
Icolstad (1994) 
Yohe (1995) 
and the most recent docuinentation for each are shown in Table 1. The 
models differ in terms of the degree t o  which they include details concern- 
ing regions, energy supply and coilservation tecl~nologies, the  carbon cycle, 
and climate impacts. They all, however, share a common approach: the be- 
lief that  policy-relevant results can he obtained by comparing the abatement 
strategies associated with a favorable versus an unfavorable (low probability, 
high consequence) scenario. 
Figure 1 presents a general overview of hedging strategies. This contrasts 
two alternative ways of thinking about the greenhouse issue when there are 
just two possible outcomes: a favorable and an unfavorable one. One is an 
upside possibility, the other is a downside risk. The topmost panel describes 
a scenario in which all uncertainties are resolved prior t o  decision making. 
In a "scenario" approach such as this one, we have the opportunity t o  learn 
whether the state of the world is favorable or unfavorable before taking 
action. The panel shows the decision tree for this "learn then act9' (LTA) 
viewpoint. A circle denotes a chailce node, a point at  which the uncertainties 
are resolved; a square denotes a decision node, a point a t  which actions are 
required. 
The bottom panel shows an alternative way of looking a t  things. This 
viewpoint is characterized by the phrase "act then learn" (ATL). For illustra- 
tive purposes, it is assumed that  global carbon dioxide (COz) uncertainties 
are resolved sometime shortly after 2020. Prior to  2020, the energy sector's 
supply and conservation investment decisions must be made under uncer- 
tainty about the importance of limiting carbon emissions. Thereafter, the 
uncertainties are resolved. The ATL approach is a pragmatic one. It is not 
designed for producing accurate long-range forecasts. Rather, it emphasizes 
the importance of near-tern1 decisions. how they are affected by long-term 
uncertainties, and how inuch one should he willing to  pay for the timely 
resolution of those uncertainties. 
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Figure 1. Alternative characterizations of decision problem. 
2. Guidelines for Scenarios 
By focusing on hedging strategies fbr low probability, high consequence sce- 
narios, this model comparisoil study adopts a deliberately parsimonious de- 
sign. We contrast just two out of many possibilities. One is described as a 
base (or reference) case; the other is a low probability, highly unfavorable 
case. At some point, it would be instructive to  do a systematic analysis of 
more than two scenarios. 
In desigiliilg the two alternatives, we took advantage of preliminary work 
that  had been undertaken by several of the participants in the EMF 14 study. 
These enabled us to  screen out several plausible sources of uncertainty and 
to focus on those that were likely to  have a major impact on near-term 
decisions. For example, differences in gross domestic product (GCIP) growth 
rates during the mid to late 21st ceiltury could have major impacts on carbon 
emissions during that  period, but not prior to 2020. 
The meaning of the uilderlyiilg probabilities must be carefully defined. 
They refer to  "judgmental" and "snbjective" distributions, and are not de- 
rived from empirical observatiolls of relative frequencies. For a readable 
overview of these issues, see Raiffa (1968). 
For reasons of practicality, we had to  define uncertainties in a way that  
could be incorporated in as many of the participating models as possible, 
and t o  reduce the computatioilal burden on them. The uncertainties had to 
be chosen in a way that would allow unanlbiguous interpretation, would be 
easily understandable by policy makers, and would have significant impacts 
on near-term decisions. I11 addition, it was desirable to  employ variables that  
had been the subject of surveys of expert opinion. In this way, we hoped to  
reduce the arbitrariness of the probability judgments that are central to  this 
type of decision analysis. 
After reviewing the earlier worli, it appeared that  there were only two 
parameters that  seemed to meet all of these criteria: the mean temperature 
sensitivity factor and the cost of the damage associated with global warming. 
More precisely, cliinate sensitivity is the equilibrium temperature change 
that  would occur if atmospheric COz concentrations were to double from 
their preindustrial level of around 275 ppmv (parts per million, by volume). 
Warming damage is defined as the economic losses that  would occur if COz 
doubling in the late 21st century were to  produce, say, a 3OC warming from 
the preindustrial level. These losses include both market damage and the 
willingness-to-pay for avoiding llollnlarket damage. Inherently, there is a 
good deal of uncertainty if we are to  allow for all the potential surprises and 
adaptive measures t11a.t might be talien in response to this rate of global 
warming. 
The next questioil to be decided was the ilumerical values of the two 
parameters being investigated. Tlle group discussed alternative values and 
eventually concluded that it would be useful to  define the unfavorable cases 
as the top 5% of each of these two distributions. The values of the unfavor- 
able variants are therefore the coilditional means of each variable in the top 
5% of the subjective distribution. For example, if the distribution is uniform 
over the range [0,1], then the unfavorable top 5% would be represented by 
0.975, the mean of the distribution between 0.95 and 1.0. 
In choosing the distributions of the two variables, we relied on two sur- 
veys of expert opinion. These are by no means fully satisfactory. They do, 
however, have the advantage of having been undertaken systematically, and 
they were subject to peer review prior to publication. For the opinion survey 
on climate sensitivity, see Morgan and Iieith (1995). For warming damage, 
see Nordhaus (199413). 
For further details on the design of this inodel comparison, see Nordhaus 
(1995). The followiilg is a summary of these guidelines: 
1. To implement the uncertainty scenarios, the models are to employ both 
a "base" and an "unfavorable" case for the climate sensitivity and for 
the warming damage parameters. 
2. The unfavorable value of the climate sensitivity factor is 2.3OC above the 
base value employed by the individual model. The unfavorable value of 
warming damage is 7.8 times it,s base value. 
3. For identification purposes, the following abbreviatioils are convenient: 
UO: base value of both parameters 
U1: unfavorable value of both paranleters 
U2: unfavorable va.lue of climate sensitivity; base value of warming dam- 
age 
U3: unfavorable value of wa.rming damage; base value of climate sensi- 
tivity 
4. The probability of the unfavorable outcome is 5% when either U2 or U3 
is being compared with UO. The probability of the unfavorable outcome 
is 0.25% when U1 is being coinpared with UO. That is, the standard 
assumption is statistical independence of the two parameters. Modelers 
are encouraged to explore probabilities other than these standard values, 
and to  report the results. 
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Figure 2. Carbon enlissions (a.verage of all models, LTA). 
3. Four LTA Scenarios: Average Model Results 
In order to  perform a controlled comparison between the base case and 
the three unfavorable scenarios, we begin with the LTA (learn, then act) 
approach. Figure 2 is a collrrentional sensitivity analysis. It shows how an 
economically efficient ca,rboil enlissions trajectory inight be affected by the 
climate and damage parameters, and it reports the average carbon emissions 
projected by the seven participating models. 
Under UO (the base case), einissions rise steadily throughout the 21st 
century. According to  the other cases, clinmte sensitivity has a smaller im- 
pact than the warilling damage parameter. Even under U2 (high climate 
sensitivity), emissions rise during the next 50 years. It is only when we in- 
corporate a high value for the warming damage parameter (cases U1 and U3) 
that  it becomes desirable to stabilize or reduce global emissions during the 
next few decades. As might be espected, the greatest difference in emissions 
occurs when we compare the ba.se scenario UO with the low probability, high 
consequence unfavorable scenario U1. For this reason, we will concentrate 
on these two alternatives when we turn to  the ATL (act, then learn) view of 
the world. 
Figure 3. Carbon concentra.tions (average of all models, LTA). 
igure 4. Temperature change (average of all models, LTA) 
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Figure 5. Value of carboil elllissioil rights (average of all models, LTA). 
Figures 3 to  5 show the average model projections of concentrations, 
temperature change, and the value of emission rights. Except for carbon 
emissions, not all of these values were reported by all seven models. For 
details on the covera,ge and for the actual values reported by each model, 
see Appendix. 
Carboil illflows are a sinall fraction of atillospheric stocks, and there is a 
long time lag before coilceiltratiolls are translated into equilibrium temper- 
ature changes. This is why changes in emissions (Figure 2) make their way 
only slowly into chailges in concentrations (Figure 3) and even more slowly 
into tenlperature changes (Figure 4). 
The value of carboil emission rights (alternately termed "carbon taxes") 
are indicators t11a.t could be useful for the decentralized implementation of 
globally efficient abatement scenarios. These values suggest how the payoffs 
might vary from different research and development strategies. According to  
Figure 5, they represent the most volatile series reported by the participants 
in this study. Each model has a son~ewhat different approach for determining 
the optimal mix between the costs and the benefits of abatement. The inter- 
scenario differences are so great that the only satisfactory way t o  compare 
cases is through a semilogarithmic scale. 
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Figure 6. Carbon elllissioils (avenge of all models). 
For the year 2000, the typical illode1 indicates that  the carbon price 
might be only US$10 per toil in UO (the base case), but could be worth ten 
times that  amount in U1 (the low probability, high damage case). In all sce- 
narios, there is a rising value over time - somewhat along the lines suggested 
by the Hotelling rule for the price of exhaustible resources. When one adopts 
a long-term benefit-cost perspective, the a.batement problem becomes one of 
determining the optiinal cumulative volume of emissions, not the quantity 
in any one year. The year-by-yea,r carbon prices are then linked by what one 
assumes with respect to the rate of return on capital in alternative forms of 
investment. 
4. ATL Scenarios: UO vs. L.1 Comparisons 
Figures 6 to  10 report on ATL sceilarios in which UO and U1 are the only 
alternatives considered and the uncertainties are resolved just after 2020. 
According to  the guidelines, the probability is only 0.25% for the unfavorable 
out come. 
Figure 6 provides an average of the carbon emission results reported by 
all seven models. It compares two possible futures: the base case UO and 
the unfavorable outcome 111. The dashed lines show what happens when 
we are endowed with perfect foresight and can make today's decisions with 
full knowledge of which of these outcomes will occur. The upper dashed 
line shows the path corresponding to  the base case. The lower dashed line 
shows the path when we are told today that the unfavorable scenario will 
definitely occur; that is, both climate sensitivity and warming damage are 
high. These perfect foresight projections are repeated directly from the 
LTA scenarios shown in Figure 2. The lower of the two dashed lines is the 
scenario that  would be followed if we were to  ignore the numerical value 
of the probabilities and govern our near-term decisions solely by worst-case 
considerations. 
The solid lines indicate the average results for an economically efficient 
hedging strategy. Note that there is a fork a t  2020, the date of resolution of 
uncertainties. The best hedging strategy consists of adopting an emissiolls 
path that  lies somewhere between the two cases shown along the dashed 
lines. Somewhat surprisingly, this optimal hedging strategy lies quite close 
to  the LTA reference (UO) scenario throughout the 21st century. Taking 
account of both the costs and benefits of abatement, it is desirable to  wait 
until 2020 and a t  that  point begin to reduce emissions rapidly - but only in 
the unlikely event of the unfavorable scenario. The world would then have 
to  change course abruptly and move to  rapid decarbonization. 
There is a range of ATL estimates obtained from the individual models. 
Figures 7 and 8 report on carbon emissions for the UO and U l  scenarios, 
respectively. During the decades tllrougll 2020, none of the models indicates 
that  it is economically efficient to  ail11 for global emissions stabilization. 
The increases are modest in the ca,se of DIAM, but substantial in the case 
of DICE. These two n~odels are distiilguished by dashed lines. 
Beyond 2020, there is no simple way to  characterize the differences be- 
tween models. Under the favorable UO scenario (Figure 7), all of them indi- 
cate that  emissioils will contiilue to rise after 2020. Two models, MERGE 
and SLICE, indicate that it will eventually become optimal for emissions to  
stabilize or to  decline in order to  avoid the negative consequences of global 
climate change. 
Figure 8 shows how the models react to  the unfavorable U1 scenario. 
The only valid generalization is that in 2020 (upon the resolution of uncer- 
tainties), there is an abrupt change in the trend of carbon emissions. DICE, 
SLICE, and YOHE report that  it is optimal to stabilize emissions from the 
middle of the century onward, but the other four models show a decline to  
virtually zero by the end of the century. Opinions will differ on whether 
Figure 7. Carboil elllissions (all models, UO-ATL). 
Figure 8. Carbon emissiolls (all models, U1-ATL). 
Figure 9. Value of ca,rboil einission rights (all models, UO-ATL). 
these are reasonable estimates of decarbonization rates. The answer will de- 
pend on what one assumes with respect to  the system's inertia and the costs 
of abrupt changes in direction. In terms of the foggy road analogy, these 
models provide alternative estimates of how rapidly a driver might attempt 
to  apply the brakes under unfavorable circumstances. 
Figures 9 and 10 report the value of carbon emission rights under the 
two scenarios. For the year 2000, most of the models indicate a modest 
but positive carboil t a s  (US$5-10 per ton). There is a general tendency 
for these values to  increase over time. By definition, the value of carbon 
emission rights is identical for scenarios UO and U1 between 2000 and 2020. 
Immediately thereafter, there is a bifurcation - a decline in the favorable 
scenario UO and a sharp jump in the unfavorable scenario U1 (see Figure 
10.) Carbon values then exceed US$100 per ton, and in some cases exceed 
US$1000. CETA is the only model in which carbon values are limited by a 
backstop assumption (US$465 per ton). 
Figure 10. Value of carbon enlission rights (all models, U1-ATL). 
5. Concluding Comments 
This paper has elnpllasized the concept of hedging strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty. It is inisleadiilg to  interpret such strategies as an argument for 
a do-nothing policy. Delay should not be confused with inaction. There is 
widespread agreement that we need to  maintain a broad portfolio of options 
for dealing with global climate change. According to  most of the partici- 
pating models, it would be desirable to institute a modest carbon tax in 
the near future (US$.5-10 per toil in the year 2000), and t o  have that  tax  
increase over time. 
During the next few decades, we will learn how far we can get with 'ko- 
regrets" energy conservation policies. It is important to  continue intensive 
scientific research to  reduce climate and impact uncertainties. Our energy 
research and development efforts must be directed toward cost-effective con- 
servation and low-carbon supply technologies. Immediate reduction of emis- 
sions is only one among several competing possibilities. The issue is not one 
of either-or, but of finding the right mix of policies. 
Appendix: Model Results 
EMF-14 Uncertainty Subgroup 
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Abstract 
The Berlin Mandate calls for strellgtheiling developed countries' commit- 
ments to  limiting greenhouse gas emissions. This paper addresses a key 
issue in the current analysis and assessment phase - the costs of propos- 
als to  limit carbon dioxide (COz) emissions. Employing four widely used 
energy-economy models, we explore the direct and indirect effects of alter- 
native proposals on the global economy. We also examine the implicatioils 
for atmospheric CO;? concentrations. 
We begin by examining a proposal, like that  of the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), in which 0rga.nisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries agree to reduce C 0 2  emissions to 80% 
of 1990 levels by a specified date. We find that implementing such a proposal 
could be quite costly. Not surprisingly, OECD countries would be the hardest 
hit. Their costs could be as high a.s several percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The analysis also shows that, because of trade effects, non-OECD 
countries would likely incur costs even when reductions are confined to  the 
OECD. An economic slowdown in the OECD would affect the full range 
*This paper reports initial results of the Subgroup on the Regional Distribution of the Costs 
and Benefits of Climate Change Policy Proposals, Energy Modeling Forum 14, Stanford 
University, with contributions from Henry Jacoby (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 
Alan Manne (Stanford University), Stephen Peck (Electric Power Research Institute), Tom 
Teisberg (Teisberg and Associates), Marshal Wise (Pacific Northwest Laboratory), and 
Zili Yang (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Helpful comments were received from 
Sally Kane and John Weyant. The authors are much indebted t o  Amy Craft for research 
assistance. The  views presented here are solely those of the authors. 
of exports of developing countries, a.uc1 hence their economic growth. This 
would likely be the case for both oil-importing and oil-exporting developing 
countries. 
We then esplore alternatives that are apt  to  be quite similar in terms 
of environmental benefits, but allow for flexibility in where and when emis- 
sion reductions are made. We f ind th i t  costs could be substantially reduced 
through international cooperation and the optimal timing of emission reduc- 
tions. Indeed, such flexibility can reduce costs by more than 80%, potentially 
saving the international coinmunity trillions of dollars in mitigation costs. 
We find that  reliance on more flexible alternatives reduces costs more effec- 
tively than adopting weaker, but still inflexible, commitments. 
1. Introduction 
The Berlin Mandate calls on the Pa.rties to  the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change to  streilgthen developed countries' commit- 
ments t o  reducing greeilhouse gas emissions.' A number of proposals have 
been put forward. These raage from slowing the current growth in emissions 
t o  sharp reductions below present levels. The choice is a difficult one. Acting 
too slowly risks irreversible environillental damage. Acting too aggressively 
risks imposing large, and per11a.p~ unnecessary, costs on the global economy. 
As noted by the Intergovernmental Pa.nel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
challenge is to  develop a prudent hedging strategy in the face of climate- 
related uncertainties (see IPCC, 1996). 
The Franlework Convention is the nlechanism established by the inter- 
national community for implenlenting precautionary measures. It recognizes 
that  a sensible hedging strategy should be flexible, with ample opportuni- 
ties for learning and inidcourse corrections. Periodic reviews are required 
"in light of the best available scieiltific information on climate change and 
its impacts, as well a.s relevant technical, social and economic information." 
Based on these reviews, appropriate measures are to  be taken, including the 
adoption of new commitments. 
Upon entering into force in 1994, the Convention established an initial 
(but nonbinding) aim for developed countries to return emissions to their 
1990 levels by 2000. At the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
'For the text of the Berlin Mandate, see UN (1995). For the text of the Framework 
Convention, see Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (1992). 
(COP-1) in Berlin in April of 1995, it wa.s determined that  existing com- 
illitmellts under the Convention were inadequate. Further commitments for 
developed countries are to  be negotiated, and prepared for approval a t  COP- 
3 in 1997. 
Although calling for new commitments, the Berlin Mandate does not 
specify what these commitments s1;ould be. Rather, it seeks further analysis 
and assessment to  guide and inform the decision-making process. This paper 
addresses a key issue in the analysis and assessment phase - the costs of 
proposals to  limit carbon dioxide (COz) emissions. Rather than rely on a 
single model, the analysis is based 011 independent runs of four widely used 
energy-economy n ~ o d e l s . ~  In each instance, we explore both the direct and 
indirect effects on the global economy. 
We also examine the impact of alternative proposals on atmospheric 
concentrations. The ultinlate objective of the Framework Convention is "the 
stabilizatioil of greenhouse ga.s concentrations in the atmosphere a t  a level 
that  would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system" (see Intergovernillental Negotiating Committee for A Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992). Although the issue of what consti- 
tutes an appropriate limit has yet to be resolved, it is instructive to  explore 
the implications t11a.t alternative emission pathways have for future concen- 
trations. 
We pay particular a.ttention to t,lle design of cost-effective mitigation 
strategies. The Framework Coi~vention states that "policies and measures 
t o  deal wit11 climate cllange should be cost-effective so as to  ensure global 
benefits a t  the lowest possible costs." Adopting least-cost mitigation strate- 
gies will free up valuable resources for further addressing the threat of climate 
change or for meeting other societal needs. We explore two ways of promot- 
ing this objective. In the first, enlission reductions take place where it is 
cheapest to  do so. In the second, they take place when it is cheapest t o  do 
SO. 
A number of studies have suggested that the cost of emission reductions 
can be substantially reduced through international cooperation (see IPCC, 
1996). From a global perspective, it would be economically wasteful t o  incur 
high marginal abatement costs in one country when low-cost alternatives are 
available elsewhere in the world. We discuss ways to  ensure that  emission 
2 ~ h e  four models make up the Subgroup on the Regional Distribution of Costs and 
Benefits of Climate Change Policy Proposals. The Subgroup is open to models participat- 
ing in Stanford University's Euergy Modeling Forum Study on "Integrated Assessment of 
Climate Change" (EMF, 1995). 
reductions are made where it is cheapest to do so, and explore the potential 
gains. 
The timing of emission reductions can also influence costs. What is 
important in meeting a concentra.tion target is cumulative, not year-by-year, 
emissions (see IPCC, 1994; Wigley et al., 1996). A particular concentration 
target can be met through a variety of emission time paths. Several studies 
have suggested that  emission time paths that provide flexibility in making 
the transition away from fossil fuels will be less costly (see IPCC, 1996). We 
examine the implications for the design of cost-effective mitigation strategies 
under the Berlin Mandate. 
Mitigation costs are, of course, only part of the story. The more diffi- 
cult question is the appropriate level of emissions abatement. This requires 
consideration of both costs and benefits. The present analysis is confined t o  
the cost side of the ledger. That  is, we focus 011 the costs of emissions reduc- 
tion. Policy makers will also want to  know what they are buying in terms 
of reducing the undesirable consequences of global climate change. Such an 
analysis is beyond the scope of the present effort. 
2. The Models 
The analysis en~ploys four energy-economy models: CETA (Peck and Teis- 
berg, 1995), EPPA (Yang et ([I., 1996), MERGE (Manne and Richels, 1995), 
and MiniCAM (Edmonds et ul., 1996). These models reflect the recent trend 
toward hybrid modeling tools that incorporate features from both bottom- 
up and top-down approaches to  energy modeling. On the supply side, each 
model employs a bottom-up representation of the energy system. Energy 
technologies are described in process model detail (e.g., availability dates, 
heat rates, carbon emission coefficients, etc.). The technology vector includes 
both existing sources and new options that  are likely to  become available. 
Cost and performance constraints are adjusted for regional differences. A 
more top-down perspective is taken toward the balance of the economy. This 
is done using macroecoi~omic production functions that  provide for substi- 
tution between capital, labor, a.nd energy inputs. 
The models provide a coilsistent way to  examine alternative strategies for 
limiting C o n  emissions and t o  examine the impacts of higher energy prices 
on economic output. They can be used, for example, t o  estimate the increase 
in fossil fuel prices required to  induce consumers to  reduce emissions. They 
also can be used to  analyze the possibility of significant regional differences 
in nlarginal abatement costs t11a.t woulcl lea,d to opportunities for cost savings 
through iilterilatioilal cooperation. 
The models employ a gelleral equilibrium formulation of the global en- 
ergy and economic system. This allows us to examine the impacts of actions 
taken in one region on the ecoilomies of another. This is particularly impor- 
tant in the case of the Berlin ~al idat -e .  Constraints imposed on developed 
countries may have unexpected coilsequeilces for developing countries. For 
example, the international price of oil will be affected by the imposition of 
carbon constraints on oil-importing countries. 
While general equilibrium models are useful in tracing the long-term 
implications of a carbon constraint, they may ignore important short-term 
effects. This is because they assume full employment of the economy and 
instantaneous adjustment to  policy shocks. The lack of attention to  adjust- 
ment costs means that these lllodels may understate the short-run cost of 
economic shocks, particula,rly if these are large and unexpected. 
On the other hand, some have argued that the exogenous specification 
of technology change tends to overstate the cost of a carbon constraint. This 
is an important issue in the energy policy debate - one that  is deserving of 
considerably Inore attention t11a.n it has received to  date. It should be noted, 
however, that  the direction of ally bias is still unclear. An acceleration 
of energy-related techilical progress may be accompanied by a slowdown 
in labor and capital productivity improvements throughout the economy. 
To receive proper consideration, the issue of endogenous change must be 
examined on an economy-wide basis (see Hogan and Jorgenson, 1991). 
Although similar in illany respects, the models differ in important ways. 
For example, EPPA is a recursive rather than an intertemporal optimization 
model. EPPA and MERGE employ a "putty-clay" rather than a "putty- 
putty" approach to  the viiltagiilg of capital stocks (i.e., they explicitly rec- 
ognize that  one type of capital cannot be "transformed" into another once 
it is put into place). Moreover, all models differ in regional disaggregation: 
CETA contains 2 regions, EPPA 12 regions, MERGE 5 regions, and Mini- 
CAM 9  region^.^ 
The models also differ with respect to  key inputs, for example, popu- 
lation, per capita productivity trends, the fossil fuel resource base, and the 
cost and availability of long-term supply options. Rather than try to  impose 
a common set of driving assumptions, the choice of inputs was left to  the 
discretion of the modeling teams. It was felt that  we would be better able 
to assess the robustness of our results with a diverse set of energy futures. 
3For a detailed model comparison, see EMF-14 (EMF, 1995). 
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Figure 1. Carbon enlissions under business as usual. 
3. Future Emissions 
We begin with an esainination of bow fossil fuel emissions are projected to  
grow in the absence of policy intervention. The costs of a carbon constraint 
are quite sensitive to  the emissions baseline. The baseline describes how 
emissions will grow under existing policies. The higher the emissions base- 
line, the more carbon must be removed from the energy system to  meet a 
particular target and the higher the costs become. 
Figure 1 compares baseline projections for our four  model^.^ Note that 
in each instance emissions are projected to  grow in the absence of policy in- 
tervention. This is the case for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and for the world as a whole. This is 
consistent with the overwhelming majority of analyses recently reviewed by 
the IPCC (1994). Of the dozens of studies surveyed, all but a few showed a 
rising emissions baseline. 
In reviewing these emission projections, several points are worth noting. 
First, although the annual growth rates are substantial - between 1.5% and 
2% - they represent a marked slowing in the historical trend. Indeed, global 
4These projections are intended as examples of how emissions might evolve under ex- 
isting policies. They should not be interpreted as each analysis team's "best guessn of 
future emissions. 
emissions grew a t  an aililual rate of approximately 3.5% between 1950 and 
1990. In part,  the slowdown is due to a projected decline in global economic 
growth. Since 1950, gross world product grew a t  an average annual rate of 
2.9%. The projected growth rate for the next half century or so is closer to  
2.5%. Also a t  work is the gradual decoupling of energy and gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth and a d e ~ & ~ l i i l ~  of C 0 2  emissions and energy use. 
The differences in emissions baselines should come as no surprise given 
the uncertainty over the period studied and thus the freedom the modelers 
had in the choice of input assumptions. Although it would be impractical 
to  sort out all of the reasoils for the differences, several factors have been 
identified as being particularly important when modeling future emissions 
(see Manne and Richels, 1994). High up on the list is economic growth. 
Those models with higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates tend 
t o  project higher emissions. The more optimistic one is about the prospects 
for reducing energy intensity or the availability of low-cost carbon-free sub- 
stitutes, the lower the C 0 2  growth rate. 
Although the models differ on the cost and availability of supply- and 
demand-side alternatives, it should be noted that  each includes some "no- 
regrets" emission reductioil options. These are alternatives that  would be 
worth adopting apart from climate considerations. A growing emissions 
baseline does not imply the absence of economically competitive alternatives 
to  fossil fuels. It only means that the supplies of such options are insufficient 
to  arrest the growth in carboil emissions. 
The focus of the Berlin Mandate is on emissioils from developed coun- 
tries. Negotiators will be interested in how a particular proposal changes the 
emissions baseline. We start by esailliiliilg a case in which OECD countries 
return emissions to  1990 levels by the year 2000, reduce them by an addi- 
tional 20% by 2010, and hold thein at  that  level thereafter. This is similar 
in many respects to  the proposal put forward by the Alliance of Small Is- 
land States (AOSIS).5 For the present analysis, we place no constraints on 
non-OECD emissions. 
Figure 2 shows the implications for global emissions. An AOSIS-like pro- 
posal may slow the growth in global emissions, but it is unlikely to  stabilize 
them a t  anywhere near present levels. This is because non-OECD countries 
currently account for over half of the global total, and their share is expected 
to  grow. The implications for climate policy are clear: stabilization of global 
emissions will eventually require the participation of developing countries. 
'The AOSIS proposal calls for Annex 1 countries to reduce emissions by 20% by 2005. 
Figure 2. Global emissioils under busiiless as usual and with a 20% cut in 
OECD emissioils (based on average of model results). 
4. The Costs of Alternative Commitments 
We next turn to  the issue of costs. In recent years, a number of studies have 
highlighted the poteiltial role of illterilatioilal cooperation and flexible tinling 
in reducing the costs of a carboil coilstraint (see IPCC, 1994, 1996; M'igiey 
et of., 1996). To explore the inlplicatioils for the Berlin hclandate, we first 
estimate the costs of adoptiilg the AOSIS-like proposal described above. We 
then examine three variants. Each results in the same cumulative emissions, 
but there are sigilificailt differences in the geographical location and timing 
of the emission reductions. 
Before proceeding, one caveat is in order. We use trade in emission rights 
t o  examine the poieiltial gains from international cooperation. By allowing 
such trade we ensure that ,  a t  a given point in time, emission reductions are 
made where it is cheapest t o  do so. It should be noted that  this is but one 
of a number of mechanisms that could be used to  facilitate international 
cooperation. For example, various forms of bilateral joint implementation 
could accomplish the same objective. Hence, trade in emission rights is 
intended only as a proxy for any of a number of cooperative mechanisms. 
With the above caveat in mind, we now describe our four cases: 
Case 1 (no interregional or int,erteillporal efficiency): Each OECD region 
is required to  meet its annual enlissions coilstraint independently. There 
is no trade in emission rights between the OECD and other  region^.^ 
Case l a  (interregional efficiency): The constraint is still on year-by-year 
emissions, but trade in emission rights is now permitted between the 
OECD and other regions. Noii-OECD countries are allowed to  emit in 
each period up to  the level of their emissions in Case 1. If they reduce 
their emissions below this level, they may benefit from the sale of the 
emission rights generated. 
Case I b  (intertemporal efficiency): Rather than a set of year-by-year 
emission limits, the coilstraint on emissions from each OECD region is 
expressed as an upper limit on its cumulative emissions. This allows 
for higher emissions in yea,rs where the cost of emissions abatement is 
highest. "Payba.ckn must occur by 2050. There is no trade in emission 
rights between the OECD and non-OECD regions. 
Case l c  (interregional and intertemporal efficiency): The constraint is 
now on cumulative emissions a t  the global level. Both interregional and 
intertemporal trading is permitted. Emission rights are based on Case 
1. As a result, reductions take place both where and when it is cheapest 
to  do so. 
Figure 3 shows costs for Ca,se 1 discounted to  1990 a t  5% per year. The 
constraint on carbon-emitting a.ctivities 1ea.d~ to a reallocation of resources 
a.way from the pattern t11a.t is preferred in the absence of this limit and 
toward potentially costly conserva,tion activities and fuel substitution. Rel- 
ative prices change as well. These forced adjustments lead to  a reduction 
in economic performance, as ineasured by GDP or some other indicator, 
depending on the model. The tighter the constraint, the greater the effect. 
Note that ,  because of trade effects, many non-OECD countries will incur 
costs even when reductioils are confined t o  the OECD. Restrictions on carbon 
emissions lead to  lower OECD demand for oil, which results in lower revenue 
for the oil-exporting countries. In addition, an economic slowdown in the 
OECD countries affects the full range of exports of developing countries, 
and thus their growth. For many oil-importing developing countries these 
broader trade effects outweigh the gain from lower world oil prices. Three of 
the four models shown account for a,t lea,st some of these effects (MiniCAM is 
the exception) and show a spillover of OECD loses onto non-OECD countries. 
'There is some trade in emission rights within the OECD, however. This is the conse- 
quence of aggregating single countries into larger regions. 
EPPA MiniCAM 
Figure 3. Costs of a 20% cut in OECD emissions by 2010: Case 1 (costs 
through 2050 discouilted to  1990 a t  5 % ) .  
Not surprisingly, the models differ as to  the magnitude of the economic 
impacts. This is to  be espected given the large differences in emission base- 
lines. EPPA, with the highest baseline, shows the highest costs. MiniCAM, 
with the lowest ba.seline, sllo~vs the lowest costs. 
.4 second factor contributing to  the large spread among models is the 
speed with which the ca.pita1 stoclc is allowed t o  adjust to  higher energy 
prices. As noted ea,rlier, two of the models, EPPA and MERGE, employ 
a so-called putty-clay formulation. They attempt t o  track the economic 
lifetime of existing plant and equipment. As a result, these models show 
less responsiveiless of energy denland to  price changes in the short run than 
over the long run. Alternatively, models that assume greater malleability of 
capital (CETA and MiniCAM) produce lower cost estimates. 
The models are in more agreement on the relative costs of the various 
alternatives (Figure 4). Note that  the potential benefits from economic effi- 
ciency are substantial. In Case 1, each OECD region is required to  act inde- 
pendently to  reduce its emissions. There is no opportunity to take advantage 
of low-cost emission reduction options elsewhere in the world. From the per- 
spective of global economic efficiency, this makes little sense. Clearly, it is 
inefficient to  incur high marginal domestic abatement costs when low-cost 
alternatives exist in other countries. In Case l a ,  we allow OECD countries 
to  take advantage of the lower-cost alternatives. We do this by permitting 
CETA EPPA MERGE 
a) Case 1 100 
Cru 1. casn l b  
b) Avenge of model renults 
Figure 4. Global costs under four alternative cases. 
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Figure 5. Regional costs undel* four alternative cases (costs through 2050 
discounted to 1990 at  5%). 
trade in carbon emissioil rights. Note that cooperation of this type can cut 
the costs of a carboil collstraiilt by well over one-half. 
Figure 5 shows the impact on non-OECD countries. International co- 
operation not only reduces costs withill the OECD, it may also result in 
substantial wealth tra,nsfers. Indeed, for three of our models, the revenue 
received from the sale of emission rights inore than offsets the trade-related 
losses to non-OECD countries. Alternatively, one could devise a burden 
sharing scheme that imposes zero net costs on non-OECD c ~ u n t r i e s . ~  Such 
a scheme would conlpensate non-OECD countries for losses accruing through 
international trade but would result in no additional wealth transfers. In this 
instance, costs to the OECD would be equivalent to  global costs. 
We nest turn to the issue of timing (Case lb). When given the choice, 
each model shifts some emission reductions into the future. That is, it 
chooses to emit more in the early years with payback coming later on (see 
Figure 6a). This behavior can best be understood in terms of an optimal 
allocation problem. A constraint on cumulative emissions defines a carbon 
budget. That is, it specifies a total amount of carbon to be emitted over 
'With an international market in carbon emission rights, global abatement costs are 
independent of the burden sharing scheme. This allows us to separate the difficult issues 
of efficiency and equity. For the theoretical considerations underlying this proposition, see 
Manne (1996). 
a) Global emissions 
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Figure 6. Global emissions and COz concentrations with and without in- 
tertemporal efficiency (based on average of model results). 
a fixed period of time. For Clase l b ,  ea.ch OECD region's carbon budget is 
defined as the sum of its permissible enlissions between 2000 and 2050 (as 
specified in Case 1). The issue is how best to  allocate the carbon budget 
over this period. 
There are several factors that  argue for using more of the available bud- 
get in the early years.s Deferring emission reductions provides valuable time 
to  reop timize the capital stock. Energy-producing and energy-using invest- 
ments are typically long-lived (e.g., power plants, houses, transport). They 
were put into place with a particular set of expectations about the future. 
Abrupt changes are apt to  be expensive. This is particularly the case when 
it comes to  premature retirement of existing plants and equipment. Time is 
needed for the capital stock to  ada,pt. 
The optimal timing of emission reductions is also influenced by the 
prospects for new supply a,nd conserva,tion technologies. There has been 
substantial progress in lowerillg the costs of carbon-free substitutes (e.g., 
solar, biomass, energy efficiency) in the past. With a sustained commitment 
to  research and development, there should be further cost reductions in the 
coming decades. It would make sense t o  draw more heavily on the carbon 
budget in the early years, when the lllarginal costs of emissions abatement 
are highest. With cheaper alternatives in the future, there will be less need 
for reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuels. 
Finally, with the ecoilonly yielding a positive return on capital, future 
reductions can be made with a slllaller colnlllitlnent of today's resources. For 
example, suppose t11a.t the net real return on capital is 5% per year and it 
costs US$100 to  senlove a toll of carbon - regardless of the year in which the 
reductioll is made. If we were to  relllove a ton today, it would cost US$100. 
Alternatively, we could invest US$31 today to  have the resources to  remove 
a ton in 2020. 
Before leaving the timing issue, several additional caveats are in order. 
First, it should be noted that  the two emission paths of Figure 6 result in 
different levels of atmospheric concentrations (prior to  2050). They may 
therefore differ in terms of ellvironmental impacts. Given that  the con- 
centration paths lie so close together, however, the differential impacts on 
temperature and sea level are likely to  be negligible.g 
Second, the above considerations (capital stock turnover, research and 
development, and discounting) argue for shifting some emission reductions 
into the future. They cannot, however, be used as an excuse for deferring 
'For a more detailed discussion of the timing issue, see Wigley et al. (1996). 
'For the analysis, we use the carbon cycle model of Wigley (1993). 
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Figure 7. OECD GDP losses under alternative assumptions about economic 
efficiency (based on average of model results). 
these reductions indefinitely. The carboil budget is finite. There is an upper 
limit on the amouilt to be emitted between now and 2050, which continued 
deferment would soon esceed. The issue is one of optimal timing. 
Finally, note tliat the ailloullt of deferment depends on the size of the 
carbon budget. In this instance, there is insufficient flexibility to  defer emis- 
sion reductions altogether in the early years. The optimal emissions path 
lies between Case 1 and business as usual. 
Returning to  Figure 4, we see that the most efficient s: rategy is one 
that  combines illterilatioilal cool~eration with flexible timing (Case lc).1° 
I11 this instance, costs are reduced by nlore than 80%. Figure 7 provides 
some insight into why the savings are so large. It shows OECD GDP losses 
averaged across the four models. In Case 1, GDP losses grow to  2.4% over 
the nest quarter century - roughly US$4OO billion in today's economy. In 
Case l b ,  GDP losses grow more slowly. Although annual losses exceed those 
of Case 1 toward the end of the time horizon, they are considerably lower 
early on. As a result, cumulative losses are smaller. If OECD countries are 
able t o  take advantage of low-cost emission reduction options elsewhere in 
the  world, losses can be held to  under 1% of GDP. 
l0EPPA is a recursive rather than an intertemporal optimization model. Several alter- 
native emission paths were explored for Cases l b  and lc .  The results reported here are for 
the lowest-cost of the paths tested, and the results are not strictly comparable with those 
from the other models. 
EPPA MERGE 
.) Ca&?1=100 
Fig 
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ure 8. Costs of alternative sets of targets and timetables. 
Figure 9. OECD GDP losses under alternative targets and timetables 
(based on average of model results). 
One way to  reduce costs would be to  design more cost-effective strategies. 
A second way would be to  make the coilstraints less stringent. We now 
coilsider two additional variants of Case 1. In Case 2, we delay the date 
by which OECD couiltries must achieve the 20% reduction by 10 years. In 
Case 3, we put off the 20% reductioil altogether: that  is, OECD countries 
continue t o  hold emissioils at  1990 levels. 
From Figure 8, note that a substantial fraction of the costs of a 20% 
reductioil would be incurred siinply by extending the existing target. That  
is, much of the costs result from reducing emissions from the business-as- 
usual path to  1990 levels. Between 40% and 70% of the costs are associated 
with the decision to  stabilize emissioils a t  1990 levels. 
Figure 9 compares OECD GDP losses for the three cases. In Case 1, 
annual losses rise to  2.4% of GDP by 2020. Postponing the 20% cut by 10 
years results in lower GDP losses during the initial two decades of the next 
century, but losses are similar thereafter. For Case 3, GDP losses are lower 
for the entire period. On average, lowering the target cuts GDP losses by 
nearly one-half. 
5. Some Final Comments 
Estimating mitigation costs is a daunting task. It is difficult enough t o  en- 
visage the evolution of the energy-economic system over the next decade. 
Projections involving a. half century or inore must be treated with consid- 
erable caution. Nevertheless, we believe that  exercises like the present one 
contain useful information. The value, however, lies not in the specific num- 
bers, but in the insights for policy making. With this in mind, we attempt 
t o  summarize what we have learned: 
Implementing an AOSIS-type proposal may require substa.ntia1 C o n  re- 
ductions for OECD countries. With a growing emissions baseline, more 
a.nd more carbon must be removed from the energy system to  maintain 
an absolute target. Such reductions could be quite costly - perhaps, as 
much as several percent of GDP for OECD countries. 
Because of trade effects, the 11011-OECD countries will likely incur costs 
even when emissions reductioils are confined to  the OECD. Restrictions 
on carbon emissions lead to  lower demand for oil, which results in lower 
revenue for oil-exporting countries. In addition, an economic slowdown 
in the OECD countries affects the full range of exports of developing 
countries, and thus their growth. For many oil-importing developing 
countries, these broader trade effects outweigh the gain from lower world 
oil prices. 
One way t o  reduce lllitigatioll costs would be t o  design cost-effective con- 
straints. Indeed, the present analysis suggests that  the potential gains 
from international cooperation (interregional efficiency) and flexible tim- 
ing (intertemporal efficiency) are huge. Taken together, they can reduce 
costs by more than 80%. The key is to  allow emission reductions to take 
place both where and when it is cheapest to  do so. 
A second way to reduce lllitigation costs would be to adopt less strin- 
gent constraints. For example, rather than a 20% cutback, the OECD 
could agree to hold emissions a t  1990 levels. The analysis suggests that  
the reduction in overall lnitigation costs would be between 3 0 %  and 
60%. The savings, however, must be weighed against the impacts of the 
incremental emissioils through larger changes in climate. 
The following steps could substantially reduce the costs of implement- 
ing a carbon constraint under the Berlin Mandate: (1) allow devel- 
oped countries to  purchase low-cost abatement options in developing 
countries; (2) allow time for the ecoilomic turnover of existing plants 
and equipment; (3) invest in the development of economically attractive 
substitutes for carbon-intensive fuels; and (4) ensure that  cost-effective 
options are adopted to  the greatest extent possible. 
Our results are coilsistent with other studies which suggest that carbon 
emissioi~s will contiilue to grow in the absence of policy intervention. 
Proposals that  focus exclusively on developed countries may slow the 
growth in global emissions, but they will not stabilize them a t  anywhere 
near present levels. Nor will they stabilize atmospheric concentrations, 
the ultimate goal of the Framewo~k Convention. To do so, would even- 
tually require the participation of developing countries. 
The present paper identifies eilorinous savings from international cooper- 
ation and flexible timing. Realizing this potential, however, may be another 
matter. For example, how do we divide up the savings from international 
cooperation? Or, how do we ensure that  parties maintain a credible path 
toward fulfilling commitments? Considerable ingenuity will be required, but 
given the stakes, even partial success is likely to  be well worth the effort. 
Fortunately, some of the necessary concepts are already being tested. 
For example, efforts to illcorporate international cooperation can build on 
the experience gained from national and international joint implementation 
initiatives. With regard to flexible timing, a limit might be placed on a 
country's cumulative emissions. Subject to this constraint, the country could 
lay out its own projected emissions time path and prepare a formal plan 
that builds on existing experience with National Action Plans under the 
Framework Co~lvention. Periodic reviews could then track adherence to  the 
commitment. Technology developnlent efforts, with suitable performance 
milestones, also could be an integral part of both the path definition and 
review processes. 
Negotiators must coilsider myriad competing ideas and interests inher- 
ent in shaping a global policy. One of their greatest challenges will be to 
meet the injunction of Article 3 of the Framework Convention: "policies and 
measures t o  deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to  ensure 
global benefits a t  the lowest possible costs." Our success in confronting the 
challenge of climate change may depend directly on their success in doing 
so. 
The larger question, of course, is what constitutes an  appropriate set of 
emission constraints. This requires consideration of both benefits and costs. 
The present analysis has been confined to  the cost side of the ledger. That  
is, we examine the costs of reducing COa emissions. Policy makers will also 
want to  know what they are buying in terms of reducing the undesirable 
consequences of global warming. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the 
present effort. 
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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of economic issues involved in the timing 
of limit ations on carbon dioxide (COz) from energy systems, with particular 
reference to  issues of technology availability, development, and diffusion, but 
also considering briefly other aspects of the problem. 
It is stimulated by the debate in the USA about optimal abatement 
paths, in particular, recent claims t11a.t it would be economically preferable 
to  defer such abatement action in favor of measures that support technology 
development but do not affect emissioil trends for many years. 
This paper categorizes t.he various economic issues involved and con- 
cludes that  for each economic argument that has been advanced to  justify 
deferring emission constraints, there are couiltervailing economic arguments 
that  could be used in support of rapid near-term emissions abatement. 
Rational policy lies between these extremes. A policy of deferring all 
emissions abatement exposes economic systems and industries, as well as 
the environment, to significantly greater costs and risks than those arising 
from a more balanced approach. 
Furthermore, the modeling studies that have been used to  justify defer- 
ring emissions abatement do so because they embody the economic factors 
favorable to  delay and largely neglect the countervailing issues, to  the point 
where they cannot be considered as relevant to  a balanced assessment of the 
issues relating to  economically optimal abatement timing. 
1. Introduction 
The debate in the USA on the optimal timing of greenhouse gas emis- 
sions abatement has been greatly stinlulated by recent modeling studies that 
examine trajectories of carbon dioxide (COz) emissions aimed at  a predeter- 
mined stabilization level in the atmosphere. The paper by Wigley, Richels, 
and Edmonds (1996, hereafter the WRE paper) applied a carbon cycle model 
to explore alternate emission pathways, and suggested that pathways in 
which abatement is deferred would be economically preferable (Wigley et al., 
1996). This was justified in part by reference to  economic modeling stud- 
ies that  used resource allocation/equilibrium models (Manne and Richels, 
1995). 
These studies stated that  four main reasons justify the belief that  defer- 
ring abatement of greenhouse gas en~issions may be economically preferable: 
technical progress; capital stock considerations; positive marginal product 
of capital (discounting); and greater absorption of COz emissions emitted 
earlier. 
This paper explores these arguments and their relationship to  the overall 
economic problem of how best to time limits on greenhouse gas emissions. 
The paper focuses primarily on issues concerning the development of 
technologies and energy systems, and related investment patterns (Sections 2 
and 3).  This is divided into two illain sections: issues of technical change 
and systems evolution, and issues of cnpital stock and systems inertia. 
The paper also examines the broader context of economic issues sur- 
rounding the timing of greenhouse gas emissions abatement. Specifically, 
Sections 4 and 5 consider how studies of preset stabilization constraints 
relate to  the real policy problem, namely, that of timing policies under the 
expectation of aggregate damage of highly uncertain magnitude arising from 
climate change. 
Section 6 briefly sketches releva.nt streilgths and weaknesses of some of 
the different modeling approaches that  have been applied to the question of 
timing emissions abatement. 
Finally, a concluding sectioil brings together the main insights of the 
analysis. 
2. Technical Change 
Technical change has been advanced as a reason for delaying emissions abate- 
ment, on the grounds that  cost reductions in technologies will make abate- 
ment cheaper in the future. Three issues need t o  be clarified in this context. 
2.1. The continuuill of abateilleilt options 
The first of these issues is that there a.re a wide range of options and technolo- 
gies for limiting emissions, a t  varying cost levels and with different prospects 
for cost reductions. Even when we have exhausted "no-regrets" options that  
can be implemented a t  no costs,- there are a wide range of options still 
available, including many cheap ones such as incremental improvements in 
building insulation, car and appliance efficiency, etc.' 
An economic representation of this is illustrated in Figure l(a) ,  which 
shows an estimate of the "abatement cost curve" for COz reductions derived 
in Nordhaus (1991) from a number of (mostly top-down) studies. Clearly, 
even after all "negative cost" optioils have been utilized, some additional 
reductions call be achieved a t  very modest costs, as one would expect; with 
a fixed cost curve, the cost then rises steadily as greater reductions are 
sought. 
Over time, technology development can be expected to  lower technology 
costs, and thus move the curve to the right. The argument that technology 
development will reduce abateineilt costs in the future appears t o  have been 
interpreted as an argument for deferring emissions abatement in general, 
i.e., waiting a t  the origin while governlnents pursue sufficient new research 
and development (R&D), and the11 moving rapidly to  exploit a wide range 
of technologies once there has been "enough" (in some unspecified sense) 
development. It may be characterized as a "do R&D, then sprint" approach. 
Alternatively (and in addition), one could move steadily along the curve 
but remain in the region of fairly low (but non-zero) abatement costs. As 
technology development shifts the curve to  the right, more options will be- 
come available a t  modest cost (if we find that  we are starting to climb too 
far up the cost curve, so that it is getting expensive, then it should always 
be possible to ease off while developnlent continues). This could be termed 
a "steady walk" approach, and it is not obvious that it involves much higher 
costs than waiting - depending on how alnbitiously one moves up the curve. 
'The extent of negative-cost and low-cost options is actually a very important question 
in the context of the WRE paper, since its conclusions are claimed to be policy relevant 
and are stated in terms of near-term emission levels. There are plenty of studies around 
claiming that most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries could at least stabilize emissions in the near term by implementing such low-cost 
measures; the Working Group I1 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) lists a plethora of such options. The IPCC's WG-I1 report details a huge range of 
such options. 
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Figure 1. Technology menus and development. 
2.2. Endogellous technology development 
The above discussion assumes that all technological development occurs in- 
dependently of emission abatement efforts. This reflects an idea of tech- 
nology development as an "exogenous" process - the idea that  technology 
development occurs independently-of market conditions. This would apply, 
for example, to the extent that technology development represents an  au- 
tomatic accumulation of knowledge, or is fostered primarily by government 
R&D. 
In fact, the idea that  new techilologies develop autonomously, or 
arise primarily because goverilmeilts pay to  develop them, is an idea that  
economists who work on technology issues abandoned decades ago. More 
than 30 years ago, Arrow (1962) noted that much knowledge is acquired 
through learning-by-doing and explored the economic consequences of this 
(see also some of the reviews in Da,sgupta and Stoneman, 1987). Government 
R&D can help, but inost effective technology development and dissemina- 
tion is done by the private sector in the pursuit of markets. In other words, 
much technology development is induced by market circumstances - market 
experience leads to  cost reductioils and expectations about future market 
opportunities determine how industries deploy their R&D efforts. 
This is not surprising, since in fact corporate R&D swamps government 
R&D in most countries. The energy sector in the 1980s provided powerful 
examples of the fact that  techilology development depends powerfully on 
market conditions. The cost of offshore oil platforms fell greatly as compa- 
nies sought to  keep operations economical in the face of declining oil prices. 
The costs of wind energy fell threefold over the 1980s as an  artificial mar- 
ket was created in Califorilia and then stea.dily tightened, and they have 
coiltinued to do so as supports have shifted to  European markets. Even gas 
turbinelcombined-cycle stations started their major developments as natural 
gas and electricity system coilditioils emerged to  make a market a ~ a i l a b l e . ~  
In these circumstances, it is in steering the markets that  governments 
can have the biggest impact on technology development (though government 
R&D can also play an important role for technologies still in an early stage 
of development). This can also be illustrated with reference to  Figure l.(c). 
Induced technology development implies that  it is the act of moving steadily 
along the curve that  pushes the curve to  the right, i.e., abatement efforts 
generate market opportunities, cash flows, and expectations that  enable in- 
dustries to  orient their efforts and learning in the direction of lower-carbon 
'For a detailed account of some of these developments see Grubb and Walker (1992). 
technologies. Hence, in this model, action itself generates cheaper technolog- 
ical options arising out of accuillulating e ~ ~ e r i e n c e . ~  In this case, deferring 
emission reductions simply delays the generation of options that  can address 
the problem a t  low cost. 
Therefore, conclusio~~s about how techilology development affects opti- 
mal timing hinge critically on the assumptions made about how technology 
develops. The evidence suggests that an  important role needs to  be accorded 
to  the potential for inducing techilology development through actions that  
affect energy markets. Notably, policies that act to  constrain C 0 2  emissions 
will tend to  create appropriate iilceiltives in energy markets to  turn the bulk 
of corporate energy RSLD away from improviilg fossil fuel technologies toward 
developing and deployiilg lower-carbon tecl~nologies. 
2.3. Technology clusteriilg and "lock-in" 
A third important issue in techilology development is that  of clustering, 
and related effects of "lock-in," and "lock-out." Studies of the economics of 
technology development ha,ve demoilstrated that technological development 
tends to  be strongly biased towa.rd esisting modes (e.g., NakiCenoviC and 
Griibler, 1991). Industries that have a. large market share in any particular 
technology can spend large ainounts on R&D and expend other resources 
trying to  make incremental improveinents to  those technologies to  protect 
their existing position, and try in various ways to  discourage the emergence of 
new options with which small coillpetitors might threaten their preeminence. 
Furthermore, no industry esists in isola.tion; rather, each is part of a 
very extensive network, depeildeilt on infra.structure, supplier relationships, 
and consumer outlets, as well as interrela.ted technologies. Consequently, 
technological trends have an evolutionary character, with interrelated lines 
of development and deployment. On the grand scale, "I(ondratiev waves" 
of interrelated technologica~l developments (such as the internal combustion 
engine combined with petroleum estractioil and refining technologies and 
distributional infrastructure) have been proposed. On a smaller scale, a 
3Note that  one objection that  has been raised to  this is the fact that  stimulating 
innovation in one sector (e.g., energy) may reduce innovation in another sector, so tha t  
there is no "free lunch." In fact, the evidence for this is rather slim; it is not all obvious 
tha t  challenges in one sector do in general cause them t o  draw "innovation resources" 
from elsewhere, though the possibility deserves further empirical study. However, the 
broader argument about the implications of adaptability (Section 2.4) does not hinge on 
this issue; it simply asserts that  the ability to  innovate aiid develop alternate systems gives 
us some freedom in how to orient developments in our economic systems with respect t o  
environmental impacts. 
Induced technology development, technology 
clustering, and systemic adaptability 
Induced/endogei~ous tecl~nology development 
"Learning-by-doing" (Arrow, 1962) 
Corporate R&D 
Exanlples from the energy sector during the 1980s: 
Offshore oil pla.tfornls 
Wind energy 
Gas turbines 
Technology clusteriilg 
Technology waves (Kondratiev), 
e.g., Petroleum refininglinternal combustion engine/ 
road technology and infra.structure 
Technology n~orphological/evolutio~~ (Griibler and Foray, 1990) 
e.g., Ferrous casting 
"Lock-in" example: steam turbine 
"Lock-out" example: 1930s hydrocarbon refrigeration 
Systemic adaptability 
Combination of induced innovation, clustering, 
infrastructure, and behavioral adjustments 
Examples: Japanese respoilse to  the oil shocks 
Other internatio~lal comparisons 
Implies very different emission profiles and much higher cost of delay. 
whole disciplinary approach of morphological analysis has been developed 
to  explore the interrelated evolution of particular technological strands (e.g., 
with detailed studies of ferrous metal t e ~ h n o l o ~ i e s ) . ~  
Such factors give rise t o  the phenomena of technological "lock-in" and 
"lock-out." For example, as the steam turbine began to  dominate electricity 
4See, for example, studies in Nakidenovid and Griibler (1991) 
supply, RgtD expeildit,ure became focused on making marginal improvements 
in its performance. Conversely, the technology of refrigeration using hydro- 
carbons that developed in Central Europe in the 1930s withered as chloroflu- 
orocarbon (CFC) refrigeration developed, and has only very recently been 
revived, with little intervening development, under the pressure of the CFC 
phaseout . 
Because of such phenomena, it can be very difficult for new technologies 
to  be adequately developed and brought into the market quickly. Thus, 
establishing market share takes time and appears to  be a very important pre- 
requisite for adequate techi~ological development, because such development 
depends on cumulative corporate R&D and the parallel evolution of a series 
of interrelated industries. 
On all three counts therefore - technology availability, technology de- 
velopment processes, and technology clustering - understanding the eco- 
nomics of technology evolution is extremely important to  climate change 
policy. A rounded understailding strongly suggests that developing mar- 
kets for low-carbon options, for example, by enlission reduction programs, 
is a very important part of fostering the developments required to  achieve 
low-cost , long-term reductions. 
2.4. Adaptability in energy systeins 
Put together, these various features of induced technology development, 
technology clustering, etc., form a. basis for expecting that energy systems 
a.re to  an important degree adapta,ble - over time, they can develop to  ac- 
commodate various constraints. This is hardly surprising given the issues 
set out above, and this evidence is coillplemented by analyses of responses to  
the oil shocks (e.g., in Japan) and by international comparisons that show 
just how different energy systems can be, as summarized in Grubb et al. 
(1996). 
In Grubb et al. (1996), the authors show that if appropriate technol- 
ogy and systems development is indeed induced by emission constraints, it 
stands the argument about waiting for cost reductions on its head: rather, 
i t  becomes optimal t o  act earlier with steady pressure, so as to  stimulate the 
necessary technological and systemic developments. This is hardly surpris- 
ing; it is all an indication that complex technological systems evolve, but 
that  they may need significant pressures to evolve in different directions, for 
example, in the direction of miniinizing particular external environmental 
impacts that  previously have not affected corporate investment and R&D 
decisions. 
Similar illsights are developed in an ailalysis by Hourcade, who discusses 
the "flexibility" of the French energy ecoilomy in terms of different develop- 
ment paths (Hourcade, 1993). His study explicitly models the role of policy 
in accelerating paper technology diffusion and develops scenarios that  differ 
widely in COz emissioils but not long-run costs. 
The World Energy Council alsd offers insight on such issues and their im- 
plications; one of the recoinmendatioils of the Tokyo World Energy Congress 
Statement urges "governments, busiiless decision-makers and energy con- 
sumers" to "start taking action now to a.dapt to the needs of our long term 
future . . . the nest two or three decades represent the key period of opportu- 
nity for a transition to  a more sustainable path of development for the long 
term. Research done and action taken now will begin the shift of direction 
required of 'minimum-regrets' action" (WEC, 1995). 
To explore the iillplicatioils further, however, we first need to  consider 
another aspect of energy systems, na,inely, investment cycles and inertia. 
3. Capital Stock Turnover and Inertia 
3.1. Capital stock turilover 
The fact that  ''time is needed to re-optimize the capital stock" has been 
advanced as a secoild reason for deferring abatement. Certainly, a major 
change takes time if it is to be done without high cost. But capital stock 
is coiltinually being restructured as existing stock is refurbished or retired 
and new stock is created to replace old stock or to meet demand growth or 
challges in demand structure.' New capital investment is thus continually 
occurring. 
A key to  economically efficient abatement is thus to  seek to  make new 
capital stock less carbon intensive than it otherwise would be. This obviously 
involves a steady departure of enlissions from the "business as usual" tra- 
jectory, starting as soon as climate change is recognized to  be a potentially 
serious problem [a point that may reasonably be identified with the publica- 
tion of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's First Assessment 
Report in 1990 (IPCC, 1990)l. 
5Frequently, the oldest capital stock is also the least efficient, with rising maintenance 
costs. The net costs of retiring such stock rather than refurbishing it for a longer (polluting) 
life may be small and may indeed result in net gain when other factors are considered. 
When the costs are finely balanced, the economic issues are similar to those involved in 
new investment to meet demand growth. 
The economic importance of getting this right is itself apparent from the 
scenarios in the WRE paper. For their ceiltral stabilization case (550 ppm 
stabilization), their "deferred abatement" case shows the new pathway as 
involving emissions rising over the next 40 years from the current level of just 
under 7GtC/yr to  a pea,k about 4GtC/yr higher, before dropping by about 
2GtC/yr over the subsequeilt 40 yeais (and even faster thereafter). Thus 
the delay scenario involves constructing an additional 4GtC/yr of capital 
stock over and above that required for replacement. In total, WRE's central 
deferred scenario thus nlea.ns investing in a t  least as much new COz-based 
capital stock over the next few deca,des as is embodied in all of the world's 
energy systems today. Then, to  meet their target, the additional stock must 
be replaced by carbon-free sources over the subsequent decades. 
Especially when coupled with uncertainties about the actual objective 
(see below), this llas powerful industrial implications. Inappropriate delay 
in constraining emissions is not in t.he interests of industry. It increases the 
exposure of industry to the risk tlmt new, carbon-intensive investments will 
have to  be prematurely retired, a t  large cost and dislocation compared with 
the costs of avoiding such investlllents in the first place (e.g., coal power 
plants or mines left "stra.nded," or frontier oil exploration and development 
left without sufficient high-price markets when they mature). 
The World Energy Council, in the co~~clusions to  the Tokyo World En- 
ergy Congress (WEC, 1995), recogilized this in stating that "action post- 
poned will be opportunity lost, guaranteeiilg that  when action can no longer 
be avoided the ensuing costs will be higher; dislocations more severe; and the 
effects much less predictable, than if a.ppropriate actions are taken today." 
3.2. Inertia 
Because scenarios that  defer action to  limit greenhouse gas emissions gen- 
erally imply more rapid subsequent abatement (if the same ultimate goal 
is to be achieved), adequate understanding of inertia in energy systems is 
essential to  analyzing tinling issues. 
The existing structure of capital stock in energy-producing sectors, dis- 
cussed above, is one source of inertia. However, such "first order" capital 
stock issues (the structure of power generation facilities, petroleum refiner- 
ies, etc.) represent only a. coinponent of the issue. Considering only these 
first-order components appea.rs t o  suggest that  most of the stock has a life- 
time of 30-40 years, suggesting possibilities for almost complete transitions 
over such a period a t  low cost. 
1. Capital stock is contiilually being created and replaced 
New investments may be an  opportunity for efficient abatement 
New carbon-intensive investments are risk-exposed 
Encouraging move toward lower carbon investments implies steady de- 
parture from BAU 
2. Aging capital stock is si~llilarly a continuum offering lower 
cost opportunities for abatement 
Refurbish? 
3. Rapid changes are costly, in both GDP and welfare impacts 
Reduces opportuility for low-cost utilization of natural stock turnover 
Industrial dislocation, stranded investments 
Breaking out of "lock-in" may be espensive 
Amplifies disequilibrium and reduces optimality of resource allocation 
- Capital market iinperfectioils 
- Labor force resista.nce and inappropriate training 
- 0 ther macroecoi~omic dislocations 
Human "pain of change" from enforced unemployment, etc. 
In fact the situation is far more complex. Some causes of C 0 2  emissions 
lie in even more fixed structures such as poor building construction, urban 
sprawl, etc. Thus town planning today, for example, could have implications 
for abatement potential and costs a t  the end of the next century. 
The discussion of Sectioil 2 points to deeper sources of inertia. Further 
emissions growth involves expailsion of a huge complex of interdependent in- 
frastructure and industries dependent ultimately on emitting COz. Certain 
transport and urban developments - infrastructure that  may substantively 
last throughout the nest century - carry with them a whole structure of 
personal and business location coisequences, upon which the infrastructure 
in turn comes to depend. Coal-fired power stations carry with them a com- 
plex network of delivery systems, usually stretching back through rail and/or 
port facilities right back to the decisions and investment surrounding coal 
mines for the next century. The costs of escaping from such interdependent 
systems rapidly is likely to be far higher than more gradual, steady transi- 
tions, and avoiding such construction in the first place ( to the extent that  
adequate alternatives are available) is likely to be cheaper still. 
This obviously relates to  the phellolnena of technology clustering, "lock- 
in," and "lock-out," discussed above. Established industries invest to  protect 
their comparative advantage and draw on clusters of technologies surround- 
ing them. New entrants and even fundamental shifts are of course possible, 
but they take a long time to evolve and be deployed on a large scale. Hour- 
cade's study develops the concept inore explicitly with reference to  European 
transport in terms of "bifurcations," different paths that ,  once followed, are 
costly to  escape (Hourcade, 1993). 
The issue is thus far deeper than one of just understanding capital stock 
replacement. It involves basic questions about the inertia in socioecono~nic 
and political systems. Sceilarios that involve a period of substantial emis- 
sions growth followed by rapid changes in trajectory toward reductions could 
involve economic dislocatioil far beyond issues of capital stock. Labor forces 
trained for carbon-intensive operations would have to be made redundant 
or retrained, the network of industries based around growing fossil fuel con- 
sumption and carbon-based infrastructure would have to be thrown into 
reverse, reformed, and remodeled, etc. Each new investment in carbon- 
intensive stock may make the transition toward a low-carbon system that  
little bit more difficult and slower. 
Quite apart from the economic and social costs of waiting and then 
forcing a rapid transition, in reality it is doubtful whether governments, after 
putting off action for another couple of decades, could or would impose such 
drastic changes of direction. This in turn is a reflection of the high welfare 
costs associated with rapid contractions in any given industry, probably 
much greater than measured in GDP terms. The political feasibility of such 
scenarios is thus also very doubtful; starting off on such a trajectory in reality 
would probably not deliver the objective claimed. 
To consider the policy illlplications of such issues more fully, however, 
we need first to consider Inore ca.refully t.he broa.der nature of the policy 
challenge. 
4. The Impact of Uncertain Stabilization 
Objectives 
Recent studies (Wigley et al., 1996; Mallile and Richels, 1995) have ana- 
lyzed the long-term objective of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations a t  a 
prespecified level and discussed paths toward this objective as a fixed con- 
straint. This may be an interesting esercise, but it is one that  is only weakly 
related to  the problem we face. 
The real problem we face is characterized by concern about potential 
impacts of a highly u~~cer ta in  nature and magnitude. The Climate Change 
Convention establishes an aim of ultiinately stabilizing the atmosphere, but 
we do not know a t  what level it needs to  be stabilized, or how the interim 
impacts on climate change and consequent hulnan impacts may be related 
to the rate a t  which the atmosphere cllanges (the Convention Objective also 
refers t o  rates of change). I consider the economic implications of stabiliza- 
tion uncertainties and physical inlpacts in turn. 
A common misconceptioll in econonlic analysis is that  by analyzing a 
number of different scenarios, we have analyzed uncertainty. This is not the 
case a t  all. \We are not in a position to choose an appropriate stabilization 
objective; indeed, it would be llighly irrational to choose a single objective 
and stick with it for the nest 100 years without reference to what we learn. 
It would also be contrary to  the Convention, which emphasizes the need to 
adjust policy in light of the accunlulating knowledge. We have to develop 
policy in the full recognition of uncertaiilties and the expectation of learning 
more. 
This brings the question of inertia to the fore even more. If we delay 
action in the belief that  we are aiming a t  a 500 ppm target, for example, then 
after a couple of decades it may simply be too late to  be able to stabilize 
a t  400 ppm, however urgent the problem then turns out to be; and even 
stabilization at  450 ppm might by then involve radical changes of direction 
that  could prove economically very disruptive. 
Figure 2 sketches the changes that would be required if we were to  follow 
until 2020 the "deferred abatement" trajectory set out in the WRE paper 
for a 550 ppm limit, but then find that we have to stay within a 450 ppm 
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Figure 2. Potential impact of uiicertaiii stabilization constraints. 
limit .6 Within tlie space of 30 yea.rs, we would then have to dismantle or 
transform more than two-thirds of tlie world's carbon-based infrastructure 
- more carbon-intensive stocli tlia,ii esists in the whole of the world's en- 
ergy systems today. It would furthermore require not only faster, but much 
deeper action - car-free cities, for esample, rather than the low-emission, 
high-efficiency vehicles tlia,t might be coilsistent with a smoother abatement 
trajectory. 
Conversely, if we a.ct on the assumption of aiming a t  a lower level, but 
after a while conclude tliat we call safely go to higher levels, we may have 
incurred more costs than needed. But the costs of escessive caution against 
escessive optimisin nlay be highly asyillllietric (within limits). Steady sus- 
tained pressure to  limit elllissioils cannot expose us either economically or 
environmentally to  tlie scale of risks tliat inay be incurred by a long delay, if 
there is a real possibility t11a.t a, low stabilization level may prove necessary. 
The risk of overreacting - excessive abatement - seems comparable only if 
'The 450 ppm and 550 ppm trajectories are estimated from the graphs in Wigley et 
al. (1996), and the transition is estimated on the basis of equilibrating the areas of excess 
emissions against the later deficit, with some allowance for the greater absorption of the 
earlier emissions. The  IMAGE model, which contains a full carbon cycle model, has been 
applied t o  consider different trajectories of stabilization a t  450 ppm. Results indicate 
tha t  delaying abatement until 2025 would then require rather more drastic subsequent 
abatement than is depicted in Figure 2; the concentration unavoidably overshoots 450 ppm 
and emissions in their projections go below zero in the period 2075-2100 in order to  try 
and bring concentrations back toward 450 ppm (Alcamo, 1996). Thus, Figure 2 may 
understate the degree of reduction required after such a delay to  stay within such a limit. 
we embark on drastic and very costly a.ba.tement progra.ms that  later prove 
unnecessary. 
The best initial path is a colllplex ba,lance of such risks, but an appropri- 
a te  balance clearly does not involve followillg "business as usual" emissions 
while waiting for evidence to  accumulate. Governments acknowledged this 
clearly in a number of references In the IPCC WG-I11 Policymakers Sum- 
mary (IPCC, 1995). 
5.  Impact Costs: Time Preferences and the Rate 
of Atmospheric Change 
Finally, a reasonable appraisal of the economic issues involved in timing 
emissions abatement needs t o  consider the actual impacts of climate change. 
These are of course fraught with uncertainty. However, several qualitative 
coilsiderations indicate that coilsidering impact costs leads to  different time 
profiles than optiinizatioil under a fixed (or perhaps even a stochastic) sta- 
bilization constraint, quite apart from the fact that  a positive benefit (in 
terms of reduced impacts) is now a.ssociated with achieving lower stabiliza- 
tion levels. 
First, consideration of the damage expected from climate change, 
whether large or small, brings a new element into consideration of time 
discounting. For the argument that marginal productivity makes it cheaper 
to  defer the costs of abatement applies similarly to  impacts: avoiding dam- 
age earlier also has a grea.ter present economic value. Deferring emissions 
abatement defers abateineilt costs, but it brings impact costs nearer. So, 
even ileglecting all other considerations, the implications of time discount- 
ing for the overall policy problem a.re not as clear-cut as is implied in studies 
that  consider only the question of stabilization without reference t o  damage 
(so that  discounting applies only t o  a.batement costs). 
In physical terms the time pa.ths of impacts may be expected to differ 
according to  the time path of emissions (as the WRE paper is careful to  
note; it presents calculations of how global average temperature and sea-level 
change vary between scenarios). One particular feature of this is, however, 
worth highlighting. An important index of climate change impacts may be 
the rate a t  which radiative forcing in the atmosphere (and hence average 
temperature) The questioil of rates of change may be particularly 
important given the tendency of some complex systems to  become more 
7Note that the rate of radiative change has no direct impact in itself, but represents a 
driving force that emerges as subsecluent t.emperature and other 
(30% higher average rale of changf ? out to 2050) 
Time 
F i g u r e  3. Impact of deferred abatement on radiative change. Source: De- 
rived from data  in Wigley, 1996. 
unstable when subject to  high rates of change and given the inertia of human 
societies. Thus, more rapid radiative and temperature change seems likely 
t o  bring more rapid, and perhaps more volatile, climatic change, and human 
societies are likely to  have greater difficulty in adapting t o  such changes than 
if they were to  occur more slowly and smoothly. 
Because the radiative impact of COz is approximately logarithmic with 
concentration, the rate of radiative change in most scenarios is greatest a t  
present and in the near future. Figure 3 shows how deferring abatement until 
2010 and followiilg the WRE 550a trajectory, greatly extends the period of 
high rates of radiative c l~ange .~  Averaged over the period 2000-2050, the 
average rate of change is about 30% higher than in the IPCC trajectory for 
the same ultimate stabilizatioil limit. 
Figure 3 compares the radiative forcing associated with COz emissions 
(as indexed by the log of COz concentration relative t o  preindustrial condi- 
tions) in the IPCC 550 ppm stabilization profile against the profile arising 
from the WRE scenario with abatement delayed until 2010 (550a). Although 
they converge on the same concentration, the average rate of change in the 
'If emissions are assumed to have been growing steadily and t o  continue t o  do so, 
then the rate of radiative change would already be declining from its peak. Given a more 
realistic representation of COz emissions over the past 20 years (i.e., the very slow growth 
in global emissions following the oil shocks, followed by large reductions in the countries 
with economies in transition), but with resnmed global growth from the mid 1990s, the 
rate of radiative change may approach its maximum in the coming years and delaying 
abatement would increase the maximum rate of change as well as extending it. 
first 50 years of the next century is about 30% higher for the case with 
delayed abatement. 
This is reflected in projections of temperature change. The WRE paper 
shows that  deferring emissioils a.batement implies a more rapid temperature 
change through the middle of the next century, and then a rather abrupt 
transition as the stabilization ceilihg is approached. For their central case, 
averaged over the next 50 years, the rate of temperature change appears to  
be more than 20% higher than is the case without deferment of emissions 
abatement. 
Results from the IMAGE model reinforce the importance of such consid- 
erations. Compared with the IPCC 450 ppm scenario, a 450 ppm scenario in 
which abatement is delayed until 2025 (followed by rapid reductions) leads 
to  a 40% higher rate of globa,l a.verage teinperature change over the first half 
of the next century, and a higher overa,ll pea.k temperature later in the cen- 
tury. We do not know the extent to ivllich the physical and human impacts 
of climate change depend on the rate of radiative and temperature change, 
but it is clearly something that  needs to  be factored into consideration of 
emission paths, and deserves further aaalysis urgently.g 
6 .  A Brief Note on Economic Modeling 
The discussion so far has not addressed specific economic modeling results. 
Although the WR,E paper likewise does not contain any economic modeling, 
it does justify some of its ecoilomic sta.tements and choice of delay scenarios 
with reference to  the results of seine ecoilomic models. The models referred 
to  are all of the equilibrium, resource-allocation type; notably, the MERGE 
model, which has been applied directly to questions of emissions abatement 
timing (Manne and R.ichels, 1995) a.nd the Edmonds-Reilly model (the Aus- 
tralian MEGABARE model, which has also been applied extensively to  ex- 
amine the near-term costs of different abatement strategies but not explicitly 
to  questions of abatement timing, is also of this type). 
Such a modeling framework is very weak in both the dimensions of inertia 
and technology development discussed above - the key dimensions required 
for analysis of techi~ological and systems aspect,s of the timing issue. Most 
such models do reflect capital stock turnover, but only first-order issues of 
'The IMAGE model has been used to look in more detail at the implications of delay for 
rates of change under a 450 ppm ceiling. Other indicators that are substantidy affected 
throughout the next century by delayed action include maize yields and natural vegetation 
change (Alcamo, 1996). 
energy production stock. Beca.use they assume that  the economy is in a. sta,te 
of full equilibrium resource alloca.tion and do not illode1 the inertia. associated 
with interdependence among different economic sectors, they only capture 
a small fraction of the full costs associated with imposing rapid changes. 
Such models simply do not provide realistic insight into the full economic 
and welfare costs of making more rapid changes of direction and steeper 
abatement after a period of delay. 
In addition, these i~lodels all assume that  technology development is ex- 
ogenous, i.e., the costs of different options and the rate of cost reductions are 
external to the market conditions assumed in the model. None of the mod- 
els cited embodies rnechailisn~s by which emission constraints can stimulate 
corporate R&D, learning-by-doing, or other behavior that  may reduce the 
costs of lower-carbon techilology; nor do they capture issues of technology 
clustering or wider a.daptive responses. 
Consequently, the econoinic inodeliilg studies that have been widely re- 
ferred to  in the context of justifying delays in emissions abatement cannot 
be considered to give reliable insight into the timing issue. And, as noted 
above, most of these studies focus on the question of time paths to a fixed, 
preset stabilization constra.int, which for the reasons discussed above is only 
weakly related to the a.ctua1 policy problem. 
Other studies using different approaches indicate just how much results 
can differ. Nordhaus (1991, 1995) and Cline (1992) have adopted highly 
aggregated cost-benefit frainewol.lis. Despite great differences in their as- 
suinptions regarding climatic da.ina.ge, their studies both indicate that  some 
significant abatement action would be optiinal now and that the appropri- 
ate level of control is increased when uncerta.inty is taken into account. This 
conclusion emerges from the cost-benefit nature of the analysis rather than 
their analysis of energy systems. Grubb et al. (1996) extend such frameworks 
and show that  if the energy system has high inertia but is in the long run 
highly adaptive, then the costs of delaying abatement may be many times 
higher than when these factors are ignored or assumed to  be negligible.1° 
7. Conclusions 
The discussion in this paper highlights many issues that  need to  be consid- 
ered in addressing the optiinal timing of C 0 2  emission limitations. 
1°A more extensive numeric model, which yields similar results concerning the costs of 
delay, is presented in Ha Duong et a/. (1996). 
The analysis of energy tecl~nology and systems issues illustrates their 
complexity. The fa.ct that energy technology developn~ent may make large 
emission reductions cheaper in the future needs to  be assessed against other 
factors: the diversity of options currently available; the fact that such tech- 
nology development may actually be induced by abatement action; and the 
interacting nature of technology and systems development. To the extent 
that  energy systems have a broader capacity to  adapt given time, all this 
implies that  countervailing economic benefits may flow from earlier action. 
Furthermore, energy systems are characterized by continuous slow stock 
turnover combined with tremendous inertia to rapid change. Incremental 
changes toward greater efficiency and lower-carbon options in the course of 
stock replacement a,nd expansioil inay consequently be much cheaper than 
continuing to  construct new carbon-intensive capital stock, since that stock 
inay be exposed to the risk of recluiring lllore rapid reductions later on. 
This a.ssumes particu1a.r importa.nce when the high uncertainties about 
the damage from climate chailge are recognized. The fact that  we cannot 
know a t  present the co~lceiltratioil a t  1vhic11 the atmosphere should be sta- 
bilized makes the questioil of inertia extremely important, because of the 
potentially very high industrial and economic costs if the initial response 
proves to  be much too relaxed. Consideration of impacts, and particularly 
rates of change in the first half of the next century, highlights the need t o  
consider the benefits that may collie from earlier action, in terms of reducing 
rates of change, aloilgside considera.tions of aiming a t  a fixed stabilization 
ceiling. 
These various economic issues a.re sullllllarized in Table 1. Some favor 
deferment, some rapid action. Clearly, focusing only on the economic factors 
that  favor deferment leads one to the coilclusion that  this will be cheaper. 
Conversely, focusing oilly on the ecoilomic and other reasons for early action, 
without reference to  the factors that could make rapid action now more 
expensive, leads one to conclude that we should take rapid and perhaps 
drastic abatement action. 
Economics is about making tradeoffs. Neither of the above extremes 
represents a balanced approach, or a balanced conclusion. The problem 
requires serious analysis of many complex dimensions, but I would suggest 
that  it should be possible for most analysts to  agree on the following minimal 
conclusions. 
1. Economic issues surrounding the optimal timing of greenhouse gas emis- 
sions abatement are complex, with some factors favoring deferment and 
others favoring strong early reductioils in emissions. 
Table 1. Balancing t h e  ecoilomic issues. 
Issue Favoring defernlent Fa.voring early abatement 
Technology Exogenous technical Low-cost measures may have 
development change implies t,lia.t it is substantial impact on trajectories 
cheaper t o  focus on R k D  Endogenous (market-induced) 
expenditure and wait for - change will accelerate development of 
i~nprovements low-cost solutions 
Clustering effects highlight 
inlportance of getting on lower 
emission trajectories 
Capital Deferment avoids action Exploit natural stock turnover by 
stock and now that  could (if rapid influencing new investments 
inertia enough) force premature Reduces mas .  rate of reduction and 
retireinent/n~isutilization associated transitional scrapping and 
of current stock disequilibrium 
Reduces risks from uncertainties in 
stabilization constraint and hence risk 
of being forced into very rapid changes 
Discounting Reduces the present 
value of abatement costs 
(ceteris paribus) 
Carbon More early emissions 
cycle and absorbed, thus enabling 
radiative higher total carbon 
change emissions under a given 
sta.bilization constraint 
Reduces impacts and (ceieris 
paribus) reduces their present value 
Reduces high rates of radiative and 
temperature change over coming 
decades (except for sources with high 
aerosol eiiaissions) 
Enables lower stabilization levels t o  
be achieved 
2. Quest ions  of  technology a n d  sys tems  availability a n d  development a r e  
very i m p o r t a n t  a n d  mus t  recogllize t h e  wide s p e c t r u m  of technologies 
b o t h  current ly  and potelltially available, a s  well a s  t h e  s p e c t r u m  of pro- 
cesses by  which such technologies m a y  b e  developed a n d  incorpora ted  
in  energy sys tems.  
3. I n  a n  equil ibrium framework,  considering only exogenous technology de- 
velopment  a n d  first-order capi ta l  s tock turnover  under  a preset  stabiliza- 
t i on  cons t r a in t  (as  ci ted i n  t h e  WRE paper )  favors deferring emission 
reductions." Focusing only  o n  a n  opposi te  m i x  of issues favors r ap id  
"It should be noted that Tom Wigley, the lead author of the WRE paper, objected 
to this representation of the WRE paper on the grounds that it is primarily a scientific 
paper and contains no economic modeling. I refer to it in this context only because the 
central economic assertions in the paper have received considerable policy and political 
and drastic abatement. Neither represents a balanced assessment of the 
policy problem. 
4. A balanced assessment would recomlnend avoiding large-scale deploy- 
ment of technologies that are immature and costly, but would favor 
steady abatement efforts to exploit a t  least low-cost measures, to de- 
ter new carbon-intensive investments (including major refurbishments), 
and to stimulate development and diffusion of lower-carbon technolo- 
gies, practices, and infrastructure through market incentives as well as 
government R&D. 
Thus, given acceptance of the basic climate problem, from any credible 
economic perspective some aba.tement action is justified now.12 The question 
of just how much will doubtless be a topic of modeling wars for many years 
to come. For to  go much beyond the general conclusions set out here, much 
more research and model a.pplication of technology and systems development 
and deployment processes, in a coiltest of high uncertainty, among other 
things, is required. 
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Technological Change and Learning* 
NebojSa Nukic'enovic' 
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
1. Introduction 
Energy and carbon intensities of economic activities have been declining 
since the onset of industrialization two centuries ago. Technologies that  
are more energy efficient have replaced less efficient ones, and technologies 
that  are less carbon intensive have replaced those that  are more carbon 
intensive. Technological change has made a major contribution to  these 
long-term iinprovements in the productivity of energy. In particular, the 
decarbonization of energy - namely, the reduction of the specific carbon 
content of energy - can be interpreted as a long-term learning process that  
can be represented by a learning curve. In this paper it is argued that  
the dynamics of technological cha.nge is a cumulative process of learning by 
doing. Technological change is not an "autonomous" process, although it is 
often represented as such in energy and ecoilomic models. 
A number of implications will be coilsidered with reference to  the miti- 
gation of carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  emissions. Various mitigation strategies for 
countering the possibility of climate change have been proposed. Recently, 
research has begun to  focus on the forlllulation of global C 0 2  emissions pro- 
files that  would lead to  the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations a t  
some negotiated level in accordance with Article 2 of the Framework Con- 
vention on Climate Change (UN/FCCC, 1992). For example, all of the 
COz emissions profiles that lead to concentrations stabilization that  were 
analyzed by the Intergovernnlental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1996) 
require the eventual reduction of global carbon emissions from well below to  
less than half the current levels during the next two centuries. In view of 
the increasing needs for energy services in the world, especially in develop- 
ing countries, such emission reductions will require a substantial increase in 
the decarbonization rate. This, in turn, implies a larger future role for new 
*This paper reports initial results of introducing technological learning into the model 
MESSAGE based on the analysis presented in greater detail by Messner (1996). The 
author is grateful for the permission to use these results. Helpful comments and suggestions 
were received from Jae Edmonds, Dominique Foray, Bill Nordhaus, and Rich Richels. The 
views presented are solely those of t,he author. 
technologies with lower C ! 0 2  emissions. Thus, there is a.n increasing recogni- 
tion in the literature that a.ba.tenlent of C 0 2  enlissions requires a sustained 
commitment to research, clevelopn~ent, and demonstration (RD&D) today 
(see, for example, I'igley et aJ., 1996). 
It will be shown t11a.t in conjunction with RD&D timely investment in 
new technologies with lower C 0 2  elnissions might be a more cost-effective 
strategy for reducing global enlissions than postponing investment decisions 
in the hope that mitigation technologies might somehow become more at-  
tractive through RD&D, "a.utoi~omous" improvements, and cost reductions 
in step with natural turnover of capital. It  has recently been argued that  the 
latter strategy is superior to  a inore timely introduction of lower-emission 
technologies, because a.t present these techilologies are generally costlier than 
the alternatives (see, for exa'mple, Wigley et  al. ,  1996, and the paper hy 
Richels et al. in this volume). Althougl~ this is true, postponement in itself 
will bring few additional benefits. Ih'hile the costs and performance of tech- 
nologies are generally inodeled as if they were exogenous, they are not. Costs 
of new tecllnologies lmve been shown to  decline and performance to  increase 
with accumulated experience and improvements. Unless there is dedicated, 
timely, and pronounced illvestment in these technologies, they are unlikely 
to  be developed and thus becolne conlillercially viable and competitive in 
the market place. Learning by doing is a prerequisite for performance im- 
provements, cost reductions, a.nd eventual diffusion. Postponing investment 
decisions will not bring about tlle tecllilological cha,nge required to  reduce 
C 0 2  emissions in a cost-effective wa,y. Even worse, under unfavorable condi- 
tions it might bring a,bout further "locli-in" of energy systems and econoinic 
activities along fossil-intensive development paths. 
The implication is that there illa,y be great leverage in policies and mea- 
sures that accelera.te the a.ccumulation of experience in new technologies 
with lower environmental impa.cts, for esa,mple, through early adoption and 
development of special niche ma.rliets. This leverage can be important, par- 
ticularly if these policies can illini~nize the "deadweight" loss to society as- 
sociated with the foregone exploitation of cheaper fossil fuels and possible 
reductions of RD&D in other parts of the economy. That is, an  acceleration 
of energy-related technical progress may be accompanied by a slowdown in 
labor and capital productivity. These are some of the problems and issues 
that  must be resolved before tecl~i~ological change can become a truly en- 
dogenous component in standard inodeling approaches. In the meantime, 
an  increasing number of models a.re being adapted to  explore alternative 
ways of incorporating endogenous teclulical change. In this paper we will 
explore the nature of the rela.tionship between tecl~i~ological learning, costs 
and performance of new technologies, and resulting emissions profiles from 
the global electricity generation system with the MESSAGE model. 
2. Decarbonization - - 
Through decarbonization, energy services can be provided with lower carbon 
emissions. The process can be expressed as a product of two factors: decar- 
bonization of energy and reductioil of the energy intensity of economic activ- 
ities, for example, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP). Figure 1 
shows the decarbonization of GDP; Figures 2 and 3 show the decarboniza- 
tion of energy and the reduction of energy intensity of GDP, respectively. 
The example for the USA is shown in the three figures primarily because 
the data  are of relatively good quality; however, available data  allow the 
assessment of decarbonizatioll trends with reasonable confidence for other 
major energy-consuming regions and countries, such as France and the UK, 
and for the world as a whole (see, for example, NakiCenoviC, 1996; Griibler 
and NakiCenoviC, 1996). Over shorter time periods similar decarbonization 
trends can be obtained for nlaily developed and industrializing countries, 
such as India and China. In Figure 1, the decarbonization rate is expressed 
in kilograms of carboil (kgC) per unit of GDP in US dollars measured a t  
1990 prices. The avera.ge amnual rate of decline is about 1.3%) meaning that  
every year about 1.3% less ca.rbon is emitted to  generate one dollar of value 
added. 
Today, about a quarter of a kilogram of carbon is emitted per dollar 
value added in the USA, and about half that  amount is emitted per dollar 
value added in Europe and Japa.11. However, the amount of carbon emitted 
per dollar value added is significantly greater in most developing and many 
re-forming countries. Thus, it is evident there are different paths of economic 
development that  lead to similar levels of affluence a t  quite different levels of 
C 0 2  emissions. The prime objective of possible mitigation strategies is to  re- 
duce these emission levels by increasing the rate of decarbonization through- 
out the world. At an average decarbonization rate of 1.3% per year, global 
C 0 2  emissions will increase about 1.7% annually, assuming the economic 
growth rate remains a t  about 3% per year. This increase will lead t o  a dou- 
bling of emission levels in about 40 years. Thus, to  stabilize global emissions 
a t  some (higher) level in the future, the decarbonization rate would have t o  
a t  least double to  offset the current rate of economic growth. The second 
Figure 1. Decarbonization of ecollo~llic activities in the USA, ex- 
pressed in kilograms of carbon per unit of GDP a t  constant 1990 prices 
[kgC/US(1990)$]. 
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Figure 2. Decarbonization of primary energy in the USA and selected 
countries, expressed in kilograllls of carbon per kilogram oil equivalent 
(kgC/ kgoe). 
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Figure 3. Primary energy iilteilsity of economic activities in the USA and 
selected countries, expressed in liilograms of oil equivalent per unit GDP a t  
constant 1990 prices [ligoe/US(1990)$]. 
alternative, maintaining lower rates of economic growth, is clearly undesir- 
able in light of the existing widespread poverty and deprivation throughout 
the world. 
Figure 4 portrays ailother iinage of the dynamics of decarbonization. 
The data  from Figure 1 are now shown a,s a learning or experience curve. The 
ratio of carbon emissioils to  GDP is shown versus the cumulative emissions 
in a double logarithmic diagram. There is an exponential decline (linear 
on double logarithmic scales) in specific carbon emissions per doubling of 
cumulative emissions. Appa.rently, the illore we emit, the more we learn 
10 
Cumulative Carbon - GtC 
Figure 4. Decarbonization of economic activities in the USA as a learning 
process where accumulated experience is represented by cumulative COa 
emissions, expressed in kilograms of carbon per unit of GDP a t  constant 
1990 prices [kgC/US(1990)$] versus culnulative COa emissions in gigatons 
of carbon (GtC) on double logarithmic axes. 
about how to emit less per unit value. This is a typical process of learning 
with cumulative experience. The progress ratio is actually quite high at 
about 76% (representing a. 24% cost reduction in specific emissions) per 
doubling of cumulative emissions. This figure compares with progress ratios 
in the range of 70-90% across a iluinber of energy technology learning curves 
reported in the literature (e.g., see Christiansson, 1995). 
As a kind of tllought esperiment, assume a hypothetical case where 
this rate of learning continues for ailother century. In this case, one could 
expect the specific carbon emissions to  continue to  decline. To date, the 
USA has emitted about 100 gigatoils of carbon (GtC, or billion tons of 
carbon), slightly less thail half the cumulative global emissions, estimated 
a t  about 250 GtC. If the rate of 1ea.rning were to  remain the same, another 
100 GtC would be emitted before the specific emissions could be reduced 
Figure 5 .  Primary energy consulllption by major energy sources in the 
USA, expressed in million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe). 
another 24%. This rate is clearly too slow for a transition to the post- 
fossil era within a century or two. Thus, for a more drastic increase of 
decarbonization, substantially higher rates of technological learning would 
be required. 
Before discussillg the process of endogenizing technological learning, let 
us first consider the techllology dynamics behind the historical rates of de- 
carbonization and the iinplications decarbonization carries for the possible 
diffusion of less-carbon-intensive energy tecllnologies in the future. Figure 5 
shows the hierarchy of repla,cements of old energy sources with new ones in 
the USA. This dynamic process of technological substitution is the driving 
force behind the historical rates of decarbonization. 
Traditional energy forms such as animal feed and wood have a high 
carbon content, both per unit of energy and per unit of economic activity, 
because of the relatively low efficiency with which they deliver demanded 
energy services. Draft animals a,nd open fire have very low energy conversion 
efficiencies compared with contenzporary prime movers and furnaces. It is 
true that  some of the relea,sed caabon can be reabsorbed by new plant growth 
a.nd new trees, and by the repla,iltiilg of animal feed, but quite often the 
land is not used in a snst,a.inable fashion. For example, because rnaily of 
these activities are associated with deforestation and land degradation, they 
often lead to net carbon flux to the atmosphere. The carbon intensity of 
fuelwood and animal feed is substalltially higher than that  of coal. Moreover, 
coal can be used with generally 11~~116s efficiencies. For these reasons, coal 
eveiltually supplanted traditional energy forms. This progress toward energy 
sources with lower ca.rbon coilteilts a,ild higher conversion efficiencies has 
continued, with shifts from coal to  oil to natural gas, and more recently to  
nuclear energy and new renewable sources of energy, both of which have 
minimal carbon emissions. Natural gas in itself brings enormous reductions 
in carbon emissions (with half the ca.rbon emissions of coal) as well as higher 
efficiencies. 
Using the available da.ta., the historical replacement of coal with oil 
and later with natural gas ca.n be illustra.ted for most countries and ma- 
jor energy-consuming regions, a,s well a.s for the world as a whole (Marchetti 
and Nakidenovid, 1979; Nakidenovid, 1979). If all energy sources are consid- 
ered the replacement process is very intricate and complex, as can be seen 
from Figure 5. Similar dyna.mics of techi~ological substitution have been 
studied for other systems, such a.s tra.nsport and steel making (Griibler and 
Nakidenovid, 1988; Nakidenovid, 1990). It is a process with long transition 
periods from older to newer technologies, especially in the areas of energy 
systems and infrastructure. Tlle coinpetitive struggle between the five main 
sources of primary energy - wood, feed, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear materials 
- has proved to  be a process with regu1a.r dyilalnics that  can be described 
by relatively sinlple rules. This process is shown in Figure 6 for the USA, 
b a e d  on the da ta  from Figure 5. 
A glance revea.1~ the domillance of coal as the principal energy source 
between the 1880s and the 1950s, a.ftes a long period during which fuelwood, 
a.nima1 feed, and other tra,ditional energy sources were predominant. The 
mature coal economy meshed with the massive expailsion of railroads and 
steamship lines, the growth of steel making, and the electrification of fac- 
tories. During the 1960s, oil assumed a dominant role in conjunction with 
the development of automotive transport, the petrochemical industry, and 
markets for home heating oil. If this substitution continues to progress a t  
similar rates in the future, natural gas (methane) will be the dominant source 
of energy during the first decades of the next century, although oil is likely t o  
maintain the second largest share until the 2020s. Such an exploratory look 
into the future requires additional a.ssumptions t o  describe the subsequent 
competition of pot,eilt,ial new energy sources such as nuclear, solar, and other 
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Figure 6. Primary energy substitution in the USA, historical data  and 
model projections for the future, expressed in fractional market shares (F) 
and transformed as F/(1-F) on logarithmic ases. 
renewables, wllicll have not yet ca.ptured sufficient market shares to allow an 
estimatioil of their penetration rates and inarket potentials. Because all of 
these alternative energy sources 11a.ve only illinimal GO2 emissions and nat- 
ural gas has the lowest emissions of all fossil fuels, the unfolding of primary 
energy substitution implies a gradual contiiluation of energy decarbonization 
througl~out he world. 
3. Technological Learning 
The replacement of old technologies with new ones occurs gradually. The 
performance of new tecllnologies improves and their costs decrease with in- 
creases in production and use. Accumulated experience and learning can 
be assumed to  increase with increases in the market shares of a new tech- 
nology. As technologies mature, their improvement potentials decrease. A 
somewhat stylized difference between new and old technologies is that the 
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Figure 7. Reductions of investillent costs for three representative new 
and advanced technologies as a learniilg process, expressed in US dollars 
a t  constant 1990 prices per unit installed capacity [US(1990)$/kW] versus 
cumulative installed capacity ( TvlLV) on double logarithmic axes. 
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former are costlier a t  the time of their introduction, but their costs can be 
assumed t o  decrease with increases in their market share so that  a t  some 
point the cost curves might cross, making them a more attractive choice than 
the old technology. Learniilg curves capture this process. Figure 7 presents 
a ilumber of illustrative examples (IIASA-WEC, 1995; Griibler et al., 1996; 
NakitenoviC and Rogner, 1996). It shows rapid declines in investment costs 
with every doubliilg of cumulative installed capacity of gas combustion tur- 
bines and wind and photovoltaic (PV) systems. This pattern of performance 
improvement and cost reductions with accumulated experience and learning 
is common to  most technologies, although its specific shape depends on the 
technology. Typical progress ratios listed in the literature range between 
65% and 95% for all technologies and between 70% and 90% for energy 
technologies (Christiansson, 1995). There are significant cost improvements 
during the RD&D. For example, in Figure 7 (with a progress ratio of 88%) 
an 18% reduction in investment costs per doubling of cumulative produc- 
tion is shown for the case of gas combustion turbines. These improvements 
during the RD&D phase are followed by nlore modest improvements after 
commercialization, 7% per production doubliilg for combustion turbines, for 
example. If such cost reductioils were to  continue in the future for the PV 
R&D and technical Commercialization 
demonstration phase o phase a 
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Figure 8. Mean aad staadard deviation of investment costs for 10 repre- 
sentative conversion tecl~nologies, current aad future (about 2020), based on 
data  in the IIASA techilology illveiltory C02DB. Source: Strubegger and 
Reitgruber, 1995. 
systems, these systeills could become conlmercially viable in a few decades, 
with cost reductioils of about a fa.ctor of five to  one order of magnitude com- 
pared with toda,y's costs (from between US$10,000/kW and US$5,000/kW 
t o  as little as US$1000/kW; see IIASA-WEC, 1995; Ishitani et al., 1996; 
NakiCenoviC et al., 1996). 
Technological learning is reflected in most energy and emission scenar- 
ios and their underlying assun~ptions. New a.nd emerging technologies are 
assumed to  have better performailce a.nd lower costs in the future compared 
with current levels. Figure 8 reflects a range of such assumptions for some 
new and emerging energy coilversion technologies. It is based on the Inter- 
national Institute for Applied Systeills Analysis (IIASA) inventory of mit- 
igation technologies, C02DB (Messner and Strubegger, 1991; Messner and 
NakiCenoviC, 1992; Schafer et cr.l., 1992). This database currently includes 
chara.cterization of about 1600 energy tecl~nologies, from energy extraction 
and conversion to  energy end use. The database includes current and future 
technologies based on inforlnation from the literature for a number of coun- 
tries and representative world regions. A large share of technology descrip- 
tions come from various energy nlodeling efforts. Most of the information 
is available for energy conversion technologies. In many cases, there are a 
sufficient number of data points fdr a'given type of technology, such as for 
gas combustion turbines of PV systems, so that sample mean and standard 
deviation can be meaningfully derived. Figure 8 shows such statistics for 
10 representative conversion technologies and gives the mean and standard 
deviation for current and future (about 2020) investment costs (Strubegger 
and Reitgruber, 1995). A glance reveals a clear pattern: current costs are 
higher than the assu~lled future costs. The less mature a technology is to- 
day (such as the PV systems). the higher the future cost reductions and the 
higher the uncertainty, as evideilced by wider distribution of cost estimates. 
This is indeed consisteilt with the pllenomenon of cost reductions associated 
with learning, assuming that the installed capacities of these technologies 
will increase in the future, making them more competitive compared with 
current alternatives. 
Equivalent assumptions are made in most modeling efforts and scenar- 
ios about future energy and emissions. Over time, new technologies be- 
come more attractive as their costs decrease and their performance improves. 
Sometimes such new tecllilologies are called "backstops." Originally, Nord- 
haus (1973) formulated the concept of a backstop to  mean a technology 
that  has a virtually infinite resource base (for example, photovoltaic sys- 
tems). Generally it is assumed that backstop technologies require RD&D 
and that they are too costly to  be competitive at  the present time. Al- 
ternatively, if the costs of other technologies increase, the backstops may 
become competitive at  some point in the future. There is, of course, a fun- 
damental difference between the two approaches. In the first approach, it 
is assumed that  new technologies will become cheaper and have better per- 
formance through RD&D and "autonomous" technological change, without 
however explicitly accounting for RD&D and appropriability issues. In the 
second approach, backstops becoine more attractive as supply limitations of 
currently competitive tecllilologies lead to  increases in their costs compared 
with those of the alternatives. In either case, technological change is either 
assumed to  occur implicitly through specified market increases or takes the 
form of an exogenous parameter. This is a standard view of technological 
change in most economic modeling approaches. In some manner technolo- 
gies are "ready" before entering the economic world and the entrepreneurs 
call choose a.mong t,llenl a.ccorc1ing to their costs and rela,tive performance 
so t11a.t they do have incelltives t.o postpoile iilvestillent in ilew technologies. 
For example, Richels et a1. a,rgue in this volume that "exogenous specifica- 
tion of technology change tends t o  overstate the costs of carbon" emissions 
reductions. 
In general, the problem is that-new technologies appear as "manna from 
heaven" in the standard approa,ches of modeling technological change: as 
time passes, new technologies become the best choices without any explicit 
RD&D effort or investment and without any of the risks that  entrepreneurs 
usually face. This is why these models are said to  have an "autonomous" 
rate of technological change. 
Models that  employ a .u toi~oi~~ous  tecl~i~ological change portray exogenous 
improvement of techilologies over time. Because these models employ market 
allocation algorithms, the technologies gradually penetrate the market. This 
kind of simulation call emulate the introduction of new technologies and their 
diffusion. The employment of autoilon~ous technological change assumptions 
can lead to  either too much or too little technological change relative t o  an 
eildogenous model, uilless the nature of the autonomous path of technological 
change is known a priori as a sceilario assumption. 
The exogenous specification of costs of new technologies and their de- 
crease over time implies that  1a.ter adoption would be cheaper than early 
adoption. Thus, it is evident tlmt in a illode1 where a given autonomous 
rate of technological change is assumed, is a cost-effective strategy t o  post- 
pone illvestinent in low-carbon techi~ologies until they become cheaper and 
until the current viilta,ges becoille obsolete. I11 reality, such results are mis- 
leading. If such initigatioil strategies were to  be adopted, there would be no 
investment in new technologies: all a.gents would wait for them to  become 
more attractive, and no one would risk an  early investment. Consequently, 
the technologies would not enter the market place and there would be no 
backstops in the future to  reduce emissions. Instead, an emissions-intensive 
development path would be adopted that  might prove difficult if not impos- 
sible to  change midcourse. Even worse, there is some evidence that  tech- 
nological "forgetting by not doing" can occur (Rosegger, 1991). Figure 6 
illustrates how importailt inertia. is in the energy systems: it takes decades 
t o  achieve a transition from old to  new technologies through active innova- 
tion and diffusion of new technologies, and for each of the successes there 
are many failures. It is in this light that  the policy-relevant assessments of 
cost-optimal time paths of enlissioils reductions should be considered. 
4. Endogenizing Technological Change 
The lack of tecl~nological realism and dynamics in most energy modeling 
work obviously must be rectified. This has been recognized for a long time. 
For example, Nordhaus and van der Heyden (1977) attempted to  endogenize 
technological change in an energy model of the USA two decades ago. They 
included RD&D and learning by doing in the form of cost reductions as a 
function of cumulative output of a technology. In the meantime, mathemat- 
ical programming and coillputing techniques have improved so that  it is now 
possible to  capture RD&D and learning processes in greater detail, although 
computations requirements are still quite challenging. 
A new research effort currently under way at  IIASA aims a t  endoge- 
nizing tecl~i~ological change illto the energy systems mathematical program- 
ming model MESSAGE (Messner, 1995) and iiltroducing uncertainty into 
the characteristics of new and emerging techilologies (Messner et al., 1996). 
The article by Griibler and hilessner in this volume summarizes some of this 
work in the area of techi~ological uncertainty analysis. This paper reports 
on some of the research findiilgs based on iiltroducing technological learning 
into the model MESSAGE, iilcluding soille results that  are relevant for future 
rates of decarbonization of electricity generation. This analysis is presented 
in greater detail by hlessner (1996). 
Messner (1996) introduced techi~ological learning into MESSAGE in 
terms of investment-cost reductioils as a function of cumulative installations 
for six new and emerging electricity geileration technologies: advanced coal, 
natural gas combined-cycle, advanced nuclear, wind, solar thermal, and PV 
systems. The learning process starts at  present costs and can reach much 
lower and more competitive costs by accunlulating experience. For example, 
for PV systems the assunled leariling curve can lead to  cost reductions of 
a factor of five between the base year (1990) and 2050 (from US$5,100 to  
US$1,000 per kW installed); the reduction potential for gas combined-cycle 
systems is approximately 45% (fro111 US3730 to US$400 per kW installed). 
The technological learning assun~ptions for all six conversion technologies are 
shown in Table 1, reproduced from Messner (1996). In the model, RD&D 
activities and investnlents must be made in expensive new technologies if 
the technologies are to  become cheaper through accumulated experience, 
represented by cumulative increase in installed capacity. 
The representation of endogenous RD&D and technological learning in 
the energy systems model MESSAGE requires so-called mixed integer pro- 
gramming techniques, because the constraint set is nonconvex. Computa- 
tionally, this approach is very deil~andiilg so that only six new technologies 
Table 1. Reductions of investnlent costs as a learning process for electricity 
generation by six new and advanced technologies, expressed in US dollars at  
constant 1990 prices per unit installed capacity [US(1990)$/kW]. 
Technology 1990 2050 Progress ratio 
Advanced coal 1,650 1,350 0.93 
Gas combined cycle 730- - 400 0.85 
New nuclear 2,600 1,800 0.93 
Wind 1,400 600 0.85 
Solar tllerinal 2,900 1,200 0.85 
Solar PV 5,100 1,000 0.72 
are explicitly modeled as a, single-region world model of the electricity sec- 
tor. The nest research taslis will include the extension of the approach to  
the whole energy system aad iilclusion of other down-stream technologies in 
addition t o  electricity generation. Anlong the shortcomings of the approach 
are that  the shape of the learning curves is specified exogeilously (including 
RD&D) and that  the uncerta.intp of tecl~nological change is not yet captured 
in this particu1a.r model. The article by Griibler and Messner in this vol- 
ume presents a version of t,he hIESSAGE illode1 that  captures technological 
uncertainty analysis. 
In order t o  compa.re the techi~ological earning case with alternative ways 
of modeling tecllilological change, Alessiler (1996) developed two additional 
ca.ses. The first variant, t.he "static" case, is the least realistic of the three 
ca.ses. In this variant, it is a.ssumed t1la.t the investment costs of the new 
technologies remain a t  their 1990 levels over the entire time horizon. The 
"dynamic" variant assuines the sa.me degree of cost reductioils given in Table 
1, but they are esogeilous ("autonomous"), occurring a t  continuous rates 
between the base year (1990) and 20.50. The dyna.mic case emulates the most 
commoil approach to  illodeliilg tecl~nological chailge in energy systems. In 
fact, it correspoilds to Case A presented in the joint IIASA and WEC study, 
Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond (IIASA-WEC, 1995). 
Figure 9 shows the illis of global electricity generation in 2050 from 
eight different conversio~l technologies, including the six selected new and 
emerging technologies. The static va.riant relies primarily on established 
technologies such as standard coal and nuclear power plants, and to  a more 
limited degree on less costlier advanced coal and natural gas combined-cycle 
technologies. With the exceptioil of sollle coal, the new and advanced tech- 
nologies are hardly used, because of the relatively high investment costs. In 
comparison, the dyna.mic cost profile does indeed lead to  greater investment 
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Figure 9. World electricity generation (TWh) in 2050 by eight generation 
technologies for three altenla.tive cases: the "static" case, with constant 
investment costs, the "dynamic" ca.se, ivith exogenously declining costs; and 
the "technology-1ea.rning" ca.se, with endogenously declining costs. 
Static 
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in new and a.dvanced t~ecl~nologies. The roles of coal and standard nuclear 
techilologies diminish compa,red with tlle static case; they are replaced by 
natural gas combined-cycle, new nuclear, solar, and wind technologies. Be- 
cause in the dynainic ca.se these technology inlprovements are exogenous, 
the shift in investments from tra,ditional to new and advanced technologies 
changes in step with the cost reductions. In contrast to the dyna.mic case, 
with technological learning investlllents in new technologies must be made 
up front, when these techilologies a.re nluch costlier than the conventional 
alternatives, if they a,re to  beconle cllea.per with cumulative experience as 
installed capacity increases. With techi~ological learning, the structure of 
electricity production in 2050 is not all that different from the dynamic al- 
ternative, with the exception of a slight shift from advanced nuclear to  PV 
systems. 
Messner (1996) has analyzed the different dynamics of investment paths 
in new and advanced technologies in the two alternative cases - the dynamic 
case with exogenous cost reductions and the technology learning case with 
endogenous cost reductions. Figure 10 presents her findings for global an- 
nual investments in electricity genera.tion in the technological learning and 
dynamic ca,ses compared wit,ll the s ta.tic case. The most striking difference 
1 1 Dynamic I 
I I 
287 
- 
- 
- - Static 
............ Dynamic 
... 
-.. 
-1.. 
-... 
0-.. .  
I I I I I 
Figure 10. Annual investnlent requirements for electricity generation in the 
world for three alternative cases: the "dynamic" case, with exogenously de- 
clining costs, and the "tecl~nology-learni~lg" case, with endogenously declin- 
ing costs, compared with the "static" case. with constant costs (index=100), 
espressed as an indes. 
is that  the case with elldogellous leariliilg shows higher up-front investment 
costs but has lower discounted systeins costs than the dynamic case with 
exogenous cost reductions. Both cases lead to  roughly the same investment 
costs in 2050, because there is sufficient cumulative investment in new and 
advanced technologies to  reduce the costs along the learning curve to  the 
level of exogenous reductions in the dynanlic case. Over the entire time pe- 
riod (1990-2050), cuillulative discounted illvestments are 6.6% lower in the 
dynamic case with esogenous learning and 9.7% lower in the case with en- 
dogenous learning thail in the stat.ic case (Messner, 1996). The difference in 
the investments is particularly large between 2020 and 2050. The discounted 
investment costs in the case with tecl~nological learning are 50% below the 
discounted investment costs of the dynamic case. 
This single example illustrates some of the generic differences between 
the two approaches in nlodeling future technology costs and performance. In 
the dynamic case it pays to  postpone some investment in new technologies 
until the costs are reduced (esogenously). In the case of technological learn- 
ing there is no time t o  waste. Higher levels of costly investments are made 
immediately in order to accrue sufficient esperience to  be able to reap the 
benefits of cost reductions a t  soilze point further along the learning curve. 
If these costly investinents are not made, the technology stays expensive. 
Nonetheless, despite high initial investments, the overall discounted costs 
are lower in this example than in the other cases. This result means that 
early RD&D expenditures and development of niche markets for new tech- 
nologies may be able to reduce the overall discounted costs of long-term 
mitigation strategies, even if similar fates of "autonom~us'~ technology im- 
provement are assumed in the case without learning. In reality, however, the 
exogenous cost reductions are uillikely to  occur unless someone else invests 
instead. At the global level this is of course a contradiction, because even 
in the dynamic case such iilvestmeilts illust be included in the calculations 
if cost reductions are to  occur. 
5 .  Conclusion 
Iilcorporating the coilcept of technological learning into the energy model 
MESSAGE led to lower COz mitigation costs compared with an alternative 
model employing a fixed rate of autonoillous technological change, as is usu- 
ally done in studies of future energy and emissions perspectives. The costs 
were also lower although esactly the same rates of performance improve- 
ments and cost reductioils were assumed to  occur over the study time horizon 
in both approaches. Compared with the case of endogenized learning, the 
"autonomous" case leads to the postponenleilt of investment decisions until 
lower-emission technologies "become" cheaper. This means that initially the 
investments are somewhat lower. I11 the case with endogenous technological 
learning initial investments are higher, but this higher investment is offset 
later through the possibilities of reduciilg emissions at  substantially lower 
costs when installed capacities a,nd emissioil levels are higher. Even with 
discounting at  5% per year, the endogellous learning case leads to  lower to- 
tal costs in the global electricity sector. Of course, these results are sector 
specific, and do not reflect ally of the deadweight loss or intersectoral trade- 
offs stipulated by Goulder (1996). That is, the analysis does not consider the 
potential loss of welfare associated with the costly initial market penetration 
of the new technologies or the tra,ilsfer of resources away from other technol- 
ogy development toward the development of new technologies. The results, 
however, do shed light on the process by which new technologies enter and 
penetrate the market, which has important implications for both the cost 
and timing of policy iilterventioils designed to achieve emission mitigation. 
Endogenization of technological chaage through technology learning 
captures some of the positive exterilalities generated by RD&D and early 
illvestmellt in new technologies. This means that  not only will a given tech- 
nology be improved through RDSLD and learning, but other technologies 
of the same "family" will improve, as well. Knowledge spillover is often as- 
sumed to  be determined by the combination of processes by which knowledge 
diffuses and by which it becomes obsolete. It has a positive impact on the 
social return of the technology leaining development strategies. 
The introductioll of techi~ological earniilg into the model does not solve 
all the problems associated with uilderstanding technological change or the 
future costs of alternative energy technology strategies. Some basic problems 
also encountered in the autonolnous technological change approach are still 
unsolved. Technical performailce and cost profiles of learning-by-doing must 
be specified a priori. In the real world the performance improvement rates 
of new technologies are not kilown a priori, which is reflected in the risks 
that  entrepreneurs usually face when they make new technology adoption 
decisions. It should be acknowledged that  technical change is only one of 
several factors that  determine technology costs and performance and thus 
ultimately also emissions paths. 
Including this "stylized" treatillent of tecl~nological change in the model 
captures some of the dynamic patterns coinnlon to  the cost reductions and 
improvement in performance of almost all technologies that  are successful a t  
the market place. Initially, costs are high due to  batch-production methods 
that  require highly skilled labor. Perforlnance optimization and cost mini- 
mization are rarely important; the overriding objective is the demonstration 
of technical feasibility. When the technology seeks entry into a market niche, 
costs begin to  matter, although usually what is of central importance is the 
technology's ability to  perform a task that  cannot be accomplished by any 
other technology. Exanlples are fuel cells in space applications, PV systems 
for remote and unatteilded electricity generation, gas turbines for military 
aircraft propulsion, and drill-bit steering technology in oil and gas explo- 
ration. Including in the nlodel the lllore costly new and advanced technolo- 
gies with the promise of lower costs and better performance through accumu- 
lated learning captures these effects of early and pre-commercial technology 
development and entry into specialized market niches. 
A technology's success in a niche market, however, does not ensure its 
successful commercialization. Improvements must be made in reliability, 
durability, and efficiency, and, even more important, costs must be reduced. 
Any RD&D devoted t o  these objectives creates a supply push. This supply 
push must be complemented by a demand pull, by which initial markets are 
expanded sufficieiltly to  further reduce costs through economies of scale. The 
demand pull may be policy driven. Technically feasible technologies that  are 
not yet economically compet.itive might benefit from eilvironmental or en- 
ergy security policies that increase their competitors' costs. For example, 
other electricity genera.tion options benefit from requirements for flue gas 
desulfurization in coal-fired plants, or from bans on electricity generation 
from natural gas that restrict combined-cycle gas technology. New technolo- 
gies may also benefit from ecollomies 01 scale and market dominance already 
achieved by older tecl~nologies. Tlle existing transmission infrastructure, 
for example, can be rea.dily used by new electricity generating technologies 
(IIASA-WEC, 1995). Includillg such effects in the model by initially intro- 
ducing new and advanced tecllilologies only in some "niche" markets and 
later in more widesprea.d applications as their costs decrease, captures some 
of these conlplex phenomena associated with innovation diffusion and tech- 
nological change. 
Thus, the rate of tecl~~~ological hange depends on the diffusion of in- 
novations and the dynalllics of their a,doption. The replacement of carbon- 
intensive technologies with zero- or low-carbon alternatives can be expressed 
a.s the process of energy deca.rboniza.ton. Scenarios with high shares of coal 
actually lead t o  a reversal of the llistorical trends toward decarbonization. 
Other scenarios that envisage that the tra.nsition t o  the post-fossil era will 
occur during the nest century portray decarboilization rates similar to, or 
sometimes even higher than, historical rates. Decarbonization must con- 
tinue if C 0 2  emissions are to  stabilize in the future. Quite high rates would 
be required to  actually reduce global C 0 2  enlissions, as would be required 
t o  achieve stabilization of atmospheric coilceiltrations a t  some negotiated 
level in accordance with Article 2 of the Fra.mework Convention on Climate 
Change (UN/FCCC, 1992). Figure 11 captures the differences in the de- 
carbonization of global electricity generation with and without technological 
learning presented in this pa,per. 
Without improvemellts in tecl~nologica~ performance or cost reductions 
compared with the present situa,tion, the sta.tic case actually leads to  a re- 
versal of historical trends toward decarbonization after the 2020s as the 
global electricity generation is "locked-in" on the carbon-intensive genera- 
tion technologies. Decarboilization occurs in the dynamic case, indicating a 
high degree of structural chailge in electricity generating capacity. However, 
the rate slows down after the 2030s compared with the technological learning 
case. The more dynamic interplay among different technologies in electricity 
generation leads to  the highest degree of decarbonization, and yet here the 
total discounted costs a.re tlle lowest of all three alternatives. That  the costs 
are lower than in the static case is not a t  all surprising as the static case does 
not include any reductioil in costs, a,ild thus older and cheaper technologies 
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Figure 11. Deca.rboniza.tion of electricity in t,he world for three alternative 
cases: the "static" case, with  constant^ iilvestmeilt costs; the "dynamic" case, 
with exogenously declining costs; and the "technology learning" case, with 
endogenously declining costs [expressed in liilograms of carbon per watt-year 
of electricity (kgC/Wyr)]. 
are generally chosen, 1ea.ding t,o rela.tively high emissions and high costs. An 
interesting result of this analysis is that technological learning leads to  lower 
emissions and costs compared with the dynamic case, even though costs and 
emission-reduction poteiltials are the saine as the exogenously assumed im- 
provement rates in the dyna.mic ca.se by the end of the time horizon. The 
additional degree of freedoin of initially introduciilg promising technologies 
in the niche markets although they are still too costly leads to overall cost 
reductions, because cuinulative leariliilg allows for significant cost reductions 
later on, when installed capacities and emissions levels are high. In contrast, 
the dynamic case does not lead to early market entry of new and advanced 
technologies. These technologies diffuse as they become more attractive, but 
by that  time the system's inertia and the still-high shares of older technolo- 
gies in the vintage structure do not allow a. more dynamic transition toward 
lower emissions. 
The "stylized" treatment of RDkD and technological learning in the 
model requires further improvement. Endogenous technological change is 
captured only for six new technologies in the presented example. This is 
seriously deficient and clearly needs to be extended to other technologies in 
the energy system and other sectors of the economy. High computational 
requirements are a serious barrier to such extensions, so that  new research is 
required. There are serious metl~odological shortcomings to the approach, as 
it captures RD&D and learning only for low carbon-emitting technologies. 
According to Goulder (1996), knowledge-generating resources are generally 
scarce, so that  expansion of tecllnological progress in one industry often 
implies a reduction in the rate of tecl~ilological progress in others, even if 
the policy in question does not intend to discourage any industry's rate of 
techllological progress. Another critical issues is that  endogenization of tech- 
nological change through learning by doing means that  the energy system 
will be "locked in" a few techilologies that  have high progress ratios. But va- 
riety has a value in itself. This nleans that  a number of speculative projects 
should be funded in any case, with the idea that his will enlarge the stock 
of future possibilities. 
This first result of endogenizing tecl~i~ological change indicates that  the 
postponement of investments in new and advanced technologies in itself will 
bring few additional benefits to future C 0 2  mitigation strategies. In other 
cases there might be benefits froin delay. Costs of some technologies might 
decrease due to  "exogenous" iinproveinent of other technologies. For exam- 
ple, improven~ents in information technologies might benefit energy technolo- 
gies so that  postponelnent might be attractive. the main result of the anal- 
ysis, however, is robust: unless there is dedicated, timely, and pronounced 
investlnellt in C 0 2  lnitigation tecllnologies, they are less likely to be devel- 
oped and thus beconle commercially viable and competitive in the market 
place. Learning by doing is a prerequisite for performance improvements, 
cost reductions, and eventual diffusion. Postponement of investment deci- 
sions will not bring about the technological change required to  reduce C 0 2  
emissions in a cost-effective way. Even worse, it might bring about further 
"lock-in" of energy systenls and ecollo~nic activities along fossil-intensive 
development paths. 
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Technological Uncertainty 
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Abstract 
Technological uncertainties are eildogenized into the bottom-up, systems en- 
gineering, linear programmiilg (LP) model MESSAGE I11 using stochastic 
optimization. Technological uncertainty as reflected in investment costs of 
electricity generation techilologies is first analyzed statistically using data  
from the C02DB techilology database. Empirical technology cost distribu- 
tions are incorporated into the LP model and sampled simultaneously. A 
penalty term in the objective function integrates (weighted by probabilities) 
stochastically drawn data samples into the final solution. The stochastic 
programming approach ensures short colnputation time and full endogeniza- 
tion of uncertainty in the model solution. Model simulations illustrate that  
compared with traditional deterministic model representations that  assume 
perfect foresight, endogenization of technological uncertainty yields different, 
more diversified future energy systeins structures. Diversification becomes 
the optimal hedging strategy for responding to  technological uncertainty. 
However, technologies that  currently have very high cost and uncertainty 
ranges (e.g., photovoltaics) do not make it to the market in the stochastic 
model simulations. They become part of the diversification portfolio, how- 
ever, once research and development, technology dynamics, and learning are 
introduced as the most important endogenous mechanisms for reduction of 
technological uncertainties. 
1. Introduction 
Life is uncertain, and technology is no exception. A first source of techno- 
logical uncertainty is related to  obtaining correct and relevant information 
about the characteristics of a technology. This process can be more difficult 
than it sounds due to  asymmetry of information between suppliers and buy- 
ers and the considerable technical knowledge required for evaluating complex 
technological information. Nevertheless, these informational barriers can be 
overcome, and the market provides the ultimate final solution for resolution 
of uncertainty about the cllaracteristics of a technology: investment. 
A second source of uncertainty about tecllnology derives directly from 
its dynamic nature as a result of innovative activities. Through innovation, 
both incremental and radical, technologies and their characteristics change 
continuously. Technologies also change during application or technology dif- 
fusion (Griibler 1991, 1992), a, phenomenoil known in economics as "learning 
by doing" (Arrow, 1962). Of course, both the rate and direction of change 
are uncertain, as a,re the eventual iinpacts of technological change on costs, 
competitiveness, structure of an industry, etc. Only one thing is certain: just 
as the technology of today is different from that of yesterday, the technology 
of tomorrow will be different from that  of today. 
It is important to  einphasize that innovative activities and the techno- 
logical variety and uncertainty they create are not exogenous. Technological 
innovations through research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) are 
part of the economic activities of firms, either in-house, in the research and 
development (R&D) laboratory of a large firm, or through economic trans- 
actions (i.e., buying technologies froin specialized suppliers). Close supplier- 
user relations are important (Metcalfe, 1981) for testing and improving de- 
sign and performance characteristics of new technologies. Therefore, even 
when new technology is supplied from the "outside," the transactions in- 
volved are far more complex than simply buying off the shelf in the technol- 
ogy "supermarket ." 
When dealing with the energy sector and its environmental impacts, 
technological change aad uncertainty enter the picture a t  each step, from 
the provision of energy services for the final consumer, to transport and dis- 
tribution, energy conversion, and finally primary resource extraction. Char- 
acteristics of (future) technologies in terms of availability, performance, and 
costs are key factors that  deterinine productivity (energy needs per unit of 
service delivered), resource availability (e.g., success rates of resource explo- 
ration and recovery rates), costs, a,nd enviroilmental impacts (emissions). 
The importance of tecl~nological uncertainty in determining the struc- 
ture and impacts of future energy systems has been recognized and explored 
since the earliest days of energy studies and modeling efforts (e.g., Nordhaus, 
1973; Starr and Rudman, 1973). Different approaches have been followed 
for analyzing the impacts of technological uncertainty through 
Formulation of alternative scenarios (e.g., IIASA-WEC, 1995); 
a Model sensitivity analysis (e.g., Nordhaus, 1973, 1979); and 
Sensitivity analysis based 011 espert polls or Delphi-type methods (e.g., 
Manne and Richels, 1994). 
In each of these types of ailalysis the subjective choice of the technologi- 
cal uncertainty range investigated is made either by the modelers themselves 
in the sensitivity analysis, or by t h  experts polled. Also, whereas scenarios 
or sensitivity analyses yield insights into the variations in model outcomes 
that  result from changes in technology input assumptions, (technological) 
uncertainty is not endogenized into the decision rules (usually based on some 
optimization criterion) einployed in the model. In other words, although we 
know of different future outcomes depending on when, how, and in what 
direction uncertainty is resolved, we rema,in ignorant about robust (or even 
"optimal") strategies in the face of uncertainty. 
Our treatment of technological uncertainty differs from the other ap- 
proaches that  have been used. First, we replace the subjective nature of 
defining the technological uncertainty range with a more "objective" ap- 
proach based on statistical analysis of data  obtained from engineering studies 
about costs of new energy tecl~nologies. Second, we attempt to  endogenize 
uncertaiilty into the decision-making process: we maintain an  optimization 
franlework, but the deterministic point estima.tes of technology parameters 
and the perfect foresight under which the illode1 operates are replaced by 
random (stochastic) variation. 
1.1. Plan of paper 
In Section 2 we briefly review the sources of technological data used in the 
statistical analysis to  derive uncertainty distributions used as input for the 
modeling exercise. Section 3 then briefly presents the energy model MES- 
SAGE 111, which was adapted for a novel approach of stochastic data  Sam- 
pling to  reflect techi~ological uncertainty. The results of this stochastic pro- 
gramming exercise are presented in Section 4 for an  illustrative global energy 
scenario extending to  the year 2050. Sections 3 and 4 draw heavily on the 
investigations published in Messner et al. (1996). Finally, Section 5 presents 
a discussion of the results obtained and the modeling and policy conclusions. 
2. Sources of Technological Data 
The limited availability of technology-specific data  was a serious problem for 
the first energy modeling and scenario studies of the 1970s. The situation 
has since improved substantially, because of the combined efforts of energy 
modelers (e.g., Fishbone et  crl., 1983; Kram, 1993) and the first attempts 
to  assemble generic technology (or process-specific) databases (Grenon and 
Lapillonne, 1976; Gault et al., 1985). In recent years, technology invento- 
ries have been developed for national (e.g., EPRI, 1989; Katscher, 1993) 
and international energy planning (IEA, 1991, 1992; IAEA, 1995), and for 
greenhouse gas mitigation studies l e g . ,  IPCC, 1996). 
For the analysis reported here, we use a computerized database of energy 
technologies and greenhouse gas mitigation options, C02DB, developed over 
the past few years a t  the International Institute for Applied Systems Anal- 
ysis (IIASA; Messner and Strubegger, 1991; Schafer et al., 1992). C02DB 
is a fully interactive, personal-computer-based technology database for the 
storage and retrieval of technological data that also permits the combina- 
tion of individual techilologies into product- or service-specific technology 
chains for full fuel cycle analysis. Another distinguishing characteristic of 
C02DB (one that makes it particularly suited for the purposes here) is that 
it retains the original data  alld references of the engineering studies used as 
input to C02DB. Hence no additional subjective data  evaluation/validation 
bias is introduced by the database developers. Currently, C02DB contains 
over 1600 technologies that cover the illost salient energy production (coal 
mines, oil wells), conversion (refineries, power plants), transport and distri- 
bution (pipelines, electricity networks), and end-use technologies (automo- 
biles, light bulbs, etc.) in existence today or estimated to become available in 
the future. Technology data are included for the industrialized countries of 
the Organisation for Econon~ic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and developing coun- 
tries, which, according to our information, makes the database the largest 
of its kind available a t  the international level. 
Altogether, eight representative classes of electricity generation tech- 
nologies were chosen. Their range and (arithmetic) mean values are given 
in Table 1. Typically, cost ranges vary by a factor of 1.5-2.5 for established 
technologies and by a factor of 5-6 for new technologies such as advanced 
biomass or solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, where the scope for future cost 
improvements and resulting commercialization prospects are much more un- 
certain. 
Performance characteristics are well-known for technologies that  are ma- 
ture, widely available commercially, and dominant on the market. In con- 
trast,  uncertainties are considerable for new technologies, largely because 
they have not been extensively used or experimented with as they hold low 
current market shares. At the same time, new technologies hold promise for 
Table 1. Investment c.ost range a.nd (a.rithmetic) mean for eight classes of 
electricity genera.ting technologies (in 1990 US$/kW). Source: Messner et 
al., 1996. 
Range 
Technology Mean Minimum Maximum Range (max/min) 
Conventional coal 1,350 650 2,450 1,800 2.77 
Advanced coal 1,695 1,195 2,905 1,710 1.43 
Conventional gas 570 330 1,050 720 2.18 
Gas CC 815 5 14 1,702 1,188 2.31 
Biomass 1,580 500 3,020 2,520 5.04 
Nuclear 2,145 1,070 3,600 2,530 2.36 
Solar thermal 3,010 1,790 4,490 2,700 1.51 
Solar P V  6,120 1,740 12,540 10,800 6.21 
Abbreviations: CC = Combined cycle; PV = Photovoltaics. 
substantial improvements through applied research, experimentation, and 
technological learning. 
The uncertainty of illvestment cost estimates analyzed by Messner et 
al. (1996) is considera,ble. For c,oal power plants, cost estimates vary by 
US$1,700-1,800 per kW, both for conventional and advanced systems. For 
conventional coal-fired electricity systems, this translates into a 177% in- 
vestment cost variation. Conversely, for capital-intensive advanced systems, 
such as integrated gasification combined cycles (IGCC) or pressurized flu- 
idized bed combustion (PFBC),  t,he variation is only 43%) although it is 
about the same in absolute arilouilts as for conventional systems. For solar 
thermal systems, the uncertainty range is also 50%, but the absolute differ- 
ence between minimum and maximum investment cost estimates amounts t o  
US$2,700/kW. Here the investment cost uncertainty is about the same as the 
maximum cost estimate for advanced coal power plants. Gas-based systems 
have comparatively low capital costs. As a result, absolute cost uncertain- 
ties are comparatively low, although in relative terms the cost uncertainty 
is about a factor of two, which is similar to  that  of nuclear power plants. 
For solar thermal systems, estimated investment cost ranges are comparable 
to  those of nuclear power plants (US$2,500/kW). Finally, solar PVs are the 
most uncertain with respect to their eventual economic feasibility, because 
of their current high costs and the enormous range in estimated future costs, 
which exceeds US$10,000/kW. It is interesting to  observe that  for all esti- 
mates the arithmetic mean of the estimated investment costs lies below the 
middle of the range covered in the data  sample. 
3. Modeling Technological Uncertainty 
3.1. The basic model 
The basic model used for the analysis reported here is the dynamic linear 
programming (LP) inodel MESSAGE 111, which was developed at  IIASA 
for the analysis of energy supply and end-use systems alternatives and their 
general environmental impacts (Messner and Strubegger, 1995). The model 
assists the analysis of future energy strategies under the influence and con- 
straints of available technologies, resources, energy service demands, and 
environmeiltal impacts. The illode1 is dynamic over time, integrating the 
optimization for the whole time horizoil into one objective function. The 
model also links the different (variable) time steps (periods) using various 
dynamic constraints representing the market penetration, or diffusion, of 
new technology vintages. 
Technology-specific iilfornlation about ilumerous technologies is incor- 
porated into MESSAGE, illcluding information on costs, efficiency, tech- 
nical plant life, and pollutant enlissions. It is therefore representative of 
the systems engineering or "botto111-up" class of energy models. The ob- 
jective function in most applications concerns minimizing the sum of total 
discounted costs, including investment and operation and maintenance costs 
of technologies. As a rule, fuel costs are determined endogenously in the 
inodel through various resource categories with (rising) extraction costs (re- 
sulting from depletion of cheaper deposits) and associated processing, trans- 
port, and distribution costs. As with the technologies of the energy sector 
"downstream" (for example, electricity generation as it is discussed here), 
extraction technologies are also subject to  uncertainty and technology dy- 
namics. These technologies are not, however, analyzed separately here (for 
a discussion of scenario sensitivity, see IIASA-WEC, 1995). 
Costs or profits from international energy trade or from energy or emis- 
sion taxes can also be included in the objective function. Technical, social, 
political, or environmental constraints for technology choice and utilization, 
such as biomass land availability, specific temporal patterns of energy de- 
mand (load curves), capital availability, etc., are usually represented by a 
number of constraints in various model applications. Such constraints serve 
an additional important purpose: they combat the drawback inherent to  LP 
models of always exploiting the cheapest technologies to  the maximum de- 
gree possible. As a consequence of this model characteristic, minute changes 
in cost assumptions can lead to  qualitatively very different results. Such 
"flip-flop" behavior is usually counteracted by iiltroducing various smoothen- 
ing constraints: limiting challges over time (diffusion or market-penetration 
constraints), limiting new installations of a technology (capacity build-up 
constraints), or linking technologies to  each other (representing technologi- 
cal interdependence in the model). 
The MESSAGE model has bien- applied in a wide range of energy- 
related analyses, such as regional and urban energy planning (Messner and 
Strubegger, 1996) and the analysis of different energy options (Messner and 
Strubegger, 1986). The most recent application of the model was in the joint 
IIASA-WEC (World Energy Council) study on long-term energy perspec- 
tives (IIASA-WEC, 1995). where three families of global energy scenarios 
for the next century were explored. 
The model used here is based on the global energy model developed for 
the joint IIASA-WEC study. In that  study, the model consisted of 11 re- 
gional models covering the world energy system. Energy flows are described 
through all relevant energy carriers and conversion technologies, from coal 
mining and oil drilling and refining via various electricity generation tech- 
nologies up to  final energy consunlption (for example, in residential heating 
and in automotive transport). For the analysis reported here, a compressed 
version of the IIASA-WEC (1995) study's global energy model was used. 
This compressed model aggregates the original 11-region model into a 1- 
region model, but includes all the technological detail concerning electricity 
generation of the original model. Energy demands are based on the inter- 
mediate "Middle Course" scenario of the IIASA-WEC (1995) study. In that  
scenario, between 1990 and 20.50 global economic output increases nearly 
fourfold to  some US$75 trillion (1012); primary energy needs double t o  some 
20 Gtoe (10' tons oil equivalent): and electricity consumption increases al- 
most threefold to  some 3.8 TW/yr (Terawatts per year). The time frame 
for the model simulations (1990 to 2050) allows us to  consider in the model 
calculations about two complete capital turnover cycles of energy generation 
facilities, which typically have a lifetime of about 30 years. 
3.2. A Conventioilal Sensitivity Analysis 
Uncertainties concerning investment costs of energy conversion technologies 
(electricity generation) were reviewed using a statistical analysis of data  
contained in C02DB (for a more detailed analysis, see Strubegger and Reit- 
gruber, 1995). Figure 1 illustrates representative distributions of investment 
costs for biomass-, nuclear-, and so1a.r-thermal-based electricity generation. 
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Figure 1. Range of iilvestinent cost distributions from C02DB technology 
inventory for biomass, nuclear, and solar electricity generation used as input 
t o  assess the costs of current and future energy systems. Source: IIASA- 
WEC, 1995. 
As a first step of tlle modeling exercise, all technology costs are set to the 
mean value obtained from the observatiolls in C02DB (cf., Table 1). Invest- 
ment costs are then varied within the data uncertainty range given above. 
Operating costs are not varied in this analysis, and the mean value from the 
C02DB is retained. As illelltioned above, fuel costs are determined endoge- 
nously in the model as a function of resource grades and related extraction, 
processing, transport, and distribution costs. 
Figure 2 shows the results of this collventional sensitivity analysis. The 
changing relative contribution of electricity generated from conventional 
coal-fired power plants to  variations in its own investment costs, as well 
as t o  variations in the investment costs of the other eight technologies, is 
shown for the year 2050. The straight line a t  100% represents an initial 
model run using the (arithmetic) mean investment costs for all technologies 
(Base Case). Two types of sensitivity runs were performed: the Low Cost 
cases reduce investment costs of one specific technology or all new technolo- 
gies (labeled ALL) to the minimum estimates from Table 1; the High Cost 
cases follow the same procedure using the maximum estimates. 
Figure 2. Relative production of (conventional) coal-fired power plants as 
a function of varying cost a.ssumptions compared with the arithmetic mean 
(Base Case), in the year 2050. 
As the results for the coilveiltioilal coal power plant indicate, the sensitiv- 
ity is rather high, particularly to  the own cost estimates of the conventional 
coal technology (for a sinlilar a,nalysis of gas combined-cycle power plants, 
see Messner et al. ,  1996). Whell high cost estimates are adopted, the share 
of conventional coal power plants drops to  a mere 10% of the Base Case sce- 
nario, ba.sed on mean illvestmellt cost estimates. Conversely, adopting low 
cost estimates increases the coiltribution of conventional coal plants by some 
50% compared with the Base Case calculation. In the Low Cost case the 
sensitivity of the contribution of collventional coal power plant technology 
to variations in the cost of alternative technologies is highest for advanced 
coal technologies ( a  decrease of approximately 70% for conventional coal) 
and gas combined cycle ( a  decrease of approximately 30% for conventional 
coal). Conversely, conventional coal technology is a winner (showing a gain 
of approximately 20%) if combined-cycle and/or nuclear technologies follow 
a high cost trajectory. 
For all other cases, variations for conventional coal are relatively mi- 
nor. Interestingly, this is also the case if all investment costs are changed 
a t  once (i.e., taking either all low or all high ends of the range for all tech- 
nologies simultaneously). In such a case, none of the other technological 
alternatives t o  collvelltional coal becomes either decisively cheaper or more 
espensive. Thus, the relative structure of electricity supply remains basi- 
cally unchanged from the Base Case, although of course the total energy 
systems costs are substantially higher or lower in the High Cost and Low 
Cost scenarios, respectively. 
This high sensitivity of model results t o  (admittedly rather high) varia- 
tions of cost assumptions highlights twb illajor weaknesses of any determinis- 
tic cost-minimization a,pproach. First, it illustrates how sensitive the model 
outcomes are to  the cost assumptions employed, which - in a caricature of 
the actual decision-making problem a,t stake - are assumed t o  be known e x  
ante with perfect foresight. Second, on a more practical level, a multitude 
of model runs would be required to identify resilient investment strategies in 
the wake of this uncertainty, including an exact analysis of the investment 
cost points a t  which the model starts to  flip into another stratum of the en- 
ergy system. Such an analysis is obviously time consuming, which explains 
why it is rarely performed. 
The approach suggested in C:olodnikov et al. (1995) and Messner et al. 
(1996), and summa.rized in the nest section, enables the performance of such 
analyses in a closed form by iilcorporating uncertainties and risks concern- 
ing future investment costs of techilologies directly into the mathematical 
formulation of the model, which thus gains a more realistic representation 
of the typical real-life investnlent decision-making process. 
3.3. Stochastic prograillilliilg 
MESSAGE I11 has three nlajor types of variables and a variety of equa- 
tion types (constraints). Variables include technology activity, annual new 
installations of technologies, and aanual resource estraction. Constraints 
in MESSAGE can be grouped as follows: (a) demand constraints that  en- 
sure that  an exogenously specified dellland is satisfied by appropriate (i.e., 
least-cost) technologies; (b)  balancing constraints for energy vectors (e.g., 
electricity) that  ensure that consulllption does not exceed production; (c) 
capacity constraints that  constra.in the production of a technology t o  the 
overall capacity existing in the period; (d) dynamic (expansion or contrac- 
tion) constraints that  relate the activity in one period to the activity level 
in the previous period; and, finally, (e) two types of resource constraints 
that  limit resource consumption to  the overall quantities available and an- 
nual extraction to  a fraction of the remaining resources in any period. All 
variables and most coilstraints a.re attributable to  (any) one specific time 
period. Only dynamic coilstraints linli two time periods. 
The simplified formulation of MESSAGE I11 can be written as follows 
(based on Golodnikov et nl., 1995; and Messner et al., 1996; see these pub- 
lications for a more detailed description than that  presented here): 
where C t  is the cost vector at  time t = O, l , .  . . , T ;  T is the vector of available 
resources; dt is the energy-demand vector at  time t or zero for the energy 
balances; et is the vector of other exogenous right-hand sides, for example, 
representing capacities already installed in the base year; At is an identity 
t o  sum all consumption of one resource over time; Bt is a matrix of in- 
put/output coefficients for the tecllnologies represented in the model; and 
Pt is a matrix that  provides relations between periods, e.g., in the form of 
capacity constra,ints. 
In the stochastic. application suggested in Messner et al. (1996) the tech- 
nology cost vectors, C t ,  are treated as ra.ndom. They are defined as Ct(w),  
where w is an element from a proba,bility space indicating the dependence 
of the "real" (i.e., the actual future) cost vector Ct(w)  on a random event 
that  i s  characterized by a probability dP(w). In contrast t o  other studies, 
we do not rely on subjectively defined probability measures. Instead, we 
derive the probabilities directly from tlle distribution functions of observa- 
tions from the C02DB techilology database, which are entered directly into 
the model formulation in tlle form of histograms. These define the initial 
distributions a t  t = 0. If the cost vector, C t ,  is stochastic, then the real cost, 
cT=~ < Ct(w),  xt >, of a given strategy x can be derived directly from (1). 
The underestimation of the expected cost incurred by using the deter- 
ministic model call be calculated as follows. For a given strategy, xt, and 
an observed "realization," w ,  of the cost-path, Ct(w), the positive deviation 
of the "real" (observed) total cost, cT=~ < Ct(w),  xt  >, from the calculated 
cost, cT=~ < C t ,  xt  >, is defined a.s 
T 
R(5, w) = = l a . x [ ~ ,  < Ct(w) - C t ,  xt  >] . 
t = O  - 
This deviation is a.n expression of the underestimation of the real costs 
for strategy x using a deterministic cost function. The expected cost of 
underestimating investnlent costs, R(x) = E R ( z ,  w), can be used as an  in- 
dicator of the economic risk associated with strategy x. The risk function, 
R(x), enters the objective function as an  a,dditional "penalty" term (it also 
could be modeled as an additional nonlinear constraint added to  the orig- 
inal deterministic model). Ermoliev and Wets (1988) provide an extensive 
discussion of motivation, formula.tion, and solution procedures for the opti- 
lnization of functions, expressed in terms of expectations similar to R(x). 
The stocha.stic model that  explicitly incorporates the risk of underesti- 
mating future investment costs call be formulated as minimizing the perfor- 
mance function 
subject to  the original constraints (2)  t o  (4).  p describes the weight that  
the risk of underestimating costs has in the objective function. When p = 
1, the first term of the performance function corresponds to the expected 
cost associated with energy developitlents and the second corresponds to 
the expected underestimatioil of real costs. Applying a risk factor p > 1 
corresponds to risk aversion, while p < 1 reflects a neutral attitude toward 
risk. 
The resulting stocllastic optinlization problem is solved on the basis of 
successive approximation of R(x) by N sample functions using independent 
draws wS of possible cost paths Ct(ws), based on the frequencies of cost 
distributions entered into the stochastic model calculation. The performance 
function (6) is approximated by including the sequence of random functions 
A simple sequential optimization procedure is designed to  follow the 
solution path of the optimal strategies z N  with N --t co, which are derived 
from the optimizatioi~ of the functions ~ ~ ( x )  for N + co. 
Thus, the stochastic optinlization inodel discussed in Messner et nl. 
(1996) and summarized above endogeilizes techilological uncertainties into 
the bottom-up, systems engineering, LP model MESSAGE 111. Empirically 
derived cost distribution functions reflect probability distributions of future 
technology costs that  are sampled simultaneously in the model runs. A 
penalty term in the objective function that  reflects the economic costs as- 
sociated with making a "wrong bet" on future technology costs integrates 
(weighted by probabilities) stochastically drawn data samples into the final 
solution. The advantage of the algorithm is that the stochastic sampling is 
directly integrated into the model, ensuring a short computation time and 
full endogenization of uncertainty in the inodel solution. 
4. Simulation Results 
Three illustrative sinlulations for electricity generating technologies have 
been performed to analyze the performance of the stochastic version of MES- 
SAGE. The results summarized here a.re reported in more detail in Messner 
et al. (1996). The three simulations include 
A deterministic unbound ("Det Unbd") case in which technology costs 
are set to  their mean values from the C02DB. The decision algorithm 
assumes perfect foresight of these future costs and the (unrealistic) model 
results correspond to  a least-cost pathway for satisfying the exogenously 
specified energy demand scenario under the assumed technology invest- 
ment costs. (Operating costs a.re not varied in this analysis; as mentioned 
above, they are set at  their respective inean values from the C02DB. 
Fuel costs are determined endogeilously through successive depletion of 
low-cost resource grades.) 
A deterministic bound ("Det Bd") case, which makes the same technol- 
ogy assumptions as the deterministic case described above but introduces 
additional market-penetration and technology-diversification constraints 
to  avoid erratic "flip-flop" model solutions and to  produce a more "re- 
alistic" and robust model outcome. 
A stochastic ("Stochastic") case that  incorporates full technological un- 
certainty and endogenizes this uncertainty into the decision rule of the 
model, which consequently no longer operates under conditions of per- 
fect foresight of future characteristics of technologies. The stochastic 
case draws on the (unconstrained) model structure of the deterministic 
bound case. 
Figures 3 and 4 show respectively the development of gas- and coal-based 
electricity generation up to 20.50 for the three cases analyzed in Messner et 
al. (1996). 
The overall trend for all simulations is rather similar: coal use declines 
and gas use expands over time. Gas is used most extensively in the deter- 
ministic unbound case, with a strong oscillation and trend reversal starting 
around 2030, a (rather implausible) pattern that is somewhat reduced in 
the deterministic bound case. In that  sin~ulation, more coal and less gas is 
used for electricity generation in the nearer future than in the other cases. 
As such, the scenario reflects "conventional wisdom" (and the fact that  the 
regulatory restrictions for gas use in electricity generation were lifted only 
recently), which considers gas to  be a "premium" fuel, too "precious" for 
use in electric power plants. I11 the unbound cases this constraiilt is relaxed 
and leads to  an immediate substitution of natural gas for coal. 
A diversification of electricity generation similar to  that in the deter- 
ministic bound case occurs in the stochastic case. This adjustment generally 
leads t o  reduced gas use toward the end of the simulation horizon and, in 
the deterministic unbound case, to  a resurgence of coal-based power gener- 
ation. This resurgence can be avoided in the deterministic bound and the 
stochastic cases. 
Figure 5 compares the structure of electricity generation by technology. 
Scenario results are shown for the yea.r 2050. 
According t o  the results of Messner et (11. (1996), in the deterministic 
cases the  use of coilventional coal power plants and, t o  a lesser degree, nuclear 
power plants is reduced in the bound case compared with the unbound case. 
In contrast, gas-fired combined-cycle power plants are deployed less in the 
unbound model. The stochastic illode1 forinulation yields an interesting 
result: the tendencies emerging in the bound (versus unbound) deterministic 
case tend t o  become reinforced. Gas combined cycles are used to  an  even 
greater extent than in the deterministic unbound case, and coal-based power 
generation and deployment of nuclear reactors are even reduced further. 
Messner et al. (1996) interpret this result in the following way: the 
modeler, through his or her expert judgement, anticipates uncertainties of 
important model parameters and introduces model bounds to  minimize ex- 
treme, unidirectional technology selections in the deterministic bound case 
simulations. The "expert" choices turn out to  be confirmed (in fact, to  a 
certain extent even amplified) in the stochastic unbound case simulations 
that  operate under completely endogenized technological uncertainty. 
Even more important is the look a t  the finer technological structure 
emerging from the model runs, in particular the distribution between 
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Figure 3. Share of ga,s in electricity genera.tion for the three cases. Source: 
Messner et al., 1996. 
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Figure 4. Share of coal in electricity generation for the three cases. Source: 
Messner et al., 1996. 
Figure 5. Electricity generation by technology in the three cases in 2050. 
Source: Adapted from Golodnikov et nl., 1995. 
conventional and advanced coal- and gas-fired electricity generation. For the 
coal-based systems, conventional power plants are generally cheaper (based 
on mean cost estimates from the C02DB), but they are also less energy 
efficient and have higher emissions. Therefore, in the Base Case simulations 
with deterministic costs, conventional coal-based systems are the preferred 
technology option. If uncertainties become incorporated into the analysis, 
however, technological diversification takes place, with some 20% of coal- 
generating capacity being based on advanced coal systems. 
According t o  Messner et al. (1996)) there is a different effect for gas-based 
electricity generating technologies. Advanced technology as represented by 
combined cycles is already the preferred techilology option in the deter- 
ministic case. Iiltroduciilg uilcertainty into the stochastic case simulations 
amplifies this technology preference: the use of advanced gas systems (com- 
bined cycles) expands even inore and the use of conventional (steam-cycle- 
based) gas systems declines sharply. These trends result from the attractive 
cost structure of combined-cycle tkchilology, which is unaffected by future 
cost uncertainties. The attractiveness of the cost structure can be easily 
understood when looking a t  the investment cost distribution: 30% of the 
engineering studies' cost estimates for combined cycles in the C02DB are 
at  the lower end of the cost range (around US$500/kW), confirming their 
economic competitiveness. 
Technologies whose current costs and uncertainty ranges are very high, 
such as solar PV or wind electricity, a,re practically not deployed at  all in 
ally of the model simulations. 
As a last observation, let us touch on the costs of technology diver- 
sification as it emerges in the model runs. In the stochastic formulation 
such diversification occurs "natura.lly." In technical terms, this means that  
diversification is achieved without relying on additional "hard" exogenous 
constraints. For the stochastic model formulation this results in increased 
model flexibility technically and in lower overall systems costs economically. 
This result can be easily understood considering that  in the stochastic case, 
as in the deterministic bound case, exogenous constraints always entail the 
danger of eliminating potentially a.dvantageous technological solutions, even 
if they do not appear a,dvanta,geous from today's (or the modeler's) per- 
spective. Conversely, incorpora.ting additional information into the objec- 
tive function, as in the stochastic illode1 formulatioil discussed above, leaves 
more degrees of freedoin for choosiilg optimal solutions and thus yields lower 
overall energy systems costs con~pared with those in the deterministic bound 
ca.se. 
5 .  Discussion 
Among the main results from the model simulations presented here are the 
following: 
1. Considering technological uncertainty yields future energy systems struc- 
tures and emissioil levels that a.re different from those arising from a 
deterministic case with perfect foresight. 
2. The structure approaches the deterministic case with additional market 
penetration a.nd diversificatioil constraints introduced by the modeler. 
Introducing stochastic uilcertaiilty thus yields more robust and "realis- 
tic" energy systems structures tlla,il those in the deterministic unbound 
case. 
3. The stochastic model also res~>onds to  a frequent criticism of LP or other 
types of optimization models: the inappropriate assumption of a single 
decision-making agent that  operates under perfect foresight. Through 
endogenization of uncertainty, decision making no longer operates un- 
der perfect foresight. The model behavior also approximates real-life 
decision-making situations in which different economic agents with dif- 
ferent "technological expectations" (Rosenberg, 1982) and attitudes to- 
ward risk display persistent differences in strategies and investment be- 
havior that  result in technological diversification. (Although, of course, 
technically speaking the model still presumes the existence of a single 
decision agent .) 
4. Technology diversification becomes the optimal hedging strategy for re- 
sponding to  uncertainty. The calculations reported here, however, show 
only suboptimal hedging, as they exclude R&D and technological learn- 
ing, which are the illost importailt endogenous mechanisms for the re- 
duction of technological uncertainties. Even more important, the model 
results reveal a pro-innovation bias and no risk aversion in investments 
into new technologies. 
5. Cost differences between the stochastic and deterministic unbound cases 
(i.e., hedging costs) are small; in most simulations the stochastic case 
also yields lower total systeins costs than the deterministic bound case. 
6. Technological uncerta.inty leads to diversification strategies along incre- 
mental innovation pathways, or to  technology changes within a "techno- 
logical neighborhood" (F0ra.y and Griibler, 1990). For instance, invest- 
ments are shifted away from conveiltional coal- and gas-based electricity 
generation toward advanced coal and gas systems (that  incidentally are 
also more benign environmentally). 
7. Technologies that  currently have very high cost and uncertainty ranges 
(e.g., PVs) do not make it to the market in the model simulations. How- 
ever, they become part of the diversification portfolio once technology 
dynamics and learning are endogenized into the model (see the contri- 
bution by NakidenoviC in this volume). 
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The Carnol System for Methanol Production and 
C02  Mitigation from Coal-Fired Power Plants 
and the Transportation Sector* 
hileyer Steinberg 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY, USA 
Abstract 
The Carnol system collsists of methanol production from carbon dioxide 
( C 0 2 )  recovered from coal-fired power plants and natural gas, and the use 
of the methanol as an alternative automotive fuel. In the Carnol process, 
hydrogen is produced through the thermal decomposition of natural gas; the 
hydrogen is then reacted with C 0 2  recovered from the power plant. The car- 
bon produced can be stored or used. A design and economic evaluation of 
the process is presented and compared with gasoline as an automotive fuel. 
An evaluation of the C 0 2  emission reductions of the process and system is 
made and compared with other conventional methanol production processes, 
including the use of biomass feedstock and methanol fuel cell vehicles. The 
C 0 2  emissions for the entire Carl101 system using methanol in automotive 
internal combustioil engines ran be reduced by 56% compared with the con- 
ventional system of coal plants and gasoline engines, and by as much as 
77% when methanol is used in fuel cells in automotive engines. The Carnol 
system is shown to  be an environnlentally attractive and economically vi- 
able system connecting the power generation sector with the transportation 
sector that  warrants further development. 
1. Introduction 
Coal and natural gas are abundant fuels. Because of their physical and 
chemical properties, coal and natural gas are difficult to  handle and uti- 
lize in mobile as well as stationary engines. The infrastructure is mainly 
geared to  handle clean liquid fuels. In order to convert coal to  liquid fuel, 
it is generally necessary to  increase its hydrogen-to-carbon ratio, either by 
*This work was performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy. 
increasing its hydrogen content or by decreasing its carbon content. Con- 
versely, to  convert natural gas to  liquid fuels it is necessary to decrease its 
hydrogen content. Thus, by coprocessing the hydrogen-rich natural gas with 
hydrogen-deficient coal, it should be possible to produce liquid fuels in an 
economically attractive nlanner. For eilvironmental purposes of decreasing 
carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  greenhouse gas-emissions, several approaches can be 
taken. The C 0 2  emissions from central power stations can be removed, re- 
covered, and disposed of in the deep ocean (Cheng and Steinberg, 1984). 
Alternatively, carbon can be extracted from coal and natural gas and the 
remaining hydrogen-rich fractions from both of these fuels can be utilized to  
reduce C 0 2  emissions while storing the carbon (Steinberg, 1989). Because 
of its physical properties, it is illuch easier to  dispose of carbon, either by 
storage or through use as a inaterials commodity, than it is to  sequester C 0 2  
(Cheng and Steinberg, 1954). A third C 0 2  iuitigation method is t o  use the 
stack gas C 0 2  from coal-burning pla,nts along with hydrogen obtained from 
natural gas to produce methanol, wllich is a well-known liquid automotive 
fuel. In this paper, we describe and evaluate the Carnol process (Steinberg, 
1993), which coilnects the power generation sector with the transportation 
sector, resulting in an overall C 0 2  nlitigation system. 
2. The Carnol Process 
The Carnol process is composed of three unit operations: 
1. C 0 2  is estracted from the sta.cli ga,ses of coal-fired power plants using 
~nonoetl~anolamine (MEA) solveilt in an absorption-stripping operation. 
The technology for this operation is well known in the chemical industry 
for C 0 2  recovery and ha,s recently been significantly improved for use 
in extracting C 0 2  from power pla,nt stack gases (Suda et al., 1994; and 
Mimura, 1995). The power required to  recover 90% of the COz from 
the flue gas of an integrated coal-fired power plant can be reduced to  
about 10% of the capacity of the power plant. However, this energy 
requirement can be reduced to  less than 1% when the C 0 2  recovery 
operation is integrated with a methanol synthesis step, described in step 
3 below. 
2. The hydrogen required to  react with C 0 2  for producing methanol can 
be obtained from either of two methods involving natural gas. In the 
conventional method for producing hydrogen, natural gas is reformed 
with steam: 
CH4 + 2H2 = C 0 2  + 4H2 . 
This process produces C 0 2  and, thus, C 0 2  emissions are increased. Hy- 
drogen can, however, be produced without C 0 2  emissions, using the 
nonconveiltional method of thermally decomposing methane to  carbon 
and hydrogen: 
The energy requirement for this process is less than that required for 
the conventional process. A fluidized bed reactor has been used to  ther- 
mally decompose methane, and inore recently we have been attempting 
t o  improve reactor design by using a molte~l metal bath reactor (Stein- 
berg, 1996). The carbon is sepa.ra.ted and either is stored or sold on 
the market as a ma.terials commodity, such as in strengthening rubber 
for tires. This operatioil requires temperatures of 800°C or above and 
pressures of less than 10 atm, preferably about 1 atm. 
3. The third step in the process co~lsists of reacting the hydrogen from 
step 2 with the C 0 2  from step 1 in a. co~lventional gas phase catalytic 
methanol synthesis reactor: 
Because this is an exothermic reaction, the heat produced in this 
operation can be used to  recover the C 0 2  from the absorption-stripping 
operation described in step 1, thus reducing the energy required t o  re- 
cover the C 0 2  from t,he power plant to  less than 1% of the power plant 
capacity. This is an advantage compared with the energy costs in terms 
of derating the power plant when C 0 2  is disposed of in the ocean, in 
which case more than 20% of the power plant's capacity is consumed. 
The gas phase methail01 syilthesis usually takes place a t  temperatures 
of 260°C and pressures of 50 a t ~ n  using a copper catalyst. The synthesis 
can also be conducted in the liquid phase by using a slurry zinc catalyst 
a t  a lower temperature (120°C) and at  30 atm of hydrogen pressure. 
3. Carnol Process Design 
A computer process simulatio~l ecluilibrium model has been developed for 
the Carnol process based on the flow sheet shown in Figure 1. A material 
CH, Fuel 1 
I C02. N2 
MDR 
MSR 
30 atm/lPbC 
TF 
MEA 
Absorber 40T 
MDR - Methane Decomposition Reactor 
MSR - Methanol Synthesis Reactor 
MEA - C02 Solvent 
MeOH H20  
Figure 1. Carnol VI process: Methanol production from power plant C 0 2  
and natural gas (process simulation). 
Table  1. Carnol process VI design process simulation: Mass and energy 
balances. 
and energy balance is shown in Table 1, selected from a number of computer 
runs. This run shows that  112.1 kg of methanol can be produced from 100 kg 
of natural gas (CH4) and 171.1 kg C 0 2  with a net emission of only 25.8 lbs 
C02/million British thermal units (MMBTU) of methanol energy including 
combustion of the methanol. This is an 85.7% reduction in C 0 2  emissions 
compared with conveiltional emissions from a steam reforming methanol 
plant that  emits 182 lbs C02/MMBTU, including the C 0 2  from combustion 
UNIT 
(See Fig. I) 
mu3 
Pressure, atm 
Temp. OC 
CH, Feedstock, Kg 
Preheat Temp. OC 
CH, Fuel for MDR, Kg 
CH, Conversion, % 
Carbon Produced, Kg 
Heat Load, Kcal 
Purge Gas fiom Fuel, Kmol 
- Liquid Phase 
Pressure, atm 
Temp. OC 
Recycle Ratio 
CO, Feedstock, Kg 
CO, Conversion, % 
Methanol Prod., Kg 
Water Cond., Kg 
E n e m  for Gas Com~ression to MSR 
Primary, Kcal 
Secondary for Recycle, Kcal 
J'erforrnancc 
Ratio MeOWCH,, Kg/Kg 
Carbon Efficiency, MeOH, % 
Thermal EfF., MeOH, % 
Thermal EfF., C+MeOH,% 
CO, Emission LbsMMBTU 
Co, Emission Kg/GJ 
CARNOL M 
MDR and Liquid Phase MSR 
1 
900 
100 
837 
6.6 
96.3 
72.1 
65,006 
2.1 
50 
120 
0.5 
171.1 
90.3 
112.1 
63.2 
53,306 
694 
1.12 
56.0 
42.9 
85.7 
25.8 
11.1 
of the methanol. At the sa.me time, the power plant has a 90% reduction 
in C 0 2  emissions, because only 10%) of the C 0 2  from the MEA solvent 
absorption plant remains unrecovered and is emitted to  the atmosphere. 
3.1. Methanol as an autoll?otive fuel 
The Carnol process can be considered a viable coal C 0 2  mitigation technol- 
ogy, because the resulting large production capacity of liquid methanol can 
be used in the large-capacity automotive fuel market. Most processes that  
utilize COz produce chemical products that  tend to swamp the market and 
thus cannot be used. Metha,ilol a,s an alternative automotive fuel has been 
used in internal combustion (IC) engines a.s a specialty racing car fuel for 
a long time. More recently, the Environnlental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has shown that nlethanol can be used in IC engines with reduced CO and 
HC emissions and a t  efficiencies esceeding those of gasoline fuels by 30% 
(MVEL, 1989). Methanol can also be used either directly or indirectly in 
fuel cells a t  efficiency levels several tiines higher that  those for automotive 
use. A great advantage of methanol is that  as a liquid it fits in well with the 
infrastructure of storage and distribution conlpared with compressed natural 
gas and gaseous or liquid hydrogen which are being considered as alternative 
transportation fuels. Compared with gasoline, C 0 2  emissions from methanol 
in IC engines are 40% lower. 
It should also be point,etl out t,lla,t removal and ocean disposal of C 0 2  
is only possible for la.rge ceiltra,l power sta.tions. For the dispersed do- 
mestic power and transportatioil (industry and automobiles) sectors, the 
Carnol process provides the capa.bi1it-y of C 0 2  reduction by supplying liquid 
nlethanol fuel to  these smaller, diverse C02-emitting sources. 
3.2. Ecoilomics of the Carilol process 
A preliminary economic analysis of the Carilol process has been made based 
on the following assun~ptions: 
90% recovery of COe from a 900 MW(e) coal-fired power plant. 
Capital investment based on an equivalent three-step conventional steam 
reforming plant amounting t o  US$100,000/ ton MeOH/day (Korchnak, 
1994). 
a Production costs that  include 19% financing, 1% labor, 3% maintenance, 
and 2% process catalyst and miscellaneous, adding up to  a fixed charge 
of 25% of the capital investment (IC) on an annual basis. 
Natural gas prices vary b e b e e n  US$2 and US$3/million standard cubic 
feet (MSCF). 
Carbon storage is charged at  US$lO/ton. Market value for carbon black 
is as high as US$1000/ton. 
Methail01 market price is US$0.45/gallon, although historically it has 
varied from US$0.45/gallon to-~S$1.30/~al lon i the past few years. 
At US$18/barrel of oil, with 90% recovery as gasoline and US$lO/barrel 
for refining costs, gasoline costs US$0.78/gallon. Methanol, being 30% more 
efficient than gasoline, competes with gasoline a t  US$0.57/gallon. 
Table 2 summarizes the economics of production cost factors and in- 
come factors for a range of cost conditions. In terms of reducing C 0 2  costs 
from power plants, with US$2/MSCF for natural gas, and a US$0.55/gallon 
methanol income, the C 0 2  reduction cost is zero. At US$3/MSCF for nat- 
ural gas and US$0.45/gallon income from methanol, the C 0 2  disposal cost 
is $47.70/ton C 0 2 ,  which is less thail the maximum estimated for ocean 
disposal (IEA, 1993). hilore interesting, without ally credit for C 0 2  disposal 
from the power plant, inethanol a t  US$0.55/gallon can compete with gasoline 
a t  US$O.7G/gallon (-$18/barrel of oil) mllen natural gas is a t  US$2/MSCF. 
Ally income from carboil makes the ecoiloillics look even better. 
3.3. C 0 2  einissioil evaluatioil of entire Carnol system 
Altllougll we call show a t  least a 90% C 0 2  emission reduction for the coal- 
fired power plant, the other two parts of the system, methanol production 
and automotive emissions, show less C 0 2  eillissioil reduction than conven- 
tional systems. Therefore, the entire Ca.rno1 system must be evaluated as 
shown in Figure 2. 
Alternative methail01 productioil processes are evaluated in Table 3. 
The yield of methanol per unit of methane feedstock is shown for 1) the 
conventional process in two parts, A) using steam reforming of natural gas 
process, and B) using a C 0 2  addition in the conventional steam reforming 
process; 2) the Carnol process, in two parts, A) using methane combustion 
to  decompose methane for hydrogen in a methane decomposition reactor 
(MDR), and B) using hydrogen combustion to decompose the methane in 
MDR; and 3) a steam gasification of biomass process. The Carnol process 
with H2 and the biomass process (solar energy) reduce C 0 2  emissions to  
zero compared with the conveiltioilal process, but with a loss of 35% and 
47% methanol yield, respectively. When using methane combustion in the 
decomposer, the Carilol process reduces C 0 2  emissions by 43% while the 
Table 2. Advanced Carnol VI preliminary process economics. 
$ 1 O'Nr 
Plant Size - To Process 90% Recovery of CO, from 900 MW(e) Nominal Coal Fired Power Plant 
90% Plant Factor, CO, Rate = 61 1 T/Hr. = 4.82 x lo6 Tons COJYr. 
Feedstock: Natural Gas Rate = 2.82 x lo6 TNr. = 407,000 MSCF/D 
Carbon Production = 2.03 x lo6 TNr. 
Methanol Production = 3.16 x lo6 TNr. = 69,300 BbVD 
Plant Capital Investment (IC) = 9607 T/D x $ 10' = $961 x lo6 
Production Cost Factors 
Natural Gas C Storage 
$ 1 O'Nr ~$IMSCF$ 1 O'Nr I ($/Ton) 
- Income Factors 
C Income MeOE Income 
$ 1 O'Nr ($/Ton) $1 O'Nr ($/Ton) $1 O'Nr ($/Gal) 
0 (0) 5.27 (0.55) 
0 (0) 5.27 (0.55) 
0 5.27 (0.55) 
01 0.13 (55.60) 5.27 (0.55) 
Cost for Reducing 
CO, 
$1 O'Nr (Sn'on) + 
Electric Power Carbon H 2 0  Mechanical Power 
Natural Gas , 
or 
Coal Biomass 
v Y 
Figure 2. Carnol system configuration for COz emission mitigation. 
Alt. Fuel Automotive 
- 
MeOH IC Engine 
Power 'Iant Recovered C02 With 
C02 Recovery 
y 
Biomass Gasification 
or 
CARNOL Process 
For CH4 to MeOH 
: 
Table 3. Methanol production and COz emission process comparison. 
(1 Based on thermal efficiency of 64% (\Yyman el r r l . ,  1993). 
(2 This represents a 32% increase in yield vs conventional. 
(3 Based on BCL process (Larson and tiatofsky, 1992). 
(4 CO, emission only from hel  production plant. 
PROCESS 
1 A Conventional Process 
Steam Reforming of CH, 
1 B Conventional Process with CO, 
Addition 
2A Carnol Process 
Heating MDR with CH, 
2B Carnol Process 
Heating MDR with Hz 
3 Steam Gasification 
of Biomass 
CO, EMISSION PRODUCTION YIELD 
Lbs CO. 
MMBTU (MeOII) 
44 
34 
25 
0 
43 
Moles MeOH 
Mole Feedstock 
0.76 (I 
1 .OO 
0.56 
0.50 
0.40 (' 
% Reduction from 
Conventional 
0% 
23% 
43% 
100% ' 
1 00Y0 
./. Reduction from 
Conventional 
0% 
(32%) 
26% 
3 5% 
47% 
production yield is only reduced by 26% compared with the conventional 
process. The co~lveiltio~lal process with a C 0 2  addition (1B) is interesting 
because there is an increase of 32%) in production although the C 0 2  emissions 
are only reduced by 23%. 
For purposes of comparisoil and clarification, the overall stoichiometry 
for the Carnol process is shown beiow, together with the conventional pro- 
cesses, and with a C 0 2  addition. 
Carnol Process 
Conventional Steanz Refonniizg of Methane 
Conventional Steanz Reforiniizg of lllethaize with C02 Addition 
It is noted that in the Ca.rno1 process a. inasimum amount of C 0 2  is used 
and an excess of carbon is produced. In the conventional process, no C 0 2  
is used and an excess of hydrogen is produced. With a C 0 2  addition to  the 
conventional process, no excess ca.rbon or hydrogen is formed and methanol 
per unit of natural gas is nlaxinlized. 
Methanol can also be produced using biomass, and as the net C 0 2  emis- 
sions are zero with C 0 2  being converted to  biomass by solar photosynthesis, 
the biomass process must a.lso be included in the evaluation. 
Biomass Steam Gasificatiorz Process for Methanol Synthesis 
2CH1.400.7 + 0.6H20 = CH30H + C 0 2  , 
photosynthesis C 0 2  + 0.7H20 = CH1.400.7 + 0 2  . 
The entire Carnol system is evaluated in Table 4 in terms of C 0 2  emis- 
sions and compared with the alternative methanol processes and the baseline 
case of conventional coal-fired power plants and gasoline-driven automotive 
IC engines. Methanol in fuel cell engines is also evaluated. All the cases 
are normalized to  emissions from 1.0 MNIBTU from a coal-fired power plant 
that  produces C 0 2  for a Carnol methanol plant equivalent to  1.27 MMBTU 
for use in an automotive IC engine. The assumptions made are listed a t  the 
bottom of Table 4. The coilclusions dra,wn from Table 4 are as follows: 
W Table 4. COz emission conlparison for systems consisting of coal-fired power plant, fuel process plant, and o rn
automotive power plant. 
Basis: 1 MMBTU for coal fired 900 MW(e) power plant 
1.27 MMBTU of liquid !%el for IC engine - other he1 efficiencies proportions energy up and down 
CO, Emission 
Reduction 
0% 
13% , 
24% 
56% 
57% 
77% 
engines. 
3) Fuel cell u 2.5 timu more efficient than conventional gasoline IC engine. 4) Only 25% rccovtly of COY hom coal plant ir n a x a q  for supply CO, 
5)  Ordy 52% rmissiolu of coal plant COY is assigned to Carnol for fuel cells to conventional methanol plant 
KGIGJ) 
Total System 
Emission 
515 
448 
390 
228 
219 
117 
than gasoline in IC 
CO, 
System Unit 
Baseline Case: 
Coal Fired Power Plant and 
Gasoline Driven IC Engine 
Case 1A 
Cool Fired Power Plant With 
Convenlional Stcam Refomcd 
Methanol Plant 
Case 1B 
Coal Fucd Power Plant With CO, 
Addition to Conventional Methanol 
Plant 
Case 2 
Coal Fucd Power Plant with 
CARNOL Process Melhanol Plant 
Case 3 
Coal Fucd Power Plant with 
Biomass lor Methanol Plant 
Case 4 
Coal F i  Power Plant with 
CARNOL Methanol and Fuel Cell 
Aulornolivc Power 
1) 90% recovery of COY from coal rued plant, 
COJMMBTU (multiply 
Fuel Process 
Plant 
I5 
56 
54 
32 
43 
17 
2) 
Emission units in Lbs 
Coal Fired Power 
Plant 
215 
215 
161 (' 
21 (' 
0 
11'' 
by 0.43 for 
IC Automotive 
Power Plant 
285 
175 
175 
175 
175 
Fuel Cell 
89 " 
Methanol is 30% more eficiat 
1. The use of conventional lllethanol reduces C 0 2  emissions by 13% com- 
pared with the gasoline base case, mainly due to the 30% improved 
efficiency of the use of methanol in IC engines. 
2. By adding C 0 2  recovered from the coal-fired power plant to the con- 
ventional methanol process, the C 0 2  emissions from the power plant 
are reduced by about 25% (161 lbs/MMBTU compared with 215 lbs 
C02/MMBTU) and the C 0 2  e~nissions for the entire system are reduced 
by 24%. It should be pointed out that  the C 0 2  can also be obtained 
from the flue gas of the reformer furnace of the methanol plant and does 
not need to  be obtained from the coal-fired plant. 
3. The Carnol process reduced coal-fired power plant C 0 2  emissions by 
90%, and the overall system emissions are reduced by 56%. 
4. Biomass is a C02-neutral feedstock; there are no emissions from the 
power plants, because the production of biomass feedstock comes from 
an equivalent an~ouilt of C 0 2  in the atmosphere, which has been gener- 
ated from the coal-fired power plant. Thus, the only net emissions come 
from burning n~ethallol in the autonlotive IC engine, and the C 0 2  emis- 
sions for the entire systein are reduced by 57%, only slightly more than 
the Carnol system. However, the main point is that  at  present the cost 
of supplying bioma.ss feedstocli is higher than that  of providing natural 
gas feedstock. 
5. Another future systein involves the use of fuel cells in automotive vehi- 
cles. The efficiency of fuel cells is expected to be 2.5 times greater than 
that  of gasoline-driven engines (World Car Conference, 1996). Applying 
the Carnol process to  produce methail01 for fuel cell engines reduces C 0 2  
emissions for the entire system by a maximum of 77%. Furthermore, be- 
cause of the huge increase in efficiency, the capacity for driving fuel cell 
engines can be increa,sed by 92% over that for the Carnol process, using 
the same 90% of the C:02  einissiolls from the coal-burning power plant. 
4. Conclusions 
The Carnol process can reduce C 0 2  emissions from coal-fired power plants 
while producing methail01 for automotive IC engines with virtually no de- 
rating of the power plant. With natural gas a t  US$2/MSCF, the cost of 
methanol appears to  be competitive with that  of gasoline for IC engines a t  
US$18/barrel of oil. The C 0 2  emissions for the entire Carnol system are 
reduced by 56%. Compared with the conventional system, steam reformed 
natural gas with a C 0 2  a.ddition from the power plant reduces C 0 2  emissions 
by only 13%, but ca.n have a. higher production capacity per unit natural gas 
than the Carnol process. Biomass as a inethanol feedstock can reduce C 0 2  
emissions by 57%. The development of methanol fuel cell engines can re- 
duce C 0 2  emissioils by 77% for the entire system with a large increase in 
production capacity. The use of methanol as an automotive fuel produced 
from coal-fired power plant C 0 2  en~iisions and natural gas appears to  be 
an environmentally attractive and ecoilomically viable system connecting 
the power generation sector with the transportation sector and, therefore, 
warrants further developillellt effort. 
References 
Cheng, H., and Steinberg, M., 1984, A Systenl Study for the Removal, Recovery 
and Disposal of Carbon Dioside from Fossil Fuel Power Plants in the US, 
DOE/CH-0016-2 TROl6, US Departnlent of Energy, Washington, DC, USA. 
IEA (International Energy Agency), 1993, IEA Greenhouse Gas R and D Programs, 
Greenhouse Issues, No. 7, Chelt,enham, UK. 
Korchnak, J . ,  1994, John Brown Engineers Co., Houston, Texas, Personal commu- 
nication. 
Larson, E.D., and Iiatofsl<y, R.E., 1992, Production of Hydrogen and Methanol 
via Bioii~ass Gasijica;tioi~, in Advance iir Thermocheii~ical Biomass Conversion, 
Elsevier Applied Science, London, UI<. 
Mimura, T., 1995, Icansai Electric Power Co., Osaka, Japan, Personal communica- 
tion. 
MVEL (Motor Jrehicle Emissions Laboratory), 1989, An Analysis of the Economic 
and Enviroiimeiital Effects of :Ifethanol as an Automotiz~e Fuel, EPA Report 
No. 0730, Ann Arbor, hII, USA. 
Steinberg, M., 1989, Coal to Methanol lo Gasoline b y  the Hydrocarb Process, BNL 
43555, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY, USA. 
Steinberg, M., 1993, The Carnol Process for hfethanol Production and Utilization 
with Reduced C 0 2  Emissioir~s, BNL 60575, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
Upton, IVY, USA. 
Steinberg, M., 1996, The Carnol Process for CO2 illitigation from Power Plants 
and the Transportation Sector, to be published as EPA report NMRL-RTP- 
015, USEPA, Research Triangle Pa.rk, NC, USA. 
Suda, 0. et al., 1994, Development of Fuel Gas Carbon Dioxide Recovery Technol- 
ogy, pp. 222-235 in Carboil Dioxide Chemistry Environment Issues, T .  Paul 
and C.M. Pradies (eds.), The Royal Society of Chemistry, IIemovan, Sweden. 
World Car Conference, 1996, World Car Conference '96, 21-24 January 1996, 
Bourns College of Engineering, Center for Environmental Research and Tech- 
nology, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA. 
Wyman, C.E., et al., 1993, Ethanol and Methanol from Cellulosic Biomass, pp. 866- 
923, in T.B. Johansson et al. (eds.), Renewable Energy, Island Press, Washing- 
ton, DC, USA. 
Part I11 
Emissions Reduct ion 
Policies and Integrated 
Assessments 

A Review of C 0 2  Emission Reduction Policies in 
Japan and an Assessment of Policies of the 
Annex I Parties for Beyond the Year 2000 
~-U.: I IP 'U Ai((ltsuoka 
Nagoya University, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, Japan 
l'asubo Kawa.shinaa, Afikiko Iiairzunza, Tsune yuki Morita 
National Institute for Environinental Studies, Tsukuba, Japan 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of international agreements on policies 
and ineasures to reduce carbon dioside ( C 0 2 )  eiuissions from Organisatioil 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries by analyz- 
ing the past and possible future effects of policies and measures instituted 
by Japan between 19i0 and 1993. Eilviroilmental policies played a crucial 
role in Japan's successful decoupling of econoillic growth from C 0 2  emis- 
sioils during the period from 1970 to 1993. The world oil crises in 1973 and 
1979, liey turiliilg points for moqt iildustrialized countries, served to increase 
Japan's awareness of the need for energy conservation. However, increases 
in oil prices were not the only reasoil Japan's performance exceeded that of 
other countries. The latter part of this paper introduces the Asian-Pacific 
Integrated Model (AIhl) used to sinlulate the effects of regulatory and eco- 
ilonlic measures. The results of the siillulation show that regulatory and 
common econoinic measures would be the illost cost-effective for COa emis- 
sion abatement. Tlle ailalyses presented here indicate that a policy that  
coinbiiles two approaches, one focusiilg 01: t l l r "u~ .~  energy effi- 
ciency standards and the other focusiilg on behavioral changes brought about 
by economic incentives, would be effective for C 0 2  emission reductions. 
1. Introduction 
Various policies a,nd nlea.sures to mitigate climate change have been pro- 
posed. Some have already been iinplemented in numerous countries, and 
many have yet to be introduced but are likely to be effective. Policies and 
measures can be categorized into four major types: regulatory measures, 
ecoilomic instruments, volunta.ry a.greements, and illformation and education 
( U N ,  1994). Of these types of action. regulations and economic measures 
are colllmonly iillplelnented by Ailnes I countries. 
There is a growing need to assess the effectiveness of these various mea- 
sures. Without such knowledge, setting reasonable and achievable objectives 
for Annex I couiltries is difficult. However, the effectiveness of policies and 
measures differs among couiltries according to their ilational circumstances, 
and thus it is difficult to  mal<e cluantitative and universally applicable as- 
sessments of the effe~t~ivelless of specific actions. 
This study assesses the policies and nleasures instituted by Japan be- 
tween 1970 and 1993 lly det,erinillillg the factors that  helped increase or 
decrease total carbon dioxide (C'Or) enlissions. The effects of possible poli- 
cies and measures in the future, sinlulated using the Asian-Pacific Iiltegrated 
hlodel (AIM), are also discussed. 
2. Japan's Experience, 1970-1993 
2.1. Factors contributing to COa emission changes 
During the. past 50 yea,rs Ja.pan lms experienced rapid economic growth. In 
ma.tly c,ases energy cons~unption and C'02 emissions lmve grown almost in 
proportion to  economic growth; Japan, however, has successfully decoupled 
increases in C 0 2  eillissiolls from ecoilomic growth. A simi1a.r trend can be 
seen in most industrialized couiltries since the world oil crises of the 1970s, 
hut Ja.pan's performance has beell one of the best in terms of lilnitillg the 
growth of C 0 2  eillissiolls while ma,intaining a high GDP growth ra.te. Tliis 
section deals with factors that ha,ve contributed to  Japan's success in this 
regard. 
The factor analysis in this paper is ba,sed on the Kaya identity: 
A C 0 2  = A(C!02/energy cons~unption) + A(energy /GDP) 
+ A(C:DP/population) + Apopulation , 
where A(x)  denotes the percent cha,nge of x. 
To focus on the effects of ellviroilinental and energy policies on C 0 2  
emissions, we further elaborated the first two into energy efficiency improve- 
ments induced by energy efficiency standards, energy efficiency due to  in- 
creases in oil prices, fuel shift for energy security and environmental reasons, 
and changes within the Japanese industrial sector. All of these factors have 
been influential in sta.bilizing C!Oz emissions. 
Energy Corzsert~cltion clnd E~z i* i~ .o~ t~~lc~ l in l  F(ictors 
The following ineasures were related lo energy conservation and other envi- 
ronmental concerns. 
Energy efficiency improvements clue to the introduction of standards: 
After the world oil crises in the 19'iOs, standards for energy efficiency 
improvement were set for inany goods used in the residential sector. Air 
conditioners, refrigerators, televisions, insulation for buildings, and cars 
are examples of products whose energy efficiencies have improved due 
to such standards. It was estiinated that altogether 20.3 MtC of C 0 2  
enlissions were reduced by setting standards for those goods. 
a Energy efficiency improvements due to increases in oil prices: Increases 
in oil prices led to short-tern1 decreases in energy demand. However, in 
the longer tern1 they have becoine key incentives for industry to acceler- 
ate developnlent of tecl1nologies with higher energy efficiencies. Assum- 
ing a case in which energy consunlption per unit of value added in the 
industrial sector renlained the saine as in 1973, this price effect reduced 
C 0 2  en~issions by 1:36.7 MtC'. 
a Fuel shift: The proportion of electricity generated by nuclear power 
increased from 1.3% in 1970 to 24.0% in 1991, because Japan's en- 
ergy policy has given particular weight to  energy security issues. This 
increase has contributed to a declii1e in the COa enlissions per unit 
of electricity proclucecl ( the C'02 enlissions coefficient) by Japan over 
the past two decades. Tlle C'02 enlissions coefficient of electricity de- 
clined from 1.7.5 l ; t C ' / l ~ ~ ~ k c a l  in 1970 to 1.37 k t C / l ~ ' ~ k c a l  in 1980, to  
1.12 k t C / l ~ ~ ~ k c a l  in 1993. H a d  nuclear power's share of electricity gen- 
eration remained the same as it was in 1973, an additional 36.6 MtC of 
C 0 2  emission could be expected today. 
From tlle pollution abatement point of view, Japan has implemented 
severe sulfur oside (SO,) abatement nleasures by setting SO, emission 
standards a t  low levels (i.e., the standards are quite strict). As a result, 
oil coilsumptioil shifted froin inexpensive, heavy, high-sulfur oil (heavy 
oil C) to better quality, low-sulfur oil (heavy oil A). This shift also helped 
limit C 0 2  emission increases (Table I ) ,  contributing to a 0.4 MtC C 0 2  
reduction. 
a Tlle rate of consumption of natural gas in the industrial and residen- 
tial sectors llas increased, especially since the oil crises. This trend 
has caused a shift away froin the coilsuinptioil of petroleum, with con- 
comitant declines in C 0 2  emissions. There has, however, been a small 
Table 1. Share of different types of oil in total hea.vy oil consulnption (in 
percent). 
1970 1980 1990 
Heavy oil A 16.0 36.1 68.0 
Heavy oil B 18.6 9.2 0.4 
Heavy oil C 65.4 54.7 31.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
increase in the use of coa.1, wllicll has contributed to  increased C 0 2  emis- 
sions. This fuel shift toward natural gas has led to a 10.2 MtC reduction 
in C 0 2  emissions. 
Other Factors Linzitirzg C'Oa E ~ ~ ~ . S S ~ O I Z S  
Tlle following factors helped limit the rise in C : 0 2  emissions, but llad little 
to  do with the governnlent's specific policies and measures. 
Growth in gross do~llestic product (GDP): The GDP growth rate llas 
declined since the oil crises; for esample, the GDP growth rate was 
10.52% in 1971 and '2.71% in 1974. Levels of COz emissions would have 
been higher if growth rates like those of the 1970s llad continued to tlle 
present. It is estilllated that ,  had tlle C4DP growth rate between 1973 
and 1985 been 5%) per year illstead of the actual growth rates (-1.76% 
to -1.75% per year), C 0 2  elllissio~ls today would be 94.2 MtC higher. 
Structural changes withill tlle industrial sector: Tlle shares of GDP 
generated by the industrial and services/commercial sectors have not 
changed much. However, within the industrial sector the proportion of 
energy-intensive industries has decreased and less-energy-intensive in- 
dustries have grown lllore rapidly (Table 2). Assuming that the share 
of each industry in the industrial sector has not changed since 1973, me 
estimated that this effect led to  a 38..5 MtC reductioil of C 0 2 .  
Factors Contributing to C02 Enzissioizs 
MIitll respect to  the above-mentioned factors, Japan could have reduced 
C 0 2  emissions more than it a,ctua.lly did. However, there were some factors 
that contributed to increasing C 0 2  emissions during those two decades. We 
noticed that  life-style cha,nges in Japan, in particular, have increased C 0 2  
emissions. 
Table 2. Sllare of iild~~stries in GDP (in percent). 
I ! )TO 1980 1990 
Energy transfor~natioil 
Agriculture, fisheries 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Food 
Textiles 
Pulp, paper 
Chemicals 
Ceranlics 
Prinlary inetals 
RIacllines 
Other 
Service 
Total 
Table 3. Shares of the nlealls of transportation in total transportation (in 
percent). 
Passenger 
Motor vehicles 
Taxis 
Buses 
Railroads 
Ships 
Air 
Total 
Freight 
Motor vehicles 
Railroads 
Ships 
Air 
TotaI 
Changes in the nlea,ns of transporta,tion: In the 1970s, mass transit 
(buses and trains) wa.s the prima,ry nleans of transportation; by the 
1990s, however, lnotor vehicles had taken over this position (Table 3). 
This change has led to a 10.6 MtC increase in C 0 2  emissions since 1973. 
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Figure 1. C 0 2  elllissions in Japan during 1970-1993. 
The shift to more energy-intensive goods at  home: Higher demand for 
computers in offices and goods such as air conditioners, microwave ovens, 
laundry dryers, electric rugs, nlattresses, and second and third television 
sets in homes, as well as a preference for larger, luxury cars have elevated 
energy consumption. \\'ithout these new goods, C 0 2  emissions would 
have been 44.5 hltC lo~ver tllail current levels. 
2.2. Effects of factors 
The previous section discussed nine factors that have contributed to  the 
changes in C 0 2  elnissions in Japan. If those factors had not changed since 
the 1970s, what would Japan's current C 0 2  elllissions be? If the factors 
had not changed since 19'73, the year just before the oil crisis, the calcula- 
tions indicate that C 0 2  e~llissiolls would be lnore than double their current 
levels (Figure 1). The share of the factors' contributions to  limiting C 0 2  
growth can be estimated by multivariate analysis (Figure 2). Of all the 
factors, energy efficiency illlprovelneilts resulting from increases in oil prices 
contributed the most to the observed decreases in C 0 2  emissions; 40.6% of 
the limitation of C 0 2  emissiolls was due to such improvements. If energy 
efficiency due to  standards is included, the ratio increases t o  46.7%. Al- 
toget her, policies for fuel shift contributed 14.1% of the limitation. These 
h 
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Figure 2. Contribution of factors to the COa emission limitations, 1970- 
1993. 
results co~lfirm that  energy efficiency improvements played an important role 
in limiting C 0 2  eiuissions. 
3. The AIM Model and Its Assumptions 
3.1. Outline of the Asian-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) 
I11 this analysis, we coilducted siillulatio~ls with the Asian-Pacific Integrated 
Model (AIM) (Morita et  al. ,  1993). This model was developed primarily to  
examine global warming respoilse mea.sures in the Asian-Pacific region, but 
it also has world modules that  ena.ble it to produce global estimates. 
AIM comprises three lilllied models, an emission model .that estimates 
greenhouse gas emissions, a climate model that determines atmospheric 
greenhouse gas conceiltrations and climatic change, and an impact model 
that  evaluates enviroilnleiltal and social impacts of climatic change. 
The emission model integrates country/regional models, which produce 
detailed estimates of technological, socia.1, and economic situations in each 
country/region (Figure 3), with a top-down world economic model. This 
structure ensures international interactions and consistency throughout the 
Table 4. Popula.tion assunlptions (in t~housa.nds of people). 
1950 1985 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
USA 152271 239000 269000 301000 297000 295496 294000 
EU+Canada 300245 450000 457000 473000 459000 454982 451000 
Pacific OECD 96307 144000 159000 165000 160000 158997 158000 
CIS Eastern Europe 286136 416000 453000 496000 518000 515494 513000 
Centr. Planned Asia 590509 1140000 1430000 1721000 1858000 1890712 1924000 
Middle East 39048 111000 175000 327000 470000 532363 603000 
Africa 222039 570000 870000 1587000 2275000 2595871 292000 
Latin America 165764 402000 529000 708000 816000 842083 869000 
Southeast Asia 652760 1417000 1890000 2636000 3178000 3359172 3538000 
Table 5. Assuiuptioils of GDP growth ra,te (in percent per year). 
Before 
2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
USA 
EU+Canada 
Pa,cific OECD 
CIS, Eastern Europe 
Centr. Planlled Asia 
Middle East 
Africa, 
Latin America 
Southeast Asia 
world market and ena.bles us to eva.llla.t,e tlie coinbilled effects of a, policy 
mix, such as a inisture of ecoiioinic iilstrumeilts a,nd regulatory measures. 
In this pa.per, A1h.I is used to  assess t'lie effects of policy mixes that  
coinbine three options: techi~ological policies for efficiency improvement, a 
carbon tax, and joint iinpleme~lta,tion of carbon reductions within Organisa- 
tion for Economic Co-operation and Developinent (OECD) countries. The 
effect of energy efficiency policies is si~nulated by applying additional im- 
proveinent rates to  the base-case model. 
I11 order to  estimate tecllnological policy effects, AIM'S country/regional 
inodules were used to  ca,lcula.te cllanges in the future energy demand of each 
country/region caused by technological efficiency improvements. OECD 
countries were categorized into three regions, the USA, EUtCanada ,  and 
the Pacific OECD nations, because this inodel was originally intended t o  
focus on the Asian-Pacific region. The assunlptions of population and eco- 
nomic growth used in the inodel a,se froin EMF 14 (EMF, 1994) and are 
TECHNOLOGY SELECTION MODULE 
Policy Options 
Model 
COUt-icyA L i % q  Model 
Demand 
--a 
Policy 
Optbns 
u 
Amount 
Energy 
Service 
,................ 
. . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .  , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
................ 
Module for 
Estlmatlng Level of 
lncreaslng Servke 
per Drlvlng Force 
(SVPFR) 
exlemal module 
Program on 
SVPFR Increase 
Model 
1 Policy Optbns 
Figure 3. Structure of end-use energy demand model. 
Table 6. Energy intensity of su11sectol.s in residential a n d  indust r ia l  sectors 
in 1985. 
Pacific OECD USA EU+Canada 
Residential sector (GJ1ca.p) 
Space heating 7.2 43.3 29.6 
Wa,ter heating 8.2 13.4 4.0 
Cooling 1 .O 2.1 0.8 
0 t her 8.2 14.4 5.6 
Total 24.7 73.2 40.0 
In~dustrial sector (GJ/GDP,  US$) 
Iron and steel 0.83 (47.2)a 0.88 (173.3)b 0.69 (45.1) 
Noilferrous metals 0.16 (28.6) 0.12 (16.7) 
Stone a,nd cla,y 0.23 (16.1) 0.22 (34.2) 0.38 (22.3) 
Paper and pulp 0.10 (4 .4)  0.57 (22.0) 0.24 (8.6) 
Chemicals 0.23 (5.2) 0.62 (20.7) 0.57 (11.0) 
0 t,her 1.01 (4.9)  2.07 (13.7) 0.99 (14.1) 
To t,a,l 2.60 (8.2) 4.40 (19.8) 3.00 (10.0) 
"Figures in parentheses t le~~ot ,e  sul~sect,oral consu~ned energy divided by subsectoral G D P  
i11 1985. 
"Figure give11 is for iron and steel, ant1 iionferrons metals. 
Table 7. Addit ional  AEEIs in each sector.  
Energy illt,eilsit,y 
Relative t,o Improvement A AEEIs 
I11 15185 Pa,cific OECDa 111 2 0 2 0 ~  rate (RC) (%/year) 
Rcside~atial/Co~il~mercial (C+J/ca,p) 
USA 73.2 2.96 1 .67 1.77 1.60 
EU+Canada 40.0 1.62 1.14 1.41 0.98 
Pa,cific OECD 24.7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Iildusirial (GJ/US$1000) 
USA 4.4 1.69 1.25 1.35 0.85 
EU+Canada 3.0 1.15 1.13 1.02 0.07 
Pacific OECD 2.6 1.00 1 .OO 1.00 0.00 
T r a ~ ~ s p o r t a t i o ~ ~  (G.J/cap) 
USA 93.7 3.51 2.83 1.24 0.61 
EU+Canada 31.2 1.17 0.94 1.24 0.61 
Pacific OECD 26.7 1.00 1 .OO 1 .OO 0.00 
"Energy intensity in 1985 iiormalized to  Pacific OECD levels. 
*Energy efficiency in 2020 (normalized to Pacific OECD levels) after technological im- 
provements in energy efficiencies in the USA and EU countries. This is the level of energy 
intensity under the standard reference scenario. 
'(Relative to  Pacific OECD)/(Energy intensi t ,~ in 2020). 
Table 8. AEEI input t,o t.llc :-\Ill iiiodcl from EMF 14 (1994). 
USA 
EU+Canada 
Pacific OECD 
CIS, Eastern Europe 
Centr. Planned Asia 
Middle East 
Africa 
Latin America 
Southeast Asia 
given in Tables 4 and 5. Tlle touiltiv/iegional model is a bottom-up estinla- 
tion model that  divide3 the resitlential/coiui~lercial, industrial, and transport 
sectors into eight, \is. ant1 three subsectors. respectively. Energy demand 
for each country/region in the year 2020 ivas estinlated based on individual 
energy efficiency factors evaluated for each sector (see Table G), as well as 
on population and eco~lonlic growth assumptions. 
Our top-down nlodel espresses the rates of energy efficiency im- 
provenlents with parameters (autonomous energy efficiency improvements; 
AEEIs), which are given by the l~ottom-up model. In this paper, however, 
we focus on energy intenbity gaps allloilg thiee regions in the OECD (Table 
7 )  ant1 consider an ,ICE1 sccnario in ~vhich tlle gaps fade out by 2020. As 
a result, tlle energy efficieuc> in the thiee legions will be leveled to that of 
tlle most efficient region, that is, Pacific OEC'D. In order to do this, me 
assumed es t ra  efficiency improvements in addition to the standard AEEIs, 
by which we estinlate the effectiveness of regulatory measures such as en- 
ergy efficiency standartls. Table 7 sllo\vs the calculations made to  arrive at  
these es t ra  AEEIs. The left-hand coluilln slloivs that the energy efficiency 
in the Pacific OECD couiltries was the lowest in all sectors in 1985. Col- 
umn two shows that in the residential/conlmlercial sector, for example, per 
capita energy coilsuinption in tlle ITSA was 2.96 times that in the Pacific 
OECD. Coluinil three shows that ,  according to AIM estimates, the resi- 
dential/cominercial sector of the USA would coilsume 1.67 times as inuch 
energy per capita as that of the Pacific OECD couiltries in 2020 under the 
standard reference scenario given by EMF 14 (1994). The year 2020 was 
chosen because it takes approsilllately 30-40 years to rebuild large facilities 
such as electrical power plants. To determine the improvement rates (col- 
umn four) necessary to achieve the energy iilteilsities given in colum~l three 
by tlle selected year (2020). the figures in the secoild coluinn were divided 
-/ 
OECD total BaU -/'- 
OECD total EEI 
.- 
- 4:; - - - - L.; 
USA EEI 
EUtCAN EEI 
i 
BaU 
Figure 4. C 0 2  einissions under BAU and regulatory scenarios. 
by figures in the third column. The right-hand column shows the additional 
iinprovement rate needed annually, given by the following function: 
The total AEEIs for the ~vorld illotlel were then estiinated by totaling the 
changes in AEEIs and the base-case XEEIs (Table 8; EMF 14, 1994). 
3.2. Results of simulations 
Effect of Energy Eficierscy Insprovenseists 
The first scenario evaluated assumed t11a.t regulatory measures mandating 
energy efficiency ilnprovenlellts (EEIs) were implemented in two regions, 
the USA and EUtCanatla. The effects of these EEIs can be assessed by 
comparing the results for this scenario (AEEIs with additional AEEIs) with 
those for the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario (base case, AEEIs only). As 
can be seen from Figure 4, the total OECD C 0 2  emissions in the additional 
AEEI case (OECD total EEI case) are reduced by 10.3% in 2005, 13.9% 
in 2010, and 16.5% in 2015 relative to  the BAU case. This result suggests 
the possibility of a similar C 0 2  reduction if the same regulatory measures 
mandating energy efficiency standards already in force in the Pacific OECD 
countries are introduced in the USA and EUtCanada by the year 2020. 
In this section, we consider three sceilarios in which different carbon taxes 
are iiltroduced into the scenario described in the previous section. Here, we 
stipulated a 20% reduction from 1990 levels of OECD emissions by the year 
2010 as a case study. .4 comparison was made of the three scenarios: 
,Scenario 1: A carbon ta,x wit11 different rates is introduced in each 
OECD region so t11a.t the reduction ta.rget is achieved individually. Only 
base-case AEEIs are expected. 
,Scenario 2: EEIs a,nd a ca.rbon tax wit11 different rates are introduced in 
ea.ch OECD region so t11a.t the reduction target is achieved individually. 
,Scenario 3: EEIs a,nd a. conlillon ta.x rate are introduced so that  the 
total einissioils from all OECD countries achieve tlle reduction target as 
a whole. 
Although Japan is not currently ready to conlnlit itself to a carbon tax, 
these scenarios are used to reflect the effect of energy prices in the economic 
model. 
The simulations \\.ere evaluated for the year '2015, because full intro- 
duction of efficiency standards is assumed to be completed in 2020 and the 
target year is 2010. The rate of the carl~on tax introduced in each scenario 
is shown in Figure 5 .  \I'ith intlividual taxes alone, the carbon tax would be- 
coine US$222-233/tC' in 2015. \\-it11 the coinbinatioil of EEIs and a car11011 
tax, the tax tvould 1)e reduced to  lTS$108-229. Tlle Pacific OECD countries 
would not benefit if otller OEC'D cou~ltries were to initiate EEI policies, be- 
cause Pacific OEC'D countries \voul<l have less of a shift from coal to other 
fuels under Scenario 2. Implenlented along with EEIs, a common tax rate 
of only US$142 would achieve the 20%, reduction in OECD C 0 2  emissions. 
Oilly in the USA would the rate of carbon tax under Scenario 3 be higher 
than the tax  rate under Scenario 2, because in this model the marginal cost 
of CO;! reduction is lower in the USA than in otller OECD countries. How- 
ever, it is clear that  for the total OEC'D, the amount of carbon tax necessary 
would be reduced with the policy iuis of EEIs and a common carbon tax. 
It is also important to  identify the GDP losses of the three regions under 
the different scenarios (Figure 6).  If the target were to be achieved through 
a carbon tax alone, the world C;DP loss would be 1.66-1.92% in each region. 
However, if the EEIs were to be introduced a t  the same time, then the loss 
would decrease to 0.7'2-1.91%. There is only a small difference between the 
first two scenarios in the Pacific OECD countries, because it is assumed that  
EEIs are implemented only in the other two regions. The amount of GDP 
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Figure 5. Carbon tax ra.te in 201.5 under three scenarios. 
loss decreases further with a, conlilloil tas,  to 1.04-1.25%. The GDP loss for 
the OECD as a ivl~ole would be the sillallest if EEIs and a common carbon 
t a s  were to be introduced. 
4. Discussion 
The main findings of this study are as follo~vs: 
Japan's successful decoupling of economic activities from C 0 2  emission 
growth was the result of several inajor factors. Energy efficiency im- 
provements resulting from energy efficiency standards and the increase 
in oil prices contributed 4G.7% of the factors' total effects. Fuel shift, 
change in the compositioll of industry from energy-intensive industry to 
service/commercial sectors, and a decrease in the economic growth rate 
were other major factors that helped maintain low growth rates of C 0 2  
emissions in Japan. 
USA EU+CANADA Pac.OECD OECD total 
TAX 
TAX + EEI 
fl COMMON TAX + EEI 
F i g u r e  6. GDP losses of the three regions in 2015 relative to the BAU 
sceilario. 
Without the factors illelltioiled above, C o n  emissions in Japan would 
have been more thaa twice the allloullt of the actual emissions in 1993. 
If there had been 110 chaages in the Japanese life-style, today's emissions 
would have been even lower. 
If the energy efficiency level of Pacific OECD countries were to  be 
achieved by all the OECD coulltries by the year 2025, total C 0 2  emis- 
sions from OECD countries could be reduced 10.3% in 2005, 13.9% in 
2010, and 16.5% in 2015 relative to the BAU scenario. 
In order to achieve a 20% reduction of the 1990 C 0 2  emission levels 
by the year 2010 using a carbon tax introduced in each region, the tax 
rate would have to  be in the range of US$222-233/tC. If the tax were 
implemented together with regulatory measures such as energy efficiency 
improvement standards, the rate would be $108-229/tC. The rate would 
be further reduced to  $142/tC if a common tax rate were implemented 
in all OECD countries together with regulatory measures. 
a GDP loss would also 1)c retlucctl if thc carbon tax were implemented to- 
gether with regulatory measures. \\'if11 an individual carbon t a s  alone, 
GDP losses in the OECD countries would be 1.66-1.92%. With regu- 
latory measures, however, the loss would be decreased to 0.72-1.91'X1, 
and it would be 1.04-1.25% if a common carbon tax were implemented 
together with regulatory measures. 
The Berlin Mandate calls for detailed policies and measures to  be dis- 
cussed a t  an early stage. However, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness 
of such policies and measures, beca.use those that exist differ widely among 
countries. The inte~ltion of this pa,per is not to  elaborate on the possible 
policies and mea.sures as they a.re implemented in ea,ch country, but rather 
to evaluate the overall effectiveness of policies when regulatory measures and 
ecoilonlic measures a,re mised. 
Tlle ma.in conclusion froin this paper is t'l1a.t a. inisture of policies, such 
as those tlmt set certain sta.ndards of achievement and those that work as 
econon~ic incentives, would be effective for C 0 2  emission reductions. It is 
therefore important to illa,illtaill a wide va,riety of policy options aad mea- 
sures that can effectively a.chieve a given ta,rget. 
COz emissions ca.n he reduced significantly with the implemeiltatioll of 
colnmon energy efficiency standa,rds, as lms a.lready been achieved in some 
OECD countries. Tlle Second Assessment Report of the IPCC (199.5) sta,tes, 
"tllere is agreement t11a.t energy efficiency ga.ii~s of perhaps 10 to 30% com- 
pared with baseline trends over the nest tivo to tllree decades can be realized 
a.t negative to  zero net cost." \\'e see from this statement, as well as from 
our ow11 analyses, that reducing elllissioils without substantially harming 
econolllic activity is possible. \Ye sllould be awa,re, however, that both the 
IPCC report a,nd our study a,ssunle that the full iiltroduction of the lllost 
efficient technology in all sectors requires time, on the order of 20 to  30 
years; therefore, it is illlporta,nt not to delay the implelnentation of effective 
policies and mea'sures. 
We are grateful to Mr. IIiliaru 1iobaya.shi of the Environment Agency and 
Mr. Go Hibino of Fuji Research Institute for their support and comments. 
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Abstract 
A cost-benefit analysis for greeilhousc n.arming based on a structurally siin- 
plified, globally integrated coupled clinlate-economic costs model, SIAM 
(structural integrated assessilleilt model), is used to compute optimal paths 
of global carboil dioside (C'02) eillissioils that nlinimize the net sum of 
cliillate-damage and illitigatioil costs. The climate model is represented 
by a linearized impulse-response model calibrated using a coupled ocean- 
atillosphere general circulatioil cliinate model and a three-dimensional global 
carboil cycle model. The cost terms are represented by greatly simplified 
espressioils designed for htudying the sensitivity of the computed optimal 
eillissioil paths wit11 re~pect  to critical input assumptions. These include 
tlle discouilt rates assuilled for iuitigatioil and damage costs, the inertia of 
tlle socioeco~~o~nic systenl, and tlle depeildeilce of climate damage on the 
change in temperature ailcl tlle rate of teinperature change. Differences in 
assuillptioils regarding these parameters are believed to be the origin of the 
marked divergences of esistiilg cost-l~enefit ailalyses based on more sophis- 
ticated economic models. 
The long memory of tlle climate system implies that  time horizons of 
several hundred years are needed to optimize C 0 2  emissions on time scales 
relevant for creating a policy of sustainable development. Cost-benefit anal- 
yses over time scales of only a century or two can lead to  dangerous un- 
derestimations of tlle long-term cliillatic impact of increasing greenhouse 
gas emissions. However, the drawdown of C 0 2  emissions to very low levels 
needed to  avert major long-term global war~lling need not be implemented in 
the short term, but call be realized as a gradual transition over many decades 
or even centuries. Nevertheless, tlle sooiler the necessary mitigation policies 
a,re initiated the less costly t,he tra,nsit-ion will be; the long time horizon then 
still leaves roo111 for later a,djustments. Short-term energy conservation alone 
is insufficient a.nd can be viewed only as a useful measure in support of the 
necessary long-term transitioil to ca.rbon-free energy technologies. 
Optimal emission paths limiting long-term global warming to sustain- 
able development levels are achieved only if climate-damage costs are not 
significantly discounted. Discouilting of cliinate-damage costs a t  normal eco- 
nomic rates yields emission pa,tlls that  are only slightly reduced compared 
with business-as-usual scenarios, producing unacceptably high global warm- 
ing levels in the long run. Altbough these solutions are logically consistent 
with the assunlptioll tha,t g1oba.l warining damage in the distant future is 
indeed of negligible coilcern toda,y. a colnnlitnlent to sustainable develop- 
ment inay be regarded as a willingness-to-pay-today value assessment that  
to  the first order does not depentl on the time horizon of climate change and, 
therefore, should not l ~ e  discount,ecl. 
To translate our general conclusiolls into quantitative cost estima,tes re- 
quired by decisioil ~llaliers, t'he present exploratory study must be extended 
using more detailed disa,ggrega.ted climate-damage and mitigation cost es- 
timates and more realistic socioeconoinic models that include multi-actor 
interactions, inherent variability, t,he role of uncertainty, and adaptive con- 
t,rol strategies. 
1. Introduction 
The creation and implenlentatioll of a,n effective international climate protec- 
tion policy is one of the central issues fa.cing decision makers today. Aillong 
the basic difficulties in a,niving a t  a coinillon policy are the global nature 
of the problenl and the fa.ct that any intlividual nation makes only a rela- 
tively sillall contribut~ion t,o the glol~al a,nthropogenic climate forcing. This 
coinbination invites a, free-rider a.pproac11, a tendency that  is reinforced by 
divergent national interests. 
This basic game-theoretical difficulty is coinpounded by insufficient sci- 
entific information on the impa.ct of clinlate change on the economy, ecology, 
and societal conditions. The uncertainty provides individual actors with a 
wide range of possible scenarios from which they can select and promote 
those that further their particular interests. Therefore, to  establish a level 
game-theoretical playing field, it is inlportant to  reduce the present uncer- 
ta.inties regarding the inlpact of cliina,te change. To provide a rational basis 
for decision making. tlle costs of atlal)ting to cliinate change must be as- 
sessed fllrtller in relation to t lle ahat enlent costs of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissioil levels. 
The scientific basis for such integrated assessment studies is still far 
from complete and varies greatly for the different components of the inte- 
grated climate-socioecoi~oi~~ic system. The Scientific Assessment of Working 
Group I of the Illtergoverilillelltal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
provided valuable sunlnlaries of our current ability to predict anthropogenic 
climate change (IPCC, 1990a, 1992, 1994). These reports provided an im- 
portant background for the  egoti ti at ions at  the United Nations Conference 
on Environllle~lt and Developinent, held in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, and the first 
Conference of the Parties (COP).  held in Berlin, 1995. A parallel assessment 
of the socioeconomic in~pact  of antl~ropogenic limate change, together with 
ailalyses of the n~echanisms for the transmission of scientific information to  
the political arena, the tlecision-n~al,ii~g processes, and t l ~ e  implementation 
of policy decisions through appropriate nlarlcet or regulatory instruments, 
would be similarly beneficial. However, our understanding in this field has 
not yet advanced to the point nhere general scientific consensus statements 
can be presented (see sunlillaries in IPCC, 1990b). To minimize the current 
divergences of existing analyses, exteilsive interdisciplinary research using 
climate, ecological, and ecoiloillic nlotlels, with support from researchers in 
the social sciences, is needed. 
In the present paper n e  attcnlpt to contribute to  this interaction by in- 
vestigating the origin of soine of the marlied divergences found in previous 
cost-benefit analyses. Our approach is to coillbine a climate response illode1 
calibrated using sophisticated state-of-the-art climate models with a rela- 
tively simple, structurally trailsparent climate-damage and abatement costs 
illode1 designed to illuininate the iinpact of the various assumptions that  
we believe lie a t  t l ~ e  core of the divergent results. By means of this struc- 
tural integrated assessnlent model (SIAM) we are then able to  distinguish 
between the relatively robust conclusions that are only weakly dependent 
on such assumptions and more sensitive results, whose dependence on the 
critical input parameters call then be systematically explored. 
We purposely chose inucl~ simpler abatement cost expressions than have 
been used in most previous greenhouse cost analyses (see Reilly et al., 1987; 
Nordhaus, 1991, 1993; Nordhaus and Yang, 1995; Manne and Richels, 1991, 
1995; Peck and Teisberg, 1992; Michaelis, 1994; Tahvonen et al., 1994, 1995; 
Beltratti, 1995; Richels and Edinonds, 199.5; and the more complete list of 
references and discussion in Cline, 1992, and Fankenhaus, 1995). In our 
view, the wide divergences in the concl~~sions of previous cost-benefit anal- 
yses using Inore sophistica.ted nulltisectoral economic models do not a,rise 
from differences in the internal deta,ils of tlle models. Rather, they can be 
a.ttributed a t  a much more elementa.ry level to different basic input assump- 
tions, such as the dependence of cliiuate-danmge costs on climate change 
and the rate of clima,te change, tbe discouilt rates for climate-damage and 
mitigation costs, the inherent inertia. of the economic system, the indige- 
nous rate of technical development, or tlle a,daptability of energy technology 
in response to  imposed illitigatioll measures. An expert poll conducted by 
Nordhaus (1993) revealed a. wide raage of opinions on the magnitudes a.nd 
impacts of these processes a,mong economists, social scientists, and climate 
researchers. Therefore. before embarliing on a detailed description of inter- 
actions between different sectors of t,lle economy, it a.ppears appropriate to 
investigate the impa.ct of these l~asic a,ssunlptions on the computed optimal 
carbon dioside (C:Oa) einissioil pa,ths in a general framework, independent 
of inodel details. We believe this iilvestigation is best achieved using struc- 
turally highly simplified cost function espressions designed to illuminate the 
fundamental cause-and-effect rela,t,ions. 
A fundamental property of both clima,te and the socioeconomic system 
is the wide range of time scales involved. The principal climate subsystems 
relevant for anthropogenic clima,te change - the a,tmosphere, ocean, and bio- 
sphere - change over time scales \.-a,rying fro111 weelis to millennia (excluding 
short weather time scales). Ice sheet,s and geological processes iilvolve still 
longer time scales. Sinlila,rly, ccolloinic and societal adjustment processes 
cover time scales va.rying in lengtll from weeks to several decades or even 
centuries. This implies t,lla.t realistic integrated global environment and so- 
ciety (C;ES') nlodels used for cost-benefit a,na.lyses must be conceived from 
the outset a.s dynamic models. Moreover, t,he impact of climate change in 
response to  human activities must 1)e considered over time horizons coin- 
patible with the natural time consta,nts of the coupled GES systems, that 
is, over several huildred years. Tllese time horizons far exceed the usual 
economic plaaning horizons, but this is a,n una.voidable consequence of the 
dynamics of the GES system if the cl~allenge of sustainable developmeilt is 
to  be faced. 
A novel feature of our approa.cl1 is the illtroduction of a simple lin- 
earized integral impulse-response clima.te model, which clarifies the impact 
of the long climatic time scales on the optimal emissions solution. The 
model is calibrated using the outputs of a state-of-the-art climate model 
consisting of a coupled ocean-atmosphere general circula.tion model and a 
three-dimensional global ca,rl~on cycle model. The impulse-response climate 
model is then coupled with a. structurally highly silnplified economic model 
of climate-damage and abatenient costs. 
The analysis is restricted to an idealized single-world system whose evo- 
lution is governed by a single decisioil maker representing the collective deci- 
sioils of the world community. Multi-actor illodels constructed with the same 
basic building bloclis as presented in this paper, but allowing for different 
climate-damage and abateinent costs as well as the divergent political goals 
and strategies of different econoinic regions, are considered in Hasselmann 
and Ha,sselinailil (1996). 
Following the standard cost-benefit approach, the optimal climate pro- 
tection strategy is defined as tlie time-tlependent path for the coiltrol vari- 
ables of the integrated climate-socioecono~nic system that  illininlizes tota.1 
costs related to  clilna,te change, consisting of the suln of the time-integrated 
global lnitigation a.nd clinlate-claniage costs. The only coiltrol variable we 
will consider are the C'02 emissions. I ~ u t  lve will also briefly discuss t l ~ e  
iinpact of other gree~ihouse gases. 
A11 alternative approa,ch t.llat is solnetillles pursued is to  define u pri- 
ori a permissible cliillate change '.corridor" ~vitliin ~vhich the climate-state 
trajectory is constrained. The optinla1 elnissio~ls path is then defined as the 
pa,tll that  ininiillizes the economic abatement costs under this constraint, 
ignoring the climate-da,mage costs ~vithin the corridor. One call talie this 
approach a step furtlier 11y ~)rescril>ing a ceiling on the at~nosplleric C 0 2  
concentration instead of ;I cli~li;~te cliange lilllit (see Richels and Edmonds, 
1995; Wigley € 2  crl., 1996: a.iitl t l ~ c  tliscussio~l in hIaillle and Ricliels, 199.5). 
The usual lllotivatioil for prescril)ing (1 prbori lilllits for the cliinate change 
or C 0 2  concentra.tion is tlie notorious difficulty of assessing climate-damage 
costs, iilcludiilg intaligible values such a.s the protectioil of species or tlle 
"quality of the environment." However, the corridor approach hides rather 
than avoids the issue of clua.ntifying cli~uate-damage costs. Formally, the 
corridor approach is equivalent to  lllinillliziilg the sum of climate-damage 
and emission-abatement costs under the assumption that  the damage costs 
are zero within the allowed cliinate cl1a.nge or C 0 2  corridor and immediately 
become very large - in excess of any coiiceivable nlitigatioil costs - as sooil 
as one leaves the corridor. We prefer a more continuous represelltation of 
the climate-damage costs inside and outside the corridor. Independent of 
the details of the climate-damage cost function, however, rational determi- 
nation of the acceptable size of the corridor inevitably leads to  the problem 
of assessing climate iinpacts in relation to mitigation costs: the trade-off 
between climate cliange iinpacts and lnitigation efforts - independent of the 
value units in ~vliicli t,l~ese are measured - is the central issue of the climate 
protection problem and ca,nnot be circuluvented by the ad hoc introduction 
of .arbitrary cliinate change or (~102 conccntra.tion ceilings. 
For the political iluplenlenta~tio~i of a,bateinent measures, it may never- 
theless be expedient to define C ' 0 2  concentra,tion targets and devise market 
control or other regulatory mecha.nisins for meeting these targets - in ac- 
cordance, for esa,mple, with the approa.cl1 adopted in the Framework Con- 
vention on Climate Change. However, the definition of the concentration 
targets sllould be b a e d  on prior cost-benefit analyses that considered all 
the conlponents of the cost budget. 
The paper is organized as follows: a.fter a discussion of the general struc- 
ture of GES inodels in Section 2. t,he construction of simple linearized inte- 
gral impulse-response clinlate illodels from the simulation results of complex 
ilo~llinear clinlate inodels is described in Section 3. The coupliilg of the 
impulse-response cliilla,t,e model to an idealized climate-damage and mitiga- 
tion costs model, a,iitl the application of this eleillentary GES model to the 
single-a.ctor gree~lllouse ga.s opt,iinization problein are presented in Section 4. 
A series of sensitivity esperiinents wit,ll the ~llodel is described in Section .5. 
The results are sumnlarized in Sect'ion 6 a,nd placed in the perspective of 
inore complete GES inodels in Section 7. 
2. Structure of GES models 
Figure 1 shows the 1)asic elements and intera.ctions within a GES model. In 
this simplified scheine it is assumed tlmt negotiations lead to a cooperative 
definition of the global ivelfa.re fui~ct~ion, :hich assigns appropriate weights 
to the welfa,re values ant1 interests of individual nations and distributes the 
burdens of an optimized global clima.te protection policy in accordance with 
a.ccepted rules. Once the coopera,tive global welfare function and burden 
sharing have been agreed on, the optimization task is essentially reduced to  
a single-actor dynamic optimizatioil problein in which available market and 
policy instruments are a,pplied to nliilinlize the time-integrated, appropri- 
ately discounted net climate-da,inage and initigation costs. 
A more deta.iled representa,t,ion of the sa,nle set of interactions, consisting 
a,gaill of a single global clinla.te systein and a single international negotiation 
box, but with the socioeconoinic systein disaggregated into separate units 
representing different economic regions, is discussed in the contest of the 
more genera'l multi-actor greenhouse gas optimization problem in Hassel- 
nlann and Hassellnann (1996). 
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Figure 1. Illteractions ant1 sul~systenls of an integrated global ellvironmellt 
aad society (GES) lllodel (froin Ha.sselnlann. 1991). 
In either case - coopeiative agreenlent on a global welfare function or 
the more general game-theoretical hituation - the dynamic system will gener- 
ally be too coinples for analytical investigations and will need to  be studied 
using nulllerical siillulatioil techniques. Unfortunately, no suitable set of 
subsystem models is currently available that could be combined in a rea- 
soilably realistic GES model for such dynamic optimization studies. There 
exist a number of sophisticated cliinate models based on coupled general 
circulatioil models ( CGCMs) of the atmosphere and ocean, which have been 
shown to  represent the present cliinate quite accurately (see IPCC, 1992; 
Cubasch et al., 1992), as well as sinlilarly sophisticated and realistic three- 
dimensional ocean-atinospllere carboil cycle models (Maier-Reimer and Has- 
selinann, 1987; Maier-Reimer, 1993; Sarlllieilto et nl., 1992). However, these 
are far too costly in computer time to be applied in dynamic optimization 
studies, which ilormally require a large iluillber of integrations using an iter- 
ative optimizatioil algorithm. Similarly, realistic economic models, although 
less demanding of computer resources aiitl still highly simplified with re- 
spect to  tlle societal conlpoiient.s ant1 the iiltera,ctions between the climate 
and economic systems, a,re genera.11~ too cumbersome for applications in 
iterative optimization studies. 
It is therefore not surprising that illost of the dynamic optimization stud- 
ies carried out to date have been single-actor investigations based on sim- 
plified box-type climate models a.nd strongly aggregated economic models 
(Nordha.us, 1991, 1993; Peck and Teisberg, 1992; Michaelis, 1994; Tahvonen 
et al., 1994, 199.5; and Beltra.tti, 1995). Greenhouse cost studies using more 
sophisticated disa.ggregated econolllic models have usually been carried out 
in the scenario mode, ra,ther tha,n a.s optimization computations (see refer- 
ences quoted above, a.s well a.s Cline. 1992, and Fankhauser, 1995). N7e limit 
ourselves here to optimization stutlies using single-actor models, but with 
tlle goal, as outlined above, of cla.rifyiiig the sensitivity of the computed op- 
tillla1 emission pa.ths wit11 respect to critical input assumptions, rather than 
providing quantitative cost estiina.tes of pa.rticular emission paths. 
In the following section we describe a. general technique for projecting the 
simulation results of sophistica,ted CC:C:M cliillate models onto simpler but 
ilonetlleless geographically a,nd dyna.mically realistic climate models. The 
illodels are formulated a,s linea,r integral respoilse lllodels and are sufficiently 
economical with respect t,o coluputer tiine to be applicable for iterative op- 
timization integrations. Tlle technique presented is a basic building block 
that ca.n also be used for tlle tlevelopinent of more realistic GES models. 
3. Projection of CGCM Climate Models onto 
Linear Integral-Response Climate Models 
3.1. General approach 
Although the climate system and its detailed representation in terms of 
C'GCMs are inherently strongly nonlinear, the response of the climate system 
to  a small external forcing, as that of any differentiable nonlinear system, is 
linear to the first order. In this paper we consider the annual anthropogenic 
emissions, e(t), of ( ( 0 2  as the external forcing. Because C 0 2  is well mixed in 
the atmosphere, e ( t )  can be represented as a single scalar function of time. 
Although C 0 2  contributes only about GO% of the anthropogenic radiative 
forcing of all greenhouse gases, we restrict the discussion here to C 0 2  because 
models of non-C02 greenllouse gases are generally less well developed. Also, 
the sources and sinks of these gases often are not well known, so that the 
inechanislns for controlling their atnlospheric concentrations are not well 
defined. It illust therefore be kept in llliild that tlle following projections 
of future climate change represent systeillatic underestimates of the real 
climate change. However, we will attenlpt to provide first-order estimates of 
the impact of non-C02 greenhouse gases later. 
In the linear approsimation, the response of the perturbed climate state, 
x ( t )  (which in a discrete model representation consists of the perturbation 
vector of all cliillate variables at  all illode1 gridpoints), to an arbitrary, suf- 
ficiently small emission function, t ( t ) ,  can be represented in the general 
integral form 
where the clinlate impulse-response function, R(t-t ') ,  represents the climate 
response a t  time t to a unit O-function enlission at  time t'. It is assumed 
that  the forcing aild clinlate perturbation are zero up to tlle initial time 
to : e(t) = x( t )  = 0 for t 5 to 
Tlle first-order linear response approximation can be generalized to 
nonlinear response relations in wllich the linear kernel R( t )  = R l ( t l )  is 
replaced by a series espailsion in terms of higher-order nonlinear kernels 
R 2 ( t l ,  t2) ,  R3( t l ,  t2 ,  t3), . . . occurri~lg in quadratic, cubic, . . . integrals over 
the emission. However, noting that a doubling of the C 0 2  concentration 
corresponds to  an increase in radiative forcing of about 4 LV/in2, or little 
nlore than 1% of the inean incident solar radiation of 340 W/m2, the linear 
form will be adequate for many applications. We discuss the limitations of 
the linearization approxinlatioll in inore detail below. 
The dinlension of R ( t )  in equation (1) is the same as that of x(t).  Thus, 
the linear response call be represented with the same geographical resolutioil 
aud with respect to the same set of variables (temperature, humidity, pre- 
cipitation, ocean currents, etc.) as a fully coupled ocean-atmosphere general 
circulation climate model. Tlle response function can be determined em- 
pirically from nunlerical cliinate response esperiments with realistic three- 
dinlensional carbon cycle inodels or CGCRIIs (Maier-Reimer and Hassel- 
mann, 1987; Cubasch t t  al., 1992; Hasselnlann et al., 1993). In practice, 
it will normally be convenient to reduce the number of degrees of freedom 
of R ( t )  by expanding the response function with respect to some set of base 
functions, such as the enlpirical orthogonal functions (EOFs) of the CGCM 
climate response simulations. However, it is important to recognize that  the 
linearized form [(equation ( I ) ]  inlplies no loss of information in the repre- 
sentation of the climate state relative to the complete nonlinear system. but 
represents simply a reduction of the full nonlinear dynamics to  the first-order 
linearized response, which is al\vays perlllissible for a small external forcing. 
The present approach appears preferable to  the usual construction of 
simplified clilnate models in the forin of empirical box models with a small 
number of degrees of freedom. These lose the detailed informati011 on the 
climate state and therefore cannot be readily constrained to conform to  the 
detailed linearized dyilalllics of a more realistic CGCM climate model. 
The formulation of the climate response in terms of a response integral 
rather than in the traditional for111 of a differential equation for a box model 
bas further advantages: it is not liinited to  simple low-order differential 
equations, but applies generally for differential equations of arbitrary order; 
it is easy to fit to the data; and it enal~les a direct determination of the 
gradient of the cost function (see Section 3.2 and Appendix), without solving 
a Han~il toniai~ problem in terins of the adjoint model. The last advantage 
does not come to bear. hon-ever. if an antomatic adjoint lllodel and fuilctiollal 
derivative compiler are used, as in our applications below. This model- 
colnpiler combination can I)e applied equally well to differential or integral 
representatioils of the systenl dynamics (Giering and Kaminski, 1996). 
In the a.pplica,tions of this pa,per we use a st.rongly a'ggregated climate model 
in which the clima.te sta,te vector: x. is reduced to a single climate variable, 
T, representiilg the global mean (surfa,ce) tempera,ture. The model collsists 
of two subsyst'ems, a car11011 cycle lnodel aad a global teillperature response 
model. 
Tlze Chrbon Cycle Model 
This model describes the evolution of the a.tmosp11eric C 0 2  concentration, 
t u ,  in response to  C 0 2  emissions, e(t): 
where R,,(t - 2 ' )  is the illlpulse response of the concentration a t  time t for 
a unit 6-function elnissioll pulse a t  time t' and it is assumed, as in equation 
( I ) ,  that e( t )  = w ( t )  = 0 for t 5 to. Later, we shall choose t = to as the 
preindustrial date 1800 (the exact date is immaterial, as e( t )  is assumed to  
be zero in the preiildustrial epoch). 
I11 this paper tlle unit for time is years. To retain the same carbon 
units ( GtC', gigatolls of carbon) for u )  ailtl the eillissions e (in GtC/yr) ,  in 
all equations PU represents the total carbon in the atmosphere. However, 
in later figures we will present results for w in the usual units of parts per 
nlillion (ppin). Tlle conversioil factor is w [C:tC] = 2.13 w [ppm]. The 
present atmospheric CO;! coilcentratioil is 358 ppm, corresponding t o  an 
atmosplleric carboil coiltent of 760 GtC'; the preindustrial concentration was 
wo = 280 ppin = 594 GtC. 
Initially, all enlissions enter the atmosphere, so that 
R,,(ixl) defines the fractioil of the e~llihsions that  is retained in the atmo- 
sphere in the asynlptotic equilibrium state. If the ocean sink alone is con- 
sidered, this is approximately 145,: if the nptalie of C 0 2  by dissolution in 
the upper layers of the ocean setliillcilts is also included, the long-term at- 
illospheric retention fact or may fall to about 7%) ( Alaier-Reimer, 1993). The 
increased storage of C'Oz in t lle terrestrial biosphere through CO;! fertiliza- 
tion and the sigllificantly slower loss of COz tllrough sedimentatioil in the 
ocean are not included in these estinlates. 
Invoking equation (31, the time derivative of equatioil (2) (which will be 
needed to  couple the C'Oz inotlel with tlle following temperature response 
model) is given by 
In an analysis of the response of a llolllillear three-dimensional global 
ocean carbon cycle inode1 to various C'Or eiilissioil levels, Maier-Reimer and 
Hasselinailil (1987) found that tlle lllotlel response could be fitted to  a linear 
relation of the forill (1) quite well for an increase in the C 0 2  level up to  a fac- 
tor of two. For a stronger eillissioil level producing a fourfold increase in the 
CO;! concentration, the linear response underestimated the atmospheric con- 
centration predicted by the full illode1 by about 30%. This discrepancy was 
due primarily to the ilonliilear decrease of the solubility of CO;! in seawater 
with increasing C 0 2  concentration. A relatively simple nonlinear extension 
of the linear response form to allow for the nonlinearities (and temperature 
dependence) associated with the solution of CO;! in seawater has recently 
been proposed by Joos et ( I / . ,  (1995). 
The Global Teinperrcturc Rc.sponsc ~lIo(lcl 
The general linear response of the change. i " ( t ) ,  of the global mean temper- 
ature induced by a change, tu,  in the (:(OL concentration is given by 
where the temperature impulse-response function, R T ( ~  - t'), represents the 
challge in the global iileall temperature produced at  time t by a unit S- 
fuliction change in the atlllospheric C'02 concentration a t  time t'. 
It is more conveniellt to rewrite equation ( . 5 )  in terms of the rate of 
cllange of the COz concentration, tit, instead of w. This is because a S- 
function input in the eini5siolls generate5 a step-function response in the 
collcentration [see equation ('L)], that is, a 6-function response in the deriva- 
tive of the concentratioi~, rather than in the collceiltration itself. Integrating 
equation ( 5 )  in parts, we obtain 
RT(t  - t1)tb(t')dt', 
where the response functioil 
represents the cllange in the global iilean teillperature produced a t  time t 
11s a unit step-function incsease in the atinosphe~~ic C 0 2  coilcentration at  
time t ' .  
Because of the inertia of the climate system, the instantaneous response 
to a step-function cliange in C'02 concentration is zero [see equation (7)], 
In the opposite limit, R T ( w )  represeilts the asymptotic equilibrium response 
of the (thermodynamic) climate systelll t o  a unit increase in the C 0 2  con- 
centration. 
The generalization of this silllple one-parameter climate model to more 
complex climate-state models, including, for example, regional tempera- 
ture distributions represellted by the first few EOFs of CGCM climate re- 
sponse experiments, 01. additional illforlllation such as regional changes in sea 
level or precipitatioil patterns as well as temperature patterns, is basically 
straightforward. Such lllodels could be readily constructed, in accordailce 
with the general forin ( I . ) ,  from esist'ing da.ta generated by CGCM climate re- 
sponse simulations. IIoivever, for illustrative purposes we restrict the model 
here to  a single cliinate variable representing the global mean temperature. 
In fact, the critical eleinents of our optiinization analysis concern not so 
much the detailed description of the predicted climate change as the estima- 
tion of the resulting clima.te-da,inage costs. As long as these are not better 
assessed, there is little point in being too specific about the details of the 
cliinate change. 
In the applications discussed in IIa,sselmann a'nd Hasselmann (1996) 
involving simulta~ileous multi-a.ctor greenhouse gas emission optimization 
strategies, it would be inore appropria,te to  consider different climate impact 
functions for different actors. This call I)e a,chieved within the framework of 
the present illode1 by siiuply a,ssigning different regional impact factors to 
the single global cliina,te va.ria,ble T. To t,he estent that the climate impact 
for a given region call I)e characterized 1)y t,he merage temperature change 
over the region, t,llis approach can be justified by the results of nunlerical 
global wa.rming siiuulations with coupled ClGCMs (Cubasch et ul., 1992). 
Tlle response of the global temperature distribution is dominated in these 
silnulations by the first EOF, implying that the average temperature re- 
sponse for any region can indeed be rela,ted to  the global mean temperature 
by a time-independent scaling fa,ctor. 
The linear respollse relation behveen the temperature change and the 
cllange of the COs concent,ra~tioii ca,n be inodified in accordance with the 
nlore accurate logarithinic dependence between the radiative greenhouse 
forcing and the COz concentra.tion I)? repla.cing ~b with d(ln w)/dt in equa.- 
tion ( 5 ) .  This substitution iiltroduces no significant colnplications in the 
numerical examples coilsidered in the following section. However, the dif- 
ference between the linear aad logaritllinic formulation is small for a small 
forcing (which we a.ssume), and for t,he present illustrative purposes the lin- 
ear relation (5) has the advantage of yielding a net linear climate response 
to  the emissions in accordance with the forin (1). 
Linear-response-fitting esercises for coupled ocean-atmosphere CGCM 
global warming simulations (Ha~sselma~nn et (I/., 1993) suggest that ,  as in 
the case of the linearized ca.rbon cycle model, the linearized temperature 
response relation is a.pplicable for cliinate cl~a,~lges associated with COz con- 
centration increases up to  a.bout double the preindustrial level, that is, for 
a temperature rise up to about 3°C. The linear response relations should 
also not be used beyond this range because the temperature feedback on the 
C 0 2  model (increasing telnperature decreases the COz solubility of seawater 
a,nd thus increa,ses the at.mospheric retention factor) has not been included 
in tlle C 0 2  response relation ( 2 )  (llowever. this effect is incorporated in the 
general nolllinear impulse-response relation of Joos et al., 1995). 
Colllbiilillg the carbon cycle ancl global temperature response models, 
the net response of the "clinlate" T to the emissions e(t) can now be written 
Noting that 
Jt dl' Jt' dl" = 1; dt" 1,: dt' , 
t o  
this inay be espressed a.s 
in accordance with tlle form ( I ) .  where 
The net telllperature inlpulse-response iu~lction, R(t), or ylobcll warnz- 
irzg resporzse [to be distillguislled fro111 tlle global warming "potential" or 
"comn~itment ," defined by IPClC! ( 1990a) a.s integrated radiative warming 
qua.ntities], represents the tempera.ture increase at  time t due to  a unit 6- 
function C 0 2  input into the a,t,nlosphere a,t time t = 0, allowing for both the 
thermal inertia of tlle ocean-atmosphere clinlate system and the slow decay 
of the atmospheric C 0 2  coilcentratioll through the transfer of C 0 2  from the 
a.tmosp11ere to other coillpoilents of the ca.rbon cycle. 
3.3. Numerical values 
The response functions R, and RT have been determined empirically from 
numerical response esperimellts using realistic three-dimensional models of 
the global carbon cycle (Rilaier-Reiiner and Hasselmann, 1987; Maier-Reimer, 
1993) and the coupled ocean-atmosphere cliinate system (Hasselmann et al., 
1993). It was fouild that the response curves could be closely fitted by sums 
of exponentials in the form 
where R$ represents the teinpera.ture response to a step-function doubling 
of the C 0 2  concentra.tion at  time t = 0 relative to the preindustrial va.lue. 
The empirically fitted anlplit'utle factors, A p  and A:, and time con- 
stants, t y  a,nd 27, for va,rious response motlels a,re listed in Table 1. 
The C 0 2  response liiotlel R\,I'l Lvas fitted to the response of the origi- 
nal inorganic three-dimensiona1 ocea,n ca,rbon cycle lllodel of Maier-Reimer 
and Hasselllla,nn (19s;) and yields an asymptotic a~tnlospheric retention fac- 
tor of 14%. The nlodified fornl R\\iO, which we will take as our ba.seline 
model, was derived from a. fit (Ma,ier-R.eimer, personal communication) to 
the response of a more recent t,hree-dimensional organic carbon cycle model 
(Maier-Reimer, 1993), including an a,dditional sediment pool whose C 0 2  
uptake reduces the a.symptotic atmospheric retention factor to 7%. Other 
impulse-response fuilctions for tliffereilt C102 lnodels are presented in the 
b a . ~ l < g r ~ u l ~ t l  report of Enting ~f (11. ( 1994) for lPCC M1orlting Group I. 
Va,rious teillpera,ture response functions were coilsidered by Hasselnlann 
et ul. (1993) in their analysis a,nd correct,ioll of cold-start errors in CGCM 
global warnling sinlulations. Tliese errors are incurred when, to save comput- 
ing costs, the clinlate is initialized a,s a,n equilibrium state at  some relatively 
recent starting time, ignoring the dela,yed impact (global warming response) 
of the C 0 2  that  had already been emitted prior to  the start of the model 
integration. The authors found t11a.t the global mean temperature response 
computed directly from an esperinlent in which the C 0 2  level was suddenly 
increased by a factor of two wa,s initia,lly larger but asymptotically smaller 
than the equilibrium response inferred from transient response experiments 
in which the C 0 2  level was iilcrea,sed gradually. They attributed this result 
t o  nonliilearities in the response of the ocean mixed layer to  a sudden C 0 2  
step-function doubling: the ra.pid initia.1 wa,rlning tends to  stabilize the up- 
per inixed layer of the ocean, inhibiting the subsequent penetration of heat 
into the deep ocean. 
Table 1. Top part: amplitudes, .4y? and time constants, tY ,  for the C 0 2  
respoilse inodels RSVO (Maier-Reimer, 1993) and RW1 (Maier-Reimer and 
Hasselmann, 1987). Bottom part: amplitudes, A:? and time constants, t:, 
for the tempera.ture response function, Rb, for the models RTO (baseline 
case), RT1 (single time consta.nt model of Hasselmann et nl., 1993), and 
RT2 (modification of RTO with long time constant term). 
RiIodel A t  A;" t y  A? t l  4 t F  AT t y  
RWO 0.07 0.648 258.5 0.101 71.9 0.097 17.6 0.084 1.6 
Model AT t T 11 T t T 4 t: 
RTO 1.21 2.1 0.759 12.0 0.531 138.6 
RT 1 2.5 36.8 - - - - 
RT2 0.8 2 .$I 0 .:3 40.0 1.4 3 00 
To investigate the impact of different time-delay characteristics of the 
temperature response function we considered three models, listed in Table 1. 
All models were norinalizetl to yield the saille asymptotic equilibrium tem- 
perature 2.5OC for a C : 0 2  doubling. The baseline model, RTO, represents a fit 
t o  the 800-year tra,ilsieilt response computed with the Hamburg large-scale 
global (LSG) oceaa circula.tion model, which was coupled to an a.tmospheric 
energy bala.nce model. for a very sinall step-function increment in the COz 
concent~ration (Aiikolaje~vicz and llaier-Reimer, personal communication). 
The model RT1 correspontls to  the single time-constant fit of Hasselma,nn et 
(11.  (1993) to  the global ~varming siillula,tioil of Cubasch et ul. (1992) for 1PC:C 
Scenario A. Motlel RT2 was obta,ined by fitting the temperature impulse- 
response model to  a. lOO-yea,r CGClAtI siillulation for a sudden CO;! doubling 
(Cubasch et ul., 1992). It reproduces the principal short-term response char- 
acteristics of model RTO, but with snlaller amplitude, and is augmented by 
an additional term with a long time consta.nt representing heat storage in 
the deep ocean. This tern1 is probably exaggerated for typical slowly in- 
creasing transient global wa.rming simulations, which are better represented 
by the models RTO a.nd RT1. However, it is rea,sonable for a sudden CO;! 
doubling because of the illhibition of heat transfer into the deep ocean by 
the nonlinear response of the mixed layer. The model has been included to 
investigate the sensitivity of cost-benefit analyses with respect to the details 
of the climate model. 
Figure 2 shows the va.rious ca.rbon cycle and temperature response func- 
tions, R,,, a.nd R$ = . I I I ~ R ~  (left aad right panels, respectively), together 
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Figure 2. Left panel: Respoilse functions, Rrl,,  representing the atmo- 
spheric retention factor for a unit 6-function e~llissioii of C 0 2  at  time t = 0, 
as given by the C02-response illodels R\\-0 (solid line) and R\V1 (dotted line). 
Right panel: Temperature rebponse functions, R$- = woRT and R' = uioR 
for a step-function doubling of the ( ' 0 2  conceiltratioll a t  time t = 0 for the 
Rk nlodels RTO (solid line), RT1 (<lottetl line), and RT2 (dashed line), and 
the resultant R' models ROO (solid line), R10 (dotted line), RO1 (dashed 
line), and R02 (dashed-dotted line). 
with the net temperature response function. R' = woR (right panel), for the 
illode1 conlbinatio~ls ROO (R\\-O+RTO), R10 (R\\-l+RTO), ROl (RMTO+RT1) 
and R02 (R\YO+RT2). Tlie temperature response fuiictions Rk and R' rep- 
resent the response to  a step-function doubli~lg of the atmospheric C 0 2  con- 
centration a t  time t = 0, which is then either retained a t  a constant level 
(in the case of Rk),  or (in the case of R') is allowed to  relax back to  an 
asynlptotic value representing 7% (model ROO) or 14% (model R10) of the 
initial level, in accordance with the carboil cycle response (14). 
The response curves illustrate (as indicated by the analytical expres- 
sions) that  the net climate response to  C 0 2  emissions cannot be character- 
ized by a single time constant. In all iliodels, after a rapid temperature rise 
in the first few years as the upper nlised layer of the ocean warms, the net 
response functioil for the global illeall teinperature increases more slowly as 
the warming penetrates into the illail1 ocean thermocline, reaching its max- 
imum value of about 1-1.5OC after about a decade or two (compared with 
the asymptotic temperature response of 2.5OC for a C 0 2  doubling without 
subsequent C 0 2  losses from the atmosphere), after wllich the temperature 
gradually returns, over a period of several hundred years, to  its asymptotic 
equilibrium value of 2.5 x 0.07 = 0.175"C' for models ROO, R01, a.nd R.02, or 
2.5 x 0.14 = 0.3Fj0(:' for model R 10. The initial fast response is governed by 
the temperature response of the ocean-a,tmosphere system, while the later 
relasation stages are determined 11y slow response terms in both the carbon 
cycle a.nd the climate system. 
Altllough there clea.rly a,re differences in detail between the different car- 
bon cycle and t,empera.ture response models, all model combinations shown 
in Figure 2 eshibit rather similar qualitative features. It was found that the 
computed optima.1 emission pa,ths presented below did not depend on tlle 
choice of lllodel combination shotvn in Figure 2, a.nd that  our general con- 
clusions a,pplied for all clilna,te nlodels considered: the climate model is not 
a critical element in integra.t,ed a.ssessment studies (ignoring possible insta- 
bilities of the clima.te system, \vhicll a,re escluded in the models considered). 
Accordingly, we will later present results only for the baseline model R.00. 
For the optillliza,tion of greenhouse ga,s emission pa,ths, the climate re- 
sponse characteristics for 110th the nea,r a,nd far time must be considered. In 
particular, if the ma,nda,te of sust,a.inable developmellt is taken seriously, the 
socioeconoinic impa.ct of the long-term climate response over several hundred 
years should not be ignored or severely attenuated through the application 
of exponential discount fa.ctors designed to lllodel economics or intertempo- 
ral societal preferences over t,lle short t,erm. Furthermore, in keeping with 
the multiple time scales of the clillla,t,e system, the dynamic properties of the 
ecological a,ild econolllic responses to  clinnte change should also be modeled 
in terms of several different time collsta,nts reflectiilg different dynamic pro- 
cesses in the coupled ecological-socioeconolllic system. We will attempt to  
follow this principle la,ter in the formula.tion of simplified expressions for the 
climate-danmge aad mitiga,tion costs in our sensitivity studies. 
The need to consider cliilla,te impa.ct over time horizons of several hun- 
dred years has been st,ressed by several authors, in particular Cline (1992). 
He points out that liiniting the time span to only one hundred years, as 
in the IPCC reports (IPCC 1990a., 1992), can lead to  a dangerous under- 
estimation of the long-term greenhouse warming impact. However, in con- 
sidering longer-term climate impacts, it is also important to apply realistic 
cliinate response models. It is oft,eil a.ssumed that the asymptotic atmo- 
spheric retention factor for C:02  emissions is about 50%, in accordance with 
the observed retention factor in recent decades. This leads to  an incorrect 
overestimation of the long-term global wa.rming response. The recent at- 
mospheric retention values of the order of 50% are the result of a continual 
exponential increase in C 0 2  einissioils in recent decades. This increase has 
been too rapid for the large but very slow deep-ocean C 0 2  sink to  become 
effective. For a C!02 pulse correspouding to, say, a.n initial C 0 2  doubling, 
the incorrect assumption tha,t. half t'he emissions are retained asymptotically 
in the atmosphere yields a long-term global warming response that  is half 
as large as the equilibriunl warming for a doubled C 0 2  concentration, or 
2.512 = 1.25OC. However, for a finite CIOz pulse (or for constant rather than 
exponentially growing en~issions) t'he a,syinptotic atmospheric retention fac- 
tor is of the order of only 7-1475 [equa.tion (14); Table 11. Thus the global 
warming response for a 6-function emission pulse corresponding to  an initial 
C 0 2  doubling is not consta.nt, but, as indicated in Figure 2, attains a maxi- 
mum after a few decades a,nd decrea,ses continually thereafter, approaching 
a. relatively low asymptotic equilibrium value of 0.07 x 2.5 = 0.175OC (for 
illode1 ROO) or 0.14 x 2..5 = 0.35OC; (for ~uodel R10). 
I11 conclusion, we note tlmt the existence of a small but non-zero asymp- 
totic C 0 2  response level, R,,,(m), implies that  for a finite asymptotic tem- 
perature rise, the total e~llissioils must renlain finite; that is, the a.symptotic 
einission level must approa,ch zero. This is indeed the case in the optimal 
solutions derived below (with the exception of siillulation S2, in which only 
the rate of teinpera.tnre change. not the temperature change itself, enters 
into the climate-damage cost expression). In practice, of course, finite total 
emissions are ensured by the finite resources of fossil fuels. 
4. The Optimization Problem 
\We now combine our global cliinate model with a simple globally integrated 
economic climate-damage and abatement costs model to  form a coupled 
climate-economic model. UTe adopt the saine level of global aggregation as 
used in similar studies by Nordhaus (1991, 19931, Tahvonen et al. (1994, 
1995), and Beltratti (199.5). There are two main differences, however, in our 
approach relative to previous studies: the use of a general integral impulse- 
response climate model, which illustrates more clearly the memory properties 
of the climate system and enables a direct calibration of the model in terms 
of CGCM global warnling simulations, and the introduction of a structurally 
highly simplified abatement costs model. 
The resulting GES inodel involves two levels of aggregation of basically 
different quality. The first level is the cliinate model, for which our input 
information for the aggregate cliinate state (the global mean temperature) 
is relatively reliable, and where we have merely introduced a linear approsi- 
mation, valid for small perturbations, of the basically well-defined nonlinear 
system to  arrive a t  a numerically readily tractable system. The second level 
of a,ggrega.tion is t,lle econo11lic c.lill1a.t.e-tla.~lla,ge a.nd greenhouse ga.s aba.te- 
nlellt costs. Beca.use the clj~nate impa,ct rela.tions a.re not well known, we 
have assumed si~nplified espressions for the climate-damage costs, a.nd, for 
the reasons stated earlier, have also considered only structurally highly ide- 
alized expressions for the mitiga.tion costs. These are introduced in order 
to  focus on the differences in the basic a,ssumptions that  have lead to the 
marked divergences in the conclusjons of earlier cost-benefit analyses based 
on more sophisticated ecollolnic models. As a basis for the application of 
more detailed eco~lonlic models, it appears necessary to  clarify the origin of 
the present divergences. Despite these simplifications, the important effects 
of inertia 11a.ve been included in the espressions for both climate-dama.ge and 
nlitigation costs. 
We repea,t that the purpose of our esercise is not to  generate quantitative 
cost calculations, but to study the sensitivity of the coupled GES system 
and the conlputed optii11al elilissioil paths with respect to  different input 
assu~nptions and pa.rameters. Our goals are to distinguish between relatively 
robust and nlore sensitive conclusions of the optilllization analysis and to  
clarify the role of the cha.racteristic climatic a,nd economic time scales in 
governing the short- a.nd long-tern1 properties of the optirnal emission paths. 
The same basic model, but disaggregated into several interacting subsystems, 
is a,lso a.pplied in Ha,ssellllalln a,lld Ha,ssel~uann (1996) in the discussion of 
the multi-actor greenhouse gas elllission problem. 
Tbe g1oba.l economy is represented as a t~vo-pa.ra,meter system dependent 
on total COz e~llissions and t,he clilna,te state. It is assumed that  there exists 
a, globa.1 welfare function, I l', that has been agreed on by all actors involved 
a,nd t11a.t depends solely on ~ ( t )  (including its first and second derivatives, 
to  represent the effects of econolllic inertia.) and T ( t )  (including its first 
derivative to  lllodel clinmte impa,cts, for esample in the ecology, governed 
by the rate of cli~nat~e change). Tlle collllnoll goal of all actors, represented 
by a single actor in this idealized cooperative scenario, is to maximize W. 
If climate damages are ignored, the optimal solution, yielding a welfare 
value WA, will be solue "business a.s usual" (BAU) pa.tl1, eA(t), corresponding 
to, say, IPCC Scena.rio A (IPCC, 1990a). How this optimal reference path 
escluding clinmte-da.lua,ge costs is a.tt.a.ined is irrelevant for the analysis that 
follows. If climate-damage costs, Cd, a,re included, the optimal solution will 
be a dinlillished enlission path t11a.t reduces the climate-da.mage costs but 
incurs some aba.teinent costs, C,. The optimal emission path is then the 
path that  maximizes tlie net welfare 
or minimizes the adclitioilal costs 
C' = C', +C'$ (17) 
relative to the BAU path. We use the term "cost" here as a synonym for loss 
of welfare. The distiilction between costs and welfare loss is immaterial for 
the present optiinizatioil problem, provided welfare depends solely on costs. 
In general, this callnot be assumed if the concept of welfare includes nonmon- 
etary quality-of-life factors. However, for the present idealized single-actor 
problem, there is no need to be illore specific in distinguishing between costs 
and negative welfare. 
We assume that both cost contributions can be expressed as integrals 
over the sl~ecific costs, c,,(t) and c,,(t), in the form 
We can choose a finite time horizon, tr,, for the total cost definition or con- 
sider the case t h  - cxl. The integrals coilverge for t h  + co if exponential 
discount factors are introduced. Time has been included explicitly as a sep- 
arate variable in the specific cost functions, c ,  and c d ,  to allow for such dis- 
count factors; different factors nlay I>c chosen for the abatement and damage 
costs. 
Costs and discount factors are ahsulned to be adjusted for inflation. We 
are conceriled only with the ratios of abatement and climate-damage costs, 
defined as additional costs re1atix.e to an unspecified BAU welfare value, 
\ I> .  Thus, all costs are defined only to an arbitrary constant scaling factor. 
We make no attempt to introduce an absolute scaling with respect to, say, 
gross domestic product (GDP). Our interest lies in establishing the forms 
of the optimal eillission paths for various input assumptions regarding the 
relative magnitudes and forms of tlle cost functions. For this analysis the 
absolute cost values are irrelevant. However, we note that most quantitative 
cost estimates suggest that the mitigation and damage costs for optimal 
emission paths are generally of the same order and lie in the range from one 
to  a few percent (this does not apply for estimates of the climate-damage 
costs for the uilcontrolled BAU emission path, however, which vary more 
widely). 
We ignore cross-coupling of the cliinate and emission variables in the cost 
expressions. A chailge in emissions, producing a change in the structure of 
tlle socioecoi~o~i~ic syst.eni, ilia.jr 1)e espected t'o a'ffect the vulnerability of t,lle 
systenl to cliinate clia,iige. Siniilarly. a change in climate will presumably 
have sonle iinpact on tlle a.ba,teiueiit costs. For example, the costs of switch- 
ing from fossil fuels to solar energy will be increa.sed if the cloud cover is 
increased. However, these effects a.re rega.rded as being of a higher order and 
a.re neglected. 
In addition to e. first and seco~id time derivatives 6 and e are included 
in the specific aba.teinent cost function in order to penalize rapid changes 
in emissions, thereby ensuriilg a s~llooth traasition from the reference BAU 
emission path. e.h(t), to altenla.t,ive reduced-emission paths without discon- 
tinuities in emissions aad their tiine derivative. In a more sophisticated 
eco~lo~nic  model, these inertia effect's would, of course, be achieved by in- 
troducing capit a1 investinents. I-Io\vever, to de~nonstrate the sensitivity of 
the conlputed opt~iinal emissio~i pat,lls with respect to  the effects of econonlic 
inertia, we prefer to represent the dependence of the aba,tenlent costs 011 the 
first and second deriva.tives of tlie einissions in the simplest possible manner, 
without the carnouflagiilg details of a Inore complex economic model. 
With the sa.me pl~ilosopl~y, we a,ssullle a particularly simple dependence 
of the mitigation costs on the deviat'ion of einissions from the prescribed 
optimal climate-insensitive BAU path. As the simplest mathematical ex- 
pression that captures the principal properties of the abatement costs that  
inay be a,nticipa.ted from a illore det,ailed ecollomic model, we set 
where r = e / ~ , ~ ,  rl and r 2  are time constants, and 
is the abatenlent cost discount factor, characterized by an abatement cost 
discount time constant, r, (inverse annual discount factor). 
The first term in the espressioil (20) has the property that  any positive 
or negative departure from the reference BAU emission path, eA, incurs 
costs that are quadratic in the deviations Sr = r - 1 for sinall ST, (f - r)2 z 
4(Sr)< and approach infinity for botli r 0 and r - w. The quadratic 
dependence on the first and secoild derivatives of e(t) is the simplest way 
of parameterizing eco~loinic inertia in the model. We have not included a 
"no-regrets" feature to  model inarltet imperfections, which would yield an 
initial decrease in the costs for an initial decrease in emissions. 
Tlle use of a, prescribed BAIT einissioi~ pa.th as a reference in the abate- 
lnei~t costs expressioil folloivs Nortlhaus (1991. 1993) and Tahvonen et nl. 
(1994, 1995). It can be arguetl tlmt this approa.cl1 is unrealistic. The intro- 
duction of abatement inea.sures tvill necessarily induce clmnges in technology, 
which will result in coiltiilually changing (presumably coiltinually lower) ref- 
erence BAU einissioil curves if these curves a,re coiltinually updated. Thus, 
ideally the BAU curves sl~ould be defined with respect to a running refer- 
ence time, allowiilg for tecl~ilological cllai~ges already induced by mitigation 
measures in the past. However, the optiillization problem becomes more 
complex if these cl~ailges are taken iilt'o a.ccount, and few data  exist t o  define 
such a dynainic set of B.4U eillissioi~ curves. I11 the interest of transparency, 
we shall therefore use a fixed BAU reference curve. In pra,ctice, this siinpli- 
fica,tion is proba,bly not too serious, as tlle in~pacts of uncertainties in tlle 
future lnitigation costs a,re exponentially discounted (see discussioi~ below). 
For tlle specific climate-damage costs. we take tlle simple form 
is tlle climate-tlanlage cost tliscount factor, wit,l~ tliscount time consta,nt rd, 
a,nd T, a i ~ d  T, a,re scaling const~ants. Thus. we assume that climate danlage 
is incurred not only t.11rough a clla,llge in the teinperature itself but a.lso 
tllrougll the rate at  tvhich the temperatur~ cha.nges: the adjustment of the 
ecology and hurna,n a.ct,ivit.ies to  clinla,te cl~ange is inore difficult the faster 
the change. The incurred cliinate dailla,ge is a,ssuined to be independent of 
tlle sign of the tempera.ture change, altllough we will be concerned only with 
positive changes. T l ~ e  quadratic depelldencies also reflect the general view 
that  climate-damage costs iilcrea,se noi~linearly with cliinate change. 
We have made use of tlle freedom to choose an arbitrary common nor- 
malization coilstant in the definitioil of the cost functions by setting the 
coefficient of the first tern1 of the a,bateillent cost function (20) equal to 
unity. This establishes t l ~ e  significaace of the constants Tc and T~ in the 
damage cost fuilction in rela.tion t o  the aba,ten~eilt costs: Tc and T~ rep- 
resent critical values of the teinperature change and rate of temperature 
change, I-espectively, for wllicll the climate-damage costs become compara- 
ble wit11 the aba,teinei~t costs wllei~ emissions are reduced by approximately 
50% (r=0.5) relative to the BXU case. Thus, the parameters Tc and TC may 
he regarded as defining a critical (soft-sl~oulderecl) elliptical window or corri- 
dor in the climate phase space T,, TC il.wit11in which the climate-damage costs 
are less than or of the same order as the nlitigation costs at  an  abatement 
level of order r = O(0.5). Outside the corridor the climate-damage costs are 
greater than the lllitigatioil costs at  this abatement level. 
The minimal-cost solutioll can be found nun~erically by a method of 
steepest descent (e.g., a coiljugate gradient technique; see Press et al., 1986). 
This method requires coinputiilg the gradient of the cost with respect to the 
control function, that is, the emissions ~ ( t ) .  For a climate model expressed 
in integral response fonn, the gratlient can be computed explicitly (see the 
Appendis). However, in the numerical results presented below, the gradient 
was computed auton~atically using a general nunlerical functional derivative 
compiler (C4iering and Iiaminsl;i, 1096), which had the advantage of imme- 
diately providing the gratlient n-henever the clinlate nlodel was modified. 
5. Sensitivity experiments 
In a.11 computa.tions we have ta,ken a simple functional form as our refer- 
ence climate-independent BAIT einissioil scenario eA (t) for the computation 
of the abatement costs: a linea,r iilcrea,se for the first 205 years, from 1995 
until 2200, growing from 6.3  C;t,Ci/yr in 199.5 a,t an initial growth rate of 
2..5 %,/yea,r to 3S Gt(.'/yr in 2200. This increa.se is consistent with the up- 
per a,ncl lower l>ountls of emission project~ions from different energv models 
(Nordha,us and Yohe, 1983; Reilly c.t ol., 1987; R!Ianne and Richels, 1991; 
see Table 2.1 in Cline, 1992) and also with the range of IPCC (1992) pro- 
jections. After 20.5 yea.rs, the enlissions a.re simply frozen at  the 38 GtC/yr 
level. Tlle decision to freeze them a,t this level is based in part on the tenta- 
t.ive longer-term projections of t'lle energy models, which assume a continual 
decrease of the emission growth rate beginning in the next century (although 
they do not consider projections significa.ntly longer then 200 yea,rs), but is 
basically arbitra.ry. A consta,nt long-tenu elllissions level will clearly not be 
a.ttainable illdefinitely beca,use of liinits to  fossil fuel resources. Nevertheless, 
we have not used a. decrea.sing long-term projection for our reference level in 
coinputing the abatement costs, beca.use tlle relevant information would be 
speculative and, lllore important, our optinla1 emission scenarios are found 
to  be insensitive to  the form of scellario eA(t) beyond a few hundred years, 
provided a modest discount fa.ctor, with a, time constant of the order of 50 or 
100 years, is applied to tlie a,l~a,teillrilt costs. (This assumes, however, that a 
siiialler discouilt rate is apldicd to t.he climate-da.inage costs in order to  ob- 
ta,in optimal eiilissioil pa,tlls tlmt are coilsistent with limited global warming; 
see discussion below. ) 
Tlle siinulatioils were repeated with a BAU scenario in which the lin- 
ear iilcrease of e~ was est,ended to 800 years. Despite the significant (and 
clearly unrealistic) iilcrease in tlle BAU reference emissions level and the 
correspondiilg CO;! coilcentration over the longer term, the differences in 
the coir~puted optillla1 eillissioli paths were minimal, because the changes in 
the BAU path beca.me effective only after the a.batement costs had already 
been stroilgly discounted. Nevertheless, t.o place the BAU scenario in a more 
general perspective, we conlpa,re t,he BAU climate projections (run SA) with 
a, modified BAU scena.rio (run SB) in ~vllich tlle einissions decline linearly 
after 200 years, and two frozen-emission sceilarios (runs SF and SG). 
Prior to  the linear BAIT curve 1)eginiiiiig in 1995, we have introduced an 
espoilential spin-up stage, st,artiug from the preindustrial state at  time to = 
1500, 
eA(t)  = 6.3 esp [( t  - to - 19.5)/ts] for to 5 t < 1995 , (24) 
where 195 = t(today )-to = 1995 - 1800 corresponds to  the length of the 
spin-up period. The enlissions 4pin-up time constant was determined as 
t ,  = 35 years fro111 tlle condition tllal the carbon cycle model (14) inust 
reproduce the 199.5 C'02 coiicelltratioli u.(199.5) = 355 ppm for the given 
preindustrial coilceiltration IL?" = u*(1800) = 280 ppm. Coincidentally, the 
coilditioil for a continuous derivative in the transition from espoileiltial to  
linear growth in 199.5, mliicl~ would require t ,  = 40 years, is thereby also 
alillost satisfied. 
All coillputations have beell carried out wit11 a discretization time step 
of At = 5 years froin the year 1800 over a period of 1200 years, up to  the 
year 3000. However, the emissioils were allowed to  adjust freely only over 
805 years, from 199.5 to 2500, and were then frozen a t  tlie level e(2800) for 
the last 200 years. The time spa11 is clearly uilrealistically long for econoinic 
predictions, but, as is apparent from Figure 2 and the results shown in the 
following figures, is nevertheless appropriate for assessing long-term climate 
impacts relevant for a sustainable developmeilt policy. The set of computa- 
tions for different parameter conlbinations is listed in Table 2. Tlle results 
are shown in Figures 3 to  7 .  
Table 2. E~nission scenarios. 
-- - - 
Scenario Figure Parameter s~t . t ings  
S A 3 Business as usua,l (BAU) 
S B 3 klodified BAU 
S F  3 Frozen eillissions a t  1990 level after 2000 
SG 3 Reduced emissions frozen a t  80% of 1990 level after 2000 
SO 4 Baseline reduced-emissions run: 
Imseline cliillat,e illode1 ROO, cost-function parameters: 
T, = 1°C!, T, = 0.02OClyr 
rl = 7 2  = 100 yrs 
r, = 50 yrs, r d  = cro yrs 
S l a ,  S l b  4 Sanle a.s SO, I ~ u t  with reduced abatement cost 
inert,ial t8erms (run S l a ,  rl = 7 2  = 50 yrs) 
or zero inertial t8erms ( run S l b ,  rl = rz = 0) 
S 2 4 Same a,s SO, but. with temperature rate-of- 
change t,erill f .  only in cliinate-damage costs 
S3a, S3b 5 Saine as  SO, I)ut ~vit~li al~a,t,einent cost discou~lt t ime 
constant changed fro111 r, = 50 yrs t o  
r, = 25 yrs (S3a,) ant1 r, = 100 yrs (S3b) 
S4a, S4b, 6 Saine a.s SO, but ~vit,ll finite climate-damage cost 
S4c, S4d tliscount time co~lst~ailts r d  = 100 yrs (S4a), 50 yrs (S4b), 
35 yrs ( S ~ C ) ,  a.nd 25 yrs (S4d) 
S5 7 Same a.s SO, but ~vit~ll damage costs enhanced 
5.1. The BAU sceilario 
The C 0 2  emissiolls a,ntl resulta.nt collcentra~tiolls and global wa.rming for the 
reference BAU scenario (run SA, solid curves) a,re shown in Figure 3, together 
with other scenarios in which the elllissioils are prescribed. The evolution 
is depicted both for the full 1000-yea,r horizon (with an additional initia,l 
200-yea.r spin-up period) and for a 200-year horizon to illustrake the dangers 
of designing sustainable developinent strategies only over short time scales. 
The BAU scenario can be interpreted quantitatively only for the first 100- 
1 5 0  years. Thereafter, the C 0 2  coilcentra~tions and temperatures exceed the 
limits of our linear response model. However, the order-of-magnitude pre- 
diction that  the C 0 2  collcentra~tions will grow to some 10 times the present 
value over the course of severa,l hundred yea.rs nlay be expected to remain 
valid. In fact, this figure is presulnably a.n underestimate, as it ignores the 
positive feedbacks of the decrea,sing solubility of C 0 2  in the ocean with in- 
crea.sing tempera.ture a,nd increa.sing C 0 2  concentrations (these effects a,re 
included in the above-mentionetl iloilliilear response model of Joos et  al., 
1995). 
The linearized tenlperature response, on the other hand, is strongly ex- 
aggerated for higher tenlperature increases. If the usual logarithmic depen- 
dence of the radiative forcing on changes in the C 0 2  concentration is assumed 
instead of our linear relation. the tenlperature response for a 10-fold increase 
in the C 0 2  level is estiinated to be of the order of 8OC (see the logarithmic 
temperature scale on the right-hand side of the top-right panel of Figure 3; 
the scale is normalized by setting the equilibrium temperature response to  a 
C 0 2  doubling at  2.5OC for both tlle linear and the logarithmic case). How- 
ever, a t  these tenlperatures other ilonliilearities besides the dependence of 
radiative forcing on the C'02 concentratioll will become important, including 
possible instabilities, for exalllple through a breakdown of the North Atlantic 
circulation. Reliable predictionh callnot be made for these extreme climate 
cllailges even with complex ilolllillear three-dimensional carboil cycle and 
coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models, as one then enters a 
climate regime for whicl~ there exist no previous experience or data. 
The full severity of tlle BAU climate change impact becomes apparent 
only in the long-term perspective over several llundred years. However, the 
constant increase in the secoild half of the nest millennium depends on the 
presulnably uilrealistic assumption of a constailt emission level of 38 GtC/yr 
after 200 years. Accordingly, in Figure 3 we have also shown a modified 
BAU scenario (SB) that is inore collsistent wit11 the estimated fossil fuel 
reserves; this scenario assuiues a linear decrease of tlle emissions level, from 
a masimum value of 38 CitC' in the year 2200 dolvil to zero in the year 3000. 
The climate change is also dramatic for this scenario. 
Although it is useful to recall the drastic climatic impact of a laissez-faire 
climate policy, the BL4U climate prediction, and thus the limitations of the 
present linearized climate response model, as well as our questionable long- 
term emissions assumption are, in fact, irrelevant to the present study. We 
need to  refer to  the BAU emissioil curve only to  compute the abatement costs 
for the determination of optimal reduced-emission scenarios, all of which - 
assuming a rational climate protection strategy consistent with a policy of 
sustainable development - yield significailtly smaller cliinate changes lying 
inore or less within the linear cliinate response range. 
5.2. The frozen-emissions sceilarios 
The UN Conference on Eilvironment and Development, held in Rio de 
Janeiro, 1992, recolllllleilded the freezing of COz emissions a t  1990 levels 
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Figure 3. From left to right: COz emissions, computed COz concentrations, and global warming for the time periods 
1800-3000 (top) and 1995-2200 (bottom) for the BAU scenario (SA, solid lines), modified BAU scenario (SB, dashed-dotted 
lines), frozen emissions a t  1990 levels after the year 2000 (SF, dashed lines), and 20% reduced emissioils relative to the 
1990 level after 2000 (SG, dotted lines). The linear inodel is not applicable above the indicated linearization limits. The 
logarithmic T scale on the right ordinate axis of the top-right panel indicates the order-of-magnitude temperature response 
allowing for the logarithmic dependency of the radiative forcing on the COz concentration. 
by the year 2000 as a first target toward a long-term clinlate sta.bilization 
policy. Tlle evolution of C 0 2  concentrations and the global mean tempera- 
ture for this scena,rio, SF, assnming t,ha.t 1990 elrlission levels are maintained 
after 2000, is shown in Figure 3. Also sllown is an alternative scenario, 
SG, in which the emissions are frozen at  a, slightly lower level of 80% of 
the 1990 levels, as has been proposed by sonle countries. Although in the 
medium term global wa.nuing is sigllificantly reduced in the frozen-emission 
scenarios, the long-term tempera.ture rise is still considerable. Thus, these 
scenarios can be regarded only as effective in gaining tiine for tlle implemen- 
tation of longer-term aba,tenleilt measures, which, as shown below, require 
a greater reduction of COz enlission levels and a transition to carbon-free 
energy technologies. 
5.3. The baseline sceilario SO 
A baseline reducetl-enlisbions co~uputatiol~ SO (Figure 4)  was carried out for 
tlie cost-function parameter values T, = 1°C'. T, = 0.02°C/yr, and rl = 
r 2  = 100 years, with discount time constants r, = 50 years and r d  = cm. 
The impact of different parameter settings and different discount factors is 
explored in runs S1 to S.5 (Figures 4 to 7) .  
The critical temperature, T, = 1°C', and rate of temperature change, 
T, = 0.02"C/yr (1°C' increase in .5O years), for the climate-damage cost func- 
tion of the standard scenario, SO. are repre5entative of typical values quoted 
in the literature. For sceilario SO. they lcatl to a nlasinlulll tenlperature in- 
crease of T,,, = 2.2"(' (see Figure -1). The decrease in tenlperature l~eyond 
the year 2200 results Go111 disco~unting the abatement costs while applying 
no discounting factor to the clinlate-damage costs: this asymmetry malces 
it economical in the long tern1 to  continually reduce emissions in order t o  
reduce damage costs (discount factors are discussed in more detail below). 
5.4. Economic inertia 
Tlle choice of the econolnic inertia coefficients, rl and r 2 ,  was found to 
be relatively uncritical. These coefficients act mainly in the initial stages, 
ensuring that  the elnission reduction is not discontinuous a t  the start time 
of the control path ( t  = 1995). Thus, initially the enlissions follow the BAU 
path (see also the nlore detailed discussion in Wigley et al., 1996). However, 
the long-term impact of economic inertia remains minimal, as demonstrated 
in Figure 4, which shows a comparisoll of the baseline scenario SO with runs 
in which the inertial terms were redllcetl (S la )  or set equal to zero (S Lb). 
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Figure 4. Evolution paths over the period 1800-3000. Top, left to  right: COa emissions, COz concentrations, global 
mean temperature. Bottom, left to  right: specific abatement costs (c,), specific damage costs (cd), and the contribution t o  
the specific damage cost (c:) from the rate of change of temperature. Cases shown are (see Table 2) the baseline reduced- 
emissions scenario SO (solid lines), the same run with reduced or zero inertial terms in the abatement cost function (run 
S l a ,  dotted lines, and run S lb ,  dashed lines, respectively), and a modified baseline run in which the climate-damage costs 
are assumed to  depend only on T (run S2, dashed-dotted lines). Also indicated in the lower panels are the exponential 
abatement and damage cost discount factors, D, and Dd. 
5 . 5 .  Ilnpact of tenlperature change and 
rate of tenlperature change 
The principal contribution to clinlate-danlage costs was found to stem from 
the temperature change itself, rather than the rate of temperature change 
(see net climate-damage costs, cd ,  and the contribution, c&, incurred by 
the rate of temperature change depicted in Figure 4). This result is also 
demonstrated by the optimal elnissions scenario S2 (see Figure 4), in which 
the climate-damage costs were represented only by a single term depending 
on the rate of temperature change. The illasimal temperature increases G°C 
within 300 years and then remains at this level. The results of Tahvonen 
et 01. (1994, 1995), who consitleretl only this T-dependent term in their 
climate-darnage costs, should therefore l)e regarded as only illustrative (as 
rvas pointed out by the authors). Adopting the usually quoted critical values 
T, and T, of our haseline scenario SO. our nlotlel indicates that  for the typical 
time constants of climate cllange the climate-tlamage costs will he dominated 
by the temperature change itself ratller than the rate of temperature change. 
However, for quantitative projections t hi3 point needs closer scrutiny with 
respect to the different types of clinlate danlage. 
5.6 .  Discount rates for mitigation costs 
The most critical and also nlost coi~troversial terms in the cost functions are 
the discount fa,ctors. It has I)c.en argued t'l1a.t tlle discouilt ra,tes for mit,i- 
gation and c,lima.t,e-t1alna.ge cost,s should be treated differently. Accordingly, 
me study their iillpacts sepa,ra.t,ely first and ret,unl to the question of their 
interrelation later. 
Because our simple a,l~a,tement cost,s illode1 does not distinguish between 
the separate effects of growth in wealth, return on capita.1, endogenous tech- 
nological development,, aad other processes nor~nally included in a more 
detailed economic model, our discount factor for the mitigation costs repre- 
sents the net impact of all of these processes combined. Our choice of the 
abatement cost discount time constailt T ,  = 50 years (2% per year) for the 
ba.seline scenario is a,t the lower range of (inflation-adjusted) discount factors 
proposed in greenhouse ga.s a.l)a.tement studies (see Nordhaus, 1991, 1993). 
Figure 5 shows the iillpa,ct of tlecrea,sing the time constant, T,, to  25 years 
(scenario S3a), and the effect of douhling T, to  100 years (scenario S3b). A 
shorter discount time scale implies t11a.t one call a.fford to  apply mitigation 
nleasures earlier, thus reducing global wa,rming; for a larger time constant it 
is more economical to  de1a.y a.ba,tement mea,sures, with a resultant increase 
Figure 5. Impact of changed abatement cost discount time constants T, = 25 years (S3a, dotted lines) and T, = 100 years 
(S3b, dashed lines) compared with baseline case T, = 50 years (scenario SO, solid lines; see Table 2 and caption to Figure 4 
for information on layout of figure.) 
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in global warming. The value of r,, is seen to lmve a strong influence on the 
computecl optillla1 eluissioll paths. IIo~vever, t,llis conclusion is based on a 
fixed discount rate for the cliluate-damage costs, which we have set to zero 
in our baseline scena.rio SO and in scena.rios S3a and S3b. Because we are 
concerned only with tlle ra.tio of clinmte-dalllage costs to mitigation costs, 
parallel changes in tlle discount rates for both types of costs tend to offset 
one another. This point is discussed further below. 
5.7. Discouilt rates for climate-damage costs 
More co~ltroversial than tlle discount rate for mitigation costs has been the 
proper intertemporal treatnlent of cliluate-daluage costs. According to  the 
traditional econolllic view, climate-clanlage costs are economic costs just like 
ally other costs and therefore sllould l ~ e  discounted a t  the same rate as 
lllitigation costs. This vieiv is based on tlle idea that  climate damages can 
l ~ e  countered by appropriate engineering measures. such as building higher 
dikes in response to rising sea levels. or other economic adjustments. Thus, 
in principle, there is no difference bet~veen the economic efforts required to 
respond to  or limit climate change. 
An alternative view is that the deterioration of future living conditions 
through an irreversible change in clinlate represents a loss in welfare that  to  
first order is independent of the periotl in the future when the climate change 
actually talies place. Future sustainable clevelopment is perceived as a com- 
lnitlllent that  does not clegrade over time, and to wl~ich a time-independent 
welfare value should therefore be assigned. In this view, climate danlage rep- 
resents a quality-of-life or welfare loss that is fundalnelltally different from 
abatement costs. The preservation of a habitable planet for future genera- 
tions is accepted as a legacy that lllust be honored today, regardless of the 
time llorizoll over which our present actions will affect future living condi- 
tions. 
Following this second line of reasoning, we have not introduced dis- 
counting of damage costs in our baseline reduced-emissions run, SO. The 
underlying value judgemellts are, of course, debatable. The application of 
the same or comparable discount factors to both mitigation and climate- 
damage costs (e.g., Nordhaus, 1991, 1993; Beltratti, 1995) yields basically 
different conclusions, as is discussed below. 
For political decision making, however, it is irrelevant which of these 
theoretical assessments of the future impact of climate change is "correct." 
What is relevant for the colnputation of an  optimal emission path - a t  least 
in a functioning democratic society - is the public and politically transmitted 
perception of tlle value of a sta,ble future clin1a.t.e. It rvould be a,n instructive 
sociological exercise t,o ascertain ~vhctller a significant irreversible clima.te 
change resulting froin the present activities of humankind that  is predicted 
t o  create major existential problems for generations far in the future, well 
beyond the normal econonlic discounti~lg time horizon, is regarded by the 
public and politicians a.s a serious problem requiring remedial action today. 
Investigations by I<empton rt ul. (1995) suggest that  this is probably the 
case, although this assesslneilt is not always supported by current politics. 
Different assumptions regarding the ra,te of damage cost discounting 
can be readily explored with our model. Sceilarios S4a, S4b, S4c, and S4d 
(Figure 6) show the effect of introducing finite damage-cost discount time 
coilsta~lts of 100, -50, 3.5, aad 25 years? respectively. The maximal COz 
coilcentratioils and t,empera,t~ues increase marliedly, particularly for the last 
two cases. The clinlate changes iniplied by these temperature increases - 
llotiilg that regional temperat'ure changes, for exainple over continents, can 
be sigilificailtly higher than tlle global illean tenlperature rise - imply a 
dramatic change in the living coilditioils on our planet. However, this occurs 
ollly after several hundred yea.rs, when the climate-damage costs have been 
discounted by one or two orders of magnitude. 
5.8.  Ratio of climate-damage and abatement 
cost discount rates 
Tlle cha.ra.ct,er of t,lle solutions depends critically on the ratio of the climate- 
da,ma,ge and a,ba.tenlent cost discount fa,ctors. With the exception of sce- 
na.rios S4b, S4c, a.nd S4tl (Figure 6): in all cases considered the discount 
time consta.nt was higher for the clinla,te-damage costs than for the abate- 
ment costs, and the long-term tempera.ture increase for the optimal emis- 
sions path renmiiled limited. If this inequalit,y holds, the discounted specific 
abatement costs becolne expollentially snlall compared with the discounted 
specific climate-da.mage costs for t - m, and the most cost-effective path is 
one in which the elnissioils approa,ch zero asyinptotically (except for scenario 
S2, in which the damage costs dependecl only on T). 
The form of the solutioil cha~nges completely if the opposite inequality, 
r d  < r,, holds (scena.rios S4c and S4d). I11 this case, the climate-damage 
costs are discouilted inore rapidly tllail the mitigation costs, and it becomes 
inore cost-effective to  revert to the BAU scenario asymptotically. Although 
the noildiscounted specific cliillate da.inage grows with the square of the tem- 
perature, this is inore than offset by the more effective exponential discount 
factor for the dama,ge costs, and e ( t )  i e,a(,t) as t i oo. Accordingly, the 
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asymptotic COz concent,ral ions ai~tl ienlpera,tures of scenarios S4c and S4d 
a.re t,he same as for the B-$11 sceiiario (Figure 3) .  
If ~d = ra (scenario S4b, Figure 6 ) ,  neither cost term is discounted 
more rapidly than the other. (However, the discounted climate-damage costs 
a.re reduced by a, inore or less consta.nt factor relative to the discounted 
abatement costs because of the time la,g of climate change relative to  the 
emissions.) I11 this case, the optilnal emissions path remains at  a relatively 
high level between the BAU pa,th and zero emissions. 
The global warming levels of t'he optimal path solutions of Figure G - 
even for case S4a with rd = 100 yea,rs > ra = 50 years - are consider- 
a,bly higher than tlle solutiolls obta,iiled assuming zero discount rates for the 
climate-damage costs. The tempera.ture increa.ses exceed most estimates of 
tlle limits of global wa.nuing accept,a,ble for sustainable development. Thus, 
if one subscribes to the ethical coinillitnlellt of preserving a habitable planet 
for future generations, these solntions cannot, be accepted. It follows that 
to the extent that there exists a public conllnitlllellt to this principle, the 
societal illtertelllporal preferellce relations describing the present and future 
costs of adapting to or 11litiga.ting cliilla,te change cannot be expressed in 
terms of standard ecolloluic discount fa.ctors appropriate for, say, the short- 
term return on ca,pital illvestinellt or intertelnporal expenditure preferences 
for consumer goods. Ra,tller. the ~villingness to  pay for the well-being of 
future gelleratioils is a.nalogous to t,he ~villingness to colltribute to public 
education, developnlent a,id. or other societal a,ctions that do not directly 
benefit t'he individual. Thus, it appea.rs lllore appropriate to determine the 
intertemporal values a.tta,clled by society to the lllitigation of future climate 
change empirically by assessing public ~villingness to pay for such measures. 
We conclude from these exa.nlples t,lla,t the computed optimal emission 
paths are highly sensitive to  the rela.tive values of the discount rates for 
climate-damage and mitigation costs, and that solutions qualitatively con- 
sistent with the requirement of sustainable development are obtained only 
if the climate-damage discouilt time consta.nts are greater than the discount 
time consta~lts for a batelllent costs. 
5.9. Iillpact of other greenhouse gases or modified 
illitigation/damage cost ratios 
Our greenhouse warming silnulatioils have been carried out only for COz 
emissions and are thus overly optimistic. To allow for the compa- 
rable climatic inlpact of other gree~lhouse gases such as methane and 
cl~lorofluoroca.rbons (CFCs),  0111 coiiiputed opt.iilla1 C 0 2  enlissioll paths 
inust be reduced. To gain a clualitat,ive estinia.te of the influence of non- 
C 0 2  gree~lhouse gases, we a.ssume tha't they can be reduced in parallel with, 
and at  the same rela,tive cost's as, the C'02 concentrations. The computed 
COz concentrations may thell be regarded to the first order simply as a 
proxy for the equivalent greenlionse C 0 2  concentration, representing the net 
effect of all greellhouse gas collcentra~tions (see IPCC, 1990a). Assuming 
a fixed ratio, y ,  between the equiva.lent and true C 0 2  concentrations, the 
effect of the non-C02 greenhouse ga.ses ca,n the11 be represented by simply 
replacing the tenlpera.ture conlputed for the true C 0 2  emissions path, T ,  
with the temperature T,,;, = 7T.  Bemuse the damage cost function de- 
pends cluadratically on the tempera,ture [see equa,tion (:22)], this corresponds 
to  an increase of tlie dalllage cost functioli by a factor of y2. The mitigation 
costs, on tlle otlier hand, increa.se by a, fa.ctor of only y. Thus, the ratio of 
climate-damage cost,s t,o nlitiga.tion costs is increa.sed by a net factor of y. 
The inlpact is sho~vn in Figure 7. The curves ca.n also be interpreted as 
showillg tlie general effect of a. change -i in the ratio of climate-damage costs 
to mitigation costs. The impa,cts a,re slilaller than may have been anticipated 
intuitively. This can be explained by two effects. First, a relative increase 
in climate-damage costs by a factor of y implies a decrease in the critical 
climate temperature, T, ja.nd tlie critical ra.te of chailge of tempera.ture T,)? 
by a factor of only ?-I/'. Thus, to reduce tlie climate-damage costs to  the 
same level as in tlie C02-only ca.se, tlie elllissioiis lllust be decreased by a 
factor of only ?-'I2. Second, ~vliile for these eillission values the climate- 
damage costs a.re at  the same level as in the C02-only case, because of 
the lower emission levels, the abat'enlellt costs a,re higher. For the optimal- 
emissions solution, in \f:llicll a bala,nce is attained between tlie mitigation and 
damage costs, the abateinent costs will therefore be lower and the elnissioll 
levels higher than these va,lues. Hence tlle reductioil in emission levels for 
the solution including both COz a.nd non-C02 greenhouse gases will be still 
slllaller than the factor ?-'I2. 
However, if we adopt the a,lterna.tive assumption that the non-C02 
greenhouse gases cannot be reatlily reduced, the reduction in C 0 2  emis- 
sion levels needed to couilteract the effect of increasing concentrations of 
other greenhouse gases ca,n be coilsiderably larger than computed for the 
C02-only case. This situation is discussed in the context of noncoopera- 
tive actors in the 11,-actor climate lnitigation problem in Hasselmann and 
Hasselmann (1996). 
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was not to provide quantitative monetary esti- 
inates of costs and benefits of optiinal C 0 2  emission strategies to  assist de- 
cision makers in determining, say, the proper level of carbon taxes. Rather, 
the goal was to  clarify the basic input assumptions and cause-and-effect re- 
lations that  are presumably responsible for the pronounced divergences in 
existing cost-benefit analyses. Our approach has enabled us to  discriminate 
between conclusions that represent relatively robust consequences of the dy- 
namics of the cliinate system and predictioils that depend on controversial 
input assumptions. 
To this end we introduced a simple impulse-response cliinate model, cal- 
ibrated using state-of-the-art C'C4Chl cliinate and three-dimensional global 
carbon cycle models, as well as highly idealized but structurally transparent 
espressions for tlie climate-damage and iilitigation costs. For the determi- 
nation of optiinal einissioil paths. only the relative levels of climate-damage 
and initigatioil costs, not the absolute cost values, are relevant. 
The priilcipal coilclusions from our investigation can be summarized as 
follows: 
Because global warnliilg response for C'O;! eillissions extends over several 
llundred years (Figure 2 ) .  the costs associated with the cliinate impact 
of present and future C'Oz einissioils must be optimized over horizons 
far beyond ilorinal econoinic discouiltiilg time scales. 
If, as in many studies, climate-damage costs are discounted at  stan- 
dard econoinic discount rates, tlie optimal C 0 2  emission paths are only 
weakly reduced relative to  tlie BAU scenario. The resultant long-term 
climate warining reinaiils vei y large and sustainable development is not 
attained. This result is logical: by discouilting climate-damage costs, it 
is assumed that  the inaintenailce of a habitable climate far in the fu- 
ture is of negligible present value. It is questionable, however, whether 
this scenario corresponds to  the value assigned by society to  sustainable 
development: an "optimal" einissions path that leads to  major global 
warming is probably not acceptable to  the general public. Although we 
subscribe to  the principle that the optiinal climate protection strategy 
should be deterinined tllrough a cost-benefit analysis in which an at- 
tempt is made to  attach a inonetary value to  all costs, we suggest that  
the monetary value of the asset "a habitable planet for future genera- 
tions" should be ascertained on the basis of willingness-to-pay criteria. 
This approach would presumably reveal iiltertemporal value assignments 
for tlie principle of sustaiiial)lc development that are different from the 
normal discou~ib rclaliolis use(\ lo  1iiotlt.1 societa.1 time preference rela.- 
tiolis associated with, say? the deferred purchase of consumer goods. 
If global wa.rming is to rema.in below a'n acceptable bound the discount 
rate for mitigation costs  nus st be greater than the discount rate for 
climate-damage costs. In pra.ctice, optimal C 0 2  emission paths yielding 
acceptable global warming a,re ol)tained only if the discount rate of cli- 
mate damage is very small or zero. Accordingly, our baseline scenario 
assumes a zero discount rate for climate-damage costs. In all solutions 
yielding limited globa.1 warming. COz emissions must be drawn down 
sigilificantly by a fa.ctor of a.t lea,st a, half over a. few centuries, with a 
continual decrea,se therea,iter. Tlie ra.te of reduction for the optimal path 
depends on the assunled discount ra,te for the mitigation costs. 
Because econoillic inertia is iiicluded in the mitigation cost function, 
C102 enlissio~is are not iiiiiuetliately rcducecl in our baseline optimal emis- 
sions path, but rise for a few decades before declining. However, even 
when the inertial terms a.re onlit.bed, allowing emissions to adjust imme- 
diately to  a new level a,t no ecoiloinic rate-of-change cost penalty, the 
optimal emission pa.ths exhibit no inlinediate drastic drawdown. More- 
over, the long-term clilnate response does not differ significantly for the 
cases wit11 and without ecoiioillic inertia.. il'e conclude that an effective 
climate nlitigation stra,tegy nlust focus on the long-term transition to  
energy tech~lologies with zero or very low COz emissions. Short-term 
reductions through energy sa.vings, although high on the present politi- 
ca,l agenda,, are insufficient on their own and should be viewed only as a. 
useful auxiliary measure in support, of the necessary long-term techno- 
logical transitio~l process. 
The tecl~nological restructuring ca.n be carried out without dramatic 
dislocations over the course of illany decades or a century. This should 
not be interpreted as implying t11a.t there is no urgency in the imple- 
mentation of policies initiating the necessary gradual transition to  lower 
COz-emission levels: a,ny delay permitting a nonregulated continuation 
along the BAU pa.th illcurs t'he need for larger, more costly adjustments 
later. Moreover, in iilitiatiilg the transition, the inertia not only of the 
economy but also of the politica,l process must be taken into account. 
The computed dela,y in the drawdown of COz emissions for our baseline 
scenario was based on a sinlple parameterization of the transition costs 
associated with economic inertia only - assuming an optimal reduction 
policy can be imnlediately impleinented politically. Our results are thus 
overly optimistic regarding the time pressures of adjusting the complete 
socioeconon~ic spstelll a.ntl sllould not be interpreted as inlplyillg the 
esistence of' a, time cnshion fbr dela,ying implenlenta.tio decisions. 
r Another simplification resulting in enlission scenarios that  are too opti- 
mistic is the linlitat,ion to COz enlissions, ignoring the comparable global 
warming contributions of non-COz greenhouse gases. To the extent that  
the abatement of' non-C02 greenhouse gases can be achieved a t  a relative 
cost similar to  that of C 0 2  emissions, the iinpact of non-COz greenhouse 
gases can be accounted for to the first order by simply increasing the 
climate-damage costs by a.n a,ppropria,te factor. This approach leads to  
somewhat lower but not dra.stica1ly reduced optimal C 0 2  emission paths. 
As the ratio of clima,te-tla,mage costs t,o abatement costs is an arbitrary 
free paranlet,er in our a,na,lysis anynay, our general conclusions are not 
affected by this nlodifica.tion. However. the problem is more severe if 
non-C02 greenhouse ga,ses ca.nnot I)e effectively abated (see discussion 
of the analogous single nlitiga,tor. ~lnilti-actor problem in Hasselnlanll 
and Ha.sselmalu1, 1996). 
r For the time sca.les of clinlate cha,llge corresponding to the optimal C 0 2  
emission paths, clima.te danla,ge due to the rate of change of tempera- 
ture is an order of magnitude snlaller than da.mage due to  the change 
in temperature itself. However, these estimates are based on global 
critical clima.te-da.mage thresholds of T, = 1°C for tenlperature and 
T~ = 00.20C/decade for the ra.tc of t.enlperature change, which need to be 
differentiated more ca.refu1ly \vit,ll rcga.rt1 to the type of clima.te damage. 
A number of general implications can bc drawn from these conclusions. 
Althougll our sensitivity analysis was based on structurally highly simplified 
cost nlodels and nlust be quantified in monetary units using more realistic 
economic models, nlost of the practical policy inlplicatio~ls of our structural 
analysis are independent of the details of such models. In practice, more 
realistic economic models necessarily involve assumptions, for esample re- 
garding future tecl~nological development. ~vhose uncertainties largely mask 
the quantitative predictive potential of the models. 
The central dilelnnla for decision makers l~igllligllted by our analysis 
is the time scale nlisrnatch betiveen the nlulticentury climate response to  
present and future COr emissions, on the one hand, and typical economic 
and policy planning horizons of a few years to a decade, on the other hand. It 
is obviously unrealistic to plan C 0 2  enlissions centuries into the future. Our 
computed optimal elnission paths are meaningful only in the sense that  they 
identify the time scales and orders of nlagnitude of the emission reductions 
required to  stablize the climate. The optimal paths will depend in detail on 
evolving energy t,ecllnology and otller fa.ct,ors t.1la.t ca,nnot he predicted over 
long time horizons. Sllort- a,lltl ~nediulll- term policy decisions call establish 
only the necessary framework favoring a gradual transition to a path of con- 
tinually decreasing emissions. Long-term policies will necessarily be limited 
to  establishing effective monitoring mechallisms and periodically adjusting 
regulatory mecllanisms in a,ccordance with continually updated projections. 
Much of the discussioii on the reduction of C 0 2  emissions has revolved 
around instruments for internalizing climate-damage costs, for example, 
througll carbon taxes or t,ra.da,ble elllission permits. However, our compu- 
tations indicate that ,  taken alone, t,he encouragement of energy efficiency 
through these measures will be insufficient to attain the goal of climate sta- 
bility. To achieve the necessary transit,ion to  ca'rbon-free energy technologies, 
a, push-pull approa.cl1 \frill presuma.bly be needed, including both penalties 
for COz elllissions a,nd rewa.rds for the development of alternative energy 
t ethnologies. 
Realistic clinlate protect,ion measures are necessarily lilnited in their im- 
mediate inlpact on C 0 2  enlissions to time scales that  are short relative to  
the na.tura1 time span of the global ~varnling problem. Thus their immediate 
influence on long-term clinla.te evoh~tion is small. Nonetheless, a far-sighted 
policy can induce a negative c.urva.tnre in the enlissions curve which, if up- 
held in the future, ~vould ha,ve a. significa.nt long-term impact. Fronl this 
viewpoint, the principal role of 111ore realistic economic models should be to  
study tlle illlpact of the availa,ble inslruments for controlling climate emis- 
sions in the polit'icadly viable sllort and ~nedium time scales on the trend 
a.nd c11a.nge in trend (t,lla.t is, on the first, a,nd second time derivatives) of 
the C 0 2  emissions curve. From these studies one could then derive redistic 
(moving) targets for tlle first two time deriva.tives, defined from the per- 
spective of the nlajor long-t.erm reduction of C 0 2  emissions mandated by 
climate model predictions. The perfonua.nce of the economy in response t o  
the applied regulatory illstrulnents would need to be continually monitored 
and the targets and control mecl~anisms periodically updated. 
7. Outlook 
The implementation of a. long-term mollitoring policy and a continually re- 
tuned regulatory policy requires more realistic modeling tools than are cur- 
rently available. The realization of an effective climate protection policy 
withill an illternatioilal framework, for esanlple, ra.ises a number of complex 
issues rega,rding clecisioi~ ma,l;ing involving. severa,l actors with different val- 
ues a.nd goals, which cannot I)e adequately addressed with the single-actor 
economic models considered here. However, we suggest that before embark- 
ing on complex multi-a,ctor ga,nle-theoretical analyses using sophisticated 
multiregional, lnultisectoral economic models, it would be useful, in keeping 
with the philosophy of the present approach, to carry out a general systems 
analysis study using a structurally highly simplified multi-actor model (see 
Hasselmann and Hasselmann, 1996). 
In addition to  the restriction t'o a single actor and the simplification of 
the economics, there a,re a nulllber of other basic limitations to  the present 
nlodel that  need to be addressed. For esample, a realistic model would also 
need to  simulate the inherent illterilal va,ria.bility of the system, whicll is an 
essential dynamic feature of both cliinate a,nd socioeconoinic systems. It has 
been shown (Hasselmann, 19iG) tlmt long-term fluctuations in the climate 
system can be generated by the stocl~a,stic forcing exerted by short-term ran- 
dom weather fluctuatioils acting on the slow colnpollents of the system (the 
oceans, the biosphere, and the cryosphere), analogous to  the Brownian mo- 
tion of heavy molecules escited by ra,ndon~ collisions with lighter molecules. 
Stochastic forcing may also be espected to  produce slow fluctuations in the 
socioeconolnic system, which similarly contains both slow elements (for ex- 
ample, in the forin of energy techilology or the cultural values of a society) 
and lllore ra.pidly fluctua.ting conlponents (such a.s business cycles, societal 
fashions, and other short-term atljustnlellt processes). A realistic represen- 
ta.tion of the intera,ctions between the clifferent spectral frequency bands of 
the natural va.riability spectrum is an inlporta,nt test of our understanding 
of the dynamics of t,he GES systenl a,nd our ability to correctly represent the 
response of the systelil to esteriml a~ntliropogenic forcing. 
Another reason for the consideration of natural variability is that  the 
impact of anthropogenic global clillla,te change must be weighed against the 
impacts of the inherent ii~ternal variability of the GES system. The skep- 
ticism that  is occasionally espressed with regard to the need for a climate 
protection strategy ca,n proba.bly be a,ttributed in good part to the intuitive 
feeling that  the effects of the (unpredictable) inherent variability of the so- 
cioecoilomic system will a1wa.y~ outweigh the impact of the predicted climate 
change. Tlle rational analysis of such assessments requires GES models that  
are able to simulate both the response to esternal anthropogenic forcing and 
the internal variability of the system. 
A more realistic GES lllodel will also need to  include societal compo- 
nents, particularly with rega.rd to the establishment of the mitigation and 
climate-dama.ge cost fui~ctioiis aatl t,he representation of the decision-making 
module in Figure 1. For the polit~ical decision-ma,king process, the "true 
costs" are less relevant than tllc .'],erceived costs" (Stehr and von Storch, 
1995). Transmitting scientific predictions of future climate change, as well 
as rational assessments of the ensuing climate-damage or mitigation costs, 
to  the political arena iilvolves the creation of a "social construct" of climate 
change and its impact. This product of the media, interest groups, and 
public awareness and educa,tion need not be closely correlated with scien- 
tific perceptions. A significa,llt portion of the population in the USA, for 
esample, perceives a,s da.ngers attributable to  global warming the unrelated 
problem of the pollution of tlle atiuosphere by health-threatening gases or 
the (entirely negligible) depletion of oxygen in the atmosphere (Iiempton et 
rrl., 1995). In a siinila,r poll conducted in Germany, 80% of those interviewed 
believed that global warming a.nd t,he ozone hole were directly related. 
In this contest, the concept of a predefined cost function dependent only 
on tlle stat,e of the economy and the clima,te may also be questioned. Social 
values change over time, a,s evidenced by the recent increase in public concern 
over threats to  the environment (see also Turner, 1995). Our understanding 
of climate change also evolves with time. The non-stationarity of the "social 
construct" of climate clla,~lge on longer time sca'les of several hundred years 
is well illustrated by the metlieval esample related by Stehr and von Storch 
(1995), in which a severe climate tlegra,da,t.ion in fourteenth-century England 
wa,s successf~~lly reversetl (in the percept,ion of t,he time) by a "mitigation" 
policy of public penitence init,ia,t'ed hy tlle a.rchbishop of Canterbury. 
Thus, both our scieiltific assessineilt of climate cllallge and its impact, 
and the transnlission of this understa~ntling into a "climate construct" serving 
a,s the basis of policy tlecisions, should be viewed as evolving entities. Our 
present assessmeilt a,nd tlle resulta,nt policy decisions may well be regarded 
as inadequate and inappropriate by future generations. A further aspect 
that  should be included in Inore detailed integrated assessment studies is 
therefore the problem of decision lnakiilg under uncertainty. This aspect 
would need t o  include the probabilistic assessment of risk and the impact of 
an anticipated future reduct,ion of ullcertainty on the timing of decisions. 
The time scale aad uncertaiilt,y dilemma notwithstanding, we have no 
choice but to  a.ccept our present understalldillg as the basis for defining 
a.nd implementing policies that ,  although subject to  continual later revision, 
must nevertheless be designed to sha.pe the future far beyond the societal 
horizon that  we can confidently perceive or anticipate today. 
Despite the limitatioils of the present study and the nonmonetary, il- 
lustrative nature of our simulations, we believe that  several general features 
of the optimal emission pa.th solutiolls we have presented will survive la,ter 
iillproved insig1lt.s and inore qua,nt,it'n,tive t rea,t,ments. These concern, in par- 
ticula.~, the long time sc.a,les of' the rliiua.t~e response, the general time history 
and order of magnitude of the reduction in CO;? emissions required to avert 
a major globa.1 wa.rming. a.nd t,lle need to espress the commitment to  long- 
term sustainable developlnent independent of standard discounting rates in 
terms of "willingness to pay" present va.lues in order to  obtain meaningful 
optimal emission solutions from cost-benefit analyses that  do indeed satisfy 
the requirement of susta.ina,ble development. 
We are grateful to  Renate Broliopf for assista~ice in carrying out the compu- 
tations and to  Norbert Noreilis for producing the graphics. Our investiga- 
t ions were stimulated in part by a contribution in collaboration with Hans- 
Joachiin Scliellnhuber for a report of the LVissenschaftlicl~er Beirat Globale 
ITillweltveriilderuilgei~ ( Gernlail --ltlvisory Council on Global Change). 
Appendix: Computation of the Cost Gradient 
We derive the gradient of the cost, g( t ) ,  in the following using continuous 
functional-derivative nota,tion. I11 pra,ctice, however, the cost C ,  equation 
(17), is computed a.s a. discrete sum ra.ther than the integrals (18) and (19), 
and the functional deriva.tive 6C'/6e = y(t) becomes a normal gradient vector 
whose components are indicated by a discrete time index. 
Applying definitions (18) a.nd (19), the variation of C yields 
or, substituting the variational relations 
for the model equa.tion ( I ) ,  ant1 removing the time deriva,tives on 6e by 
partial differentiation, 
Sen el dc, + __6e( t )  - -:be(t) [ de  elf d2 o 
Applying relation (10) to the double integrals and invoking equation 
(13), we obtain for the gradient y( t )  = SC'/Ge(t) 
In equa.tiou ( A s )  we lta,ve tlroppetl the terms resulting fro111 the perturbations 
in equa,tion (A4) a,t t l ~ e  cl~dpoillts of t,lle intcrval. These yield n'-function 
expressioiis that  in effect inlpose tlie hounda,ry coltditions 
e(t) = 0 at t = 0 , th  (if ca depends on 6) , (-46) 
6(t)  = 0 at  1 = 0, t h  (if ca depends on e )  . (-47) 
If these boundary conditions are not satisfied, the contributions to the abate- 
ment cost, c,, at  the endpoints of the iilterval will become infinite if the 
dependence on 1 or t is quadratic, as n-e have assumed. However, in the 
discretized practical inlplementation there is no need to  impose boundary 
conditions (AG) and (A;) explicitly: they are satisfied auto~llatically by the 
minimal-cost solutioil in tlte linlit of a very slnall discretization increment. 
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Learning from Integrated Assessment of Climate 
Change 
111. Grclnger iilorgcr~z crizcl Hcicli Dou~lntnbadi 
Carnegie hlellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 
1. Introduction 
The idea of doing integrated assessnlellt of climate change has recently be- 
come popular in the USA (Corell, 1993; C~ibboiis, 1993). It is argued that ,  by 
putting current knowledge together into a, single, coordinated analysis frame- 
work, it should be possible to dra,w better insights about policy options a,nd 
t,o do a better job of setting future research priorities. Such activities began 
more than a deca,de a,go, both a,s coortlinated discussion pieces (Schneider 
and Chen, 1980; Sclineider, 1989; National Research Council, 1992) and 
also a.s formal models (Nordha,us, 1977; R.otnlans, 1990; Manne and Richels, 
1992; Peck aiid Teisberg, 1992). Today, illore than 20 efforts are under way 
a.round the world (Dowlatalmdi, 1995a,; \.l'e.ya'nt et nl., 1996). Not all of 
these efforts sha.re the same goals. For esa.niple, some a,ddress a particu- 
1a.r nation's problems, soiile a.re interna~tional in focus, and others examine 
specific econolnic sectors in great deta.il. Ilowever, we believe a few basic 
principles, sumnlarizetl in Table I ,  slioultl guide all integrated assessments 
( Dowla.taba.di and hjlorga,n, 1993a.). 
Integrated a.ssessment is neither an end in itself, nor a one-shot proposi- 
tion. Tlie lllost useful results froill doing integrated assessment will typically 
not be "answers" to specific policy cluestions. R.ather they will be insights 
a.bout the nature aiid structure of tlie clinlate problem, about what matters, 
and about what we still need to lea,rn. At Carnegie Mellon, we have had a 
group of about 12 fa,culty a,ild 1.5 gradua.te students working on integrated 
a.ssessment for the past sis yea.rs. \.ire began our work in 1990 by building 
a. list of key policy questions a,ncl constructing a set of influence diagrams 
that spanned the problem a,ild a,cted as a graphical checklist for subsequent 
analysis (Morgan and Dowlata.ba.di, 1994). Then we performed a systematic 
scenario analysis (ICAM-0) to esa,inine the relative importance of uncer- 
tainty in the science versus value judginents about costs and benefits (Lave 
and Dowlatabadi, 1993). Given current aad likely future uncertainties, we 
found that  the value judgments dominate. Next, we constructed a stochas- 
tic simulation model called tlie 1iitegra.ted Climate Assessment Model, or  
Table 1. Hallmarlis of a good i~l tegrated assesslneilt of climate change. 
1. The cha,racterization and analysis of uiicerta,inty should be a central focus of 
all assessments. 
2. The approach should he iterative. The focus of attention should be permitted 
to shift over tinie depending on what has been learned and which parts of the 
problem are found to be critical to answer t,he questions being asked. 
3. Parts of the probleili about which we have little knowledge must not be ignored. 
Order-of-magnitude a.nalysis, houndiiig analysis, and carefully elicited expert 
judgment should he used when formal models are not possible. 
4. Trea.t.ment of values should Ile esl~licit and, when possible, parametric so that 
many different act,ors can malie use of result,s froin the same assessment. 
5. To provide proper perspect,ive, clin1at.e iinpacts should he placed in the contest, 
of other natural and human ha.ckground stochastic va.riation and secular trends. 
Where possible, relevant 1iistorica.l dat,a, should he used. 
6. A successful assessnlent is liliely to consist of a set of coordinated analyses that 
span the problem, ilot a single nloclel. Different, part,s of t,his set will proha,hly 
need to adopt different analyt,ical st,rat,egies. 
7. There should be multiple a~ssessments: 
Different actors and prohleins mill require different, formulations; and, 
No one pro.iect will get everyt~lliiig: right; nor are results from any one 
project likely t,o be persua.sive on t,lleir own. 
ICAM-1 (Dowla,taba.di a,lltl Morgan, 19931)). In parallel, we began a lluinber 
of detailed studies, 1)uilding on the  lessolls we were learning, t o  lay t he  ground 
work for our  nest  iteration. We have recently coinpleted a second-generation 
stochastic simulatioil model called ICARI-2 (Dowlatabadi and I\;andlika.r, 
1995). I n  t he  ICAM model, inost para.meters are  described as  probability dis- 
tributions and  uncertainties a.re propagated through the  model and  analyzed 
using s tandard metllods in the  DEhlOS soft\va.re environment (Henrion and 
Morgan, 1985; Morga,n a.nd Henrion, 1990). ICAM 2.1 involves specificatioil 
of over 2000 uncerta.in quantities. Probal~ility distributions are  constructed 
from primary literature, espert  elicitations (Morgan and Keith, 1995), and,  
in some cases, our  own subjective judgments. In parallel with simulation 
of demographic, economic, and enviroilmental changes and  their response 
t o  various policy implei~~entat ions,  ICAM includes estimates of market and  
noilnlarket impacts of climate change. T h e  la t ter  have been chosen t o  reflect 
plausible ability a,ild willingness t o  pay in different regions of t he  world. T h e  
ICAM family of models is in the  public domain (through the  authors) ,  and  
they sllould be rega.rclet1 as frame1vol.1;~ for coherent probabilistic exploration 
of climate change issues. 
While we have produced over 40 papers and conference reports on vari- 
ous facets of the clima.te cllaiige prol~lenl (Global Cllailge Integrated Assess- 
nleilt Program, 1995), in this a.rticle we step back from all the specifics to 
reflect on the broader insights that we can draw from our work to  date. 
Most discussiolls of cliinate chailge begin with the natural science, then 
discuss physical, biological, and social impacts, and finally move to policy. 
Indeed, that is a rea,sona.ble reflectioil of the structure of the US Global 
Change Research Program, wllich until recently 11a.s devoted almost all its 
attention to  the natural sciences. However, because the inotivatio~l for our 
work on integrated assessinellt is to try to gain policy-relevant insight, a 
sonlewhat different structure is a.ppropriate for this article. We will begin 
by asking who are the decisioil mal;ers? Then we will identify the issues that  
coilcern thein. From there we ~vill go on to as]; wllere are the serious iinpacts 
likely to occur'? Although policy issues will be discussed througl~out the 
paper, we will close ~vi th  solne specific evaluatioils of several policy options, 
followed by a very brief discussioil of some of the problems we see for future 
work. Througl~out lle discussion, our focus will be on tlle insights we have 
gained relevant to  llow decisioil ma1;ers and research administrators fra.me 
and think a.bout the clima.te problem. 
2. Who Are the Climate Decision Makers? 
Some assessineilt efforts implicitly assuine that the world's policy decisions 
about cliinate will be illade just once, by a single decision maker: a "unitary 
rational actor" who might also be ternled a "global commoner." Of course, 
the people who build and use these illodels know this is not true. However, 
they would argue, such lllodels call a t  least give a valuable first impression. 
Our work llas led us to believe that  the first impressions gained from 
a "global commoner" nlodel nlay confuse inore than they clarify. At tlle 
interilatioiial level, a t  least a dozen different nations will make choices that  
could liave significant clinlate implications. Ivlany of those choices will not be 
made by single national decision-making authorities, but rather through the 
individual choices of millioils of orgailizatioils and individual citizens, and 
they will be driven by local interests and conditions. This distributed de- 
cision making is one of the inost fuildaineiltal cllaracteristics of the climate 
problem. A second, equally fundamental cllaracteristic of the problem is 
t11a.t these Inany sepa.rate tlecision nlaliers a,re principa,lly motivated by non- 
clilna,te considera.tions (nlicronloli\.cs) ant1 will each make a long sequence 
of choices with cliinate implica~tions (luacrobehaviors) (Schelling, 1978). As 
time goes by, Inany of these choices will be designed to  adapt as new so- 
cial and climate circunlstances and nnderst,aading emerge. This pattern of 
sequentia.1 a.nd adaptive decision maliing is an equally fundamental charac- 
teristic of the clima.te problem. 
The first stochastic sinlulation integrated assessment model we built 
(ICAM-1) divided the world into two geopolitical regions: high-latitude in- 
dustrial economies and low-latit,ude less industrial economies. Even with 
this very siinple inotlel, we fount1 t'l1a.t the choices natioilal decision makers 
a.re likely to  prefer a,re very different for t'hese two regions. This difference 
springs froin differential vulnerability to cliinate change, diverse ecoilonlic 
and demographic conditions, and tlifferences in the range of possible response 
opt ions. 
Of course, one rea.son so ina.ny of toda,y's cliinate assessments assume 
a single national or interna,tioilal decision malier is that  the analyses get 
complicated very quickly if a a  a,t,teinpt is made to  include multiple decision 
ina.kers. For esample, will the different actors cooperate or play strategic 
ga,nles? Clearly it is illlpossible to include all the different perspectives aad 
views of different decisioil n~a,liers ill a single a,nalysis. What one can do is 
include i*epr.e.strltntint vie\vs so a,s t,o begin to  explore the implications of 
the diversity. In tlle scena,rio a,nalysis we did in our ICAM-0 nlodel (Lave 
and Dowlatabadi, 199:3), we considered a. nunlber of typical groups on the 
Anlerican politica.1 scene ( environnlent alists, industrialists, etc.) and were 
able to  show t11a.t groups t11a.t held middle-of-the-road views were likely to  
fa.vor modera.te a.ba.teinent of carbon dioside (COz), but the more extreme 
groups on both ends were  unlikely to be able to  reach any consensus, even if 
the current scientific uncert~ainty \va,s reduced considerably. Those favoring 
no action might fa.vor research a,s a tactical matter, as a way to  stall, but 
we found it unlil<ely that modest iillprovenlents in scientific understanding 
would change tlleir policy prescriptions. Similarly, we found it unlikely that  
those favoring dra,stic a.ction ~vould inoderate tlleir policy prescriptions in 
the face of modest iinproveinents in scientific understanding. These results 
suggest that ,  in a fundanlental way, the cliinate problem is a political prob- 
lem, and that  we should work to  avoid exa,ggerated expectations about how 
much modest improvenlents in scientific understanding over the next decade 
or two can improve the situa.tion. 
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'No abatement. 1. Minimize ecological impacts. 
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Figure 1. Tlle optimal cliinate policy is dependent on the decision rule and 
regional factors affecting outcomes. Here, the results for each of the seven 
regions in ICAhl-2 are presented as shaded squares. Each quadrant of these 
squares represents a different decisioil rule. Along the horizontal axis, the 
decision rules reflect neutral and lligh aversion to economic risk. Along the 
vertical axis the decision rules reflect neutral and high aversion to  ecological 
risk. The shading in each box indicates the strategy chosen by that  regional 
decision maker when adopting each of the four decision rules. Only when 
all regions adopt the first decision rule, minimize ecological impact, is there 
a concordance in strategy. In all other cases, different regions find that  
different strategies best suit their goals. 
We have begun to  explore these issues further with results from the 
ICAM-2 stochastic simulations. Figure 1 illustrates how four different LLde- 
cision rules" would affect policy choice by different "regional commoners" if 
they were to  make a single one-time policy choice today under the assump- 
tions of our current ICAM-2 assessment model. Clearly, real decision makers 
will not make a single choice and then stick with it as the world and their 
knowledge a.bout it changes. I11 ovt1c.r t.o esplore the iinplications of this 
fa,ct, we lmve begun to built1 sequential decision-making illodels of clinlate 
policy evolution. Adaptive behavior a.nd policy revisions occur as a response 
t o  learning about the changing global environment. Once a policy instru- 
ment has been chosen, the design of implementation requires consideration 
of how the policy may be introduced and how it may be revised through 
time as an adaptation to  a changing environment. Different implementa- 
tion designs call be explored and their performance and evolution under 
different future conditions can be eva.luated. The best of these adaptive pol- 
icy strategies dominate one-time decision-making a'pproaches under a wide 
ra.nge of possible future outcollles (Don!la,ta,badi, 1995b). A major departure 
from traditional a.na.lysis, this a,pproach to esploring climate change policies 
shows that  setting the policy int.0  notion ca,ll provide information about 
the beha,vior of the cliinate aild socioecoilolllic system that can be useful in 
subsequent decision iualiing. Our simula.tions suggest that  a well-designed 
'*policy experiment" ca.n yield infori~la~tion a.bout the system's behavior with 
high net payoff in the long run. 
Just as there are questions about which decision rules t o  adopt in ana- 
lyzing the problem, there are questioils about what structural assumptions 
to make in constructing the a,ssessment model. Both the behavioral as- 
suillptions that  are illade ant1 t,he physical aad economic processes that  are 
included in the illode1 ca,n lmve a la,rge impact on the conclusions that  one 
reaches. l i e  illustrate the i~npor ta~lce  of structural assulllptiolls by using 
1CAPI.I-2 to  ca,lculate the prol,a,bility that a specific carbon tax will have a 
positive net present value wllen conlpa.red \vith business as usual. The re- 
sults for the ivorld a,s a. ivhole a.nd the seven regions modeled are presented 
in Table 2. The impo~.ta~nt finding is the change in values from case t o  case, 
not the absolute va,lue of the probability for any particular case. Column 
1 reports the results from the probabilistic ICAM-2 model for structural 
assumptions that  are typica,l of most deterministic integrated assessment 
models. As we add pla.usible elabora.tions, note the enormous cllanges that  
result. For the world a,s a whole t,lle probability that  this particular tax 
policy will yield a net positive I~enefit ra,nges from 15-95%, depending on 
the structural assunlptions that a,re made! 
Note that  some modifica.tions tend to  increase the odds across all re- 
gions, while others tend to  lllove thein down. However, whatever structural 
assumptions are made, one result reinains robust: the variation in results 
across the different regions, which face different geographical and socioe- 
conomic conditions, remain very large. For example, the difference in the 
Table 2. Probability. as il fi~llctio~l of clifferellt nlodel structures, that  
a US$4.OO/ton carbon tax that begins in llie year 2000 and increases by 
US$IZ.OO/ton every five years through the year 2100 will have a positive net 
present value. 
Model alternatives Six alternative model structures 
Discounting: 
- applied a t  the sallle level globally; 
- ha,sed on regional grou.t.11 per cap. 
Techilological change: 
- occurs autoaomously; 
- induced by ca,rhon t.a.x. 
Aerosols: 
- radiative  effect,^ excluded; 
- radiat,ive  effect,^ inclucletl. 
Adaptat,ioil t.o c1imat.e i i ~ ~ p a c t s :  
- iinpacts are permanent; 
- a,daptation occurs after det,ection. 
Oil & gas: 
- reserves exllaustecl l ~ y  2050; 
- new reserves will Ile discoveretl. 
Region 
China 
E. Europe S;: FSU 
Inclia & SE Asia 
Africa 
RiIiddle East 
OECD 
Latin America 
World 
Probability that  the carbon tax  policy 
will have a positive net present value 
0.05 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 
0.20 0.65 0.70 0.40 0.15 0.05 
0.40 0.40 0.55 0.30 0.25 0.15 
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.30 0.25 0.20 
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.40 0.20 0.15 
0.50 0.85 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.30 
0.60 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.70 0.25 
odds between the 0rga.nisa.tion for Ecollolllic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and Chills never falls below 30%, and can be as high as 90%. 
The ICAM-2 model allows us to  describe cha.nges in a number of sepa- 
rate climate, environmenta.1, a,nd socioeconomic attributes such as regional 
mean annual temperature and precipitation change, local sea level rise, gross 
domestic product (GDP), fuel use. a.ba,tement and adaptation costs, ecosys- 
tem characteristics, and so on. Akihiro Tokai and colleagues (1995) have 
Table 3. Impact of clinlate and other disturbances on Inanaged and un- 
managed ecosystems for tlie year 2050 with 2xC:02 and a global population 
of 10 billion. 
Low estimate High estimate 
Category of disturbance (10"m2) (lo6 km2) 
Ecosystem stressed by clilllate changea 4.2 7.9 
Land lost to sea level riseb 0.08 0.26 
Unmanaged ecosystems lost t,o a,gricl~lture~ 5.3 12.4 
Land lost to urbanizationd 2.1 G 
"The low estimate is the 5th percelltile p ro jec t io~~ from the ecosystem dynamics model 
using a logist,ic loss funct,ion. The high est.i~nat,e is the 95th percentile projection from the 
ecosystem dynamics model using an exponential loss function. 
"The low estimate is t l ~ e  5th percentile projection from t l ~ e  sea level rise impacts module 
of ICAhl-2. T h e  high estiulat,e is t l ~ e  95th percent,ile projection from the same model. 
'The low estimat.e is fro111 US Depart,ineut of Agriculture (Langer e t  ul., 1992). The  high 
estimate is f r o ~ n  Iireilell~all ai~cl Bouwnlan (ITS Enviroumental Protection Agency, 1992) 
uncler an assuinption of no forest regrowth 011 the laucl freed from agriculture in North 
and Latin America, Europe, Commo~~wealt~li of Independent States (CIS), and Oceania. 
d ~ h e  low estimate is from M'aggoner (1994). The  11igh estimate is based on the value of 
current urban area from Dixo11 ct 01. (1993) and a trend suggested by Waggoner for the 
fut.ure urban area increase. 
performed a preliminary a,nalysis to s l ~ o ~ v  how one might construct separate 
"multi-a.ttribute utility functions" for different hypotl~etical national actors 
such a.s eilvirolllllelltalists a,nd industrialists. Suc11 a,nalysis not only demon- 
strates t,he different policy prescriptions preferred by each group but call be 
used t,o explore opport~unities for "deals" (if tlie a,ctors are prepared to  trade 
performance on one attribute for a,nother). We a.re ilow working to  elab- 
orate this worli, but find that ,  beca.use different actors are likely to value 
social and ecological impa.cts differently depeilding on where they occur in 
space and time, new  neth hods illust lje developed to support the elicitation 
of multi-a.ttribute utility fuilctiolls froln representative actors. 
In addition to differences ca,lised by ba.sic values and judgments about 
the future, different policy inakers a,re likely to favor different actions because 
climate change a,nd its impacts will be only one issue among many requiring 
their attention and a.ctioa. Ta,ble 3, which estimates the relative magnitude 
of impacts on ecosystems projected for climate change, sea level rise, agricul- 
ture, and urbanization, suggests that this is true even if we restrict ourselves 
to  issues involving global change. If we were concerned only with a single 
"global commoner," or even with a number of "national commoners," whose 
sole concern is economic efficiency, these results suggest that climate change 
would not figure as the first priority of very many actors on the world stage. 
In a later sectiolr, \ire a,rgue illat on avera,ge econonlic inlpacts of climate 
change will he iuotlest, a.t lea,st in t'lle developed world. In some parts of the 
developing world this may not he t,rue, but even in these places there are 
probably inany investnlents that could yield greater benefits than climate 
change abatement. Ecological inlpacts will be primarily focused on coastal 
margins and zones of transition from one nlajor bionle to another. However, 
if we abandon the fornlulation in terms of a global or national commoner, 
and make the more realistic a.ssulnption of lllultiple actors and political pro- 
cess, the importance of clinlate cllange in lla,tional and international agendas 
can increase dramatically. C~overnment~s. particularly democracies, tend to  
focus on "squeaky wlleels." \4'ealtlly coa.sta1 conlnlunities that a,re losing 
valuable real esta.te and infra.structure to stornls as a consequence of sea 
level rise, and nature lovers ~vho  are ~va.t,cliing favorite ecological regions be- 
conle stressed aad llndergo ma.jor clmnge, ca,n esert considerable political 
1evera.ge. Through processes of interest group politics and "social amplifica- 
tion" (1l;aspersoii ef (11.. 1988) t,lleir concerns ma,y drive regional, national, 
aad even international decision processes i11 ways that  are entirely different 
from the "economically optimal" natioiial or international strategies. 
So, ~ v h o  are the clinlate decision lua,kers? Tlle insight is that ,  to a 
greater extent t11a.n for any previous environlllental problem, they are a, 
diffuse and often divergent group s1)rea.d all over the globe, many of whom, 
over a period of ma.ny deca.des, \\-ill 111a,lie a series of climate-relevant decisions 
that  are primarily driven l)y local. non-clinla.te, considerations. Costs and 
benefits are both cli.~tr.iltrtccl a,nd rnlutd differently aillong these decision 
makers. As a consecluence, the ininti-set. and tlie social and policy tools we 
will need in order to  fraale and deal with the clinlate problem will often 
be quite different fronl those a.ssocia.ted with tlle conventional single-actor 
single-decision models that have doillinated lllost public policy thinking. 
3. What Is the Climate Problem? 
Most scientists a.nd other well-infonned people would describe the climate 
problem in roughly tlie follo~viilg ternis. Hunlan activities result in the re- 
lease into the a,tmosphere of radiatively inlportant trace substances such as 
greenhouse gases and aerosols. A portion of these substances remain in the 
atmosphere and affect the bala,nce of outgoing and incoming solar radiation. 
This balance is further affected by hulnan cha.nges to  the surface of the land. 
The net effect can be aa  appreciable change in the average temperature of 
the planet as well as in the dyna.mics of the ocean-atmosphere system. These 
clla,nges ca.n in turn lead to a va,ric-lt,y of challges in loca,l and regional climatic 
pa.tterns. As they lmve in the pa.st. such rha'nges in climate will affect both 
natural ecosystems and the pattern a,nd nature of human activities. Both 
can be expected to feed ha.ck to muse further change in the climate system. 
Humans call respond to clinla.te change and its impacts in any or all of 
four ways. Abatement involves reducing emissions in order to slow, stop, or 
reverse the accumulation of ra.diatively importa.nt trace substances. Adapta- 
tion involves adjusting to live wit11 the changed climate by changing technol- 
ogy (build aqueducts and dikes) a,nd by shifting behaviors (change farming 
pra.ctices). G'eoerzyiiaeer.in,g involves modifying the earth system to reestab- 
lish the desired radiative ba,la,nce (e.g., by adding more reflective aerosols 
to  the stratosphere when too illuch energy is trapped in the atmosphere) or 
by reinoving greenhouse ga,ses froill the atnlospllere (e.g., by planting trees, 
wllich sequester COz a.s they grow). ResecLrch produces knowledge that can 
pla.ce us in a. better position t,o lllltlersta,nd climate a'nd to make Inore in- 
formed choices a.bout a.batement, adapta.tion, a'nd geoengineering. To many, 
research means extensions to known climate science (Morgan and Keith, 
1995), but in fa,ct, sollle of the iuost important research is likely to involve 
impacts, adapt ation st rat egies, aba,telnent technologies, and social experi- 
nlents that  provide information on the rela,tive cost and difficulty of various 
policies. 
So that's "the problem." But is i t?  In a democracy like the USA, 
"the problenl" is ~vhatever vot,ers and their elected representatives think it 
is. Thus, one of the first tllings \i:e tlitl wa.s to try to understand what the 
Anlerican public knows and tlliltks about the issues of climate cha.nge and 
global wa.rming. To do this we used nletllods developed in previous work 
on risk commuilications (Bostrom et crl., 1992; Morgan et al., 1992). \We 
began by conducting a set of carefully structured interviews to develop a 
prelilllinary description of what, the public knows and thinks about climate 
change. This description is t,ernled a "~llental model." \We then went on to 
verify our filldings with a larger set of survey studies. 
The people we interviewed regarded global warming as undesirable and 
higllly likely (Bostronl et al., 1994). Many believe that substantial warming 
has already occurred. They tend to confuse stratospheric ozone depletion 
with the greenhouse effect a.nd wea.ther with climate. Automobile use, in- 
dustrial process heat a,nd emissions, pollution in general, and aerosol spray 
cans are perceived a,s the main causes of global warming. Additionally, the 
"greenhouse effect" is often interpreted literally to mean a hot and steamy 
climate. Respondents described globa,l cliinate change effects that included 
increased incidence of hliill cancer illld cllanges in agricultural yields. Mitiga- 
tion and control strategies proposed I)y interviewees ranged from alternative 
fuels for cars to the creation of a synthetic ozone layer. Many of the strate- 
gies proposed focused on general pollution control and regulation, with an  
empllasis on autoillobile and illdustrial emissions. Specific links t o  C o n  and 
energy use were relatively infrequent. Respondents appeared to  be relatively 
unfamiliar with recent regulatory developments regarding the environment, 
such as the ban on cl~lorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for nonessential uses, such 
as spray cans. 
Drawing on tlle results of these open-ended interview studies, we devel- 
oped a questionilaire that was designed to esamine laypeople's knowledge 
about the possible causes and effects of global warming, as well as the likely 
efficacy of possible interventions. This questionnaire was administered to  
two groups of well-educated people in Pittsburgh, USA. Our results (Read 
c t  ( I / . ,  1994), which have 1)een supported by siillilar findings by I<empton 
and his colleagues (1995), suggest that laypeople have a very nonspecific 
mental model of cliinate change. XIany appear to believe that all pollu- 
tants cause clinlate chailge and good green practice will prevent it .  Our 
respondents showed a poor appreciation of two key facts: (1) if significant 
global warilling occurs it will be primarily tlle result of an increase in the 
coilcentration of C 0 2  in tlle eaith's atmosphere; and (2) the single illost 
important source of COz additions to tlle atillosphere is the combustion of 
fossil fuels, most notably coal and oil. Our respondents' understanding of 
tlle clinlate issue was encunlbered by a laige nunlber of secondary, irrelevant, 
and incorrect beliefs. Of these, the two inost critical are confusion with the 
problenls of stratospheric and tropospheric ozone, and difficulty in differen- 
tiating between causes and actions specific to  cliinate and more general good 
environmental practice. 
Wllen the world is being aslied to spend hundreds of billions of dollars 
on solutions to the problem of cliinate change, people ncled a more specific 
understanding than they now have if they are going to make informed pri- 
vate decisions and be inforilled participants in public debate about the issue 
of climate change. The clarificatioils needed to produce adequate public un- 
derstanding are fairly sinlple and well within the capabilities of modern risk 
communication. 
As one step toward inlproving tlle situation, we developed a public infor- 
mation booklet on climate change (Morgan and Smuts, 1994). The booklet 
has two novel features. It is designed to address the misconceptions iden- 
tified earlier among the general public and it is hierarchically organized so 
that  readers ca,n clloose the level of deta,il they wisli in discussions a,bout 
clima,te change, its inlpact,s, ant1 the options we fa.ce. 
Defining the climate problem involves several other issues beyond the dif- 
ferences between lay and expert characterizations. Different regional actors 
elnphasize different issues; ailalysis conventions have placed greater empha- 
sis on some processes tlmn on others; and iilstitutional needs have shaped 
the way in wllicll the problem has been summarized. We illustrate with 
two exa.mples, the first iilvolving t'he role and treatment of aerosols, the sec- 
ond involving the clloices of sunlma,ry ineasures to allow easy comparisons 
between the greeilhouse ga,s enlissioils of different nations. 
Most policy assessments have franled the climate problem as a C 0 2  
problem. A few have also considered other radiatively important ga,ses such 
a,s lnetllalle and ilitrous oxide. Altl~ough climate scientists have known for 
nlany decades that  aerosols ca,il also pla,y an important role, until very re- 
cently aerosols have not received nlucll a.t,t,ention in policy studies. The short 
residence time of aerosols lea.cls to geogra,pbically specific regions of radiative 
cooling, with possibly complex effects on global circulation patterns. 
Historica,lly, regional a,ir pollutioil ha.s evolved from the control of par- 
ticulate illa,tter t,o the c1ispersa.l of sulfur dioxide (SOp) emissions, a,nd most 
recently, the control of sulfur and nitrogen oxides. The USA and many other 
OECD couiltries have reduced particula.te eillissiolls by more than 95%, have 
esperimeilted wit11 tall staclis, a,nd a,re now e~lga'ged in reducing their SO2 
emissions by roughly 50% fro111 levels in the mid-1980s. Few countries in the 
rest of the world yet have elllbarlied on particulate nla.tter controls, let alone 
SO2 controls. Econo~llic prosperit? a,nd trends in industrial countries deter- 
mine the tinletable for control. Tlle global cliscussions about climate change, 
if mana.ged appropriately, could lead to eltlla'nced local and regional a.ir pol- 
lution control. But the la,rge differences in initial conditions for the OECD 
aad other regions ca,n lead t,o very different regional outcomes associated 
with proposed clinlate nlit,igation policies. 
Many climate policy studies lnve been defined as a greenhouse gas prob- 
lem. However, at  the regional level, soot, smoke, and sulfate aerosols p1a.y 
a significant role in the ra,dia,tive balance of the a.tmosphere. These aerosols 
serve to  cha.nge the albedo of the atmosphere, clouds, and underlying ground. 
Scientists have not yet a.greed on the net radiative impa.ct of sulfate a,erosols 
(Charlson et al., 1991; I<iehl and Briegleb, 1993; Pandis et al., 1994; Pilinis 
et al., 1995). In interviews, 16 of the country's leading climate scientists esti- 
inated the radiative forcing due to  a.eroso1 averaged over the Northern Hemi- 
sphere to  be between -1 and -2 iva.tts/in2 (Morgan and Keith, 1995). The 
impact of aerosols on clima.te dyna,luics is uncerta,in (Charlson and Wigley, 
Aerosols Excluded Aerosols Included 
Figure 2. C4lobally averaged mean radiative forcing projections are pre- 
sented without aerosol effects (left), and with aerosol effects (right). Two 
features are evident: i) in this model iilclusion of aerosols reduces total forc- 
ing in the year 2000 by 1 \ \ ~ m - ~ ,  and ii) the point at  which the impact of 
carbon taxes call be felt as a reductioll in radiative forcing (indicated with 
the arrow) is delayed by 20 years. 
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1994; hlitchell c t  nl., 199.5) and may have sigllificant regional implications, 
such as a reductioll in mollsooil precipitation (Lal et al., 1995). 
Illclusion of both greenhouse gases and aerosols in ICAM-2 has led us 
to four interesting findings. First, barring unforeseen dynamical responses, 
inclusion of aerosols lowers the amount of climate change and its adverse 
impacts in the business-as-usual policy. Second, proposed C 0 2  abatement 
programs impose a hitherto unquantified cost associated with accelerated 
climate change if COa coiltrols lead to an associated reduction in SO2 emis- 
sions. Third, on the time-scale of a century or more, the radiative forcings 
estimated with and without the inclusion of sulfate aerosols converge as local 
pollution controls grow more stringent. Fourth, initial regional atmospheric 
aerosol loadings play a sigilificallt role in the determination of the eventual 
climate impacts. In the Southern Hemisphere, low aerosol loadings lead to  
minimal adverse impacts from C 0 2  abatement. In China, where aerosol load- 
ings are high and expected to rise in the next quarter century, the adverse 
impacts of C 0 2  abatement are very large. The globally averaged results are 
shown in Figure 2. Although these insights do not surprise aerosol physicists, 
their policy implications have proven surprising to  decision makers. 
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I11 problenls tl1a.t involve long-terln consequences, policy choices can de- 
pend critica,lly on whether ant1 hoiv cost,s are conlpa,red over time. For most 
decisions, both individuals and societies adopt discounting, which means 
that  future costs weigh less heavily tllan present ones. While it is clear 
from Figure 2 that  stringent aba,teinent will produce the smallest impact 
on climate change in the long run ,  even wit11 a modest discount rate, the 
enormous up-front costs of a,batellleilt combined with the costs of the accel- 
erated short-term wa,rnling from removing sulfates, overwhelm the long-term 
benefits. Edmonds et (11. (1994) ha,ve fo~lild simi1a.r results when considering 
benefits of renewa.ble energy sources. This difFiculty can be avoided if SOz 
emissiolls are lnailltainetl ivhile C 0 2  emissions are controlled, but such a pol- 
icy is likely to  meet strong oppositioil from people concer~led about regional 
acid deposition. It sllould also be notetl that the alternative of releasing 
sulfates in the stratosphere (albeit in lnuch smaller quantities) is likely to  
lmve deleterious inlpacts on tlle stra,tospheric ozone and a different impact 
on global circulatioll patterns. IVe will return to this issue in the discussion 
of geoengineering. 
We turn now to  a, second illustration. Most diplomats frame the cli- 
mate problem a.s one of negotia.ting international accords that  specify bow 
countries will llla,nage their enlissiolls over time. To simplify the problem of 
specifying what na.tions shoultl do ant1 lmve done, they have sought a single 
metric that ca,n be used to colupa,re elllissions across nations and over time. 
The most widely discussed nletric is tlle Global lhTarnling Potential or GWP 
(Lashof and Ahuja, 1990), which colllpa,res the net radiative forcing of a 
unit of aay other tra.ce ga.s (such a.s methane) over its lifetime as gas with 
that  of a unit of C 0 2 .  Different hunlan a.ctivities produce different mixes of 
greenhouse gases. For exa,mple, electricity generation mainly produces C 0 2 .  
In contrast, rice farming nlainly produces ~llethane, which has an instanta- 
neous radiative forcing a.n order of magnitude larger tha,ll COs, but 11a.s a,n 
atmospheric residence time t,lla.t is aa  order of magnitude shorter. 
GWPs capture the insta,llta,neous physics of the problem. By integrating 
for some arbitrary period (the lellgth of ivhich is, of course, a value judgment 
a,nd thus subject to  controversy), they ca,n also reflect some aspects of the 
temporal dynamics. However, they do not recognize the economic reality 
of discounting, which caa work to reduce the effective importance of future 
changes in radiative forcing (Eclcaus, 1992). Further, Milind Kandlikar has 
argued that ,  because most decision makers are principally concerned about 
impacts, not gas concentrations, any reliable equivalence scheme also needs 
to  incorporate climate cllange a,nd impact dynamics. 
Table 4. Compa~rison of G\,lTP values wi tli several alternative scena,rio 
ba,sed indices for t.race ga,ses. -411 vall~es sliowil coinpare other trace ga.ses 
with carbon dioxide. Thus, a.n index va.lue of 100 nleans a unit Inass of the 
trace gas contributes 100 tiines as nlucll as a unit inass of carbon dioxide. 
SBI index wl~en SBI index when SBI index when 
da,lllage assumed danlage a,ssulned damage assumed 
to be linearly proportional to square proportional to cube 
proportional of t,enlperature of temperature 
Trace gas GWPa to temperature1' IPPC-A IPCC-D IPPC-A IPCC-D 
Ailethane 
2% discount 11 19 12 12.9 8.5 10 
6%) discount 11 38.4 27.5 28.1 19.9 21.5 
Nitrous oside 
2% discount 290 269 282 280 289 286 
6% discount 290 258 271 269 278 275 
HCFC-22 
2% discount 1500 2445 1706 1811 1284 1466 
6% discount 1500 3178 2217 2354 1700 1879 
nGWP computed in this esan~ple wit,l~ a. t,ime horizon of 100 years. 
bIf damage is linear i11 t,e~npera,tr~re, dct,ails of the emissions scenario do not affect the 
relative weights for t,he trace gases. 
I<a,ndlikar lms proposetl t,lla,t t be prol~leiil ca,ii be a,ddressed by devising 
indices tha,t compare the eventual econonlic iinpa,cts of unit enlissions of 
different greenhouse ga,ses (Iiantlliliar r f  nl., 1993). If greenhouse damage is 
a. fu~iction of global lnea,ii teinperat,ure change, then the indices will depend 
on the future enlissio~is of trace ga,ses. Future enlissions of trace gases are 
intrinsically linked to ecoiionlic growth and a.batement policies, which in 
turn are governed by especta,tioils of greenhouse da.n~age. Trace gas indices 
ca.n thus be calculated either on the basis of enlissions scenarios such as 
those devised by the Intergoveriull~ental Paael on Climate Change (IPCC),  
or using optimal co~itrol tecluniques where the trade-off between damage and 
abatement costs is nlade explicit, and the trace ga,s index values are a by- 
product of computing a.n optimal elilissioiis trajectory. 
Damage and abatenlent costs a,re poorly known quantities. However, by 
using a range of plausible values for these quantities, it is possible to  pro- 
vide values for a scenario-ba'sed index, or SBI, and draw some conclusions 
about their dependence on uncertain variables. Results are shown in Table 
4. Although for long-lived nitrous oxide the difference between GWP and 
the SBI is 10% or less, tlie difference ca,n be 1nuc11 greater for species with 
atmosplleric lifetiines significa,nt,l~. shorter than COz. The differences esceed 
a. fa,ctor of three for nletlia,ne a,nd a. fact'or of two for HCFC-22. Such dif- 
ferences can have enormotrs econoll~ic consequences in the abatement costs 
tlmt a country, especia,lly one with a la,rge agricultural sector, may face. 
Icandlikar has found SBIs to be far inore sensitive to the nonlinearity in 
climate change damage than to costs of abatement and the future energy mix. 
The index calculatioils a.re rea.sonably robust over a. wide range of possible 
outcomes of energy supply futures. Tra.ce gas indices depend critically on 
the choice of the discount ra.te. .A higher tliscount rate reduces the impact 
of future damage from trace gases with longer lifetimes and leads to an 
increase in the va.lue of tlie indes for species that are short-lived relative 
to COz. C:onversely, for a. species that is long-lived relative to CO;?, higher 
discoullt ra.tes lead t.o a decrease in its t,ra,ce gas index. Thus, the debate over 
a.n appropriate time liorizon of integra.tion for GWPs, is translated into the 
choice of an  appropriate discount rate for the greenhouse warming problem. 
Finally, it is found t11a.t econolllic uncertaiilties from the nonlinearity of the 
damage function and from the clloice of the discount rate both influence the 
SBI more than uncertainties in atinospheric lifetime of greenhouse gases. 
4. Where Are the Serious Impacts? 
Opponents of clilllate change nlitigation policies expect serious econonlic 
inlpacts due to  iinplementation of any al~atement policy. Proponents es-  
pect significant iinpacts of clinlate cllallge in coastal areas, in agriculture, 
in unmallaged ecosystems. and for human health. There is a fundamental 
difference in the distributioilal features of climate policy and climate change 
impacts. By cltsigrz, lllost clinlate mitigation policies impose a small bur- 
den on most of the population. By ~-rclture, Illany climate change impacts 
fall on specific subsets of the population. We shall return to this issue in a 
discussioil of equity versus efficiency in tlie section on policy insights. 
Unfortunately, the lllechanisnl of inlpacts due to climate change and 
valuation of such illlpacts are both poorly understood. Furthermore, climate 
policy evaluations often ignore direct policy interventions targeted a t  the 
impacts rather than a t  control of alltllropogenic emissions. To illustrate 
these issues we discuss selected results froln our research. 
4.1. Coastal areas and adaptation 
Impact mechanisms in coastal areas are relatively well understood. Climate 
change has been linked to sea level rise, which can result in losses to coastal 
ecosystems and property. Ea.rly sea level rise inlpact assesslllents involved 
a coloring book approach where t,lle area of shorefront inundated by rising 
sea level was multiplied by its price and the total was used as an estimate 
of economic impacts (Schneider alld C:llen, 1980; Barth and Titus, 1984; 
Titus, 1986). Greater sophistication of illlpact assessment has brought with 
it a realization of the role of hard (seawalls) and soft (zoning regulations) 
coastal protection measures (Yohe, 1990). These realizations have reduced 
impacts of sea level rise assessed for industrial countries (Patwardhan and 
Small, 1994). 
More recently, the role of ada.ptation to sea level rise has been empha- 
sized. It has been a,rgued tha.t, I)eca,use the secular trend in sea level rise is 
predictable, adaptatioil is likely. JVith 1;nown trends in future sea level, it is 
possible to plan a retreat or calculate the value of a defense (Rijkswaterstaat, 
1990; Titus et crl., 1991). Arllled wit,ll this l;nowledge, it is argued, the fi- 
nite life of coastal properties ca,n l)e tleterminetl, a.nd they can be discounted 
through their reina,ining life. Furtlrermore, the lost value of the vulnerable 
properties will be trallsferred inland. Tlle next row of houses will appreci- 
ate in value wit11 the recognition that they will soon be on the beach front. 
Thus, while the physical losses occur on the coast, it is argued that adap- 
tation lea,ds to econonlic losses that a,re equiva.lent to greeilfield property a t  
the inland bounda.ry of developnlent's. This formulation of adaptation has 
lowered estinlated damage of sea level rise by almost an order of magnitude. 
However, the above is too sinlple a characterization of the impact mech- 
anism. Sea level rise a,nd storm surge together lead to inundation. We have 
nlodeled these processes and decision nla.liing for a coastal town (West, 1994) 
and find that ,  when stocllastic stornl events are introduced into the problem, 
well-timed adapta.tion is very difficult a.nd full depreciation of structures is 
unlikely. The principal problem decision makers face is attribution of im- 
pacts to  changes in sea level and to  estreme events. There is always the 
chance that  a. freak storm will lead to  preina.ture abandonment of structures 
or that  a calm period (while sea. level is rising) will lead to inappropriate 
illvestment in vulnerable coasta.1 properties. Thus, because of the stochastic 
nature of weather, a.da,ptation to clillla,te change impacts in coastal areas or 
in agriculture is estrenlely difficult a,nd unlikely to be executed with finesse. 
The pendulum of impact estimates, whicll has been swinging toward lower 
values, is now on a return swing to higher impact valuations as we learn 
more about the limited potential for managed adaptation to  many climate 
change -impacts. 
Tlle notioll of a clima.te or policy inlpact on welfa,re llinges on the pre- 
sun~ption t11a.t the sta.tus quo is optim;il. or a.t lea,st superior to the status af- 
ter climate change. In other words, on the coast, the docks, piers, hotels, a.nd 
homes are ideally loca,ted and lllatclled to  present patterns of activity and 
climate. Then, it is argued, altered future climate conditions will necessarily 
lead to  an inferior outcome if present practice is continued. This is a. strong 
assumption that is ullliliely to be true when one considers marginal climate 
change and the stochastic nature of weather. After an extreme event wipes 
out existing ca,pital, opportunit,ies inay a.rise actually to improve productiv- 
ity and welfare. By a.s.un,irzg optimal allocation of resources, economists 
inlplicitly ignore these scena,rios. Here, ilnpa'cts leading to  replacement of 
obsolete structures aad capita,l c.a.11 1ia.ve long-run benefits. This is especially 
the case in industria~lized na.tions where insurallce is available. I11 less in- 
dustrialized countries, iilco~lles a.re inore closely tied to  nature, citizens live 
closer to  a subsisteilce level, and iilst,itutionalized safety nets are a rarity. 
Thus, the iinpacts of clinlate change on individuals and the fabric of society 
a,re likely to be Inore severe (Lave, 1988; Lave and Vickland, 1989), and 
opportunities to upgrade to more efficient new capital, more limited. 
I11 conclusion, people's abilit? to a.da.pt to  the economic impacts of cli- 
mate cha.nge depends on bhree fa.ct,ors: ( i )  how often they turn over the 
ca.pita.1 stock that sha.pes their patterns of production and consumption; 
(ii) whether they lea.ni to ant,icipa.te clima.te c1ia.nge tllrough time; and (iii) 
whether they lia,ve already detected clima.te clnnge and/or its inlpact(s). 
These three factors were used i11 tlle siluple lllodel that yielded the results 
reported a.bove and in Figure 3 .  This figure illustrates the difference in re- 
alized clinlate cha.nge impa.cts \vlien assunling that people will be dumb and 
not adjust and wlieil illa,killg pla,usible a~ssuinptions about future adjustment 
activity. Perfect a.djustment (unlikely when facing stochastic impacts) yields 
the lowest curves. M'llen no adaptatioil is possible, the impacts follow a path 
similar to  1la.ving very long-lived ca,pita,l, or long-delayed detection of climate 
change and can be a a  order of ma.gnitude higher. When stochastic impacts 
are considered, iinpa,cts a.re solllewhere in between these two extrenles. 
4.2. Terrestrial biosphere and valuation 
At present, ecologists are unable to build good predictive models of how 
ecosystems will change in the presence of climate change. There are a num- 
ber of fundamental reasoils for this inlpasse. First, few undisturbed ecosys- 
tems have been observed and, in general, few landscapes are in equilibrium. 
Second, although nluch of t,lle concern 1ia.s been about climate change, there 
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Figure 3. I11 the upper figure, the level of damage follows the familiar path 
if there is no opportunity for adaptation to  climate change. This is repli- 
cated in the case with long-lived capital. For capital with shorter lifetimes, 
the damage is significantly lower. I11 the lower figure, as the lag in detection 
of climate impacts and availability of suitable new technologies increases, so 
does the damage level. Here the damage for an even mix of capital stock 
(lo- ,  35-, 80-, and 1000-year lifetimes) is depicted with various lag times in 
detection and adaptation. In both cases, the assumed rate of average tem- 
perature change is 0.7OC/decade and the damage function follows Nordhaus' 
familiar figure of 0.25% of GDP for a temperature change of 3°C. 
are also significaat perturbations in t,lle ca.rbon, nitrogen, and water cycles. 
Tllese play a.s import,ant a role as clinla,te in the function of biota. 
Biomes are conlmunities of living orga,nisms, each of which may be af- 
fected by climate change and other disturbances down to  the subcellular 
level. Thus, the rela.tive fitness of each organism may change, affecting its 
survival as part of the newly emerging community and the overall function 
of the new biome. Ideally. impacts of climate change need to be considered 
from the subcellular level tllrongh t,o regional and continental land cover. 
This is a challenge a.l<in to socioeco~lo~~~ic  nlodeling of each individual in 
the society a,nd their int,eractions ant1 filnctions under different clima,te a,nd 
policy conditions. 
I11 order to make the problem tractable, ecological modelers have tended 
t o  focus on potential la,nd cover rather thaa actual land cover and have ex- 
plored shifts in the location of ecotones uilder equilibrium conditiolls for 
present and llyl>otllesized fut,ure climates. In this work, two major chal- 
le~lges have been sidestepped: ( i )  the role of factors of disturbance other 
tllan climate, soil, aad elevation in determining land cover; and (ii) the dy- 
namics of ecological response to perturba.tions such as climate change and 
its influence on the structure and conlposition of future biomes. 
Pllysiological effects a.re f~ulda,mental t,o our understanding of globa.1 
cllange impacts. Nonetheless, due to computationall model, and data limits,- 
tions, most of the climate inlpa,ct assessluents have used continental "transfer 
models" for regional- a,nd pla,neta,rp-scale clima,te change impact assessments. 
hIost tra.nsfer models use a. clima.te database and an ecosystem classification 
scheme defined deterministically by climate (and at  times soil) conditions 
(Einanuel et nl., 198.5; Prentice e t  al., 1992; Smith et al., 1992). Malanson 
(1993) notes that ,  ideally, illlpacts should be a.ssessed a t  every scale, but 
neither the knowledge nor the ro~llputa.tional power needed to  perform such 
calculatio~~s a.re a t  hand. The second-l~est co~npromise of transfer nlodels 
involves further ina.dequa,cies, because these have not been able to simulate 
dynamic features such a.s inertia and competition. Within our integrated 
assessment effort we ha.ve developed a. new approacll to  modeling continen- 
tal scale land-cover cha.nge. This zeroth-order model, developed by Shevli- 
akova and Dowlatabadi (1994), is 11a.sed on the observation that  land cover 
is diverse even when the climate, soil, a,nd disturbance regimes are similar. 
Armed with this observation, a. proba.bilistic description of land cover has 
been developed. This new model permits the potential coexistence of dif- 
ferent vegetation types. Dynamics a.re simulated as changing probabilities 
of occurrence for different vegetation types and hence transition from one 
donlina.nt form to  another. By repla,cing the deterministic framework with 
a, probabilistic inodel, we ha,ve also succeetled in sinlulating some inea,sure of 
inertia and competitioil in laiitl cover response to climate cliange and other 
disturbances. 
To date, four iiuportant illsights have resulted from this work. First, 
proximity to  human settleillent is a.s powerful a determinant of land cover 
as are various iildicators of clima.te, eleva.tion, and soil. Second, \vith 
plausible assunlptiolls about dieba.ck, migration, and establishment rates 
new quasi-equilibria are establislied after very long lag times (2250 years). 
Third, uncerta~inties in liey time collstants (for dieba,ck, migration, and re- 
establishment) lea,d to  uncertainty in both sign a'nd illagilitude of net annual 
COz fluxes from the terrestrial biosphere. Furtliermore, the perturba.tioas 
to  the net terrest'rial ca.rbon cycle are of the sa.me order of ma,gnitude as 
eillissions due to  combustioil of fossil fuels. Finally, in terms of land cover, 
climate change impacts are estiinated to be of tlie same magnitude as several 
other inodes of tlist~urbance (see Table 3) .  
Estiillating a, value for impa~cts on lalid coves is antithetical to tliose who 
assign rights to nature. However, quaiitification of nonina.rket values, which 
ecoilomists such a.s Mitcllell aiid C'a.rson ( 1989) 1ia.ve approached with equal 
measures of ingenuit,y a,iitl coiitroversy, is only lialf the challenge. The dy- 
rlamic evolution of these values tlirough time is a,lso in questioil (Loewenstein, 
198'7; Loewenstein a,nd hIa.ther, 1988; Fischhoff~ 1991). We have proposed 
that ,  for the nzajority of the public. t,wo liealtliy stands of trees will be in- 
distinguishal~le (Do\vla,taba,di c t a/., 1994). Thus, wliile the constitueilts of 
la.nd cover ina,y cha,age i11 response Lo cliluate cha,nge, for the nlajority of the 
public, tlle loss of species illa,y iiot be esperieiiced, or if experienced will be 
forgottell througll time. We lnve coined the tern1 "value erosion7' to  describe 
this process. This is also describecl in tlie cogilitive psychology literature a.s a 
process of psycl~ological adapta,tioil t,llat influeilces the longevity and severity 
with which losses are perceivetl. I\'hile losses looln large a t  the outset, over 
time an erosion in valuatioli often occurs as people re-calibrate their think- 
ing to  the changed circumstances (1l;ahnenlaii and Tversky, 1979). Consider 
the loss, due to disease, of the grea,t orila~illeiltal elm trees that  just a few 
decades ago graced tlle nortl~ea~st,eri~ USA, or even earlier, the loss of the 
wonderful "spreading Chestilut tree(s)," which most of us now know about 
only through Longfellow's poein &out the village blacksmith. At the time 
of these tragedies, lna,ily people mourned the dramatic population collapses, 
and would have been willing to, a,nd indeed did, spend large amounts of 
money t o  try to  prevent the loss. But now that  these losses have occurred, 
and time has gone by, both we ant1 na,ture have readjusted. While we re- 
lllaiil sad toda,y t.1ia.t t'llere a.re not. very many elins a,itd chestnuts, most of 
us d011't continue to  carry t,llat loss a,t tlle sa.me level in our "mental balance 
sheets." As allother esanlple. coi~sider one of the greatest enviroilmental 
disruptions of all time . . . the settlenlent of North America by Europeans. 
Today, few Americans think of this a.s a.n enormous environmental loss, let 
alone continue to  grieve a,nd ca,rry a large debit on their "mental balance 
sheets." 
Of course, valua~tions do not just erode, through various social process 
they also can be a,mplified. iI"11o in 1950 would have predicted the change 
in attitude that Americans 1la.ve untlergone with respect to the quality of 
the ellviroillllent and the need for its protection? Similarly, as late as 1980, 
who would have predicted the tlra,matic shift in American attitudes toward 
slnokiilg in public places? The possibility of such rapid social shifts or "tip- 
ping" (Schelling, 1978) pla,ces serious 1inlita.tions on our ability to  predict 
how future societies will value things such a.s the impacts of climate change. 
Indeed, just as many Anlericans seen1 to feel that their local environment 
is in continued decline, despite the fact tl1a.t inany envirollillental indicators 
have showil nlarked inlprovements in recent decades, the debate on climate 
change policy and its potential ecological impacts inay it self lead to increased 
perceived losses, whet,ller a,bat,eilleiit action is talien or not! This observation 
suggests an a.ssessment I)a.setl on esploration of different model specification 
and paranleter values is liliely t,o he more promising than one that attempts 
prediction. 
We believe that value erosion is subject to  manipulation. Nature pro- 
grams on televisioil a.nd envil~onmental activists at  tlle door serve to  heighten 
aw7areness about the environlnent. These ca.n lead to value a.mplification and 
further complicate the questioil of how values inay change through time. Our 
esploratioil of labile values pla,ced on ilollnla,rket iinpacts of climate chailge 
leads to  outcomes tlmt vary over a,n order of nlagnitude. 
4.3. Huinan health and policy coiltext 
Climate change could have both direct temperature-related impacts on 
health and indirect impa.cts through c11a.nges in the prevalence and virulence 
of diseases and their vectors. Here, a,s in the case of ecosystem impacts, a 
nlajor challenge in developing a, predictive model of climate impacts is the 
attribution of historic effects to  climate versus other environmental factors. 
Lifestyles, modes of activity, demographics, environmental pollution, and 
public health policy all play critical roles in life expectancy. 
~(alkstein and others (1987; 1994) have esplored the direct impacts of 
climate on 1luma.11 llealth. Their al)l)lica,tioil of epidemiological methods in 
a.nalysis of clima.te and nlort'ality tlata. for a number of US cities has led 
to interesting findings. According to these models, different cities exhibit 
great diversity of impacts. This confirms tlle important role of other local 
environmental, vulnerability, a.nd esposure factors. Jacksonville, FL (the 
warmest city studied in tlle USA) sllows no increased deaths in response to 
heat stress. However, cities such a.s New York exhibit a strong correlation 
between deaths aad heat waves. It is estimated that  on average 40% of these 
heat-stress-induced dea.ths a,re tlue to ha'rvesting (Scheraga and Sussman, 
1994). Estremes of colt1 in winter also lea,tl to mortalities. Mortalities due 
to extreme heat a,nd cold a.re fountl to be of simila,r magnitude in the USA. 
Outside of estrenle weatl~er conditions, ivea,tller has a benign effect on health 
(Cifuentes, 199.5). 
A major challenge in a,ssessing the direct health effects of climate change 
is the colliilearity of clinlate conditions and air-pollution episodes. Cifuentes 
and Lave (1996) have esplored this issue by esarnining daily pollution, 
weather, and mortality tla,t'a for Philatlelphia and Birmingham. They find 
a.ir pollution to be fa,r inore importa,nt t11a.n weather as a driver of the ob- 
served patterns of mortality. This suggests that  the interplay between cli- 
mate change a.nd local a,ir pollution deserves more attention, and that public 
health policies first be ta,rgeted toward reduction of local air pollution, es- 
pecially respira.ble pa.rticula.tes. 
Vector-borne impacts of clinla,te cl~ange a,re also considered to  be a sig- 
nificant source of risk to tlle lluma,n population. Malaria llas been the focus 
of a number of studies (Ma.rtens c t  crl., 1994; Nichols, 1994; Rogers and 
Packer, 1994). Here t,oo, projections are plagued with uncertainties in the 
relative impact of clilna,te compa'red wit,ll hulnan development and move- 
ment a.s determinants of disea.se prevalence. In tlle 19th century, malaria 
was prevalent in Cana.da. Today, public llealtll and urbanization have essen- 
tially era,dicated the probleln. The absence of malaria there today is neither 
caused by, nor indica,tive of, a regional clilllate change. Alternatively, con- 
sider dengue fever, ivllicll was essentially eradicated in Texas by the middle 
of the 20th century. Its resurgence today is not due to climate change, but 
due to  the loss of a potent pesticide (DDT), trade in used tires with Mexico, 
and increased urba,n detritus. 
I-Iealth impacts 1la.ve grown nlore prominent in discussions of climate 
change policy. This is in part due to  the public salience of human health 
and results from an attempt to  focus increased attention on the climate issue. 
Furthermore, human health is an impa.ct of clinlate change where valuation 
of lives lost (in economic terms) 1la.s strong opponents. Consequently, this 
fra'lning tends to push the public t'oward considering the (economic) costs 
of abatement of elllissiolls to be Irivial in light of the (incalculable value of) 
averted premature deaths. Thi5 is an incomplete and possibly illcorrect per- 
spective on the issue. Sllould abateillellt expenditures lead to generally lower 
levels of welfare, public health could suffer and far more premature deaths 
ensue than if a business-as-usual or proactive public health policy were to  
be pursued. In general, the weak illteractioll between climate and mortality 
suggests that air pollution control and targeted public health policies are 
likely t o  be far Inore effective in averting premature deaths than would any 
climate policy. 
5. Insights About Policy Options 
The uncertainties a.re large a,ntl, wheil propa.gated through the model, often 
lead to  an inability to differentia,te between the outcome of a "no abatement 
strategy" and all but the most stringent abatelnent policies. A specific esam- 
ple of this is showll in Figure 4, in n-hich no policy is stocl~astically dominant. 
We ha.ve found very similar results repeatedly in our various assessment ac- 
tivities, a.cross a variety of luodel formula.tions. By using expected values, 
we showed in Figure 1 t l n t  regional outcollles vary by policy and strategy. 
However, with the exception of China., for ~vhicll the stra,tegy of "no abate- 
ment" often stochastically donlil~at,es other strategies, it is typically also 
difficult a.t the regional scale to ol)ta,in results that persuasively differentia.te 
bet~veen nlodest sba,tement and no a,l)a,t,ernent. Furthermore, the resources 
a,va.ila.ble for tra.nsfer between regions are ra'rely sufficient to  allow incentives 
for concerted global action.  result,^ from our interviews with climate sci- 
entists suggest that  it is u~llikely t11a.t illlprovelnents in understanding will 
chailge this situa,tioll a.ppreciably over the next several decades (Morgan and 
Keith, 1995). 
I11 the face of these uncerta,inties, three normative policy perspectives 
are common in discussions of clilna,te policy: (1) Even small abatements are 
good pra.ctice and, if they ca.n 1)e obta.ined for free or a t  low cost, should be 
pursued. Proponents of this view favor the "no-regrets option" and argue 
that  there is a largely unta,pped potential for energy conservation. (2) We are 
inorally wrong to incur the risks of changing climate and should engage in 
"significant abatement." This group fa,vors "ca.rbon taxes" and restructuring 
of macroeconomic incentives for energy use and greenhouse gas release. (3) 
We must think in terms of "disaster relief" because the world will be inca- 
pable of concerted mitigation a,ctioll before catastrophic change. This group 
is resigned to  a.da,ptation a,nd "geoengineering," which has the potential of 
Figure 4. Tlie upper figure shows cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) 
from ICAM 2.1 for estimates of tlie per capita net present value of three 
alternative abatement policies in the OECD. The moderate and high carbon 
taxes start a t  US$0.5 and 2.0 per ton of carbon in the year 2000, respectively, 
and grow by those same amounts in each subsequent year. The lower figure 
displays. the net difference between the case of no tax  and the two tax policies. 
Tlie points a t  wliicll tlie CDFs cross the origin are the values reported for 
model G i11 the lower part of Table 3. 
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giving us time to inlplement lllitigatioll after the fact or to  modify climate 
to  favor our needs. \Iic liave slntlietl aspects of these perspectives and offer 
selected insights below. 
5.1. No-regrets options: Energy coilservation 
Some have argued t l n t  so much energy efficiency is being overlooked that 
30% of US C 0 2  enlissions may be alnted at  a net economic benefit (Na- 
tional Research Council, 1992). A leading contender is management of the 
demand for electricity, ca,lled "demand-side ma.na,gement7' or DSM. For 20 
years there have been scattered DSM programs, some of which appear to  
have been quite successful. Could a ra,pid increase in investment in such 
progranls significalitly reduce electricity collsumption and associated C 0 2  
emissions? To answer this question Sollnenblick has reviewed neoclassical 
economic studies of collsumer investment decisions, engineering studies of 
the technical potential of DS b4: and DShil field evaluation studies. 
Only by admitting market failure do lleoclassical economic studies al- 
low the possibility of nlajor savings. These studies tend to  ascribe people's 
failure to invest lnore in DSA'I to poor or unreliable performance by DSM 
equipment, large tra.nsa,ction costs, or hidden costs associated with instal- 
la,tion and operation. Thus, they a.rgue, DSM programs may be pushing 
ecluipnleilt or behavior t.lla,t consunlers lmve already deemed prohibitively 
espensive, unrelia,ble, or too technically illlnlature to  be adopted today. Our 
analysis of selected DShl progranls suggests that transaction costs may exist 
for consumers, but that  n-ell-designed DShI programs can reduce these costs 
and improve the flow of informa.tion to customers (Sonnenblick, 1995). 
In contrast to  ecollolnic studies, engineering assessments of DSM suggest 
large savings - a.s nluch as 75% of t,he nation's electric demand (Lovins and 
Lovins, 1991). Most of t,llese st,udies focus on laboratory-based savings and 
retail cost of the DShI technologies. This approach ignores the uncertainties 
of a highly decentralized resource and fails to  account for the full costs of 
inlplementing a na.tionwide retrofit tlirough utilities, as DSM is practiced 
today. 
Field evaluation programs of va,ryillg quality have been conducted for 
a handful of DSM programs. Their performance lies between the two ex- 
tremes above, usually resulting in energy savings of a few percent. For 
example, some commercial lighting programs have been relatively success- 
ful at  reducing participants' energy needs by around 5% at  a cost of 3-5 
centslkwh. Progralns aimed at  the residential sector have generally been 
costlier. Savings of 5%) in t'hcse progranls lmve typically cost. between 8 and 
15 centslkwh. 
Sonnenblick concludes t11a.t well-implemented DSM can lead to  modest 
energy savings, but that ,  to da.te, no large field study has come close to  
the significant savings suggested by engineering studies. The large discrep- 
ancy between studies of tecllllical potential and real-world experience is an 
intriguing and conlplex issue. One fa.ctor may be that allowing returns on 
DSM investments to utilities is relatively new to most states7 regulations. 
Allother ma.y be t11a.t the DSh4 measures a.re being selected and installed by 
contractors who a.re not a.s expert in these nlatters as the engineers who per- 
for111 the laboratory evaluations. Utilities are also finding that the skill and 
\visdon~ required to  iinplelllent an effective progra,nl are hard-won. Finally, 
the adnlinistrative burden of even relatively small programs is formidable. 
Today's DSM prograins proba,bly a.mount to between 1% and 2% of peak 
electric denland. An aggressive lla,tiollal program lllight be able to  achieve a 
5% savings a,t a. cost of tlle order of 10 cents/kiVh. Above such a level it is 
unclear how ra.pidly dilninishillg returl~s might set in for larger investments. 
It a,ppears, however, a,t lea,st with the current genera,tion of technologies and 
iillplementation methotls, tha,t one should not be too optimistic. 
5.2. Sigilificailt abateillent: Taxes 
Economists have tout,etl fuel price a,djustments a,s the lllost efficient lever with 
wllicll to  control energy use and llence enlissions of CO;!. Taxes on the ca,rbon 
content of fuels are tll~il '  preferred nlethod for lnitigating carbon emissions. 
Fa,ced with higher prices, consunlers conserve energy and switch awa.y from 
fuels with high ca,rbon content (e.g., coa,l to na,tural gas or renewables). Using 
a detailed nlodel of energy supply to col~su~ners in the USA (electricity, oil, 
gas, gasoline) a.nd a tlet,ailed model of consumer energy deinands statistically 
estinlated from historic da.ta developed by Jorgenson and colleagues (1982, 
1987, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1992). Dowlatabadi et al. (1995) explored the 
consequence of energy and ca.rbon ta,ses for US housel~olds. 
Our detailed model of electricity production revealed conditions under 
which the imposition of ca.rbon taxes could actually raise emissions of CO;! 
(Dowlatabadi e l  al., 1993). This is due to  the high capital costs embodied 
in electricity prices, permitting situa.tions where the relative price rise in 
electricity generated using coal is slllaller than price rises experienced in 
consumption of natural gas. A long-term shift away from coal-generated 
electricity requires high carbon ta,ses (US$100 per ton under historic fuel 
price and teclunological price-performa,nce assulllptions) or continuation of 
the significant technical (e.g., aero-derived ga's turbines) and institutional 
challges (e.g., reform of utility genera'tion nlonopolies) experienced in tlle 
recent past. 
Dowlatabadi et  al. (1995) lmve also explored the distributional burden 
of carbon ta.xes and the "BTU ta.x" proposed by the Administration. These 
instruments were found to be equally efficient in carbon abatement. In addi- 
tion, the distribution of the burden of energy price manipulations was found 
to be evenly distributed (geographically) across the nation. Furthermore, 
for a given revenue target, the burden of carbon and "BTU taxes" imposed 
on avenge l~ouseholds were fount1 to l ~ e  very simi1a.r. 
Fina,lly, on the positive side, lve 11a.ve identified a, strong link between 
gains in efficiency of energy teclillologies and price and regulatory signals 
(Oravetz and Dowla.taba.di, 199.5: Tschang a.nd Dowlatabadi, 1995). In com- 
bination with the ca.rbon aba,tement possible from modification of coilsumer 
behavior, these led to very significant aba.ten1ent being possible through iin- 
position of gradually increasing energy or carbon taxes. 
5.3. Disaster relief: Geoengineering 
Actions underta,ken with the primary goal of changing the climate, usually 
by ma.nipulating clillla,te forcing, a.re geoengineering. Specific strategies can 
include soilletlling a.s uncontroversial as pla,ntiilg trees, but may also include 
mass fertiliza,tion of the tropical ocea,ns to enhance COz uptake by phy- 
toplankton, or loft'ing reflective materials to the stratosphere or into earth 
orbit. Unlike elnission a.batement strategies, sollle geoengineering strategies 
could produce effects quite rapidly, and ca,n be adopted unila.terally by one 
or a. few countries. 
Stra.tegies that  will reduce the elllissiolls of greenhouse gases below 40% 
of 1990 emissions, the a.nlount needed to prevent climate change in the long 
run (Houghton et nl., 19901, will require extensive international coopera.tion 
and sustained effort for Illany decades. If these are not successful, or if they 
a.re only partly successful and climate change turns out to be more serious 
than anticipated. ada,pta.tion will he inevitable and widespread, but in some 
cases will be difficult a.nd costly. Consequently, geoengineering is an option 
that  at  least some major prt icipants are likely to want to pursue. 
Arrhenius (1896) suggested that burnillg fossil fuels might help prevent 
the coining ice age - a. geoengineering solution! More recent looks a t  the 
technical possibilities for geoengineering have been underta.ken by Dyson 
a.nd Marlaad (1979) and the Na,tional Resea.rc11 Council (1992). Keith and 
Dowlata.badi (1992) ha,ve perforined a, lllore complete evaluation. Although 
they have not been able to ex11aust.ively explore all possible secondary effects, 
their work suggests t l n t  t,llere a,re a nuinber of stra,tegies, with relatively low 
direct costs. Policies such as lofting fine particles into the stratosphere, may 
appear attractive to decision makers if climate change becomes serious, but 
the risks of unintended consequences a.re unknown and possibly large. 
AiIany observers believe tlle idea of geoengineering, or even its study, is 
morally repugnant. \,ITe believe such study is needed for two reasons. We 
need to  understand the inlplicatioils if some nation were to  take unilateral 
a.ction. Second, the existence of a, pla.usible fallback strategy might be an 
importa.nt element of achieving an interna,tional compromise on modera.te 
.abatement options, since it would provide a hedge against catastrophe if 
cliinate change proves more serious than a.nticipa.ted. 
5.4. Beyond an efficiency-based framing 
There a.re exterilalities associa,tetl 110th ~vith ta,liing action and with adopt- 
ing a policy of no aba,tement. For example, a pr0gra.m of modest abate- 
nlent might result in technical developnlent a,ild social learning, which could 
prove very useful if clinlate clla,~lge 1)ecomes more serious and more strin- 
gent responses a,re needed quiclily. Even in the a.bsence of significant climate 
change, proponents of the precautionarv principle might argue tlmt i~lucll 
of the new t.ecllnica~l and social l<now-ho~v a,ccumulated through moderate 
a.ba.tement would prove useful in other contests. On the negative side, those 
with a strong belief in the ability of ma.rkets to allocate resources efficiently 
would a.rgue that  the resources ~vould produce nlucll greater physical and 
social well-being and grea,ter technical ca.pability if they were not diverted 
to  support ea.rly a,bateinent. Thus, given t l n t  our estima.tes of expected 
value produce no definitive policy choice, tleciding the question on the basis 
of econoinic efficiency may depend on determining the difference between 
two highly uncertain ternls - the negative and positive externalities. This is 
inherently difficult bemuse the a,nswer depends on social and economic pro- 
cesses that  are not well understood and upon their interactions with other 
uncertain  phenomena^. Most integrated assessments have ignored both of 
these externa'lities. In Models 5 and 6 of Table 2, we attempted to  incor- 
porate both, but we have little confidence in the stability of the results in 
the face of a variety of alternative plausible formulations. We believe that  it 
is unlikely t11a.t we, or others, will ever be able to  definitively resolve these 
difficulties. 
Some may mistalie our findings of a. lack of clear stochastic dominance 
by an identifiable policy a,s an arguillent for doing nothing. This is not the 
correct interpreta~tion of our results. If. \vhen viewed in terms of econonlic 
efficiency, there is no discernible differellce between the expected value of 
"no abatement" and of va'rious strategies of moderate abatement, factors 
other than expected value sllould determine policy choice. 
Two obvious candida.tes for deternlining policy choice are equity and 
ecological stewardship. IVhile we ca,nnot discern a dominant strategy on effi- 
ciency grounds, we can clearly see that the costs and benefits associated with 
any strategy will be very unequally distributed. Earlier we reported that the 
burden of carbon and energy taxes are broa.dly distributed (Dowlatabadi et 
al., 1995). CVe have a,lso noted that the impacts of climate change will fall 
on a few vulnerable popula.tions (Lave, 198s; Dowlatabadi and Lave, 1993; 
Patwardllan and Sluall, 1994). Denlocratic governments at  all levels are typ- 
ically more concerned with equity issues than with efficiency. Although our 
analysis suggests tlmt the policies of inaction a,nd moderate abatement are 
indistinguishable on efficiency gro~ulds: if clinlate clnnges, moderate abate- 
ment has significaat equit,y benefits. 
It is much more difficult to study equity than it is to study efficiency. 
There is no widely accepted metric a,nd there are fewer analytical nlethods 
on which to draw. However. as we a,rgued in Table 1,  the fact that  there is 
limited knowledge a,nd analytical ca.pa.bility does not justify analysts' ignor- 
ing the problem. More explicit considera,tion of equity issues would make 
future integrated assessnlents illore va,luable to  government decision makers. 
Turning now to ecological stewa,rdship, there have long been arguments 
in the climate debate tlmt costs a,re irrelevant: mankind has no business 
disturbing the clima,te. Fra,med in such a,bsolutist terms, the choice of how 
t o  proceed becomes a choice between value systems, and thus a very difficult 
topic for analysis. 
We believe, however, that the lnost useful framing is not so absolutist. 
At least in the industrialized worltl, forlnulations in terms of willingness and 
ability to  pay are now widely a,ccepted as a.n analytic procedure for studying 
changes at  the iitnrgirz. However, in lna,ny regions the ecological impacts 
of climate change could be fa,r froill marginal. CVe have begun to conclude 
that the most useful way to think about the problem of valuing ecological 
impacts is in terms of a mixed stra,tegy that uses a utility-based formulation 
for modest changes, but inlposes a rights-based constraint on the magnitude 
of the change that  people a,re willing to  accept without violating some basic 
responsibility of stewardship toward the natural environment. 
Again, most integrated assessnlent a.ctivities, our own included, have 
tended not to  systenlatically esplore the stewardship implications of alter- 
na.tive policy options. In our nest round of analysis we p1a.n to  do so. 
6. Next Steps 
Tlle second guideline in Table 1 argues that good integrated assessment 
should be iterative. We have now worked our way through the problem four 
times and, based on illa'ily of the lessons outlined here as well as a number of 
others, are embarking on our fifth itera.tion. Much of our work will continue 
to focus on the obvious substa.ntii'e issues: How should we incorporate the 
relationsllip between tecllnologica~l change and policy? How might we better 
represent the dyilamic process of research investment, gathering of knowl- 
edge, and sequent,ial decision maliing'? How do we iinprove our estima.tes of 
ecological impacts? Tlle list goes on and on. 
Yet the illore we worli on iiltegra,ted assessnlent of climate change, the 
inore we realize that the biggest challenges are pl~ilosophical and method- 
ological. For example, from t'he outset we have placed great emphasis on 
including uncertainty in our analysis (Doivlataba.di and Morgan, 1993a). 
However, it is oilly receiltly t,lla,t we lmve conle to understand just how ex- 
tensive tlle uncerta.inties are. Neiv illetllodological challenges appear when 
some parts of the problenl involve mana.gea.ble uncerta~inty while other parts 
involve extreine uncerta,inty. \Are a,re fa,cing silllila,r challenges in the area of 
va.lues. In most cases, a,nalysts are used to thinking of values, or utilities, 
a,s given. On occa.sion. we and others have perforilled a,nalyses designed to  
help decision 1nal;ers explore a,nd refine their values. But we have never 
norlted on a problein in which the labile a,ild adaptive nature of values, or 
tlle llumber of different a.ctors with different values, is a,s central as it is in 
cliina,te policy. Finally, ive have been doing analysis for the entire world, 
using ba,sic idea's of ca.usatioi1. probability, and rational expectation: ideas 
t1la.t are probably not sha.red bv 80% of t,he world's peoples. The available 
tools of policy a.nalysis a,re simply not. up to tlle cllallenges we face, so we 
are busy inventing new tools. The pro1)lem il1a.y wear us down before we 
succeed, but there is no risk of runilillg out of interesting and fundamental 
questions! 
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Abstract 
Interna.tiona1 cooperation on environmental issues, involving mutual a,d- 
justment of policy, typica,lly takes place through international institutions. 
Institutioils are the typical vehicle for iilterna,tional environmental protec- 
tion, not because they supersede state authority, but bemuse they facilitate 
joint action 011 tra~asboundary issues t,ha.t are ivithin the jurisdiction of no 
single country. Iiey functions tlmt int~el.na~tiona~l institutions perform for 
states include fa.cilitating the negotiation of agreements; providing infor- 
mation; structuring reciprocit,y: ant1 providing governance arrallgements for 
the tra,nsfer of funds from rich countries to poorer countries to cope with 
environmental problenls having transbonnda~ry effects. The general point 
to emplmsize is that international illstit,utioils operate, not through coer- 
cion or Inere persuasion. but. by challging the incentives facing sta,tes. By 
coordinating state a,ctions. well-functioning illstitutions reduce the costs of 
cooperation. 
The effectiveness of interna.tiona1 institutiolls varies from one environ- 
lnental issue to another. Furthermore, sources of effectiveness or ineffective- 
ness may a,ppea,r at  a,ny of t,hree stages in the process: problem definition, 
policy negotiation, and policy iillplelllellta,tioll. Environmental institutions 
will only be effective if they create incentives for cooperation, whether among 
regulators, between regulators a,nd the regulated, or between those who con- 
tribute to funds and those who receive a.id from them. Otherwise, they will 
nlerely become sites for repetitive and costly political struggle. Such in- 
centives depend on what ea.rlier work has dubbed the "three Cs": effective 
envirollmental aid is likely to follow a pa.th that increases concern for environ- 
mental protection, provides solutions to contracting problems, or increases 
capacity for designing and iillplelllenting specific measures. 
*Parts of this paper draw on joint work with Barbara Connolly. 
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If the illterna,tioilal e i~viroi~i i~ei~t  is t'o be protected through internatioiial 
a,ction, the institutioiis tlmt accomplish this task will not be patterned on 
modern states. They will not use hierarchies to enforce rules. Instead, effec- 
tive institutions will promote negotia,tion, provide information, and facilitate 
the operation of reciprocity. Tliey will help to generate concern, reduce con- 
tractual difficulties, and enha,nce ca,pacity within countries. Collective man- 
agement of resources will lmve to be ca,rried out by institutions that foster 
cooperation tllrougll reciprocity, nlonit.oring, and persuasion. These institu- 
tions, to be legitiina,te, will have to 1)e illultilateral in form, involve many 
states, and operate a.ccording t.o iloildiscriilliilato~.y rules based on general 
principles. They will also lmve to "get t'lle incentives right.?' 
1. Introduction 
bi'llen goverililleilts coilvene to negotia,te on international environmental is- 
sues, they typically establish new iilberilational institutions, assign tasks to 
existing institutions, or modify esistiilg institutions. Institutions - sets of 
forilla,l and inforillal rules a,ntl procetlures, usually linked to bureaucratic or- 
ganizatioils - are centrally iilvolved in international environmental policy. 
Esamples of iilstitutioils crea,ted especially for environmental purposes in- 
clude the U N  Enviroiunent Progra,nlnle (ITNEP), the 1973 Convention on 
Iilterna~tional Trade in Encla~ngeretl Species (CITES); the 1973 Convention 
on Prevention of Pollutioil by Ships (MARPOL); the 1979 Convention on 
Long-Range Tra,ilsbounda~ry Air Pollution (LRTAP); the Montreal Protocol 
for protection of the ozone layer (1987) a,ild the Montreal Protocol Fund 
(1990); and the Global Environnlent Facility (1990). Almost all such in- 
stitutions have their origins in post,n.ar trea,ties, most dating from a.fter the 
Stockholm Conference of 1972.' Esaillples of established institutions as- 
signed environmental t,aslis or inodified to a,cllieve environmental purposes 
include the World Rank, the U N  Developineilt Programme (UNDP), and 
the European Union. 
2. Cooperation, Sovereignty, Institutions 
International cooperation on such issues call be thought of as mutual ad- 
justment of policy through a set of political bargains. It should not be 
confused with 11a.nuony; on the contrary, international cooperation (like 
'Caldwell (1990) 1ist.s over 40 "significant" environment,al treaties concluded between 
1946 and 1989. 
labor-management cooperation) ent,ails significant conflict, including threats 
of noncooperation unless the t'erllls a,re right. So, for instance, China and 
India eventually signed the hilolltreal Protocol, but only after developing 
countries were compensated with a Fund and given extended deadlines for 
a chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) phaseout to help them adjust to the new rules. 
Since no state can deal effectively with transboulldary issues on its own, on 
the whole they ca.n a'chieve their ol~jectives better by sacrificing some of their 
legal freedom of action in ret,urll for restrictions on the freedom of action of 
others - but only if t,he price is right,. Goverlllnents do not become altruistic 
when they enter international negotia.tions. 
States agreeing to interna.tiona1 instit'utions do not give up their consti- 
tutiollal sovereigllty - their consellt is still needed and they can refuse even 
to ilnplelllent their legal obligations if they so choose. However, in return 
for compensatioll they are often willing to  relinquish some of what could be 
called their "operational sovereignty" - their legal freedom of action. Opera.- 
tional sovereignty is subject to  ba,rga,ining and exchange, and becomes more 
a ba.rgaining chip t11a.n a. sylllbol for illsistence on unilateralism. 
Institutions are the typical vehicle for interllational enviroilmental pro- 
tection, not because they supersede state a.uthority, but because they facil- 
itate joint action on transbounda.ry issues tha,t are within the jurisdiction 
of no single country. Iiey fuilct~ions that international institutions perform 
for states call be sunlma.rized in four phrases: 1) facilitating the negotia- 
tion of agreements; 2) providing information; 3) structuring reciprocity; and 
4) providing governance arrallgeillellts for the transfer of funds from rich 
countries to  poorer countries to cope with environmental problems havillg 
transb0unda.r~ effects. 
Ex nizte, 1na.ny possible a.greements might be superior to  the status quo 
for all essential pa,rticipants, that is, tllose states (and possibly other ac- 
tors such as interna.tiona,l orga.niza,tions or industrial firms) with sufficient 
resources to  render institutions illeffective if they choose not to  coopera,te. 
These participants could prefer different a.rrangenlents, leading to  protracted 
negotiations. Institutional rules help to define "focal points" and t o  narrow 
the range of disagreement subject to barga.ining. Furthermore, institutions 
contain procedural rules for maliing decisions - for instance, by majority 
vote, consensus, or superlnajority voting - that  enable valid rules to  be rec- 
ognized (since they have been adopted through these legitimate procedures). 
Once in operation, international institutions largely operate by provid- 
ing illformation t o  members about ea.ch others' preferences and performance. 
Institutions provide inforillation publicizing the consequences of damaging 
ellvironmental policies. Illst,it,utiolls also establish standards of beha.vior 
a,ga.inst ivllicll actual performance can be con1pa.red and monitor the per- 
formance of st'a.tes a.ntl indust,ry. -4 study of a variety of internationa,l envi- 
ronmental institutions revealed that ea.ch of tllenl monitored aspects of envi- 
ronmental quality, either alone or in conjunction with independent scientific 
laboratories (Haas et  al., 1993, p. 402). Monitoring, however, is often done 
badly, particularly wheil it relies esclusively on national reporting, which is 
spotty in character (Mitchell, 1994). 
Third, internationa'l institutions structure reciprocity. They do not, in 
general, have the capc i ty  t,o enforce rules directly through vertical sanc- 
tions. On the contra,ry, imtional governments retain the ultimate capacity 
to  sanction one another. However. institutions link similar issues together, 
so that the nonfulfilln~ent of 011liga.tions by one state is more likely to lead 
others to retaliate. Some institutions, such as the Montreal Protocol, provide 
for trade sanctions a.ga,inst those who violate the rules. 
Finally, illterna,tional inst itut'ions ca,n legitimize the provision of aid to 
solve environmental problems by structuring the arrangements governing its 
~)rovision. As showll by their frust'ra.ted demands for new financial commit- 
ments a t  the 1992 Ea.rth Sunlnlit and by their positions in global negotia- 
tions regarding the clima.te clla,llge a,lltl ozone regimes, developing countries 
increasingly view enla.rged resource tra.nsfers a.s a prerequisite for their par- 
ticipation in global environment,al protection efforts. For such aid to  be 
provided, it is necessary to esta.blisl1 fimncial tra.nsfer institutions for the 
environn~ent: sets of rules, typica,lly linked to  one or more international 
orga.nizations, esta.blished to govern a flow of funds from richer to poorer 
countries to  a,cllieve specific environluelltal purposes. 
The general point to enlphasize is t11a.t international institutions oper- 
ate, not through coercion or mere persua.sion, but by changing the incentives 
facing states. By coordinating state actions, well-functioning institutions re- 
duce the costs of coopera.tion. By subjecting laggards to public and private 
criticisms in focused nfa,ys inst'itutions luay increase the costs of nonfulfill- 
ment. These effects a,re exerted at  the margin - institutions cannot overcome 
adverse interests - but a.re frequently significant (Iieohane, 1984). 
3. Variation in Inst it ut ional Effectiveness 
"Effectiveness7' is a slippery concept with many meanings. Ultimately, stu- 
dents of this subject a.im to discover how international institutions change 
the behavior of actors a.nd the policies a.nd performance of institutions in 
ways that  contribute to or impede the solution of significant environmental 
problems. That is, without the institution, would environinental quality, and 
the policies designed to improve such quality in the future, be worse? In- 
stitutional effectiveness depends on clloosiilg a significant problem, defining 
its scope in a manageable way, proposing solutions, devising institutional 
arrangements to  implement the solutions, and actually implementing the 
solutioils agreed upon. 
Regardless of one's specific definition of institutional effectiveness, it 
clearly varies from one eilvirollinental issue to another. The Montreal Pro- 
tocol on tlie ozoile la,yer has let1 to sigilificant policy change that  has been 
quite thoroughly implemented. LRTAP has helped to  reduce transboundary 
pollution in Europe associa.ted with a.cid ra,in, especially in countries that  
were neither leaders in pollutio~l reduction nor a,damailtly opposed to  costly 
a,ction. Consistellt with the fu~lctioils illentioned above, its success was due 
to  its provision of information about the problem (the domestic consequeilces 
of acid ra.in) and a.bout the inlplenlenta.tion of pollution-reducing measures, 
a,ild to  its ability to liilli issues t,o one aaotller (Levy, 1993, p. 119). On 
the other hand, i~lstitutions designed to  prevent overfishing in international 
waters and to  protect. tropical forests have been ilotoriously ineffective in 
achieving these purposes (l'eterson, 1993; Ross, 1996). It may be helpful to  
describe typical sta#ges of institut.iona1 policy inaliing and to identify poten- 
tial causal factors t,ha.t nlay a.ccount for va.riations in effectiveness. 
Three broad sta.ges of policy illa,liing ca,n be identified: problem defini- 
t,ion, policy negotiation, and policy iillpleillelltatio~l. Sources of effectiveness 
or ineffectiveness inay al1pea.r a.t a.ny of these stages in the process. Con- 
sider problein definition. The R.Iontrea1 Protocol process may be a   nod el 
of sensible problem definition, involving a combination of scientific analy- 
sis and policy, but it is lmrdly typical. After 1989 Western governments 
and interilational agencies began to  assess how to  deal with dangerous East 
European nuclear power pla,nts. However, all the solutions they came up 
wit11 were "essentially pronuclear," involving continued reliance on nuclear 
power. Demand lnailagemeilt 1va.s not emphasized. As Barbara Connolly 
a.nd Martin List comment, "The pronuclear orientation is not surprising, 
given domillatioil by professional nuclea,r organizations" (Connolly and List, 
1996, p. 269). The other side of this coin is that  "coalitions of the green 
and the greedy" have inore political illlpact than environmental movements 
alone. When such coalitioils are lllobilized behind an adequate definition 
of the problem, as llappeiled with respect to  ozone and CFC production, 
policy change and implemeiltatioil ca,n occur with remarkable rapidity (Oye 
and Maxwell, 199.5). 
Policy negotiation ca,n a.lso be smoot~li or contorted. At this stage of the 
process, we also observe va.ria,tion in effect~iveness. Compa.re, for instance, the 
Montreal Protocol Fund with the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Both 
funds had similar purposes: to tra.nsfer resources from rich to poor countries 
to  help solve eilvironmental problems with transboundary implications. The 
G E F  was established in 1990 with a \llorld Bank-led administrative structure 
and with clear dominaace of a,n "informal" governance structure by donor 
countries and the Ba.nli. It therefore la,cked legitimacy with governments of 
poor countries. Since it wa,s an open-ended pilot program with ambiguous 
rules, both poor a,nd rich couiltries worried about setting adverse precedents 
that  would affect major future allocations of resources. As a result, in its ini- 
tial years the GEF beca,nle t~l~oroughly politicized. Each specific negotiation 
beca.nle pa.rt of a North-South struggle over control of financial transfers for 
environn~ental purposes. In its first few years, the G E F  probably made it 
harder, ra.tl1er than easier, for governments to  cooperate on enviroilmental 
aid. Furthermore, conflicts aillong the iinplementing agencies - especially 
between the World Banli, on the one hand, and the UNDP and the UNEP, 
on tlle other - worseiled t.he sit'uation. 
I11 contra,st, negotiations in the hlontrea.1 Protocol Fund, also established 
in 1990, have been businesslike and productive. Before the developing coun- 
tries were brought into negotiations. developed countries had already ta.ken 
steps, individually and collectively. to  reduce production of ozone-depleting 
substances. Iience they were lieeii to ensure that developing countries would 
not untlernline their efforts l)y sharply increasing their own production of 
these substa.nces. The coillbination of high dema,nd for agreement on the 
part of developed countries and strong ba,rgaining power for developing coun- 
tries led to  a formal decision-ma,liing structure with equal representation, on 
an executive committee, of developed a,nd developing countries. Decisions 
are norn~ally imde  by consensus and in aay case require a two-thirds vote 
of all members a.nd a. ma.jority of both developed a.nd developing countries. 
The Fund has a strong illdependent secreta.riat, and serious attention is paid 
to  scientific criteria in evaluating project proposals. 
The third sta,ge in the process iiivolves implementation, where the most 
serious problems of ineffectiveness a,rise. Each set of institutions has its "lag- 
ga.rdsn - countries t11a.t either refuse to  sign commitments or fail to  live up 
to  them. With respect to  ozone, China and India are particularly problem- 
atic (Desombre and I<aufman, 1996). I11 the LRTAP regime, the laggards 
were largely from Eastern and Southern Europe, but also included Great 
Britain (Levy, 1993, p. 119). Indeed, a,s became evident after 1989, the 
socialist countries of Ea.st,ern Europe werc la,ggards in lllost areas of environ- 
mental policy. 0rganiza.tion of the Pet'roleuill Esporting Countries (OPEC) 
countries and independent ta,nker firills mere most reluctant to  conform to 
MARPOL standards during the 1970s (AIitchell, 1994, pp. 233, 246). Many 
producers, including Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia, have failed to effec- 
tively regulate logging of tropical forests (Ross, 1996). For international 
institutions to have effects on the quality of implementation, they must get 
resources into the right lla,nds. Bribes do not produce environmental im- 
provement. When recipients of a,itl (lo not slla,re the priorities of donors, or 
when they la.ck tlle ca,pacity t,o act effectively, resources are wasted. 
The contrast between JYorld Banli forestry programs in Indonesia and 
tlle Pllilippines (Ross, 1996) illa,lies this point well. In Indonesia, efforts to  
make a.id conditional on illore susta,inal)le logging policies foundered: when 
the logging industry is part of tlle governnlent coa'lition, as in Indonesia, 
tllose who contribute to t,he funds cannot pcrsuade governments to  imple- 
ment genuine reform. In the Philippines in tlle late 198Os, however, con- 
ditionality led to a renlarliably fa.r-rea.ching series of reforms, because the 
VCTorld Bank wa,s a,ble t,o Lvorli with a.ctivists in t,he new Aquino government, 
who sought conditionalit~y in order to increa,se their leverage vis-A,-vis the 
logging industry. Effective interna.tiona1 financial transfers to  protect tropi- 
cal forests depend on a,ctive forces for reform within the countries concerned. 
"Buying" reforin through condit'iollal a,itl does not work. 
4. Explaining Variation in Effectiveness: 
The "Three Cs" 
Environmental institutions will 0111,~ be effective if they create incentives for 
cooperation, wllether anlong regulators, between regulators and the regu- 
lated, or between tllose who contribute to funds and those wllo receive aid 
from tllenl. Otherwise, they will merely become sites for repetitive and 
costly political struggle. Such incentives depend on what earlier work llas 
dubbed the "three Cs": effective eilvirollilleiltal aid is likely to  follow a path 
that  increases concern for environmental protection, provides solutions to 
contracting problems, or increases capacity for designing and implementing 
specific measures (Haas ct nl., 1993). 
Concern refers to the interest in preserving the environment expressed by 
potential participants in an  international environmental institution. Govern- 
mental concern must be sufficiently high to prompt states to devote scarce re- 
sources to solving the problem. Such concern requires political mobilization 
~vitllin societies, put,t,ing pressure on government for act,ion; it also requires 
syinpa.thetic or a,t lea,st responsive individuals withill governments. Where 
financial aid is concerned, the level of concern of the recipient must be suffi- 
cient to make action fea,sible, but not so high as to induce it to go ahead on 
its own, since if it did tlie latter, no financial transfers would be necessary. 
Potential contributors, however, inust be sufficiently concerned to be will- 
ing to spend funds on selected environmental problems abroad, rather than 
at  home. Hence, wheil fina,ilcial t,railsfers occur, concern is typically higher 
among potential contributors t'llan in t lie home state. Such asymmetrical 
levels of coilcern crea.te persistent political tensions between contributors 
a,ild recipients, but they also provide opportunities: financial transfers can 
increase support for environmental protection in recipient countries by aug- 
menting the political or fiiia.ncia1 resources a,vailable to sympathetic groups, 
altering attitudes of key actors, or building political coalitioils behind reform 
packages. 
Also importa,ilt for iilstitutioii building are contracting problems: how to 
draw up internationa,l agreeillelits in whicli the parties can have confidence, 
despite the a,bsence of \vorlcl courts a,nd police to enforce them, and how to 
avoid the kinds of negot,iat,ing foul-ups experienced by the GEF. Where en- 
vironiuental a,id is concerned, the differing priorities of donors and recipients 
give rise to  many potential cont~racting problems. I11 some cases, recipients 
face the danger that ,  a,fter implementing costly policy clianges, contribu- 
tors will renege on their fina,ncial commitments. Developing countries ex- 
pressed these coilceriis in negotia,t,ioils about tlie GEF. More typically, how- 
ever, coiitributors worry illore tllail recipieilts about contracting problems, 
as evidenced by the histories of the Montreal Protocol Fund, debt-for-nature 
swaps, and nuc1ea.r a.id in Ea,stern Europe. In a.11 three cases, contributors 
made large contributions in return for proinises of future performance by re- 
cipients - proinises t11a.t are difficult to enforce. Having received funds, recip- 
ients have incentives to revert to  actioils oriented toward their own priorities, 
rather than those of the contributors: to  coiltinue producing ozone-depleting 
chemicals after a,ii extended dea.dline lia,s passed; to let loggers and poachers 
invade nature preserves; or to  extend the lives of retrofitted nuclear plants 
rather than closing them down. Institutions for environmental aid are always 
designed with such contractiilg probleills Inore or less explicitly in mind. 
Finally, a dearth of political and administrative capacity to formulate 
and implement policies to  protect the natural environment and assure sus- 
tainability is often the grea,test difficulty for international environmental 
institutions. I use "ca.pacity" 11roa.tlly here - referring not just to  the ability 
of goverllilleilts to  enforce la,rvs a,i~tl regula.tions, but to the capa.city of indi- 
viduals in civil society t o  play a.n effective role in policy making. Issues of 
capacity are particularly iillportailt with respect to  environmental aid. Rich 
countries typically initiate these arraagenlents out of concern that  poorer 
countries are not adequately protecting the global or regional environment. 
These perceived policy failures a.lways reflect, in part,  lack of human, or- 
ganizational, and financial resources in the poor countries, although they 
ma.y also result froin a lack of local conceru about eilvironmental problems. 
Therefore, a.linost by definition, recipient ca'pa.city is deficient on issues that  
financial transfer mechanisms target. Developiilg countries typically have 
environmental ministries, but nmny of t.llem lack the technical competence, 
financial resources, or political clout to make much difference. Potential 
coiltributors ma,y also la.ck a.ppropriate a,nalytic capability, local knowledge, 
or long-term ties to  recipient cou~lterpa,rt agencies to  support relatively new 
ellvirollmental goals. Also inlporta.nt is t,he ca.pa,city of the donor institu- 
tions. As the example of environllleiltal a.id to  Eastern Europe shows, when 
established donor inst,itut.ions such as t.he World Bank, the Eur0pea.n Bank 
for Reconstructioi~ and Development, the European Union's Assistance for 
Economic Restructuring in the Couiltries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(PHARE) progra.111, a,nd 11ilatera.l a.id a.gencies confront new environmelltal 
issues, they often seek out problenls a,nd solutioils that fit their ready-made 
orgallizatiollal tool kits instead of t'ailoring interveiltions to the specific char- 
acteristics of ellvironlllelltal problenls. Each of the "three Cs" provides an 
a,nalytical lens through ivhich to view features of the eilvironment in which 
financial tra.nsfers operate. Yet the "Cs" are not separate phenomena in the 
real world; they intera.ct. Perhaps inost obviously, capacity to some extent 
reflects concern. Decisions on where to allocate scarce resources, whether for 
aid progranls by the goverilnleilts of wealthy countries or for autonomous ini- 
tia,tives by developing countries, depend on domestic priorities. Conversely, 
developnlent of capacity a,illoilg stra,tegic a.ctors can affect subsequent con- 
cern: for example, strengthened nongoverilnlental orga.nizations may enjoy 
greater success in promoting public enviroilmental awareness as well as in 
pressuring governmellts t o  take action. Clearly, coilcern affects the contrac- 
tual environment, since differing priorities a,mong contributors and recipients 
create incentives for reneging on commitments. Hence, although it is analyt- 
ica.lly convenient to distinguish among concern, contracting, a.nd capacity, 
they may be hard to  disentaagle in pra.ctice. 
5. Understanding Nonhierarchical Governance 
The domestic analogy and discussions of tlle "tragedy of the commons" may 
have led some people to  believe that interilational environmental protec- 
tion should be fostered tbrough the reinvention of Hobbes's Leviathan. In 
this model, international environineiltal law would be legislated, then en- 
forced. However, reflection on the na.ture of international relations and the 
experiences of iilternationa,l enviroilillental institutions suggests that such an 
organizational design ~vould fa.il. iVorld politics is inherently decentralized; 
ally enforcement of rules that talies pla.ce is not managed from above, but 
occurs tllrough the opera,tioil of reciprocity ailloilg states, often with the ac- 
tive involveineilt of intergoveriuuental a,ild ilongovernmental organizations. 
If the iilterilatioilal eilviroilnleilt is to be protected through international 
action, the institutiolls that accoinplisl~ this task will not be patterned on 
modern states. They will not use hiera~rchies to  enforce rules. Instead, effec- 
tive institutioils will proinote iiegotia.tion, provide information, and facilitate 
the operatioil of reciprocity. They will help to  generate concern, reduce con- 
tractual difficulties, a,ild eilllailce ca,pa,city within countries. They will define 
problems competently - in ways that a.re both consistent with science and 
with underlying collfiguratioils of power aad interests in tlle world system. 
Collective managemeilt of resources \\;ill have to be carried out by institu- 
tioils that  foster cooperation through reciprocity, monitoring, and persua- 
sion. These institutions, to I)e legitima,te, will have to  be multilateral in 
form, iilvolve many sta.tes, and opera.te a.ccording to nondiscriminatory rules 
b a e d  on general principles (Rnggie, 1992). They will also have t o  "get the 
incentives rigllt." 
For iilstitutions to  work well, political pressure for environ~uental pro- 
tection must continue to be 1nol)ilized a.t the domestic level, and both non- 
governmental and governmental institutions need the capacity to analyze 
and iinpleinent protective policies. That  is, both concern and capacity need 
t o  be high. Without robust iilstitutioils a t  both domestic and international 
levels linked closely to one another, diffuse public pressure for "green" poli- 
cies could lead to  merely syinbolic efforts, rather than t o  effective measures 
to  assure improve~nent of the quality of the ilatural and human environment. 
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